Focuses of the fight against nuclear proliferation

First focus: responding to proliferation crises

The upcoming NPT Review Conference will be held amid several serious nuclear proliferation crises. The international community has responded firmly to these crises, happening whereas the total nuclear weapons worldwide had been reduced by over 25% since the end of the Cold War, with the adoption of several resolutions by the IAEA Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council.

Certain States’ violations of their obligations under the NPT have shaken the international community’s confidence in the international non-proliferation regime. They could also harm the development of international cooperation in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to the expense of the vast majority of States complying with their obligations.

To protect the international security architecture, States Parties to the NPT should adopt a firm and determined response to all proliferation crises. It is important to keep a close watch on North Korea because it is coming dangerously close to acquiring an operational nuclear arsenal.

The Iranian nuclear programme

The Iranian nuclear crisis, which began in 2002 when it was discovered that Iran was developing a clandestine nuclear programme, is emblematic in that respect. Iran continued sensitive nuclear activities for more than 10 years, particularly in the area of heavy water and uranium enrichment, without any credible civilian justification.

In this context, France, along with its partners, has always pursued one goal: obtaining a guarantee about the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme with an appropriate method combining openness to dialogue and firmness. Thanks to this approach, international sanctions were strengthened in 2010 and EU/E3+3 negotiations (United Kingdom, Germany, United States, Russia, China) engaged in 2013 led to the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 14 July 2015.

The JCPOA is a non-proliferation agreement which aims to provide stringent framing for the Iranian nuclear programme to curtail the risk of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. It was effective during its first years of implementation.

The United States withdrew from the agreement on 8 May 2018. Since 2019, Iran has violated its nuclear commitments under the JCOPA many times. Negotiations to ensure the United States’ return to the JCOPA and Iran’s full implementation of the deal were held in 2021 and 2022, but were unsuccessful because Iran did not agree to the final text submitted by the Coordinator of the JCPOA Commission in August 2022.

Iran continues to grow its nuclear stockpile to unprecedented levels and to conduct activities without any credible civilian justification, such as enriching uranium up to 60%. Iran’s nuclear escalation weakens the global non-proliferation architecture.

The IAEA opened investigations on the “outstanding safeguards issues” linked with Iran’s implementation of safeguards, about undeclared nuclear material at regarding the detection of nuclear material at undeclared locations. The IAEA Board of Governors adopted four five resolutions – the most recent in June November 2024 – calling on Iran to act to fulfil its legal obligations related to its Comprehensive safeguards agreement regarding safeguards and to fully cooperate with the Agency.

In connection withAlong with its partners, France remains determined that Iran must never develop or acquire a nuclear weapon and that a diplomatic solution is the best way to address Iran’s nuclear programme. o prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and continues to work on a diplomatic solution to this end. It France welcomes commends and supports the IAEA’s important crucial work regarding about the verification of Iran’s nuclear programme and Iran’s implementation of its safeguards agreement, despite Iran continuing of obstruct the work of the Agency.

Nonproliferation measures and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

North Korea is the only State to have conducted nuclear tests in the 21st century and is conducting its nuclear and ballistic programmes illegally.

France has condemned in the strongest terms the nuclear tests North Korea has conducted since 2006 as well as its ballistic missile launches.

France voted for and welcomed the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions strengthening international sanctions against the North Korean regime. France urges North Korea to abstain from any action that might aggravate tensions, to comply with the UN Security Council resolutions and NPT obligations and to carry out a complete, irreversible and verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear and ballistic programmes. North Korea needs to shed full light on its past and present nuclear activities and re-establish IAEA inspectors’ access to its national territory. It must also cease all transfers of sensitive capabilities and items in the nuclear and ballistic fields.

The threat posed by North Korean nuclear and ballistic programmes is not simply regional but global. Every illegal action by the North Korean regime requires a firm and determined response from all States to address this threat and to preserve the non-proliferation standard, which has a value in itself, as well as the Security Council’s authority.

The international community should remain united in the face of the North Korean proliferation crisis: diplomatic and economic pressure aims to prompt North Korea to engage in negotiations on denuclearization. Sanctions are necessary to prompt the regime to renounce its proliferation programmes and to preserve the NPT’s second pillar. France calls on all States to fully and efficiently implement international sanctions and continues its efforts with its EU partners to strengthen autonomous sanctions against North Korea.

In this respect, we deplore irresponsible actions by Russia, which has used its veto power to end the mandate of the Group of Experts of the 1718 Committee of the United Nations Security Council responsible for implementing international sanctions. We will continue to condemn blatant violations of the Council resolutions, including the transfer of weapons to Russia for the war of aggression against Ukraine.

France will again propose a joint declaration condemning North Korea’s nuclear programme during the second Preparatory Committee of the NPT (July-August 2024), highlighting the international community’s dedication to the North Korea issue.

The withdrawal clause of Article X of the NPT

On 10 January 2003, North Korea announced that it planned to withdraw from the NPT, which opened a debate on withdrawal from the Treaty and its consequences, and on how to interpret Article X of the NPT.

France has already expressed its position on the interpretation of this Article several times. The right to withdraw is accordingly not challenged but may not be exercised preventively. Notice of such withdrawal must be given to the States Parties to the NPT and the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. As North Korea has not fulfilled these requirements, its withdrawal is invalid.

It is important to note that even if the requirements are fulfilled, the State concerned is still bound by certain prior legal and political commitments, and particularly, its international responsibility in the case of NPT violations committed before withdrawal.

It is therefore essential to address the issue of the consequences of withdrawal. It would not be acceptable for a State, after having benefited from the provisions and cooperation set out in Article IV to acquire nuclear material, facilities and technology, to then withdraw from the Treaty and use them for military purposes.

Reflections on the implementation arrangements of Article X started in 2004 at the instigation of France and the European Union and should continue in order to prevent possible abuse, as France has stated on several occasions.

Security Council Resolution 1887, adopted on 24 September 2009, includes several provisions in this area and particularly underscores the role of the United Nations Security Council in dealing with withdrawals from the NPT.

Second focus: strengthening the international non-proliferation regime

France considers that it is vital to support and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime in several areas.

Dean Calma/IAEA

Support for the IAEA safeguards system

France is committed to the key role of the IAEA safeguards system, which is a pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It supports the Agency’s efforts to ensure that its safeguards system remains fully effective and credible, particularly through the universalization and reinforcement of the system.

IAEA’s safeguards aim to curtail the proliferation of nuclear weapons by detecting any diversion of nuclear technology for military purposes. Their acceptance by non-nuclear-weapon States is enshrined in Article III of the NPT.

There are three types of IAEA safeguards agreements:

• Comprehensive safeguards agreements, by which a State accepts that the IAEA applies safeguards to all nuclear material used in peaceful activities in its territory, and to ensure the absence of their diversion to nuclear weapons.
• Voluntary offer agreements, concluded by the five nuclear-weapon States, which authorize the IAEA to apply safeguards to nuclear material in certain facilities;
• Item-specific safeguards agreements, which enable the IAEA to apply its safeguards to the nuclear material and facilities set out in the agreement. They currently only concern the three States that are not party to the NPT (Israel, India and Pakistan);
• Moreover, an Additional Protocol, for each of the three types of agreements, gives the IAEA wider access to the information and nuclear sites of a State, with short notice, to increase the IAEA’s ability to verify the peaceful use of nuclear material and to ensure the absence of non-declared activity or nuclear material.

Strengthening IAEA safeguards is beneficial to everyone: the credibility and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system are crucial to enabling the responsible development of civil nuclear energy. If they are not respected, mutual trust is threatened and cooperation to foster peaceful uses of nuclear energy is hindered.

Within the safeguards system, the implementation of an additional protocol, combined with that of a comprehensive safeguards agreement, is essential to obtaining comprehensive assurances of compliance with non-proliferation commitments. It is therefore an essential pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The international community has taken action to promote safeguards agreements and additional protocols. France does its utmost to support those actions and contributes actively through its diplomatic action.

France and the IAEA safeguards

Supporting safeguards is an important focus of French policy regarding the IAEA. The expertise and technical assistance that France provides in the area of verification support the work of the IAEA. They can be seen in particular through the French Support Programme for IAEA Safeguards, which was officially set up in 1982.

In order to guarantee the credibility of the IAEA’s verification activity, France seeks to ensure that the IAEA has the human, financial and technical resources necessary to carry out the mandate entrusted to it by the international community. It also remains attentive to ensure adequate funding for the IAEA’s other priorities, particularly in the areas of promotion and technical cooperation.
To help strengthen the IAEA safeguards, France voluntarily offered to make certain nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards under the trilateral France-Euratom-IAEA agreement which entered into force on 12 September 1981. The IAEA is empowered to verify end-use in order to ensure that nuclear material subject to its supervision is not diverted from civilian uses. EURATOM is party to this agreement. It ensures that the IAEA receives all the information it needs regarding such nuclear material.

Moreover, France signed an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement on 22 September 1998, which entered into force on 30 April 2004 at the same time as those signed by the other Member States of the European Union. The French Additional Protocol helps strengthen the IAEA’s capability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities in non-nuclear-weapon States. France is thus committed to declaring to the IAEA its cooperation in this area with non-nuclear-weapon States, and to allowing it, as necessary, to verify the actual situation in the relevant nuclear facilities.

Lastly, like its European Union partners, France is subject to international controls on civil nuclear material. Two international bodies conduct these controls: the European Commission (under Chapter VII of the Euratom Treaty) and the IAEA. All the civilian nuclear facilities in France are inspected and underwent 334 inspections in 2019 (315 inspections by Euratom and 19 inspections by the IAEA).
France supports the IAEA’s efforts to ensure that its safeguards system remains fully effective and credible. We support in this regard the efforts to universalize additional protocols, as well as the evolution of the system towards state-level concepts based on all relevant information available.

We also support, including through specific financial participation, the renovation and extension of IAEA laboratories, which is used to analyse more than 600 samples of nuclear material from different inspections.

Support for international suppliers’ regimes

Export controls are one of the tools available to the international community in its efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. France provides its support and participates actively in various international export control regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Zangger Committee, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement. In this regard, France endeavours to stringently control transfers of dual-use goods and technologies, i.e., those which could be used for both civilian and military purposes. As such, the export of goods and technologies is not prohibited per se, but it is controlled, generally in the form of a mandatory licence. The control of exports is therefore essential to the development of trade of these goods and technologies because it builds confidence by providing suppliers with assurances of the peaceful use of their exports.

At EU level, Regulation 428/2009 incorporates the recommendations of the various control regimes, which are then directly applicable in the national law of each of the Member States. Under the catch-all clause, it is now possible to control the export of goods not present on a control list if they may be linked to the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction or destined for a country under embargo.

Nuclear suppliers groups

The Zangger Committee was created upon the NPT’s entry into force to ensure the implementation of the clause on not providing any equipment or material for a nuclear purpose not subject to IAEA safeguards under the NPT (Article III, paragraph 2 of the NPT). In 1972, its members defined a number of common rules (“Understandings”) on the export of goods referred to in that Article.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) came into being after the Indian nuclear test in 1974 and now has 48 members. The NSG has drawn up Guidelines on nuclear exports, supplemented by control lists covering nuclear and dual-use goods. This set of rules is applied by the Member States at national level and is enshrined in their respective export control regimes.

In general, NSG meetings address issues raised by the implementation of the Guidelines and the updating of lists of nuclear and dual-use goods. Members also exchange information related to the Group’s goals. Notifications are also exchanged on Member States’ refusals of applications made by companies.
In this framework, France contributes actively to international counter-proliferation efforts, including to ensure the NSG control lists are kept up to date, and encourages efforts to promote transparency of the regime.

France also seeks to ensure that the realization of the NSG’s non-proliferation goals does not impede the development of legitimate cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. France is taking part on a bilateral basis in many civilian nuclear energy projects and provides services throughout the civilian nuclear energy cycle. These partnerships, including with States that are not members of export control regimes, is a testament to our commitment to ensuring access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Missile Technology Control Regime

As part of its action to control the proliferation of ballistic missiles, France plays an active part in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which it helped create within the G7, and for which it has provided the permanent secretariat (Point of Contact) since 1990. The MTCR, which currently has 35 members, is based on adherence to common guidelines on national export policies, which are applied to a list of equipment, software and technology (technical annex) aiming to limit the proliferation of WMD delivery systems. France took part in the drafting and development of the MTCR’s technical annex, which entered into force on 7 April 1987, and which establishes a list of items whose transfer must be controlled by States. It participates regularly in experts’ meetings aiming to keep this text up to date to ensure that export controls take into account the latest technological developments in the area of WMD delivery systems.

The MTCR currently has 35 member countries:

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States.

Continuing to make effective export controls a priority, the member countries decided in 2003 to include a catch-all controls clause in the MTCR Guidelines for controlling the export of non-listed items when they may contribute to WMD systems. Moreover, France has supported efforts to adapt the MTCR to new threats, including terrorism.

To find out more

Support and assistance for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime

France is an active player in ongoing initiatives aimed at reinforcing the non-proliferation regime in practical ways in order to meet the challenges that threaten the future of the NPT. It is particularly committed to the creation of multilateral mechanisms concerning verification regimes as well as the nuclear fuel cycle. It also provides assistance, where necessary, in disarmament and non-proliferation, and supports nuclear-weapon-free zones.

France promotes the completion of the International Monitoring System established by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) through the construction and operation of monitoring stations and the participating in on-site inspection training and exercises. In line with its political support for the Treaty, France has fully complied with its commitments for the early deployment of the International Monitoring System, building and certifying the 16 monitoring stations under its responsibility according to the Treaty, and ensuring continuous transmission of all data from these stations. Today, 90% of the monitoring network set out in the Treaty is certified. This network, which is hypersensitive (below1,000 tons TNT equivalent as provided for by the Treaty), was able to detect the North Korean tests.

Support for multilateral systems for the nuclear fuel cycle

Fuel cycle technologies (including enrichment and reprocessing) are particularly sensitive because they can have both military and civilian uses. Particular vigilance is therefore required when it comes to their exports, as is the introduction of multilateral mechanisms in this field.

During its Presidency of the Council of the European Union, France, together with its European partners, supported a European Union financial contribution of up to €25 million and technical support for the creation of a low-enriched uranium bank under the auspices of the IAEA. This bank, inaugurated in Kazakhstan on 24 August 2017, should foster the development of economically viable nuclear power programmes and prevent the dissemination of certain sensitive technologies of the fuel cycle such as enrichment. The establishment of this low-enriched uranium bank rounds out other pragmatic and tangible solutions that France supports.

Moreover, under the NSG, France has committed to adopting stricter criteria for the export of nuclear fuel cycle technologies. In the early 2000s, France promoted a criteria-based approach for authorizing exports of enrichment and reprocessing technology, subjecting them to certain criteria including compliance with international non-proliferation commitments. In June 2011, the States participating in the NSG reached an agreement on an amendment of the Guidelines for that purpose, strictly governing the transfer of goods and technologies linked to enrichment and reprocessing, and contributing to strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

Fight against the proliferation of WMD delivery systems

France, along with 34 other countries, is a member of the MTCR, a regime for control of exports that could contribute to unmanned aerial vehicles for weapons of mass destruction.

France has also subscribed to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), which establishes confidence-building and transparency measures for ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (pre-launch notifications, annual declarations, invitations).

In application of the EU Regulation 428/2009, France contributes to combating the proliferation of WMD delivery systems by controlling its exports of goods and technologies that could contribute to their proliferation.

Support for nuclear-weapon-free zones and security assurances

Negative security assurances consist of a commitment from nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In the event of any violation of such assurances, positive security assurances strengthen those negative assurances by obliging States to take measures related to collective security or assistance.

France has taken strong commitments in this area, both unilaterally and within regional frameworks.

Since 1982, France provides negative security assurances to over a hundred non-nuclear-weapon States that comply with their non-proliferation obligations. This commitment taken by France, as well as other nuclear-weapon States, is enshrined in the Resolution 984 adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1995, which was further reiterated in UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009) and UNSC Resolution 2310 (2016).

In 2015, for the first time at his level, French President François Hollande reiterated these negative assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States, which he deemed as “legitimate” expectations.

In addition, France has consistently supported a regional perspective to disarmament and non-proliferation through establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). Such zones include both regional States – that have renounced the option of possessing nuclear weapons or of authorizing the stationing of such weapons on their territory - and, sometimes, parts of the territory of States that are not part of the region – in most cases nuclear-weapon States that have undertaken not to deploy nuclear weapons in the areas concerned.

France is party to most of the protocols to the treaties creating NWFZ. In addition to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 (providing complete demilitarization), France is party to the protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ratified in 1974 and 1992), the Treaty of Rarotonga (ratified in 1996), the Treaty of Pelindaba (ratified in 1996) and the Treaty of Semipalatinsk (joined in 2014) creating zones free of nuclear weapons respectively in the Latin America and the Caribbean, the Pacific, Africa and Central Asia. France also recognized the status of Mongolia as nuclear-weapon-free zone in 2012.

France also supports the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East based on UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and on the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

France is determined to continue the dialogue with the ASEAN and its Member States to enable the full realization of a zone free of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia.

France believes the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, combined with negative security assurances, is an essential regional aspect of non-proliferation and contributes to the security of all in accordance with Article VII of the NPT.

Third focus: preventing and curtailing proliferating trafficking

Patrolling the Caribbean Sea
© Jean-François D’Arcangues

The non-proliferation regime is essential and it should be bolstered, but a lot relies on the willingness of States to implement it, to sanction its violations and to stop proliferation. Therefore, France:

• Adapts its legislative framework to ensure that the measures determined in the non-proliferation regime are truly binding:
• Participates in various informal initiatives which allow it to practically impede proliferation flows
• Supports the initiatives and the strategy developed by the European Union to fight against proliferation.

Strengthening of France’s legislative and regulatory framework

Domestically, in addition to stringent export controls, France strengthened its national legal system for fighting the proliferation of WMDs and their delivery systems by passing the Act of 14 March 2011. This Act expanded the range of offences (criminalizing the act of provoking, encouraging or inciting anyone in any way to commit acts related to proliferating activities) and introduced in the Code of Customs provisions relating to dual-use goods.

France has also strengthened its legal system by ratifying the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and its 2005 Protocol. The SUA Conventions transposes into international law new offences related to the fight against proliferation, particularly the transport of “any explosive or radioactive material […], of any biological, chemical or nuclear weapon, […] any source material, special fissionable material” when they are contrary to obligations under NPT. The SUA Convention strengthens the framework allowing for inspection at sea of ships suspected of transporting proliferating goods.

Support for and participation in informal international initiatives

Technical and police cooperation to fight proliferation

France participates and supports several initiatives to fight proliferation, particularly the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the G7-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (G7GP).

The PSI is an informal cooperation forum bringing together 113 countries and aims to strengthen international cooperation in order to curtail transfers of WMDs, their delivery means and related materials. It aims to enhance operational cooperation between the participating States and relies on regular practical training exercises to build participating States’ capacity in intercepting proliferating shipments. Its operation is flexible because to participate, it is only necessary to adhere to the 2003 Declaration of Principles. France is implementing the governmental proliferation inception plan which establishes a framework for national action to deal with the trafficking of goods or technology related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

To find out more about the PSI

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), launched in 2006, governs technical cooperation among 89 participating States and 5 observer institutions (EU, IAEA, INTERPOL, UNODC and UNICRI) in order to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism. Under this Initiative, multilateral activities are conducted to strengthen the various procedures, public policies and plans of participating States. All the participants commit to implementing the GICNT Statement of Principles, which set out a set of security goals.

To find out more

The G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched in 2002, finances and coordinates projects to secure essential materials for making WMDs. This Global Partnership is governed by the Kananaskis Principles of 2002 and the principles developed at the Muskoka G8 Summit in 2010. The initiative was originally launched to assist former-USSR countries in dismantling and destroying non-conventional arsenals, securing fissile materials and redeployeing researchers dedicated to nuclear military programmes. It has been extended to include 31 countries and the whole of the European Union. Its main mission is to contribute to implementing Security Council Resolution 1540, to combat the acquisition of WMDs by non-state players, and it was extended during the Deauville Summit in 2011.

To find out more

Lastly, France conducts regular dialogue with its different partners to raise their awareness about nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues, and to encourage them to strengthen their national measures to control and fight proliferation.

Cooperation and the fight against proliferation financing

Financing is one of the essential aspects of any proliferation activity. The essential acquisition of critical materials and goods with high technological added value, through obscure acquisition networks, make these programmes costly.

The Act of 14 March 2011 also made the financing of proliferation an offence, which makes France one of the first States to have such legislation. It prohibited the “act of supplying financing for a proliferating activity, by providing, bringing together or managing any funds, values or goods or by providing advice for that purpose” (Articles L. 1333-13-5 of the Code of Defence on nuclear materials, Article L. 2341-2 on biological weapons and Articles L. 2342-3 and L. 2342-60 on chemical weapons). In support of this legislative approach, France has carried out a national analysis on proliferation financing risks to evaluate the most exposed sectors and serve as a basis for raising the private sector’s awareness.

The Security Council resolutions relating to proliferation finance target the financing of this activity. Particularly Resolution 1540 (2004) requires that States prohibit and curb any financing of activities enabling any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, posses, develop, transport or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery.

FATF Action

An intergovernmental body created in 1989 under the impetus of the G7, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is made up of 40 members. It is a forum for creating and monitoring internationally endorsed standards against money laundering and terrorist financing.

International discussion in this forum was established to develop the necessary tools to identify and prevent the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drawing on the mechanisms used to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

FATF plenary meeting, February 2012 Credits: FATF

This work is conducted in the FATF. The FATF mission is to set standards and to promote the application of legislative, regulatory and operational measures against money laundering and terrorist financing. Its mandate was extended in 2012 to include countering the financing of the proliferation of WMDs.

As a result, the FATF standards were reviewed to include Recommendation 7 through which States committed to:

• Implement targeted financial sanctions against persons and entities designated under the UNSC Resolutions adopted on the basis of Chapter VII;
• Freeze, without delay, the funds or other assets of these persons and entities;
• Ensure that no funds or other assets are made available to them, directly or indirectly, or for their benefit.

The implementation of Recommendation 7 is supported by a Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT/ CPF Systems. In addition, it establishes a high-level political goal of introducing a system in which designated persons and entities are identified, deprived of resources, and prevented from raising, moving and using funds and other assets to finance proliferation. Countries are then obliged to demonstrate the effectiveness of their efforts to implement targeted financial sanctions, without delay, monitor compliance and ensure adequate cooperation between the relevant authorities to avoid the circumvention of sanctions.

France is strongly committed to regularly adjusting politicy and legal frameworks to evolving threats and to effectively countering the financing of proliferation. Against this backdrop, it supported the inclusion of this issue in the FATF mandate and actively participates in work in this area in the FATF.

France contributed to the evolution of FATF Recommendation 1, which until October 2020 only concerned countering money laundering and terrorist financing. It is now required to conduct an assessment of proliferation financing risks. Countries are asked to identify, assess, and understand the proliferation financing risks to which they are exposed, to increase engagement with the private sector and take commensurate mitigation measures.