The Fight against Biological Weapons

While the use of biological weapons dates back to ancient times (there are examples of epidemics being intentionally caused as early as antiquity), it was during the 20ᵗʰ century that advances in biology enabled the development of vectorized bioweapons, tested in certain theatres of operations (by Japan in Manchuria in 1932 and 1933, for example).

Currently, in light of the development of science and technologies applied to biological and biomedical research and the pharmaceutical industry, along with advances in genetics and nanotechnologies, this threat remains a highly relevant issue.

These weapons are particularly dangerous because germs are living things that can therefore multiply, spread and indiscriminately affect civilian populations as well as military personnel.

Biological disarmament and non-proliferation : legal framework

1925 Geneva Protocol

After the end of World War I, the international community understood the danger of biological weapons and created the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This text, which concerns “the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare”, remains fully relevant today.

France is the depositary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which is conserved in France in the diplomatic archives of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. In 1996, France, like nearly all of the signatories, withdrew the reservations it attached when it ratified the Protocol, concerning the possibility of using such weapons in retaliation.

The 1925 Protocol relates more to humanitarian law and the law of war than disarmament law. It does not provide for the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, but rather prohibits their use in war.

1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC)

This convention, also known as the Biological Weapons Convention or BWC, is the main legal tool for preventing the proliferation of biological weapons. The BWC established the legal bases for banning biological weapons and currently has 187 States Parties.

France became a State Party to the BWC in 1984. It previously considered the absence of verification measures to be an obstacle to the text’s implementation. However, it adopted domestic legislation in 1972 incorporating similar provisions to the obligations stipulated in the BWC.

Strengthening the BWC and improving its implementation

Since its ratification of the BWC, France has worked tirelessly in support of strengthening the Convention’s regime and authority and improving its implementation. In 2019, it chaired the BWC Meeting of States Parties.

Organization

In the absence of verification measures, compliance with the ban remains subject to the good faith of the States Parties. Every five years, a review conference is held, responsible for making the main decisions concerning the BWC. Meetings of States Parties are also held annually in Geneva, with the aim of finding common viewpoints on ways to improve the implementation of the Convention. The Working Group on the Strengthening of the BWC meets twice per year. In addition to the States Parties, these meetings can also include observers.

Recent developments

During the Ninth Review Conference held in November and December 2022, the States Parties agreed to establish a new intersessional programme, responsible for developing recommendations, including legally binding measures, to strengthen the Convention in all its aspects:

• International cooperation and assistance (Article X of the Convention)
• Scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention
• Confidence-building and transparency
• Compliance and verification
• National implementation of the Convention
• Assistance, response and preparedness (Article VII of the Convention)
• Organizational, institutional and financial arrangements

The Working Group is also responsible for establishing a mechanism for international cooperation and assistance (Article X) and scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

The Tenth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is scheduled to convene in 2027.

France’s position

Faced with the major risks posed by biological weapons, France is working resolutely to ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the prohibition rules, by implementing the following actions:

• Taking an active part in the meetings of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BWC, to ensure that the international community remains attentive to biological proliferation issues and to advance consensus on ways to strengthen and effectively implement the Convention.
• Annually submitting confidence-building measures for the BWC and encouraging States who have not yet done so to submit them. Confidence-building measures are annual reports submitted by States Parties on their activities in relation to the BWC (biological research, scientific development, etc.). Their submission is politically binding, meaning that biological activities developed in the country must comply with the terms of the Convention (prohibition on developing biological weapons, for example).
• For France, this reporting mechanism is essential to the BWC. It increases transparency and improves confidence between States Parties to the Convention.
• Working to establish a peer review mechanism through voluntary transparency exercises carried out in different regions of the world.
• Ensuring compliance with export control measures.
• Supporting the BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), which carries out activities to promote universal membership and support the implementation of the BWC.
• Promoting the SecBio platform, which aims to improve the overall level of biosafety and biosecurity of practitioners and facilities by centralizing all national and international standards and practices within a single platform to make them available to all States Parties. In addition to its database function, SecBio offers a training feature in the form of learning modules, as well as a forum to facilitate direct exchanges between experts.
• Making the BWC universal: through its diplomatic network, France is taking steps to raise awareness among States that have not yet joined the BWC about the Convention’s objectives and principles.
• Taking practical action to combat proliferation through the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. In 2011 in Deauville, the G8 Leaders decided to renew the Global Partnership and widen its goals, notably making biosecurity a major priority. France has undertaken several projects in this field.
• Conducting numerous assistance projects and programmes in the field of public health and the fight against infectious diseases.
• Actively supporting European initiatives for disarmament and the fight against biological proliferation. These initiatives include the launch of EU regional centres of excellence aimed at spreading European best practices for controlling chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. France is an active participant.
• Supporting the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM), of which independence is a key principle, in the event of allegations.

France’s biodefence programme

For a number of years, France has been pursuing biodefence programmes designed to improve the protection of civilian populations and military forces deployed in the field against potential biological attacks. These programmes are carried out in strict compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

Biodefence programmes to protect military forces have two components:

• epidemiological surveillance systems, in complement to the WHO global surveillance network, and means of detecting biological agents in the environment;
• biomedical protection capabilities against certain biological agents, including vaccines, antibiotics, serums and antidotes.

The capabilities developed can be used to protect civilian populations on French territory, in response to the risk of bioterrorism, for example. They contribute to the effectiveness of the global health security strategy developed by the WHO, taking into account challenges related to infectious and emerging diseases.

Biological safety and security

• Biosafety refers to a set of standards and procedures that define all aspects related to the protection of workers and the environment against the accidental dissemination of biological agents. Technologies used to ensure the containment of pathogens (filters, sealed containers, etc.) contribute to biosafety.
• Biosecurity refers to the procedures that aim to prevent the voluntary dissemination of pathogenic agents (through theft, misuse or other malicious acts). In an intense epidemiological context (SARS, avian influenza, H1N1, Ebola, COVID-19), the security of biological facilities is a major concern.

A set of procedures to ensure the traceability of all laboratory operations (from site security and access control to operations involving equipment and pathogens) are therefore put in place. Measures also include identifying and avoiding sources of involuntary error. This process can help identify a malicious act.

Within the framework of the G7 Global Partnership, France has offered its assistance in the area of biosafety and biosecurity. In recent years, France has carried out several cooperation projects in this field, in particular in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Strengthening biosafety and biosecurity standards is an effective way to fight against biological proliferation.