DISCUSSION PAPERS IN DIPLOMACY

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WHAT CAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACHIEVE?

Alan K. Henrikson

The key word in the main question before us is ‘achieve’. The problem is not just what does ‘public diplomacy’ do, but what results does and can it obtain? It may be setting too high a standard to expect truly lasting accomplishments from public diplomacy, considered all by itself. That would surely be too much to ask of it. Public diplomacy, or ‘PD’ for short, usually has been, after all, a support function, an adjunct or accessory service to major policy initiatives which have high-political, economic, and even military components. One thinks, for example, of the Marshall Plan—the European Recovery Program. Or, in more recent times, the formation of the European Union and the expansion of NATO. Or, today, the U.S. government’s ‘global war on terror’, which, as it is being directed, has entailed large-scale military intervention in Afghanistan and the invasion and de facto occupation of Iraq. In all of these cases, the role of publicity—the attempt to reach publics and to influence public opinion—surely was secondary to other, more urgent operations and considerations.

However, it still is reasonable, and also very timely, to ask: Can public diplomacy—‘the PD factor’—make a difference? Might it produce, under certain circumstances, results that are truly significant—results that are recognized and not merely noticed, results that change situations and not just charge them, results that mean something and not just say something? I believe that it can, and the historical record does provide some evidence in support. Accumulated past experience, however, may not be the best guide for assessing what public diplomacy can accomplish today. Conditions, particularly the technology and the infrastructure of communications, have radically changed. This creates a vast new potential. As a recent British ambassador to the United States, Sir Christopher Meyer, has said, ‘We’re babies in the proper use of information technology.’ Communication, of ideas as well as of information, arguably has now become the most powerful form of action. Even Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has recently

acknowledged, noting that America’s adversaries well understand it too, that ‘communications transcends borders’, and that ‘a single news story handled skillfully can be as damaging to our cause and helpful to theirs as any other method of military attack’. Public opinion is becoming the arbiter of history. Opinion is a measure as well as the source of power.

Communication, however, is not all about warfare, about winning ‘hearts and minds’ for the sake of achieving military victory. It is, as Karl Deutsch long ago emphasized, the method of community. While communication as such is neutral, it can also reflect idealism. ‘Communicative action’ in the world’s public spaces or ‘public sphere’, in the terminology used by the philosopher Jürgen Habermas and others in recent years, may even be the way to a more enlightened future. Conditions—the communications revolution plus the spread of democracy—seem favorable. Equal opportunity for participation, emphasis on rationality of thought, and the increased adequacy of information can work powerfully to establish world order, in this view. Against it, however, is the perhaps more realistic belief of many, including some post-modernists, that with globalization and the Internet can come communicative anarchy—not the development, but the dissolution of community. Rather than becoming united by the increased frequency and criss-crossing of messages, in this opposing view, world society might become fractionated. With multiple centers competing with each other in debates in the global ‘public sphere’, the result might be fragmentation and divergence rather than unity.

5) ‘Habermas’ Public Sphere’, http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/bassr/gaynor/publics.htm. For a discussion emphasizing the ‘normative potential of communicative action’ even in the (theoretically) ‘anarchic’ international, or interstate, arena, see Jennifer Mitzen, ‘Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Global Public Spheres’,
What does this—the new communications era—mean for diplomacy, particularly public diplomacy? Although, as noted, the conditions under which public diplomacy is conducted have been changing very rapidly, the fundamental purposes and organizational structures of public diplomacy, as with the institution of diplomacy generally, have been evolving much more slowly. The tension created can be felt everywhere in the diplomatic world, and indeed throughout the entire world of politics. Thus, in addressing the challenging present question, ‘What Can Public Diplomacy Achieve?’, I shall endeavor not to do so in isolation from the actual governmental settings and the larger social contexts in which diplomacy must be conducted today.

FROM COORDINATION….

One of the most pressing situational factors bearing down on public diplomacy is what I might call the constraint of ‘coordination’. One aspect of this constraint is the insistence that those involved in diplomacy, including public diplomacy, be and stay ‘on message’. While of course necessary to a degree, this imperative to concentrate on one theme or even one point can preclude not just the airing of reasonable alternative views but even the giving of full explanations of policy. David Brooks, the conservative and generally pro-Bush administration columnist for the New York Times, has, for example, been very critical of the president’s speeches, in particular, for placing resolve above logic—offering resolution rather than ratiocination. Oversimplification—and the assertion of will—is just boring. It can become unpersuasive. The effect can be to take reason, and reasoned dialogue, out of the diplomatic process. That is a first aspect of the coordination constraint.

A second aspect, closely related to it, involves the administration as well as the articulation of policy. It is the demand, often now being made, for the closer integration, and sometimes even the amalgamation, of the various services and agencies that are engaged in the work of international communication, in the broadest sense. There is a perceptibly increasing requirement coming from the governments of many countries, though not, so obviously, from their general publics or even from their legislatures, for the ‘alignment’ of public diplomacy—and development assistance and even tourism promotion too—with the stated (and sometimes unstated, inexpressible) foreign policy aims of the countries’ political leaderships. That
is a second aspect of the coordination demand. This can have the harmful effect of blurring the missions and making bland the personalities of the different agencies involved in public diplomacy, denying them an opportunity to maximize the results of their acquired, distinctive strengths.

A third, also closely related aspect of the constraint of coordination is the today more openly and firmly expressed insistence on ‘accountability’ to a country’s taxpayers. Of course, it should not have to be said that it is not only the elected political leaders of a country who have a special responsibility in this respect. All self-respecting, conscientious civil servants do as well. An overemphasis on fiscal and political accountability can create a damaging atmosphere of punitiveness—as well as, of course, short-term thinking and a superficial result-orientation. This can actually be wasteful.

I would frankly acknowledge that these features of the ‘coordination’ demand are evident in some of the current governmental approaches of my own country, the U.S.A. And I have to say that I have noted signs of them, too, in some of the high-level reports and other documentation produced in the U.K.

……To Partnership

There is, undeniably, great merit in thematic coherence, organizational consistency, and fiscal control. But an ensemble, a complex and overall whole, such as the conduct of a country’s foreign policy should be, has its parts. And the individual parts of a national ensemble have their own missions to fulfill, their own particular functions, or distinctive roles, to perform. To some degree, these may counterbalance one another. A measure of separation is needed for the melodic interaction of voices, in government and also in diplomacy.

On the positive side, weighing against the negative constraint of overemphasis on ‘coordination’, is a notion with greater up-side potential. I have noted in some of the British and American, and incidentally also Canadian and Norwegian, public diplomacy-related materials I have read the recurrence and interestingly varied use of the term, ‘partnership’.

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suggest, a key word and concept. It is one that, if developed still further, could provide a way forward to an even more effective, and ‘achieving’, public diplomacy. It is a non-hierarchical idea, a respectful one, and one that invites others’ participation. Moreover, it crosses boundaries from the domestic sphere to the international sphere, and also from the public to the private sphere. It is becoming one of the most creative and influential notions in the whole field of international cooperation. This is partly because ‘partnering’ is dynamic, not just static. It is a process as well as a structure, a verb as well as a noun.

In some of the British documents I have seen, ‘partners’ is used to denote the different agencies of government that are involved in delivering the country’s messages and services abroad. It is used also with reference to the country’s closest foreign allies and friends, particularly in connection with some common or joint undertaking. It is used, too, to identify certain countries outside the circle of established alliance and older friendship that, it is hoped, might be brought into closer association. Moreover, and perhaps most pertinently, it is used to designate those elements within other countries—beyond their governments at different levels—that are to be engaged in exchange and even cooperation, or partnership. Thus ‘public-private partnerships’ of many kinds too are encompassed within the larger ‘partnership’ concept.

A good recent example of this, from the U.S. experience, is the ‘Partnership for Disaster Relief’ formed by a number of American businesses, at the instigation of the U.S. government, to help the people of Pakistan after the devastating earthquakes in Kashmir. ‘I think companies are realizing that we all have to be salesmen for America and not just sit back and rely on the government’, said Sanford Weill, chairman of Citigroup Inc. He himself helped to lead the effort, possibly at the prompting of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and close Texas friend and former White House reliable partner’, a position deriving from its varied peace facilitation and development support successes overseas—as well as, implicitly, its oil wealth (pp. 81-82). Jan Petersen, ‘Norwegian Public Diplomacy’, address at the Norwegian Heritage Museum, Seattle, 12 April 2004, http://odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/aktuelt/taler/statsraad_a/032171-090220/dok-bn.html.

assistant to President George W. Bush, Karen Hughes. His company contributed 7 million dollars.7

The very notion of partnership implies, as noted, the ‘wholeness’ of a combined undertaking. It suggests joint ownership, so to speak, of the enterprise or effort—if not necessarily fully equal shares, and also common, if not necessarily fully equal, participation in decision-making. There is also to be expected some measure of sharing of profit and loss. There could even be joint liability. Most of all, there is mutuality—of interest, of effort, of thought, of feeling. I note that for the British Council ‘mutuality’ is a key word.8 Partnership in international relations, including transactions with a high degree of public diplomacy in them, means mutual involvement, common deliberation, and the sharing of results.

Partnering is not a one-way relationship. It’s a two-way street. It is inherently bilateral. Or even multilateral. With three or more participants, however, the dynamics and the nature of a ‘partnership’ can change in subtle ways. Patterns of leadership and followership can emerge—though these can shift, with leaders and followers exchanging roles and dividing responsibilities, and otherwise adapting to each other. Mutuality broadens, with the increase of numbers and the repetition and accumulation of experience, beyond reciprocity into a more generalized comity—possibly even into community. The best public diplomacy, surely, depends on reciprocity.

Having offered this prefatory comment on the centrality of ‘partnership’ in effective public diplomacy, I shall proceed presently to outline, in connection with public diplomacy, a number of major strategies that have


9) Mark Leonard and Andrew Small [The Foreign Policy Centre], with Martin Rose [Counterpoint, British Council], British Public Diplomacy in the ‘Age of Schisms’ (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2005), contains an effective explication of it. See also Martin Rose and Nick Wadham-Smith, Mutuality, Trust and Cultural Relations (London: Counterpoint, British Council, 2004).
been pursued by governments, particularly those of the United States and the
United Kingdom, sometimes working together. All of these exhibit a potential
for ‘achievement’ in public diplomacy. To some degree these policy-models
represent a historical sequence, though they do also overlap. Older strategies
can be revived, and have application in new situations, including some of the
not entirely unprecedented situations we are facing today.

Each of the strategic concepts I shall describe—five in all—has a close
relationship to foreign policy. In several cases, they even have been the
‘names’ of foreign policies. The conceptual headings of these five categories of
larger political strategy are: (1) consolidation, (2) containment, (3) penetration,
(4) enlargement, and (5) transformation.

All of these policy-related concepts imply a set of ‘public diplomacy’
approaches. These may differ somewhat in each case. Some public-diplomatic
approaches, that is, probably are better suited than are others to the
achievement of the policy goals that our governments today are more
insistently saying should be pursued in a coordinated way. I confess that I
have not fully thought through exactly which methods best match which
goals. Whether such coordination is fully desirable, or even entirely possible,
is, as I have suggested, debatable. Nonetheless, it should be recognized that,
nowadays, the burden of proof is on those who would maintain more loosely
associated, more pluralistic, and more segmented approaches to governmental
communication with other societies, for that would mean a public diplomacy
that is less overtly ‘purposeful’, in a goal-oriented sense. The dominant trend
clearly is in favor of integration, or tighter coordination.

**THE NEW CONCEPTION OF ‘PUBLIC DIPLOMACY’**

Because it will have relevance for an assessment as to what public diplomacy
might (or might not) be able to achieve in connection with the five large
political strategies I have mentioned, I must be as clear as possible as to what
my understanding of ‘public diplomacy’ is, what it means. This is not so
much to indicate how I myself would use the term, as to indicate how it is
increasingly coming to be used. Its meaning has changed. ‘Public diplomacy’
always has been, of course, a somewhat ambiguous, even oxymoronic
expression. As a diplomatic historian, I must admit to a bias in favor of the
traditionalist view that diplomacy is conducted by diplomats, interacting
primarily with each other and with government officials—not with general
publics, beyond, that is, a certain upper level or interested segment of society
that may be considered part of a ‘diplomatic community’. This is certainly
consistent with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which confers not just ‘privileges and immunities’ upon members of a diplomatic mission but also certain limiting expectations regarding their activity in the host country. Apart from the duty ‘to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State’ and ‘not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State’ (Article 41, paragraph 1), there is the requirement, which is becoming increasingly unrealistic, that all ‘official business’ entrusted to the mission ‘be conducted with or through the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the receiving State or such other ministry as may be agreed’ (Article 41, paragraph 2).

The premise of the traditional view is that the purpose of diplomacy, including public diplomacy, is to affect the policies, dispositions, and actions of other states. ‘Public’ diplomacy is thus to be differentiated from the rest of diplomacy only in that the influence to be exerted on other countries’ governments is indirect, i.e., exerted via channels other than the formal or ‘official’ ones—notably, via the press and other such media of mass communication, today including the Internet, and also through more specialized networks of various kinds ranging from business connections, trade unions, scholarly associations, diasporic relationships, and religious or other institutions and affiliations. This focus on influencing, in one way or another, the governments of foreign countries, in this understanding, is what makes public diplomacy, from a traditionalist perspective, diplomacy. There is still a lot to be said for this relatively strict definition. ‘Together with the balance of power, which it both reinforces and reflects’, observes Geoffrey Berridge, ‘diplomacy is the most important institution of our society of states’ (emphasis added).

The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, which, owing to the professional experience and personal imagination of the then-Dean, Ambassador Edmund A. Gullion, led the field with the establishment in the early 1960s of the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy. This center was to have been directed by Ed Murrow himself, but he died before he could take up the position, following his service as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Director of the United States Information Agency.

The Fletcher School’s Murrow Center has over the years used different formulations of the idea of ‘public diplomacy’, a term on which it has been

recognized as having institutionally almost a patent. This has been reinforced over the years by the annual awarding to a deserving USIA (and now just State Department) officer the ‘Edward R. Murrow Award for Excellence in Public Diplomacy’, after which the recipient gives a brief speech. Although the definitional formulation has varied, the central element in it has always been, until very recently, the notion that governments employ public media and social channels to influence the attitudes and actions of other governments—especially the administrations or (more pejoratively) the regimes in control of other states. The sources of the influence brought to bear could include more than governmental sources. But the focus was always on the ‘foreign policy decisions’—ultimately to be carried out governmentally—of other countries.

Now, however, the emphasis of the term ‘public diplomacy’ is perceptibly shifting toward shaping the thoughts of and forming relationships with other societies. This is conceived almost as an objective in itself, irrespective of the bearing that this influence on other societies might have, at least in the short run, on relationships with the governments—the current leadership—of the countries in question. This new tendency in the understanding of ‘public diplomacy’ can be seen, for instance, in the definition offered by the Carter Report. Noteworthy in the definition proffered there, apart from the stress on ‘consistency’ with the goals of the British government, is the absence of any explicit reference to other governments. The Carter Review Team characterized


13) The cultural diplomat Richard T. Arndt, acknowledging Gullion’s ‘authorship’ of the ‘public diplomacy’ phrase, observes that it was ‘a phrase devised to cover the nontraditional diplomacy practiced by USIA’, adding: ‘What USIA did wasPublic Diplomacy and vice versa.’ He notes critically that the phrase ‘all but excluded the cultural-educational dimension of the agency’s work, despite Fulbright-Hay’s mandated fields to be represented’. Richard T. Arndt, The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005), 480, 494, 512.

14) A definition of ‘public diplomacy’ offered in March 1966 by Dean Gullion himself carefully leaves room in the ‘foreign policy’ processes of both sending and receiving countries for extra-governmental elements: ‘By public diplomacy we understand the means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way as to exercise an influence on their foreign policy decisions.’ ‘Definitions of Public Diplomacy’, website of The Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/murrow/pd/definitions.html.
‘public diplomacy’ as ‘work aiming to inform and engage individuals and organisations overseas, in order to improve understanding of and influence for the United Kingdom in a manner consistent with governmental medium and long term goals’ (emphasis added). The word ‘organisations’ here could include, of course, foreign official-governmental organizations too, but the emphasis would clearly seem to be on forming societal connections and gaining direct influence, for Britain, on target countries as wholes, without privileging or even recognizing in explicit terms the intergovernmental or ‘diplomatic’ relationships that in most cases are considered to be the authoritative and controlling ones of the international legal order, or the interstate system.

The implications of this new emphasis in public diplomacy, not only that of the United Kingdom, are profound. The United States government has carried the new trend even further by so stressing the importance of, very broadly speaking, ‘civil society’ in other countries that U.S. relations with governments or regimes of other countries are impliedly made conditional on those governments’ or regimes’ servicing the interests of their people — that is, being ‘responsible sovereigns’, in ways that the United States with the rest of the ‘international community’ of democratic countries might consider appropriate. In short, rather than being an indirect way of communicating with other governments, or regimes, and influencing their policies and behavior, such public diplomacy can be an instrument of ‘regime change’.


16) Although the term ‘regime change’ itself has been given currency by Dr. Condoleezza Rice, as National Security Adviser and subsequently as Secretary of State, the basic phenomenon, which in most cases has involved military force and also has featured some use of what we today would call public diplomacy, is older. The 1953 overthrow of the Mossadegh government in Iran and the 1954 overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala are paradigmatic cases. For a useful brief review, see Peter Ford, ‘Regime Change: A look at Washington’s methods — and degrees of success — in dislodging foreign leaders’, Christian Science Monitor, 27 January 2003. For a comprehensive one,
This, I suggest, is different from the public diplomacy of the past, including even that of most of the years of the Cold War when, owing partly to the constraint of the danger of mutual annihilation with nuclear weapons, the ‘coexistence’ of systems, including the leadership groups in charge of them, was accepted. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 is expressly premised on the belief that ‘an international convention on diplomatic intercourse, privileges and immunities would contribute to the development of friendly relations among nations, irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems’ (emphasis added).17 Today, it would seem, all bets are off. And public diplomacy can be, as it occasionally also has been in the past, a revolutionary instrument. It may now even be the preferred revolutionary instrument, not because military action is physically impossible or too dangerous but because of the rising and manifold cost of war and other violent military measures in our highly interdependent and globalizing world.

**CONSOLIDATION**

The first of the aforementioned policy-related strategies of public diplomacy I shall discuss is consolidation. This, I am more and more coming to believe, is the most important of all the strategies, for it offers the greatest likelihood of achievement and also because it is a necessary step — an absolute precondition — of all the others. By ‘consolidation’, I mean the political process of increasing the understanding of and confirming the support for a country such as Britain and its policy activity within the sphere of the country’s own allies, friends, and partners—that is, with its own ‘camp’, to use an older term, or what we might today call its ‘core community’. This obviously includes the country itself, though, in the conventional nomenclature, it is not ‘public diplomacy’ but rather ‘public affairs’ that is aimed at domestic opinion, the people at home. Today it is widely recognized that the distinction — and the administrative wall — between ‘public affairs’ and ‘public diplomacy’ is breaking down. “Domestic public diplomacy”, as a Dutch analyst of the new public diplomacy, Jan Melissen, terms it, ‘can in a way be seen as the successor to public affairs during the Cold War, and its

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17) Preamble of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

objectives go beyond traditional constituency-building.’ A ‘socialization of diplomacy’ is occurring.\(^{18}\)

A beautiful example, though I should perhaps hesitate to call it an example of public diplomacy (rather than public affairs), recently occurred in the United Kingdom, a country that is struggling with multiculturalism as well as carrying out a complex devolution policy. This is Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown’s suggestion, with reference to the Fourth of July in the United States, that there be a national day to celebrate what is best about the U.K. ‘We welcome the idea of a British Day’, said Rebecca Walton of the British Council, ‘if it gives people in Britain the opportunity to celebrate the positive aspects of our culture and the diversity and vibrancy of Britain today.’\(^{19}\)

It should here be noted that consolidative (like most other kinds of) public diplomacy can be not only bilaterally but also multilaterally conducted, if carried out by international groupings such as NATO, the EU, or the Commonwealth, for example. The 2006 Melbourne Commonwealth Games illustrate the idea of consolidative public diplomacy very well. It is, essentially, what the lawyers call an *inter se* concept, that is, concerning relationships between and among the parties, or members, of a community itself. As Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon said, in commenting on this festive in-gathering of athletes from 53 countries in Melbourne, ‘For a Commonwealth Games, first of all you need a Commonwealth.’\(^{20}\)

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precedes, but it also can proceed from such organized efforts at consolidation, having large public diplomatic components.\textsuperscript{21}

On the European scale, a continuing challenge for the United Kingdom and most other members of the European Union is to engender a sense of ‘European’ identity and feeling. Even nationally based institutions can contribute to this, through their own efforts and by partnering. Stephen Kinnock of the British Council, for example, has urged: ‘We should be actively seeking to form operational partnerships and networks with our analogues (Goethe Institut; Instituto Cervantes, for instance) and other European partners to develop programmes and projects that are European in their design and delivery.’\textsuperscript{22} More must be done, it is widely recognized, to overcome the so-called democratic deficit, in the core areas as well as at the margins of Europe. The new White Paper of European Communication Policy adopted by the European Commission is described as ‘a call for action on how we can close the gap between the EU and its citizens’. Last year the Commission launched its ‘Plan D for democracy, dialogue and debate’, intended to involve citizens in discussing what the European Union is for, where it is going, and what it should be doing.\textsuperscript{23} ‘But these initiatives by the European Commission will only succeed’, the White Paper stated, ‘if many more forces are brought into play. A partnership approach is essential. Success will depend on the involvement of all the key players—the other EU institutions and bodies; the national, regional and local authorities in the Member States; European political parties; civil society.’ In an illustration of how ‘the partnership’ will work, and referring to the cooperative effort as ‘public diplomacy’, the White Paper suggests that ‘communicating about the role of the EU in the world’ would be an effective way ‘to engage Europe’s own citizens as well as to enhance support and understanding of the EU in the rest of the world.’\textsuperscript{24} This is yet another example of intermixture of foreign


and domestic policy. European ‘Infopolitik’, as it recently has been called, is both Aussenpolitik and Innenpolitik.25

Particularly in light of the Danish cartoon controversy, as well as the recent violence involving Muslim youths in Britain, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and elsewhere, the need for a greater sharing of information among Europeans about Islam and of the situation of Muslim communities in EU member states and within Europe as a whole is obvious. Merely verbal ‘solidarity’ is not enough. President George Bush reportedly telephoned Denmark’s Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen to express ‘solidarity’ with him.26 A deeper consolidation based on common values of freedom of speech and of the press and, of course, on religious tolerance and respect for cultural differences is necessary. The Bush administration now sees Europe’s alienated Muslim minorities not just as a danger to Europe’s social cohesion but also as a short-term and especially long-term U.S. security threat. ‘While Islamist extremism is a global phenomenon’, said Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Daniel Fried, ‘we find the nature of the problem in Western Europe to be distinct—both in its character and its potential to threaten the United States’. The challenge is complex. It can’t be addressed only through arrests, military campaigns, or even greater democracy, acknowledged Fried. It would require a generational ‘battle of ideas’, no less critical than that waged against communism following World War II. It would be an ideological as well as sociological struggle. Ultimately, the United States would have to rely on its European allies who, as a Wall Street Journal writer observed, ‘mostly have failed to integrate Muslim minorities’.27

This would have to be a two-way process—of listening as well as talking. It should be centered on local communities, with city administrations as well as national governments and European Union institutions taking a leading part. Again, the emphasis is on internal relations within Europe and the wider Western democratic community itself. In a new effort to engage the Muslim majority, the U.S. government is seeking to bring more Muslims into established transatlantic exchanges such as the Fulbright program and the

26) Glenn Kessler, ‘Controversy May Affect U.S. Efforts: Outreach to Muslims, Diplomacy in the Middle East Are at Stake’, Washington Post, 8 February 2006. In its statements the Bush administration tried to strike a balance that included ‘embrace of freedom of expression, displeasure at the cartoons, disgust at the violence and support for the Danish government’.
International Visitors Leadership program. The State Department has launched initiatives as well to bring together U.S. and European Muslims. The U.S. Ambassador to Belgium, Tom Korologos, has convened a people-to-people encounter between American and Belgian Muslims who ‘compared notes on coming to terms with secular Western societies’. The large Islamic Society of North America has announced internships, scholarships, and exchanges for Belgian imams and Muslim leaders, teachers, and students. The mayors of Dearborn, Michigan, and Ghent, Belgium, have formed a sister-city relationship. Such expressions of American ‘soft power’ combined with a European ‘Infopolitik’ that draws on the informational and capacities of 25 member nations could be formidable. The civil influence generated within EU countries can then be exported to a degree, as is already happening at Europe’s southern margins through ‘arguably the greatest single public diplomacy initiative ever conceived’—the EuroMed Partnership, or Barcelona Process.

For comparison, a similar North-South consolidative process—and, historically, possibly even a greater initiative—is the effort that was made, and should again be made, to confirm the ‘community’ relationship between the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere, particularly those of the Caribbean and Latin America. The concept of ‘Pan American Union’ cooperation dates from the 19th century. It was institutionalized through a series of Inter-American Conferences beginning in 1889-90. The Governing Board of the Pan American Union (the forerunner of the Organization of American States) in 1930 recommended that April 14 be designated as ‘Pan American Day’ as ‘a commemorative symbol of the sovereignty of the American nations and the voluntary union of all in one continental community’. Pursuant to this recommendation, the President of the United States, Herbert Hoover, in a proclamation called upon ‘the schools, civic associations, and people of the United States generally to observe the Day with appropriate ceremonies, thereby giving expression to the spirit of continental solidarity and to the sentiments of cordiality and friendly feeling which the Government and people of the United States entertain.

28) Ibid.
29) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), acknowledges: ‘Currently, the closest competitor to the United States in soft power resources is Europe. European art, literature, music, design, fashion, and food have long served as global cultural magnets’ (p. 75).
toward the peoples and Governments of the other republics of the American Continent’ (emphasis added). 31

With the ‘Good Neighbor’ Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 came a new emphasis on deepening an interaction that, despite the differences of cultural background between the United States and most of its neighbors to the south, were conceived by many Americans, English-speaking as well as Spanish-, Portuguese-, French-, or Dutch-speaking, as more akin to ‘domestic’ relations than ‘foreign’ relations. The Western Hemisphere was the ‘home’ of the Americas. President Roosevelt’s closest adviser on Latin American matters, Assistant (later Under) Secretary of State Sumner Welles, it has been insightfully pointed out, ‘in particular saw hemispheric affairs as a changing and organic challenge, unlike the geopolitical chess games of Europe’. 32 In order to help the relationship grow, and also to offset the Nazi and fascist influence that was penetrating and threatening to ‘soften’ hemispheric political solidarity, the U.S. government began to give limited support to private educational and cultural exchanges—in, for it, an unprecedented official initiative. Secretary of State Cordell Hull explained in a remarkable four-page letter of June 1938—considered a defining document of American cultural diplomacy—that the U.S. government, since its beginnings, had deliberately left to the private sector ‘what should at least in part have been its responsibility’. Henceforward it would not only build upon but also ‘stimulate cultural interchange’ with Latin America, which was prepared for new U.S. efforts in this realm by the Good Neighbor Policy. 33

The State Department’s new Division of Cultural Relations (CU), which came into formal existence in July of that year, was given responsibility for handling these programs which ‘within a few years expanded to other geographical areas’, as the veteran American public diplomat John H. Brown records. ‘After World War II, the Fulbright Act (1946) and the Smith-Mundt Act (1948) laid the basis for large-scale global U.S. government-sponsored educational exchanges “to promote the better understanding of the United States among the peoples of the world and to strengthen cooperative international relations”’ (emphasis added). 34 The first and third of the three

32) Armst, First Resort of Kings, 50.
33) Ibid., 68.
‘pillars’ of U.S. public diplomacy—that is, informational programs and cultural programs, along with educational programs—also originated in conflictual situations, either during wars or in anticipation of them, primarily for the purpose of solidifying relations among those who were or who it was hoped would be, and remain, on the same side.

**CONTAINMENT**

This brings me to the second large policy-based concept I would like to discuss: *containment*. This idea is best known, of course, from its association with the Cold War. It need not, however, be strictly confined to that historical context. The author of the anti-Soviet ‘containment’ policy, George F. Kennan, reflected forty years later that what most needed to be contained was ‘not so much the Soviet Union as the weapons race itself’. He added that ‘the weapons race is not all there is in this imperfect world that needs to be contained’. There were ‘many other sources of instability and trouble’, including ‘the grim phenomenon of a rise in several parts of the world of a fanatical and wildly destructive religious fundamentalism’, with ‘the terrorism to which that sort of fundamentalism so often resorts’. He also saw, in the mid-1980s, ‘the worldwide environmental crisis’ that needed to be contained.

Containment is essentially a defensive idea. At the tactical level, it is, typically, reactive. It is intended, and can be strategically designed, to limit the further spread of powers or influences, not necessarily another country as such, that are deemed harmful or threatening—or are just too big and powerful for comfort. It is closely related to the balance of power. ‘After all’, as John Lewis Gaddis has written, ‘the breakdown of Soviet-American cooperation after World War II resulted not from the actions of any one man, or even any one nation, but from the workings of a political principle so


ancient that Thucydides would have found it familiar: that great powers, separated only by power vacuums, tend not to get along.\(^{37}\)

In our own time, this realistic principle, and the ‘containment’ term itself, are being applied to a ‘rising’ China. The Chinese government’s military spending, and even its rapid economic growth, are causing concern in the region and beyond. The American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, shortly before departing for Melbourne (where she engaged in some consolidative public diplomacy by attending the Commonwealth Games) for ‘trilateral talks’ with Australia’s Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and Japan’s Foreign Minister Taro Aso, spoke in a press conference in a way that inevitably prompted thoughts about the ‘containment’ of China. ‘I think all of us have a responsibility and an obligation to try and ensure that the rise of China will be a positive force for the international community, and not a negative force’, she said. ‘We need together to recognize that China is going to improve its military but we need to make sure that this improvement is not out-sized for China’s regional ambitions and interests. That is concerning, particularly for those who have had the responsibility for defending the Asia-Pacific region of which I would count all three countries.’\(^{38}\)

It is not inconceivable that some would at least think, if not speak, even of ‘containing’ the United States today. I was somewhat startled myself to hear, a number of years ago, a senior British foreign policy planner say that foreign policy in the future was going to be ‘mainly about reacting to the United States’—in a sense, ‘containing’ it.\(^{39}\) ‘Ending the Cold War was given as a gift’, Mikhail Gorbachev recently said of his country’s relations with America. But the gift only strengthened its arrogance and unilateralism, he said. ‘The winner’s complex is worse than an inferiority complex.’\(^{40}\) I should say that some Americans, too, are concerned about the lack of external, or systemic, limitation on their own country’s actions, recognizing that self-containment might be impossible. George Kennan himself in his reflections about ‘containment’ at the National Defense University a decade ago, said:

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'And finally, there is much in our own life, here in this country, that needs early containment. It could, in fact, be said that the first thing we Americans need to learn to contain is, in some ways, ourselves'.

Containment, as has been noted, can be both strategic and tactical. It is positional but also processual. It is both long-term and short-term. The basic idea of it is classically expressed in Kennan’s famous observation—and prescription—of 1947 that ‘Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence’—or, one might add, simply overcome militarily. Professor Kennan was later at pains to explain that ‘containment’, as he intended it, was not primarily a military concept. It was political, and economic. And, he might have added, public-diplomatic as well.

Containment via public diplomacy, like containment by military action or economic measures, also can be strategic and tactical. To stop the spread of terror ‘with a global reach’ is now what might be considered a new grand strategy for the United States, and perhaps even for certain of its allies, notably the United Kingdom. In that remarkable document, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, the statement is made: ‘We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies’ efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed’.

This early-reactive, even pre-emptive, approach would have an informational and ideological aspect as well. The character of much of the current communications effort is, frankly, propagandistic—and reminiscent of ‘informational’ programs carried out by the U.S. government in the 1950s. The National Security Strategy states: ‘We will also wage a war of ideas to win

43) Kennan, ‘The Origins of Containment’, 26: ‘So when I used the word containment with respect to that country [Soviet Russia] in 1946, what I had in mind was not at all the averting of the sort of military threat people are talking about today.’ See also George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), chap. 15 ‘The X-Article’.
the battle against terrorism.’ This would include ‘using effective public diplomacy to promote the free flow of information and ideas to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism.’

At the purely tactical level, some controversial measures are being taken. Some of this informational activity is largely just reactive, aimed at containing rumors rather than spreading truth of a higher order. The machinery that has been set up for this is impressive. ‘They call themselves a rapid reaction force’, rather dramatically began an article about it in Der Spiegel:

At 4:30 every morning, they report for work in a windowless room on the second floor of the State Department in Washington. The televisions in the room are all set to Arab broadcasters—part of the daily search for reports coming out of the Islamic world that could spell danger for the United States.

The team’s job is to correct false reports and wild myths as fast as possible—corrections which are then posted on the State Department Web site. And some of the conspiracy theories are whoppers—like the one claiming the US knew about the catastrophic tsunami in Asia but didn’t put out a warning in time, or the one about US troops in Iraq selling the organs of dead Iraqis.

‘But correcting urban myths’, the Spiegel article went on to say, ‘is just a tiny cog in that part of Washington’s massive PR apparatus aimed at improving the US image in the Muslim world.’ Its author lists, among other activities, the financing of radio and television stations, providing help to build Islamic centers, and giving payments to spiritual leaders. ‘Friendly contact with the Islamic world’, is the secret marching order Bush has given the State Department, the Pentagon and the CIA in carrying out the largest propaganda offensive since the end of the Cold War.’ The program is estimated to be costing ‘billions of dollars’.

Much of this money is being spent, directly and also indirectly, by the Pentagon and the U.S. military under the name of ‘information operations’. In 2003 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld approved an ‘Information Operations Roadmap’, now declassified. This came after the Department of Defense’s Office of Strategic Influence was dismantled following news reports that it would plant false news items in the foreign press. A portion of that effort has

45) Ibid.
been outsourced to a private firm, the Lincoln Group, which has been reported to have a dozen U.S. government contracts totaling 130 million dollars. The firm works in Iraq, Afghanistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan, and employs about two hundred persons. What it does, according to Lincoln Group president Paige Craig, is not propaganda. ‘We call it “influence”’, he said. Secretary Rumsfeld testily defends the ‘use of nontraditional means to provide accurate information to the Iraqi people’ in the face of an ‘aggressive campaign of disinformation’. He protests:

Yet this has been portrayed as inappropriate; for example, the allegations of someone in the military hiring a contractor, and the contractor allegedly paying someone to print a story—a true story—but paying to print a story. The effect is that ‘the resulting explosion of critical press stories then causes everything, all activity, all initiative, to stop, just frozen. Even worse, it leads to a chilling effect for those who are asked to serve in the military public affairs field. The conclusion to be drawn, logically, for anyone in the military who is asked to do something involving public affairs is that there is no tolerance for innovation, much less for human error that could conceivably be seized upon by a press that seems to demand perfection from the government, but does not apply the same standard to the enemy or even sometimes to themselves.’

European governments, in part because their policies are for the most part less challenging than are the attitudes, actions, and actors of the United States, have been able to use public diplomatic methods in their containment efforts that are more open, and more reliant on the structures and forms of conventional diplomacy. Their responses are also becoming more multilateral. For instance, in responding to the Danish cartoon crisis, Prime Minister Rasmussen in early February, rather belatedly to be sure, invited the foreign ambassadors in Denmark, including those from Muslim countries, to meet with him to discuss the controversy. This followed his refusal in October of last year to meet representatives from ten majority member Muslim countries

48) Rumsfeld, 'New Realities in the Media Age'. The use of the Lincoln Group, and other private firms, in its informational efforts clearly has put the U.S. military on the defensive, causing it to have to insist that no ‘law’ has been violated in planting articles in Iraqi newspapers while concealing their source. Thom Shanker, 'No Breach Seen in Iraq on Propaganda', The New York Times, 21 March 2006. There obviously is concern among the military leadership that U.S. communications, in general, risk being ‘discredited’ by the reports of planted articles.
who objected to publication of the drawings. Two weeks later, Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller and Bishop Steen Skovsgaard of the Danish People’s Church in Lolland-Falster met in Vienna with Grand Mufti of Syria Ahmed Bader Eddin Hassoun and Grand Mufti Reis-ul-Ulema Mustafa Ceric of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik, representing the Austrian EU Presidency. The success of this Austrian effort to offer leadership at the European level was limited. The Muslim visitors, perhaps reluctant to appear ‘instrumentalized’ or to seem to be part of a mere ‘containment’ exercise, declined to participate in a press conference following the meeting. A statement by EU foreign ministers soon afterward backed the promotion of ‘dialogue’ with Muslim countries, principally through the existing Euro-Mediterranean—Barcelona—process as well as through the Asia Europe Meetings (ASEM). The EU also threw its weight behind an earlier Turkish-Spanish initiative for an ‘Alliance of Civilizations’, in part an evolution of the United Nations’ 2001 Year of Dialogue among Civilizations that then-President, Seyed Mohamed Khatami of Iran had initiated at a UN General Assembly session in 1998.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, called for a roundtable of influential Muslim-country political and religious figures and other international dignitaries, using an already existing group he had recently formed, the High-Level Group for Alliance of Civilizations. The government of Qatar offered to host the AOC meeting, which took place in Doha on 26 February 2006. At the event Secretary-General Annan, expressed a strong sense of urgency as well as some frustration at the ineffectiveness of

49) ‘Danish PM tries to ease a cartoon row’, AlJazeera.Net, 2 February 2006. Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s refusal prompted twenty-two former Danish diplomats, including some who had served in Muslim countries, publicly to criticize the Prime Minister for ‘snubbing’ the eleven Arab and Muslim country ambassadors who had requested a meeting with him to discuss the cartoons. ‘Danish Diplomats Bash PM Over Anti-Prophet Cartoons’, 12 February 2006, IslamOnline.net, http://islamonline.net/English/News/2005-12/20/article07.shtml.

50) Former President Khatami himself, however, stressed that the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ was different from his concept of ‘Dialogue among Civilizations’, although he participated personally in the latter effort as well. ‘An alliance of civilizations will be meaningless without dialogue among civilizations’, he said. ‘Khatami: Alliance of Civilizations Meaningless Without Dialogue’, Payvand’s Iran News, 30 November 2005, http://www.payvand.com/news/05/nov/1283.html.

traditional forms of diplomacy. He hoped that the High-Level Group members would come up with suggestions that would ‘really catch the popular imagination, so that we are not just a nice group of people agreeing with each other, but people with a message that can echo round the world’. He therefore said: ‘We need to engage in dialogue not only scholars, or diplomats or politicians but also artists, entertainers, sports champions—people who command respect and attention right across society, and especially among young people, because it is very important to reach young people before their ideas and attitudes have fully crystallized.’

This Doha meeting, and other gestures like it including a joint statement by UN Secretary-General Annan, the Organization of the Islamic Conference’s Secretary-General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, and the European Union’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, all were efforts to ‘calm’—essentially, to contain—the situation. No ‘solid plan of action’ yet has resulted. While sympathetic with short-term and also longer-term purposes of the AOC initiative, one can nonetheless to a degree understand the skeptical thinking behind the Fox News description of the Alliance of Civilizations as a ‘daisy-chain’. It was no arc of containment.

54) Claudia Rosett and George Russell, ‘New U.N. Scheme: Alliance of Civilizations’, 22 November 2005, FOXNews.com, http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,176362,00.html. The full phrase was ‘a daisy-chain of dubious associations that cast serious doubt both on the project itself and on the U.N.’s ability to cut loose from the scandals of the past decade’, with reference to two of the former UN Secretariat officials involved in the AOC, Iqbal Riza and Giandomenico Picco.
PENETRATION

A third policy-based strategic concept of public diplomacy, sometimes combined with containment, is penetration, or the attempt to reach target audiences and even to form relationships with selected persons or groups deep inside a target territory. This can be and has been done through the work of intelligence services, of course, but it also can be done through such public-diplomatic means as radio programming and educational and cultural exchanges as well as, of course, exploratory trade and business relationships. The use of this term in the business world is suggestive of its meaning in international relations as well.

Market penetration occurs when a company enters, or ‘penetrates’, a market with its current products or services by either gaining customers from competitors (a company or even the government of the country whose territory is entered), attracting non-users of the product or service, or convincing current clients to use more of what it has to offer. This general idea can be seen, for instance, in an article by the writer on public diplomacy, Mark Leonard, titled ‘The Great Firewall of China Will Fall’. Despite the Beijing-ordered operation by Chinese computer scientists of an electronic ‘firewall with a least four different kinds of filter’, and even the acceptance of a degree of self-censorship by Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, and some other Western companies, most outside information still will get through and most internal messages still will get around—with the resulting likelihood that ‘the dream of a democratic China has not been deferred’.

If the society or bloc of countries being addressed is relatively ‘closed’, such penetration may be as difficult to achieve as it can be important—as a generator of current ‘inside’ information and as a builder of ‘bridges’ for future collaboration. Contacts that may be established thereby, with dissidents (perhaps including persons with ethnic, religious, or other ties to the sending country) as well as with potential alternative political, economic, and scientific leaders, do exert pressure on the existing authorities of the receiving country. Such contacts thus can be risky, in ‘downside’ as well as ‘upside’ ways. Sometimes, of course, provocation resulting from penetrative diplomacy is intentional, and it can gain an advantage for one side. But it can

also occur entirely unexpectedly, and disadvantageously. It can result, for instance, from relatively innocent and benign activities such as scholarly research or journalistic reporting, if the government of the host state considers them to be improper ‘interference’ in its domestic affairs, or even ‘espionage’. The charge of espionage can be a ploy to gain bargaining leverage for a spy exchange. That, too, has happened. Famous ‘incidents’ from the Cold War era are the 1963 Barghoorn case and the 1986 Daniloff case. Normally, however, as with the educational relationships that the British Council developed with Soviet institutions during that period relationships proceeded without notable incident, as long as ‘reciprocity’ carefully was maintained.

Penetration through exchanges, whether government-organized or entirely private in initiative, is a subtle business. It is unlikely therefore to have major consequences, at least in the short run. Excessive claims have been made for the effectiveness of these and related programs. That ‘public diplomacy’ brought about—or even was an important factor in bringing about—the ‘collapse of communism’ may be, as Martin Rose has pointed out, ‘an exaggerated case of post hoc ergo propter hoc’. A good (or bad) example is a University of Pennsylvania Press blurb announcing a book by a former U.S. foreign service officer, Yale Richmond, titled, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain. ‘Some fifty thousand Soviets visited the United States under various exchange programs between 1958 and 1988’, it said. ‘They came as scholars and students, scientists and engineers, writers and journalists, government and party officials, musicians, dancers, and athletes—and among them were more than a few KGB officers. They came, they saw, they were conquered, and the Soviet Union would never again be the same.’

One of the Soviet students who came to the United States in 1958 was Mikhail Gorbachev’s adviser, Alexander Yakovlev, considered by many to be the author of the ‘glasnost’ policy. However, when he was a student at Columbia University in New York that year, as Yakovlev later recalled, he had ‘a very ambivalent impression’. He recognized, of course, America’s

56) Professor Frederick C. Barghoorn of Yale University was briefly held by the Soviet government under a charge of espionage in 1963 and the U.S. News & World Report writer Nicholas Daniloff was similarly accused and held in 1986.


wealth but he was ‘terribly irritated by the primitive criticism’ of his
country by Americans. The kind of propaganda he encountered ‘pushed me
toward more conservative attitudes’, he said. ‘This was not a matter of
intelligence or reason, it was just a matter of emotions. It caused negative
emotions.’ The longer-term effect of Yakovlev’s sojourn at Columbia,
however, presumably was more positive and liberalizing, but it is difficult
really to know the balance of it. The publisher’s description of Cultural
Exchange and the Cold War also noted parenthetically that these exchange
programs ‘brought an even larger number of Americans to the Soviet
Union’. It would not be even plausible, however, to suggest that, as a result
of the Americans’ exposure then, the United States ‘would never again be the
same’.

The post-Cold War world has seen ‘a major shift from ideological to
cultural engagement’, and this is a much more complex process than the
generally propagandistic efforts of the Cold War era. ‘Where once public
diplomacy was a crowbar that could usefully be inserted in the cracks of the
other ideological position to break it down’, as Martin Rose emphasizes, ‘it is
now a much more elusive and ambiguous instrument.’ It is an instrument
that has been called, however, the ‘linchpin’ of public diplomacy. That
argument, and title, is used by the authors of the Report of the Advisory
Committee on Cultural Diplomacy recently carried out for the U.S.
Department of State. Part of the point the authors of the Report make is that
‘when our nation is at war, every tool in the diplomatic kit bag is employed,
including the promotion of cultural activities’. However, ‘when peace returns,
culture gets short shrift’. A peacetime emphasis on cultural promotion and
exchange could, the Advisory Committee’s proposition seems to be, ‘create
enduring structures’. Cultural diplomacy could create ‘a foundation of trust’

59) ‘Shaping Russia’s Transformation: A Leader of Perestroika Looks Back—
Conversation with Alexander Yakovlev’, by Harry Kreisler, Institute of International
60) ‘New Book Demonstrates How Cultural Exchange Programs Helped to Raise the Iron
Curtain’.
61) One cannot help but think, however, of the impact on the course of American history
of a non-exchange-student adventurer who found his way from the United States to
Russia for a period, and returned, disastrously: Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin of
President John F. Kennedy on 22 November 1963.
62) Rose, ‘Supporting the Acrobat’. 
with other peoples, on which policy makers could build ‘to reach political, economic, and military agreements’.

Exploitation of peacetime opportunities also would facilitate creating ‘relationships with peoples’, which endure beyond changes in government. It would, more specifically, ‘reach influential members of foreign societies, who cannot be reached through traditional embassy functions’. These persons could develop into a network, a root system of familiarity and trust. The logic is explained metaphorically by former Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who analogized diplomacy in general to gardening. ‘You get the weeds out when they are small. You also build confidence and understanding. Then, when a crisis arises, you have a solid base from which to work.’ The role of cultural diplomacy thus would seem to be ‘to plant seeds’. For this to happen, a certain amount of early, organized, and penetrative, spade work is needed.

With regard to Iran today, the U.S. government is newly conducting a two-track approach, recently outlined by Secretary Rice before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. This was reported as being, first, ‘concerted international pressure to deter Tehran from building a bomb’—in a sense, though the word is not used, containment. Then there is something new: ‘a newly robust attempt to seed democratic change inside the country with $75 million for broadcasts and aid to dissidents’—in a word, penetration. This money would go to aid dissidents and scholars and also to fund Farsi language radio and satellite programming ‘in the mold of the old Radio Free Europe’, as an Associated Press reporter understood it. Secretary Rice herself stated: ‘The United States wishes to reach out to the Iranian people and support their desire to realize their own freedom and to secure their own democratic and human rights. The Iranian people should know that the United States fully supports their aspirations for a freer, better future.’ Another State Department official, understandably speaking on condition of anonymity, ‘refused to say whether the money is intended to help an eventual

64) Ibid.
overthrow of the mullah-led government’—that is, to bring about regime change.’  

The Department’s newly created Office of Iranian Affairs, headed by the Vice President’s daughter Elizabeth Cheney as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, is currently examining applications for financial support in an expanding program aimed at changing the political process inside Iran. In this competition for funding, according to a State Department website announcement, applicants ‘must outline activities linked to reform and demonstrate how the proposed approach would achieve sustainable impact on Iran’. A Department official acknowledged that activists inside Iran who apply for funds do so at ‘considerable personal risk’. Other experts said these might not be the best ones to get the money. As result of these considerations, the New York Times reported, ‘State Department officials and various advocates for change consulted by the department said that for now the money would probably be concentrated on groups seeking to document human rights abuses and promote women’s and labor rights, rather than groups seeking direct political change.’

**ENLARGEMENT**

A fourth general strategy, in this case directly associated with a policy term, is enlargement, or expansion of the ideological, economic, and also political and cultural sphere of a country and its allies on a very broad front, rather than to prise open a beachhead of influence within a particular country. Perhaps the most graphic expression of the ‘enlargement’ idea was that of the National Security Adviser in the first Clinton administration, Anthony Lake, when he said: ‘During the Cold War, even children understood America’s security mission; as they looked at those maps on their schoolroom walls, they knew we were trying to contain the creeping expansion of that big, red blob. Today, at great risk of oversimplification, we might visualize our security mission as promoting the enlargement of the “blue areas” of market democracies.’

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wisely added: ‘The difference, of course, is that we do not seek to expand the reach of our institutions by force, subversion or repression.’

Instead, enlargement of the ‘blue areas’, as Lake called them, would come from ‘stating our purpose’. America’s ‘core concepts’ he identified as ‘democracy’ and ‘market economics’. The number of democracies in the world, Lake noted, had ‘nearly doubled’ over the last ten years. Since 1970 the number of ‘significant command economies’ had dropped from 10 to 3. ‘This victory of freedom’, he said, ‘is practical, not ideological’; billions of people on every continent were just realizing that ‘democracy’ and ‘markets’ were the best ways to organize their lives. While ‘culture’ did shape politics and economics, ‘the idea of freedom has universal appeal’. In this line of reasoning one can see the influence of the thought and experience that lay behind Francis Fukuyama’s earlier argument that ‘The End of History’, in the Hegelian sense of the dialectical history of argument regarding first principles of social and political organization, had arrived—and that it wasn’t really necessary to have ideological debates any more. Democracy and market economics just worked. Period.

In putting forward the Clinton administration’s ‘enlargement’ concept, Tony Lake emphasized that ‘engagement itself is not enough’. His explanation of this new, more positive foreign policy has a bearing on both public affairs and public diplomacy, particularly the importance of high-level foreign-policy speechmaking. ‘We also need to communicate anew why that engagement is essential’, he stressed. ‘If we do not, our government’s reactions to foreign events can seem disconnected; individual setbacks may appear to define the whole; public support for our engagement likely would wane; and America could be harmed by a rise in protectionism, unwise cuts to our military force structure or readiness, a loss of the resources necessary for our diplomacy—and thus the erosion of US influence abroad.’ His words indicate the importance, it may be noted, of consolidation, and the closeness of domestic and foreign affairs.

‘Enlargement’ thus requires a large, organizing, vision, not just small, clever, penetrative devices. Yet the gains that were to be expected were, at

69) Ibid.
71) Lake, ‘From Containment to Enlargement’.
least in the short run, likely to be incremental and marginal, rather than grand and sweeping. On closer examination, one can see that what was to be ‘enlarged’ was the *existing* sphere. It was a kind of creeping expansion of the West’s own areas of interest. As Lake outlined U.S. strategy, enlargement would develop—from inside out, so to speak—concentrically. The ‘four components’ of a strategy of enlargement were the following: first, to ‘strengthen the community of major market democracies—including our own—which constitute the core’; second, to ‘help foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies, where possible, especially in states of special significance and opportunity’; third, to ‘counter the aggression—and support the liberalization—of states hostile to democracy and markets’; and, fourth, to ‘help democracy and market economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern’. In the last analysis, it was ‘American interests’, not just the American interest in democracy or markets, that would determine *where* the United States, and its allies, would seek to ‘enlarge’. The policy was more cautious and limited than it appeared to be. One can see, in Lake’s articulation of ‘enlargement’, elements within the policy of consolidation, of containment, and also of penetration. There was idealism in it, yes, but also realism and opportunism as well.

The basic idea was to extend the area of Western enlightenment, where it was possible to do so. This would be most likely to occur in areas next to or closely neighboring the sphere of Western democracies/market economies themselves. Thus the newest ‘blue areas’ might, some of them, be overlapping ones—‘purple zones’—at the edges of the former communist sphere, or ‘red blob’. Of course, to speak, public-diplomatically, in such terms would be considered aggressive. It would invite protests that the United States and its Western, mainly NATO allies simply wanted to replace the ‘Iron Curtain’ with another barrier, this time of their own construction, farther to the east, and closer to Moscow—and also to Beijing.

That NATO and the European Union, too, are able to overcome these objections, coming even from within the Western ‘camp’ itself, is a tribute in part to the way ‘enlargement’ has so far been carried out by NATO and by the EU, as representing ‘no threat’ to anyone. Moreover, in principle at least, the ‘door is open’ to any other qualified country in the ‘North Atlantic area’ or in ‘Europe’ to join.72 For those countries that may not be interested, there is always the alternative, from NATO, of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) or,

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from the European Union, Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCAs). The non-exclusionary aspect of these Western organizations has been, however, often difficult to sell. Yet the stated ‘openness’ of these institutions remains important as a way of making them remain at least publicly consistent with the notion of a universal legal order and of a global society.

TRANSFORMATION

The fifth foreign-policy concept that can be advanced by public diplomacy is the most recent, and radical, one: transformation. Clearly it is the most ambitious of all. The very word, used in this context, has an Orwellian quality to it—a Latinate abstraction without concrete reference, and perhaps used to conceal actual political intent. Yet, for the United States at least, transformation can almost be said to be a genuine tradition, deriving from the American Revolution. ‘We have it in our power to begin the world over again’, famously wrote Thomas Paine in his pamphlet Common Sense (1776). ‘A situation, similar to the present, hath not happened since the days of Noah until now’, he posited therein. What Paine then meant, however, was not world transformation but something much more ‘provincial’, as the historian Bernard Bailyn has pointed out. The originality of American Revolutionary thinking depended on the relative isolation of the American position, its physical remoteness which favored such radical simplicity, and creativity, of thought. As Paine himself later observed, ‘America was the only spot in the political world where the principles of universal reformation could begin’. The locus of transformation, or building the world anew, was therefore

initially to be the uniquely advantageous natural setting of North America itself—a whole continent—not fields afar.

Today, by contrast, it is transformation of places *elsewhere* that is the stated objective of American policy. Secretary of State Rice in a recent address at Georgetown University explaining the Bush administration’s new ‘Transformational Diplomacy’, began by quoting President Bush’s second inaugural address in which he, as she described it, ‘laid out a vision that now leads America into the world. “It is the policy of the United States,” the President said, “to see and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”’ She then went on: ‘To achieve this bold mission, America needs equally bold diplomacy, a diplomacy that not only reports about the world as it is, but seeks to change the world itself. I and others have called this mission “transformational diplomacy”.’

In her explanation of ‘transformational diplomacy’, Secretary Rice remarked, as have many others in recent years, that ‘the greatest threats now emerge more within states than between them’. She then asserted: ‘The fundamental character of regimes now matters more than the international distribution of power’—a shift from classical realism to neo-conservatism. She added, however, that in this world ‘it is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests, our development efforts and our democratic ideals’. America must ‘integrate and advance all of these goals together’, she said.

The objective of transformational diplomacy, as the Secretary defined it, would therefore be ‘to work with our many partners around the world, to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system’. She went on to emphasize that the United States would not do all this hegemonically. ‘Let me be clear, transformational diplomacy is rooted in partnership, not in paternalism’, she said. ‘In doing things with people, not for them, we seek to use America’s diplomatic power to help foreign citizens better their own lives and to build their own nations and to transform their own futures.’

What, to me, stands out in this definition is Secretary Rice’s apparently simple emphasis on ‘doing things with people’—that is, *directly* with the populations of countries. This meant a huge organizational and procedural

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change as well as a major shift in personnel policy. ‘Old diplomatic institutions’, she said, must be transformed so as to serve ‘new diplomatic purposes’. The ‘new front lines’ of diplomacy were going to be in the field—outside the major capitals of Europe and in the cities and countrysides of the developing world, in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. ‘Goodbye Paris, hello Chad’, wrote one rascally commentator.79

Along with global repositioning—that is, shifting more personnel not just out of Europe but also out of Washington, DC—she would ‘localize’ the American diplomatic posture. The effect of transformational diplomacy would be to spread the presence of the United States out from foreign capitals more widely across countries. The Secretary noted: ‘There are nearly 200 cities worldwide with over one million people in which the United States has no formal diplomatic presence.’ This need for more local urban representation would be met, given that it was not always possible to build new consulates outside capital cities, with the ‘more economical idea’ of American Presence Post (APPs). The idea of an APP, she explained, is that ‘one of our best diplomats’ would move outside the embassy to live and work and ‘represent America in an emerging community of change’. Presence Posts were already being operated in such places as Egypt and Indonesia. The size and scope of the APP network would be expanded. Even more innovatively, Virtual Presence Posts, too, would be set up. These would simply be internet sites, typically created and managed by young officers, that would be ‘focused on key population centers’—though not actually located in them. These could function as ‘digital meeting rooms’ that would enable foreign citizens, ‘young people most of all’, to engage online with American diplomats hundreds of miles or even farther away.

Closely related to both the localization and the virtualization thrusts of the new transformational diplomacy is a new ‘regional and transnational emphasis’. As ‘geographic regions are growing ever more integrated economically, politically and culturally’, argued Secretary Rice, ‘building regional partnerships’ is becoming more important—in conducting counterterrorism strategy, for instance. A ‘regional approach’ would be used also, for example, in tackling the problem of communicable disease. ‘Rather than station many experts in every embassy, we will now deploy small agile networks of our diplomats,’ the Secretary explained. ‘These rapid response teams will monitor and combat the spread of pandemics across entire

continents’—obviously a containment-oriented approach, as well as a more deeply systemic, transformative one.

The same regionalist thinking, she pointed out, would apply to public diplomacy. ‘We are adopting a more regional strategy in our public diplomacy as well’, she stated. Noting that, for example, in the Middle East ‘a vast majority of people get their news from a regional network like Al Jazeera, not from a local newspaper’, Secretary Rice decided: ‘So our diplomats must tell America’s story not just in translated op-eds, but live on TV in Arabic for a regional audience. To make this happen, we are creating a regional public diplomacy center. We are forward deploying our best Arabic-speaking diplomats and we are broadly coordinating our public diplomacy strategy both for the region and from the region.’ In a ‘Fact Sheet on Transformational Diplomacy’ released by the State Department along with the Secretary’s Georgetown University address it is stated bluntly that ‘public diplomacy is an important part of every diplomat’s job description’.80

‘Partnering’ more closely with the military—or willing participation in civil-military ‘jointness’—also henceforward would be expected from American diplomats. Secretary Rice noted ‘the critical intersections’ of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction, and military security. In recognition of this cross-cutting of issues, she said, President Bush had created in the Department of State the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS)—with, in the event of a post-conflict operation, up to $100 million to be transferred from the Pentagon! ‘Should a state fail in the future, we want the men and the women of this office to be able to spring into action quickly’, and ‘partner immediately’ with the military, with other federal agencies, and with international allies. Different kinds of help also would be needed. Many new kinds of specialists—police officers, judges, electricians, engineers, bankers, economists, legal experts, and election monitors—would therefore be gathered by the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization in a civilian reserve corps. All of this work would appear to be for the purpose, though Secretary Rice did not say it, of what is essentially, to use a term and employ a concept the Bush administration originally had shunned: nation-building.

The basic aim of transformational diplomacy, as the U.S. State Department’s Director of Policy Planning Stephen Krasner succinctly expressed it in a follow-up speech at the Institute for International

Economics, was to create ‘responsible sovereigns’. He supplemented Secretary Rice’s own explanation of the Bush administration’s new approach by emphasizing particularly the foreign assistance dimension of it. Along with trade agreements under the World Trade Organization, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the U.S. government’s development assistance, most notably the prospect of funding from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), would provide ‘incentives’ to developing countries ‘to be better governed’. Economic aid too, therefore, was to be an ‘instrument’ of transformational diplomacy.

An important recent administrative change was designed to improve the instrument’s responsiveness—without however, assurances were given, ‘politicizing’ it. Citing Secretary Rice’s statement at a meeting with USAID employees, Professor Krasner further confirmed that ‘we’ll never use food as a weapon’. He emphasized the very strong U.S. record of commitment to humanitarian assistance programs and also the ‘long-term’, not ‘short-term’, nature of the development effort to be fostered under transformational diplomacy. ‘When we’re saying we want effective partners, it’s not just buying a vote in the U.N. Security Council next month’, he said, re-emphasizing: ‘It’s about making these countries responsible sovereigns.’

The particular administrative change that was made was to establish the new ‘dual-headed’ position in the State Department, at a rank equivalent to Deputy Secretary, of Director of Foreign Assistance. The person appointed, Randall Tobias, would also be Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which would continue in existence—rather than be folded into the State Department, as the United States Information Agency had been in 1999. Nonetheless, we here see the constraint of coordination again at work. This structural change would make it possible, ‘when we’re discussing foreign assistance with the Hill and with other actors, to guarantee that we can say we are being good stewards; we are being effective; we are aligned’, in Krasner’s view. The standard of accountability thus also obviously is to be met.

What is perhaps most obviously missing, as Professor Krasner acknowledged in responding to a question from the expert audience at the Institute for International Economics, is a theory of transformation. ‘This is a hard problem and we don’t have a clear theory about how to go about it’, he admitted. He himself asked the penetrating strategic questions: ‘Do we need organic change in which we have to do everything at once? Can we identify
certain key sectors? Can we isolate some sectors?" These are queries
that need to be put to public diplomacy as much as to development assistance
in conceiving a coherent theory of transformation. Without a theory, and
strategies flowing logically from it, diplomacy is just process.

The dominant feature of the new transformational diplomacy of the
United States, which conceivably could be paralleled or even to some extent
actually joined in by like-minded partners, appears to be its emphasis on
localism and popularism—on asking the men and women of the State
Department 'to be active in the field', in Secretary Rice's words. 'We will
need them to engage with private citizens in emerging regional centers, not
just with government officials in their national capitals'. They would be
trained in record numbers 'to master difficult languages like Arabic and
Chinese and Farsi and Urdu', she advised. 'It's exciting to be a diplomat
these days because it's not just about reporting on countries. It's not just
influencing governments. It's being a part of changing people's lives...' 82

Transformations have indeed occurred in history, and diplomacy—
including public diplomacy—has helped to bring some of those
transformations about—'achieving' them. 'America has done this kind of
work before', Condoleezza Rice rightly said, with reference to history. 'In the
aftermath of World War II, as the Cold War hardened into place, we turned
our diplomatic focus to Europe and parts of Asia. We hired new people. We
taught them new languages, we gave them new training. We partnered with
old adversaries in Germany and Japan and helped them rebuild their
countries. Our diplomacy was instrumental in transforming devastated
countries into thriving democratic allies, allies who joined with us for decades
in the struggle to defend freedom from communism.' And, when the Cold
War ended, America 'again rose to new challenges'. As she mentioned in her
Georgetown University speech, the U.S. government opened '14 new
embassies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe'. So also, of course,
did many other governments, with which the United States was closely
associated. 'Our efforts helped newly liberated peoples to transform the

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81) 'Transformational Diplomacy', transcript of remarks by and discussion with Stephen
Krasner, presented by the Center for Global Development at the Institute for
International Economics, Washington, DC, 20 January 2006. Krasner noted that
when heading at Stanford University the Center of Democracy, Development, and
Rule of Law, he and others 'tried to at least have an integrated format for looking at
these—at all of these issues'.

82) Rice, 'Transformational Diplomacy'.
character of their countries and now many of them, too, have become partners in liberty and freedom...'. Some of them, however, have not, yet.

DIPLOMACY, PARTNERSHIP, AND COOPERATION

A recurrent theme—a kind of leitmotif—throughout my discussion of the five concepts of foreign policy in which public diplomacy has played and can play a part is the notion of partnering, or the sharing in an enterprise by moral equals in mutual trust. In strategies aimed at consolidation, the ‘partners’ are mostly internal, belonging to a core group of allied and like-minded governments, and their countries’ domestic publics as well. Strategies aimed at containment can stretch an association to include ‘partners’—usually just political leaders and state officials—of very different origin, belief, and geographical location that are nonetheless sometimes capable of being united in cooperation out of fear of a common threat—aggression, terrorism, disease, etc. Strategies aimed at penetration search for ‘partners’ within enemy countries or non-adversary but closed societies that can absorb information, possibly dissent and even resist influentially, and ultimately perhaps offer alternative leadership. Strategies aimed at enlargement invite ‘partners’—whole countries, large or small—at the margins of a regional or other international community which generally are expected, and able as well as disposed, to accommodate themselves to that community’s norms, rules, and institutions. Strategies aimed at transformation seek ‘partners’ at the social level, by directly enlisting populations outside capital cities in democratic exercises as well as economic-development activity that will, somehow, cause their governments (or regimes) to behave responsibly toward them—or else be overthrown by others who can and will do so, and be ‘responsible sovereigns’.

A partnership, achieved by diplomacy, does not merely connect. It must unify in some way. It must engender a sense of a whole, if not a full concertation of detailed effort. There is usually an element of tension in any partnership, given the different personalities, individual or organizational, that are involved. This is certainly true within governments. It is true also within alliances and organizations. And it is even more true in partnerships that purport to join in some way different cultures, different ideologies, and different histories too—that is, societies at different stages of development and having different memories and different stories to tell. Diplomacy is in fact

83) Ibid.
based on difference, on mutual strangeness. It is dialectical. It involves counterpoint.

International ‘harmonising’, such as that aspired to as one of the stated purposes of the United Nations (Chapter I, paragraph 4), requires not just different voices but also different ‘parts’. Even Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, when speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations recently about ‘New Realities in the Media Age’, said:

We are at a point where we must have the cooperation of other countries, and therefore, we have to figure out how to do that. Now, to do that, you’re going to have to adjust your policies because the goal is to get enough people, for example, dealing with the problem of proliferation that you can be successful. And that may require—that desirable goal may require some adjustments as you work with other countries and fashion an approach [so] that enough of them are comfortable with that [and] you can accomplish your goal.\footnote{84) Rumsfeld, ‘New Realities in the Media Age’}

There is very little room in the Rumsfeld—or, one may say, the current American—model of cooperation, however, for divergence, or for the persistence of genuine differences of opinion based on different philosophies, different cultures, or different outlooks. ‘Harmony’ is not monotony. Nor does ‘partnership’ mean internal monopoly. Within governments as well as across them, and also between states and societies, disagreement persists, and, where it does not exist, it can develop. Diplomacy, including public diplomacy, is inevitably dialogical, and, increasingly, multi-logical. Diplomacy, including PD, may be able to avoid discord. It may even at times achieve a measure of concord. But it can never establish a total or single accord.