Nuclear disarmament

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France is committed to nuclear disarmament, the first pillar of the NPT. France takes a three-pronged approach:

  • Adopting a progressive and pragmatic approach to nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT respecting the principle of undiminished security for all.
  • Taking concrete action for disarmament by reducing its arsenal to the lowest level compatible with the strategic context and irreversibly dismantling its fissile materials production facilities for nuclear weapons in complete transparency.
  • Setting priorities to continue disarmament gradually, particularly by completing the next steps which are the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); negotiating a Fissile Missile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament; and continuing work on the verification of nuclear disarmament and efforts on arms control.

Key figures

300

France announced an overall cap on nuclear weapons in 2008.

1992

France irreversibly stopped producing plutonium; in 1996, it stopped producing highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

1998

France ratified the CTBT.

1/3

In 2008, France announced that it had reduced the number of weapons, missiles and aircraft in the airborne component of its deterrent force, following on from the reduction from 6 to 4 SSBN in its seaborne force in the 1990s.

- 50%

France halved its nuclear arsenal between 1991 and 2008, in line with its principle of strict sufficiency.

0

France no longer has any nuclear testing facilities nor fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons.

€75 million

Total cost of denuclearizing the Albion Plateau, completed on 25 February 1998. France is the only State that had a surface-to-surface nuclear force that it has fully dismantled.

€12 billion

This was the total cost of dismantling its former plants for the production of fissile material. for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices.

16 CTBT monitoring stations and 1 radionuclide laboratory

In French territory. The Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) has 8 other stations around the world covering all 4 technologies set out by the CTBT.

€7 million

France’s annual contribution to the CTBTO budget.

General principles

Principle of undiminished security for all

Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation measures should be firmly rooted in the realities of the strategic and security context. As in other fields, disarmament cannot merely be declared, it must be built with patience, perseverance and realism.

Faced with a worsening strategic environment, nuclear disarmament must be guided by the principle of undiminished security for all as reiterated in Resolution 1887 and the 2010 NPT Review Conference. As emphasized by Article VI of the NPT, disarmament is the responsibility of all States regardless of whether they have nuclear weapons or not.

Creating the appropriate conditions for a world without nuclear weapons requires progress to be promoted in all countries and all areas of disarmament, inequalities in conventional weapons to be reduced, and work to be carried out on reducing international tensions and improving collective security. Credible nuclear disarmament must be accompanied by progress in other fields (be it biological, chemical or conventional weapons, anti-missile defence or space).

Collective security can only be created on a foundation of mutual confidence, which should be fed by a desire for dialogue and cooperation. To successfully achieve this disarmament objective, it is necessary to make multilateralism more efficient, continue our efforts to resolve regional crises and strengthen strategic dialogue between the main players.

Principle of strict sufficiency

France applies a principle of strict sufficiency to determine the level of its nuclear forces. The French nuclear arsenal is therefore kept at the lowest level possible compatible with the strategic environment. France has paved the way: it has taken significant unilateral measures in reducing its arsenal and increasing its transparency, some of which are unprecedented among Nuclear-Weapon States, especially since the end of the Cold War.

Gradual disarmament

A step-by-step approach to disarmament is the only solution for tangible and realistic progress. This approach, which stems from Article VI of the NPT, was endorsed in the final document of the NPT Review Conference in 2010, as well as in UN Security Council Resolution 1887. Only a progressive and pragmatic approach can lead to concrete progress, which bolsters international stability and security.

“Resolving to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all.”

Resolution 1887, adopted by the Security Council on 24 September 2009

The next logical steps are therefore to ensure the rapid entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiate a Fissile Missile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament, continue work on nuclear disarmament verification and reduce strategic risks.

Transparency on doctrine, arsenals and concrete disarmament efforts help to bolster the confidence necessary for improving collective security conditions.

Negative security assurances

Negative security assurances consist of a commitment from nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In the event of any violation of such assurances, positive security assurances strengthen those negative assurances by obliging States to take measures related to collective security or assistance.

France has taken strong commitments in this area, both unilaterally and within regional frameworks.

Since 1982, France provides negative security assurances to over a hundred non-nuclear-weapon States that comply with their non-proliferation obligations. This commitment taken by France, as well as other nuclear-weapon States, is enshrined in the Resolution 984 adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1995, which was further reiterated in UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009) and UNSC Resolution 2310 (2016).

In 2015, for the first time at his level, French President François Hollande reiterated these negative assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States, which he deemed as “legitimate” expectations.

In addition, France has consistently supported a regional perspective to disarmament and non-proliferation through establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). Such zones include both regional States – that have renounced the option of possessing nuclear weapons or of authorizing the stationing of such weapons on their territory - and, sometimes, parts of the territory of States that are not part of the region – in most cases nuclear-weapon States that have undertaken not to deploy nuclear weapons in the areas concerned.

France is party to most of the protocols to the treaties creating NWFZ. In addition to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 (providing complete demilitarization), France is party to the protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ratified in 1974 and 1992), the Treaty of Rarotonga (ratified in 1996), the Treaty of Pelindaba (ratified in 1996) and the Treaty of Semipalatinsk (joined in 2014) creating zones free of nuclear weapons respectively in the Latin America and the Caribbean, the Pacific, Africa and Central Asia. France also recognized the status of Mongolia as nuclear-weapon-free zone in 2012.

France also supports the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East based on UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and on the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

France is determined to continue the dialogue with the ASEAN and its Member States to enable the full realization of a zone free of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia.

France believes the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, combined with negative security assurances, is an essential regional aspect of non-proliferation and contributes to the security of all in accordance with Article VII of the NPT.

For more information:

Stocktaking of France’s efforts in nuclear disarmament

France is taking several approaches to contribute to disarmament.

Reducing and adapting armed forces, in line with the principle of strict sufficiency

In accordance with the principle of strict sufficiency, the French arsenal is maintained at the lowest possible level compatible with the strategic environment and the foreseeable development of threat. France is applying this principle by reducing its nuclear forces and adapting its strategic positioning.

The complete dismantling of the land-based component was finalized in 1998:

  • by the anticipated withdrawal of Pluton missiles in 1991 and the withdrawal and then dismantling of the Hadès weapons system in 1997

Pluton weapons system (1978) Anticipated withdrawal of Pluton missiles in 1991. © ECPAD / France / 1978 / Pellegrino, Roland

  • by the total and irreversible disarmament of the Albion Plateau ground-to-ground component and its reconversion for civilian use: France is the only State with a nuclear ground-to-ground component to have entirely dismantled it by 1998.

First nuclear warhead dismantled as part of disarmament on 30 September 1996 in one of the Albion plateau launch zones. © Alex Paringaux

The airborne and ocean components have been reduced by one third:

  • from six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to four since 1998;
  • from three fighter squadrons to two since 2010.

France has reduced its arsenal by half in under ten years.

Enhancing transparency measures

Transparency measures have been taken by France both when it comes to the composition of nuclear forces and doctrine and disarmament actions.

France is transparent regarding the composition of its nuclear forces:

  • Announcement of the total cap on the French arsenal (less than 300 nuclear weapons). France has no other weapons besides those in its operational stockpiles. It encourages other nuclear powers to disclose their entire nuclear arsenals (number of strategic operationally deployed weapons, but also stockpiled weapons and, for States possessing such weapons, non-strategic weapons).
  • Announcement of the composition of the French nuclear arsenal: three sets of 16 submarine-borne missiles and 54 ASMPA delivery systems: France publishes these figures in an effort to support transparency. It calls on all Nuclear-Weapon-States to make the same transparency effort for all the categories of weapons in their nuclear arsenals.
  • Pre-launch notifications of all our space launches and our ballistic missile launches and the annual publication of a declaration on our space and ballistic activities within the framework of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). France calls upon all States to subscribe to and implement the Hague Code of Conduct.

France regularly communicates on its nuclear deterrence doctrine (recently in the French President’s speech on 7 February 2020). The fundamental elements can be found in:

  • the White Papers (in 1994, 2008 and 2013) as well as in the Revue Stratégique de Défense et de Sécurité Nationale (Strategic Review of Defence and National Security) published in 2017 and the Revue Nationale Stratégique (National Strategic Review) in 2022;
  • the reports appended to the military planning laws;
  • public speeches by the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister.

France has dismantled part of its nuclear facilities in complete transparency and continues to communicate clearly about its disarmament efforts:

  • to an international expertise mission responsible for evaluating the environmental impact of French tests. This was an unprecedented measure by a nuclear-weapon State. This mission led to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report which concluded that the site is not harmful;

Pacific Test Centre facilities in 1987 and in 1998, after dismantling (CEA)

  • Organization of visits to sites formerly linked to nuclear activities:
    • the former fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons at the Pierrelatte and Marcoule sites (the last visit was on 26 June 2023 for several States Parties to the NPT represented in Geneva);

Visit of the dismantled French fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons at the Pierrelatte and Marcoule sites (5 February 2020) © CEA/DAM

    • the Luxeil air base in April 2015 including the nuclear weapon stockpiles which are now empty;
    • the Albion Plateau launch zones on 18 June 2015, where the silos which contained the ground-to-ground component have been permanently dismantled;

Blast-proof tunnel in the former Command and Launch post in Rustrel. Credit: Marie-Gaëlle Robles.

  • Control of civilian enrichment facilities by the IAEA in order to verify that they are not used for military purposes. The controls carried out at the Georges Besse II plant are equivalent to those conducted in similar plants in non-nuclear-weapon States. The La Hague reprocessing plant is the most highly controlled nuclear facility in Europe.
  • Regular publication and distribution of brochures produced by France on disarmament and reporting documents, especially in the framework of the NPT, which correspond to three actions of the Action Plan adopted by consensus during the 2010 NPT Review Conference (actions 5, 20 and 21). France also organized a seminar on transparency with the Foundation for Strategic Research on 4 February 2020. This seminar, which brought together 60 representatives of governments and civil society, provided an opportunity for France to present its national implementation report, in which tangible actions that it carried out in support of the global and effective application of the NPT are detailed, and to gather the reactions of participants. This report was then updated in order to take into account the comments made during the seminar. The revised version was published in the run-up to the Tenth NPT Review Conference.

This shows that France is committed to more transparency and encourages others to adopt the same approach. Disarmament efforts are rooted in confidence which is built by transparency and reciprocity. It is important for all nuclear powers to move forward in the same direction.

Stopping nuclear testing and irreversibly dismantling test sites

View of the Pacific Testing Centre in operation/before its dismantling.

France announced the definitive end of nuclear tests on 20 January 1996. It was the first nuclear-weapon State, alongside the United Kingdom, to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1998. France is the only nuclear-weapon State to have completely and irreversibly closed down and dismantled its nuclear testing facilities, the Pacific Testing Centre, in late July 1998. France, together with its European Union partners, is calling for the dismantling of all nuclear testing sites, in a transparent manner and open to the international community. It actively contributes to the universalisation of the CTBT.

France is one of the biggest financial and technical contributors to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). The CTBTO monitoring system, now 90% complete, plays an essential role in fighting proliferation, as proven by the instant detection of North Korea’s nuclear testing. France has 16 monitoring stations in its territory.

Stopping the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices and irreversibly dismantling production sites

In 1992 France ceased all production of plutonium for its nuclear weapons and took similar steps in 1996 with regard to its highly enriched uranium (HEU).

Dismantling the G2 reactor in Marcoule, cutting operations/CEA

In 1996, it was the first State to decide to close and dismantle its fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons at Pierrelatte and Marcoule. The dismantling of these facilities is indeed irreversible, as observed by the representatives of States and civil society who are regularly invited by France. France no longer has facilities that produce fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices.

It is implementing a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. France calls on all concerned States to strictly and immediately observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices and to shut down and, where possible, convert to civilian uses or dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

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Assisting with nuclear disarmament within the framework of the nuclear section of the G7 Global Partnership

In 2002, the Kananaskis Summit created the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The initiative was originally intended to:

  1. assist former-USSR countries to dismantle and destroy their non-conventional arsenals;
  2. secure fissile materials;
  3. redeploy researchers working on nuclear military programmes.

It was updated at the Muskoka Summit in 2010 and extended at the Deauville Summit in 2011. Now expanded to include 31 countries and all of the European Union, its purpose is mainly to contribute to implementing Security Council Resolution 1540, to fight against the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors.

In Poltova (a now defunct military air base), a technician cuts the nose off the last of Ukraine’s Tupolev-22M3s, the strategic aircraft manufactured during the Soviet era with capability to carry nuclear weapons (27 January 2006). Photo credit = AFP Photo/Sergei Supinsky

France has allotted significant financial amounts and technical expertise within the framework of this initiatives. For example, France has allocated over €46 million to securing and evacuating spent nuclear fuels and dismantling nuclear reactors from two former Soviet submarines stored at the base in Gremikha, Russia. France also financed the repatriation and reprocessing of two high intensity radiological sources located in Lebanon and Sudan. It contributes to various IAEA projects regarding the repatriation of radioactive sources.

Removing strontium generators on the northern coast of Russia. Credit = CEA

Our priorities

France has several priorities in the field of nuclear disarmament:

  • swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT),
  • launching negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), based on the “Shannon Mandate” (document CD/1299);
  • enhancing transparency measures;
  • continuing dialogue between Nuclear-Weapon States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States on the technical issues of disarmament verification;
  • reducing strategic risks.

The swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CNTBT)

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CNTBT) was signed by France on 24 September 1996 and ratified on 6 April 1998, with the United Kingdom. It sets a qualitative limit on the development of nuclear weapons. However, its entry into force remains conditional on it being signed and ratified by the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty. Nine States in this Appendix have not yet ratified the Treaty: six have signed but not yet ratified it (China, Russia Egypt, Iran, Israel and the United States) and three have not signed it (India, North Korea, and Pakistan). Russia decided to revoke its ratification of the CTBT on 2 November 2023.

While several States have adopted national moratoriums on nuclear testing and only the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has carried out nuclear tests in the 21st century (2006, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2017), these moratoriums are insufficient: until the Treaty enters into force, the prohibition of nuclear testing cannot be considered as a norm of international law.

France therefore calls for universalisation of the CTBT and completion of its verification regime.

The treaty provides for 321 monitoring stations to be set up around the world

Positive and encouraging results have been recorded: 187 countries have now signed the Treaty and 178 have ratified it. Indonesia ratified it on 6 February 2012, meaning that it must now be ratified by only eight nine more States in Appendix Annex 2 tof the Treaty in order to enter into force.

France also participates in finalizing the verification regime by constructing and commissioning monitoring stations and participating in exercises and training for on-site inspections, which helps in the fight against proliferation. It has 16 stations in its territory, and worked to set up IS 25, the last station under its responsibility, in Guadeloupe in 2019.

Developing a seismometer in the CEA laboratories/CEA

France directly contributes approximately 4.5% of the CTBTO’s regular budget, making it the sixth-largest contributor in 2017 after the United States, China, Japan, Germany and the United Kingdom.

Lastly, at European level, three joint actions adopted within the framework of the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) yielded work in such areas as training, building verification regime performance and technical assistance to third countries. The latest decision, adopted on 25 September 2023, approved a further contribution of €6.28 million for CTBTO activities. The European Union has thus far contributed €29.5 million to the organization.

The negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) on the basis of the Shannon Mandate (document CD/1299)

France places priority on immediately starting negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament. It will constitute significant progress in terms of nuclear disarmament: by eliminating capacity to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices, it will preclude any nuclear arms race in accordance with the goal set out in Article VI of the NPT.

Dismantling of the G2 plutonium production reactor in Marcoule (June 2009)

The FMCT is the next logical step to nuclear disarmament with the quick entry into force of the CTBT. The FMCT and the CTBT should prevent qualitative and quantitative improvement of nuclear arsenals, thus being essential steps for continuing disarmament efforts and consisting in the next logical and necessary steps towards disarmament and to maintain international stability.

France has been strongly committed to negotiating an FMCT for over 20 years. It is one of the French proposals for disarmament as announced by the President of the French Republic in his speech on 7 February 2020. It is also one of the priority actions identified in the final document adopted by consensus by the NPT Review Conference in 2010.

France has taken concrete action without waiting for negotiations to start by stopping its production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices and irreversibly dismantling its production facilities in full transparency.

A draft treaty was presented by France at the Conference on Disarmament on 9 April 2015 as an official document of the Conference. It was also submitted as a working document to the 9th Conference of the States Parties responsible for examining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2015).

France has reaffirmed the importance it gives to the FMCT by taking part in the FMCT Group of Governmental Experts in 2014-2015 and the High-Level Expert Preparatory Group (HLPG) responsible for drafting the FMCT in 2017 and 2018. France remains determined to renew its efforts to support the opening of negotiations on an FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament. This remains the only appropriate forum for the negotiation of an FMCT as it is guided by respect for the principles of consensus and involvement of the States most concerned by disarmament. France will continue its efforts to support the launch of negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament.

Reducing strategic risks

In his speech of February 7, 2020, French President Macron identified strategic risk reduction as a priority area of engagement for France to achieve comprehensive, progressive, credible and verifiable disarmament.

France promotes a strategic approach to risk reduction. Strategic risks can be defined as risks that have an impact on strategic stability and may result in an escalation leading to a nuclear conflict.

France therefore actively contributes to various initiatives on strategic risk reduction at the national, bilateral and multilateral levels. France participates to discussion on strategic risk reduction within the framework of the P5 Process which brings together the five nuclear-weapon States. In this format, our aim is to push for the adoption of concrete measures of risk reduction building on the P5 Leaders Statement of January 2022, which stated “the avoidance of war between nuclear-weapon States and the reduction of strategic risks as our foremost responsibilities”. Alongside the other nuclear-weapon States, France presented a joint working document on the reduction of strategic risks at the NPT Review Conference in 2022.

In the context of the war in Ukraine, France firmly believes in the importance of continuing dialogue between the P5 members at the level of experts on the reduction of strategic risks, to limit risks of misunderstanding and escalation.
Besides P5 discussion and unilateral measures of strategic risk reduction, France also engages in initiatives, such as the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) initiative or the senior officials meeting on reducing risks of nuclear conflict.

Strategic Arms control

Strategic Arms Control provides a crucial contribution to strategic stability. France strongly believes in strategic disarmament, as well as arms control between States with the largest arsenals. Maintaining regulation on strategic competition through law is a priority for France. It is in the interest of European security and provides stability, foresight and transparency, and makes it possible to manage certain systems that could otherwise become destabilizing elements.

Since 2019, when the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty expired, the New START Treaty has been the last strategic arms control treaty between the United States and Russia. It stems from the SALT treaties, which were negotiated in the early 1970s, and was signed in 2010 by Presidents Obama and Medvedev. In particular, it limits the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed operationally to 1,550 for each of the States parties to the treaty.

The extension of the New START in 2021 was essential, and we are calling for negotiations on a follow-up agreement after 2026. The verification system which is central to the New START is a key element in building confidence. The New START Treaty is an important contribution to the implementation of Article VI of the NPT.

Enhancing transparency measures

Transparency is particularly important in building confidence, which is essential in arms control and disarmament, and a factor of strategic stability.

The President of the French Republic underlined the importance of transparency in the speech he gave on Friday 7 February 2020, reiterating that the French nuclear arsenal has under 300 nuclear warheads. He also encouraged the nuclear powers to go further in their transparency efforts.

Continuing dialogue between Nuclear-Weapon States and Non-Wuclear-Weapon States on the technical issues of disarmament verification

France actively takes part, alongside some thirty Nuclear-Weapon and Non-Nuclear Weapon States, in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). This partnership addresses the technical aspects and challenges related to nuclear disarmament verification, with the aim of exchanging and mutual understanding of the issues involved in the verification measures. It also aims to strengthen mutual confidence between Nuclear-Weapon and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. France jointly organized an on-site exercise with Germany (NuDiVe). The first exercise took place in September 2019 and the second in April 2022. These exercises focused on the dismantling phase of a nuclear warhead, and aimed to test a set of procedures developed within the IPNDV, designed to provide sufficient safeguards ensuring that no fissile material had been diverted during the (fictional) dismantling process.

France also took part in the two Environmental Management Group (EMG)s on disarmament verification.

Updated: July 2024