

The Hidden Face of International Aid

Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos

Contrary to popular belief, aid to the countries of the South has lost nothing of its strategic dimension since the end of the Cold War. It did indeed seem for a time that the collapse of the USSR would, in the eyes of the great powers, diminish the political importance of the Third World and consequently lead to a disengagement of the international donors who financed international assistance. But in reality, official development aid had been displaying a marked tendency to decrease before the fall of the Berlin Wall, having become a victim both of its failures and of a liberal vision that, during the 1980s, favoured market forces and economic investment to the detriment of governmental and multilateral assistance.

During the 1990s, the assumption that western donors might beat a retreat came to be contradicted by the construction of a law of humanitarian intervention, and by the persistence of numerous conflicts that seemed likely to threaten world peace. Moreover, the demise of the Soviet bloc had engendered new rivalries, notably between Paris and Washington. Thus, through fear of American hegemony, France doubled its aid to Francophone Africa in the years following the end of the Cold War¹. Finally and most important, the events of 11 September 2001 revealed the dangers inherent in leaving the Third World to its own devices. In the context of the war on terrorism, the struggle against poverty is now perceived as an element in the campaign to prevent the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism in the breeding grounds of destitution, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whether it is a matter of development projects, emergency operations or debt cancellation, international assistance continues to be seen as a lever of influence, a diplomatic tool and a financial issue.

The vast deployment of aid to the victims of the Asian tsunami has recently reminded us of the diverse aspects of this phenomenon. In effect, it presents us with all the ingredients of the “counter-gift” in both its symbolic and material forms: the demonstration of power, the considerable media presence, economic interests, military positioning, etc. The United Nations, high priest of aid, was thus able to profit from the disaster by reaffirming its role as a coordinator, a role that the United States had been contesting since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. We may recall that shortly after the tsunami struck, the Bush administration had claimed it was directing a coalition of the main donor countries. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the UN had once again come close to being stripped of its prerogatives. But apparently the United States had better things to do than to contest the leadership of relief operations. In Indonesia, the deployment of American troops in particular enabled the US to regain a foothold in a country with which it had suspended military cooperation following the massacres in East Timor in 1999.

In a similar vein, the landing of Japanese troops enabled Tokyo to raise the “humanitarian” banner and return to territories invaded by the empire of the Rising Sun during World War Two. The disaster was particularly significant for a country frequently described as an “economic giant” and a “political dwarf”, since it officially justified the defeated Japanese army’s intervention abroad, thereby obfuscating an unhappy and highly unpopular precedent in Japan: the decision to join the United States in its war on terror in Iraq.

Of course, medium-size powers are not absent from the Asian “battleground” either. For example, the French presence in Indonesia considerably enhances a strategy of visibility in the family of great nations.

China and India, both of which claim an important regional role, are also prominent among the

donors. India, no longer wanting to be seen as a beggar nation, rejected foreign aid for its own coastal regions which had been struck by the tsunami, and sent supplies to Sri Lanka and Indonesia.

Political stakes

In truth, it should come as no surprise that aid serves well-understood interests besides those of the recipients. This has been the case since the end of the Second World War, when the “modern” architecture of international aid as we know it today was introduced. However, it is clear that procedures have changed. The economic and diplomatic stakes are as important as ever, and it is helpful to recall their characteristics in order to arrive at a better understanding of their content and mechanisms. American aid in particular, of great significance in political terms and considerable in absolute value (though a lot less relatively to US GDP), is worth analysing from a strategic angle. There is one simple reason for this: Washington has never really tried to hide the financial and diplomatic returns the State Department expects from assistance to the Third World. At a very early stage, development aid was seen as an instrument of a foreign policy designed to curb Soviet expansion². Concentrating on its “private estate” in Latin America, the US established a kind of de facto division of labour: France would oversee Francophone Africa, Britain its former colonial empire, and Japan Asia³. Besides countering the communist threat, America was also intent upon offloading its agricultural surplus and opening up new commercial markets.

Viewed from this perspective, Washington’s aid policy was somewhat different from the French model, which was conceived more in terms of cultural influence, and from the highly pragmatic Japanese model⁴, which was aimed at ensuring the flow of supplies to a country lacking in raw materials⁴. American diplomacy was also unique in the emphasis it placed on food aid, a domain in which the USSR – an importer of cereals, it should be remembered – was almost absent. Food aid was rapidly available, easy to set up and offered two advantages: on the one hand, the dispatch of food supplies depended directly on the presidency and did not require congressional approval, while on the other, the farmers’ lobby, worried about the collapse of world prices, could be satisfied⁵. The much-vaunted *Public Law* of 1954, the PL480, thus served to dispose of post-war agricultural surpluses, sometimes on a barter basis. Renamed Food for Peace in 1966, the programme began to target its beneficiaries more on the basis of need. After 1971, its importance diminished owing to “competition” from UN and European food aid⁶.

The US nevertheless continued to use food aid to “punish” renegades, “reward” allies and “rally” opponents. For example, it suspended food deliveries to Salvadore Allende’s socialist Chile, which had nationalised the interests of American multinational corporations in 1971, and it was late to respond to the pleas of Bangladesh during the 1974 famine, for Dacca maintained trade links with Cuba. On the other hand, when Ethiopia was afflicted by famine in 1984, the Reagan administration intervened in the hope that American food aid would encourage Mengistu’s Marxist junta to turn to the West, following the example of Numeiri’s socialist regime in Sudan the year before.

The use of aid as a positive or negative sanction is certainly not confined to America – the French had brutally terminated technical assistance to Sekou Touré’s “socialist” Guinea in 1958 and to Ali Soilih’s “progressive” Comoros in 1975. But food aid has a symbolic and emotional dimension which endows it with a veritable added value in strategic terms. Like hunger, which can be used as a weapon of war to break the resistance of a rebellious population, food aid can be employed as an economic weapon when seeking concessions from a hostile regime. The delivery of food aid to North Korea, negotiated in exchange for Pyongyang’s promise to terminate its nuclear programme, is a recent and blatant example. It matters little if the food is

misappropriated by the apparatchiks of one of the world's last Stalinist regimes: what counts is the existence of a lever of influence through the threat of suspending aid.

Symbolic stakes

International assistance, a positive sanction when it accompanies a process of transition to democracy and a negative sanction when it penalises a dictatorship, is meant to be not only political, but also virtuous, indeed moralistic. From this perspective, the increase, reduction, cessation or resumption of aid acts as a diplomatic signal. In 1991, for example, the Netherlands decided to suspend assistance to Indonesia, its former colony, because of the military repression in East Timor. This is a familiar story, for under the Marshall Plan the United States had once threatened to impose the same penalty on the Netherlands, which had resumed hostilities with Indonesian nationalists late in 1948, a year before independence.

The establishment of such sanctions is clearly indicative of a double standard. Australia took no action when Indonesia invaded East Timor in 1975, but suspended aid to Vietnam when it occupied Cambodia in 1979. Lacking raw materials and worried about preserving its sources of supply, notably from the oil-producing countries of the Middle East, Japan was not too concerned about the oppressive character of the regimes with which it cooperated. While it suspended its aid programmes to Burma and Haiti after the coups d'état that occurred in those countries in 1988 and 1991 respectively, it continued to provide aid to China after the repression of the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 1989. Japan also provided assistance to Indonesia after the massacres perpetrated by the army in East Timor in 1991.

From this point of view, it is clear that the allocation of international assistance does not depend solely on the intensity of need, and that its volume is determined by political and media considerations. Thus it is significant that the sums governments dedicate to development aid have collapsed and the advantage has passed to highly visible and less expensive interventions to relieve the effects of humanitarian disasters. Given the accounting procedures demanded by the bureaucrats of the European Union in Brussels and the United Nations in New York, the system's internal logic has undoubtedly favoured relief operations, as urgency requires a rapid disbursement of funds. But fundamentally, the increasing power of humanitarian actors is due to the West's increasing sensitivity to the suffering of others and, consequently, to the often excessive coverage the media devotes to crises in the countries of the South. In terms of public relations, the distribution of sacks of rice during a famine or a flood is much more "rewarding" than the sinking of wells in the Sahel, or development projects whose results will not be apparent for years to come.

The question of the visibility of international assistance looms even larger when we resituate it in the context of the media and its exaggerated appeals to public generosity. Cooperation with the Third World undeniably proceeds from a policy of demonstrating power. This explains, for example, why the highest per capita rates of aid are often recorded in island micro-states. As it happens, this form of prioritisation does not stem solely from the specific needs of countries which, for lack of space, do not benefit from economies of scale, are seldom competitive, and find it difficult to diversify their activities. The bias towards island micro-states also stems from the vulnerability of their governments, which are likely to form political alliances with the donor who offers most in terms of "selling" their voice at the UN⁷. In short, the limited size of such territories facilitates the assessment and pricing of development projects whose visibility is an essential criterion for small donor countries, as demonstrated by Austria's assistance to the island-state of Cape Verde⁸.

Of course, such a political, and indeed cynical, analysis inevitably angers idealists, who tend to deny that aid has a strategic dimension and emphasise its humanitarian quality. It has therefore been claimed that donors do not take their own economic interests into consideration when

targeting the beneficiaries of their assistance. It is quite true that apart from the aforementioned case of island micro-states, territories lacking in raw materials have received significant aid. But the argument is not strong enough to make a convincing case for donor disinterest. In effect, aid programmes are also opportunities to open new branches in precisely those countries with which the donors have few commercial links. This is borne out by the actions of the United States, which became the main donor to India as American investments began to overtake those of their British competitors in the 1960s. Moreover, the purely symbolic dimension of international aid should not be underestimated. The need to demonstrate power largely explains America's interest in a strategically insignificant country like Somalia during the famine of 1992, a time when Washington was keen to assert its new role as the world's policeman.

Economic stakes

Economic interests play a large part in every instance of international assistance. While serving as British Colonial Secretary from 1919 to 1921, Lord Milner was already maintaining that the Third World should be developed in order to create jobs and markets for the benefit of the countries of the North⁹. Decolonisation did not put an end to this view. Since then, donor states have clearly expected a return on the investment represented by their aid policies. But some countries are more prepared to admit it than others. The United States sees nothing wrong in using humanitarian crises and peace-keeping operations to drum up business for American companies. After a conflict, USAID (United States Agency for International Development) usually makes deals with companies charged with reconstruction work which has been set up by NGOs on the basis of projects selected by American forces overseas, from Afghanistan to Iraq. In this context, the Asian tsunami offered a window of opportunity that American and Japanese companies will not fail to utilise: given the size of their populations, India and Indonesia are formidable future markets.

France, on the other hand, is more reluctant to admit the economic interests involved in its aid to the Third World. In 2001, a report by Robert Gaïa, a member of the French parliament, did emphasise the possibilities for investment offered by the combination of civil and military activities carried out by French troops involved in peace-keeping or reconstruction roles in countries devastated by natural disasters or wars¹⁰. But at the level of official discourse, AFD (Agence française de développement) does not highlight the profitability of its development programmes – probably because, unlike its American counterpart, it rarely liaises with the defence ministry and, most significantly, is not as accountable to parliament. USAID, however, is regularly threatened with closure and is constantly forced to persuade Congress of aid's economic utility. It therefore does not hesitate to reveal the sordid calculations that governments are normally careful to conceal from public scrutiny. Thus, when the Senate rejected a new law on assistance to the Third World in October 1971, USAID had to justify its existence by preparing a memorandum that calculated in precise detail the return expected from American assistance in terms of purchases, contracts, jobs, exports, agricultural production and even development of the higher education sector¹¹.

In fact, global aid is a vast industry. Without even taking into account religious organisations and government agencies, the lucrative non-profit sector represents 1,100 billion dollars and 19 million full-time jobs, which is the equivalent of the world's eighth-largest economic power in terms of GDP for the year 1995¹². To be sure, this sector is mostly concentrated in rich countries and its activities are chiefly directed towards education, health and social welfare. But it is estimated that international NGOs spend some 12 billion dollars a year, which is as much, indeed more, than the development aid provided by governments. From this point of view, it is therefore essential to take the independent transnational actors into account when seeking to understand the informal diplomacy of Third World aid.

The informal diplomacy of NGOs

In effect, the role of NGOs on the international stage has increased to such an extent that some governments now openly regard them as multipliers of influence. This is particularly noticeable in the United States, where a political function is assigned to organisations funded by USAID, beginning with the largest of these, CARE and CRS¹³. Initially founded by servicemen in order to dispose of American army surplus materials in the ruins of post-war Europe, CARE has always maintained a privileged relationship with the Pentagon. During the Vietnam War the organisation distributed food aid alongside American soldiers, and later helped to regroup the population in “peace villages”, an operation designed to isolate Viet-Cong rebels by depriving them of the support of the peasantry. At the time (1963), USAID manuals explained very clearly that NGOs were expected to “achieve the objectives of American foreign policy”¹⁴. In the light of what was once called “psychological warfare”, it is therefore unsurprising to find CARE now working in Afghanistan and Iraq, where reconstruction and stabilization are strategic issues for the American army.

Of course, the political function of charitable organisations is not confined to distributing food aid in order to win the “hearts and minds” of populations which have been “liberated” by American troops. Besides their role as vectors of soft power, the NGOs allied to Washington’s cause are also conduits for the export of cultural values and economic models. Philip Coombs, director of the Ford Foundation and secretary of state for education under John Kennedy in 1961, even stressed the importance of educational development programmes as a factor of “American influence”¹⁵. In this respect, private foundations and charities played a considerable role in the great ideological war against “Marxist subversion”. In Thailand and the Philippines, for example, USAID’s financial support helped local NGOs to counter communist insurgents by attracting and employing former cadres who had been released from prison. The expansion of the voluntary sector was accompanied by the marginalisation – if not the collapse – of large-scale Marxist organisations, and exercised a moderating influence that encouraged the abandonment of armed struggle¹⁶.

The triumphant liberalism of the 1980s, a veritable golden age for NGOs, moreover established and ratified the influence of private actors in the provision of aid to the Third World. Enthusiastic observers and researchers were quick to emphasise how well charitable organizations performed when compared with the costly bureaucracy of government development agencies¹⁷. Institutional donors, for their part, preferred to direct their funds to NGOs rather than to the administrative machinery of corrupt regimes, which were likely to misappropriate development aid. While the welfare state model was under threat in the industrialised countries, western governments allowed their voluntary sector sub-contractors to take charge of aid operations that had previously been the responsibility of the state¹⁸. As a result, NGOs are increasingly reliant on government funding – a situation which has facilitated their use for political ends.

At present, the diversity of the humanitarian sphere precludes the description of a typical organisation of international solidarity. Some NGOs are merely suppliers of services to western governments. Others loudly proclaim their independence and are careful to dissociate themselves from the manipulations of “diplomacy by proxy”, as shown in the case studies conducted by the Paris-based Observatoire de l’action humanitaire (Aid Watch)¹⁹. The share of dedicated funds in an NGO’s financial structure gives us some idea of its room for manoeuvre. To be specific, “dedicated funds” means subsidies destined for a particular programme or region, a procedure known as “earmarking”. Given the implications, this percentage is so “sensitive” that NGOs seldom reveal it, if they publish their budgets at all. Whatever the source of its funding, an organisation’s institutional culture also plays a determining role. The

relationship between an NGO and the government of the country in which it has its headquarters is sometimes a matter of osmosis. An executive director of OXFAM-USA, an organisation renowned for its independence from government, explains the situation in the following way: “NGOs that sub-contract from the US government and receive most of their budget from it have a civil service mentality. They think like the government. They don’t need to be told what they have to do in order to live up to Washington’s expectations.”²⁰

How effective is international aid?

In truth, the political mission that donor states would like to assign to NGOs is highly controversial. Tactically, its effectiveness seems more than doubtful. If the essential goal of American aid to Europe (and to the Third World thereafter) was indeed to contain Soviet expansion and to defend the “free world”, then the collapse of the USSR in 1991 could be considered a success. It could also be taken as an encouragement to Washington’s strategists to continue using USAID for political ends, this time with the aim of combating terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. But there is scant evidence to suggest a causal link between aid and the curbing of the communist threat. Similarly, the anticipated consequences of the reconstruction of Iraq or Afghanistan leave us somewhat sceptical as to the likelihood that Islamist terrorism will beat a retreat.

Illusions about the effectiveness of the aid lever stem largely from the sense of superiority felt by westerners, who overestimate their own influence and ignore the ability of poor countries to manipulate them according to the “biter bit” principle. For example, India, a champion of non-alignment, was adroit at playing the USSR card against the United States in order to obtain assistance from both sides while avoiding the military and diplomatic conditions they sought to impose. Despite its heavy reliance on aid (which represented up to a third of public investment during the 1960s), New Delhi managed to conduct its own development policy within the framework of a planned, dirigiste economy that was the polar opposite of the liberal model proposed by the US, the sub-continent’s major donor. When voting for resolutions at the UN General Assembly during that period, India’s representative sided more often with Moscow than with Washington²¹. Other developing countries adopted a similar policy during the Cold War. Statistics indicate that the level of aid had little influence on the way the recipients voted in the United Nations²².

The balance sheet is equally confusing when it comes to assessing the economic and social impact of international aid. Experts admit that the diversity of empirical studies prevents generalisation and the construction of a model for the performance of aid. Just because a programme has worked well in a given country, it does not mean that, all conditions being equal, it will have a positive impact in another country. Furthermore, the causal link between aid and factors such as economic growth, the ability to save and the level of investment is also hard to prove; quite often, international aid simply enables developing countries to ease the burden of external debt repayment²³. Consequently, it is necessary to qualify the role American cooperation played in the success of the Asian tiger economies and in the reconstruction of post-war Europe. The countries concerned were already in possession of the industrial infrastructure, commercial networks and technological expertise which, from the outset, facilitated their revival as competitive market economies. In contrast, sub-Saharan Africa provides a striking example of the failures of international aid, evoking a bottomless pit into which has been poured an estimated 300 billion dollars of aid money since decolonisation. Despite such efforts, the statistical averages for the last forty years indicate an increase in poverty and a decline in the African continent’s share of global trade.

Sub-Saharan Africa, which is chiefly agricultural and has experienced very little industrial development, is particularly revealing because it calls into question the merits of food aid, the

flagship programme of American assistance. It is common knowledge that the drawback of this programme is its tendency to penalise the local peasantry, whose plight is exacerbated by the competition from free food. It also changes consumer habits by strengthening a country's reliance on food imports, as was the case in Somalia during the 1980s. Admittedly, international assistance has little effect upon prices when it benefits deprived populations which, in any case, have no purchasing power; and it briefly relieves the balance of payments by acting as a substitute for imported foodstuffs²⁴. Moreover, the resale of provisions distributed in the field does not amount to misappropriation when it effectively enables the funding of irrigation and infrastructure, as happened in India during the Green Revolution. The difficulty lies more in the appropriation of aid by dictators who use it to strengthen their coercive powers by selecting the beneficiaries and starving the opposition, as is happening in Zimbabwe and North Korea today. International aid then becomes a problem rather than a solution.

It could of course be argued that food aid has not prevented its main recipients from reviving their agricultural sectors: this occurred in Europe under the Marshall Plan, in South Korea after 1953 and in India and Israel during the 1970s. But the picture changes completely when we look at the relative distribution of international aid, calculated on a per capita basis rather than in terms of the absolute value of its volume. Black Africa, the major focus of aid now that Asia is re-entering the virtuous circle of economic growth, then emerges clearly from the pack, dominated by the great failures in Ethiopia and the Sahel, where agriculture has made little progress despite more than thirty years of uninterrupted support.

Even so, a conclusion such as that outlined above should not dissuade the international community from continuing to assist endangered populations. But it does restrict aid goals to the level of simple, short-term humanitarian relief operations, and offers no convincing case for the ability of donor states to export long-term development models. International aid certainly does not function like a set of communicating vessels. Tony Blair's "Marshall Plan" for Africa is somewhat puzzling in this respect. As one journalist has noted, the plan "lacks the 50 billion dollars a year needed between now and 2015 to reduce poverty in the South by 50%"²⁵. Through the miracle of a zero sum equation, we might well believe that the abundant wealth of the North will overflow and trickle down to the countries of the Third World, thus alleviating poverty.

In reality, it is impossible to reduce the problem of African development to a question of funding; other factors such as cultural resistance, corruption and armed conflicts must be taken into account. In a recent report which should serve as discussion document for the UN Millennium Project, which aims to reduce world poverty, the economist Jeffrey Sachs stresses that bad governance in Africa is as much a consequence as a cause of under-development. Therefore, Sachs argues, international aid should be increased in order to break out of this vicious circle. But the United States prefers to concentrate its efforts on countries whose economic rationality allows development and where there is less risk of aid being misappropriated²⁶.

It is a familiar dilemma. Should aid be dependent on the good governance of the recipient? Or are we to believe that international aid will create the right conditions for development and democracy? In the first case, there is a risk of penalising the victims, for the most striking needs are often to be found in the most badly managed countries. But the second assumption once again overestimates the positive effects of aid, and may even entail complicity with those responsible for the coercion and corruption typical of predatory economies. The drawbacks of both propositions, which are at the forefront of contemporary debate, make it difficult to side with either the moralists who seek an increased contribution from rich countries, or the realists who advocate greater conditionality.

In the final analysis, the whole question turns on a retrospective (and admittedly incomplete) assessment of the impact of programmes funded by the international community. But the

political, economic and social goals we seek to assign to aid are often contradictory and impede the establishment of an authoritative overview. However, one thing is certain: it is a general rule that the programmes most likely to fail are those with the strongest economic and political conditions attached to them – for they then interfere with the process of development. In short, in our over-eagerness to do good, we constantly run the risk of producing the worst possible outcome.

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Notes

1. Peter J. Schraeder, "From Berlin 1884 to 1989: Foreign Assistance and French, American and Japanese Competition in Francophone Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 33, n° 4, December 1995, pp. 539-567.
2. M. F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy*, Westport (Conn.), Greenwood Press, 1976.
3. Steven W. Hook, *National Interest and Foreign Aid*, Boulder (Colo.), Rienner, 1995.
4. For the way in which Japanese aid has been used to promote national interests (*kokueki*) see Sukehiro Hasegawa, *Japanese Foreign Aid: Policy and Practice*, New York, Praeger, 1975, p. 7. For the way in which Japanese war reparations paid to Asian countries have counted as development aid and have financed projects carried out by Japanese companies, particularly the dams built by Kubota Yutaka's Nippon Koei Corporation, see Alan Rix, *Japan's Economic Aid: Policy-Making and Politics*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1980, p. 201 ff.
5. Mitchell Wallerstein, *Food for War. Food for Peace: US Food Aid in a Global Context*, Cambridge (Ma.), MIT Press, 1980, p. 130.
6. John Catie, *The Political Economy of Food Aid*, Aldershot, Gower, 1982; Uma Srivastava et al., *Food Aid and International Economic Growth*, Ames, Iowa State, University Press, 1975.
7. Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, "Le charme discret des petites îles," *Politique internationale*, n° 91, spring 2001, pp. 381-401.
8. Because its means are limited in comparison with those of the US, or even of France, Austria invests in countries where, in relative terms, its aid is likely to have the greatest impact.
9. Paul Moesley, *Overseas Aid: its Defence and Reform*, Brighton, Wheatsheaf, 1987, p. 11.
10. This report can be consulted on: <http://www.hcci.gouv.fr/lecture/note/n1102.html>
11. According to USAID, the sums invested in aid schemes during the fiscal year 1971 brought in 971,800,000,000 dollars in the form of purchases from 4000 businesses evenly distributed throughout the United States. The cessation of American aid would have entailed a 7% reduction of exports and the loss of 70,000 jobs, including those of 2,000 consultants and 65,000 employees of USAID. It would also have occasioned the loss of a quarter of the maritime transport market in the hands of American companies. Moreover, universities would have been forced to terminate contracts estimated to be worth a total of 23,216,500 dollars. See Steve Weissman (ed.), *The Trojan Horse: a Radical Look at Foreign Aid*, San Francisco, Ramparts Press, 1974, pp. 237-240.
12. Lester M. Salomon, Helmut K. Anheier et al. (eds.), *Global Society: Dimensions of the Non Profit Sector*, Baltimore, John Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, 1999, p. 9.
13. The 2003 budgets of these two organisations amounted to 524 and 484 million dollars respectively. In 1976, they cornered 79% of the US government funds allotted to NGOs of international solidarity. Since then, USAID has been careful to diversify its partners. In 2003, however, CARE and CRS still received 27% of the funding the US government allotted to international NGOs. See Robert Goman (ed.) *Private Voluntary*

Organizations: Agents of Development, Boulder (Colo.), Westview Press, 1984, p. 55; USAID, *2005 Voluntary Foreign Aid Programs. Report of Voluntary Agencies Engaged in Overseas Relief and Development (The VolAg Report)*, Alexandria (Va.), Dimensions International, 2004. Source: www.usaid.gov/our-work/cross-cutting-programs/private-voluntary-cooperation/pub.html#top www.usaid.gov/our-work/cross-cutting-programm/private-voluntary-cooperation/pub.html#top

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18. Steven Rathgeb Smith and Michael Lipsky, *Nonprofits for Hire: the Welfare State in the Age of Contracting*, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1993; Bernard Hours, *L'idéologie humanitaire ou le spectacle de l'altérité perdue*. L'Harmattan, 1998.

19. www.observatoire-humanitaire.org

20. Joseph Short, quoted in Brian Smith, "US and Canadian PVOs as Transnational Development Institutions," in Robert Gorman (ed.), *op. cit.* p. 164.

21. Concerning the resolutions over which the US and the USSR found themselves opposed, between 1958 and 1962 New Delhi voted alongside Moscow on 38 occasions, but only 19 times alongside Washington. See Philip John Eldridge, *The Politics of Foreign Aid in India*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969.

22. Paul Moesley, *op. cit.* pp. 35-37.

23. Howard White (ed.), *Aid and Macroeconomic Performance*, Basingtoke, McMillan, 1998.

24. Kunibert Raffer and Hans Wolfgang Singer, *The Foreign Aid Business: Economic Assistance and Development Co-operation*, Cheltenham, Elgar, 1996.

25. Babette Stern, "Le G7 confirme les désaccords entre États-Unis et Europe sur l'aide à l'Afrique," *Le Monde*, 6 February 2005, p. 5.

26. This was the conclusion reached by *The Economist* in a dossier devoted to aid, 16 April 1999.

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