



# PREVENTION, RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE (2018-2022)

A Comprehensive Approach to the Fragilization of  
States and Societies

STRATEGY REPORT



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# Foreword



In the current climate of violence and conflicts, forced displacements, risks of famine, climate change and natural disasters, epidemics and economic crises, international order is on the verge of dislocation, rendering states and societies more fragile. This litany of turmoil facing the world could grow longer.

Today, 1.6 billion people (almost one-fifth of the global population) live in contexts of fragility, conflict and violence. Without major efforts to reduce vulnerabilities, these particularly at-risk populations will face development challenges that will ultimately call into question the commitment of “leaving no one behind” made at the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Summit 2015.

Faced with this bleak picture, we must not give in to pessimism and fatalism. The triptych of fragility, conflict and violence, while still relevant, requires another triptych in terms of response: diplomacy, defence and development. These “3Ds” were reiterated by the President of the Republic on his first visit to the Barkhane forces in Mali on 29 May 2017 and also at his first ambassadors’ conference in August 2017.

It is important to recognize that the growing complexity of fragilities and crises requires, now more than ever, that all the relevant French actors (known as “Team France”) and their international partners adopt a comprehensive approach. This implies a contiguum of actions to be implemented in accordance with the mandate of each community of actors, whether they operate in the fields of diplomacy, security, humanitarian relief, stabilization or development.

This need is fully embraced at the highest level of the French state and was reiterated by the government on 8 February 2018 at the meeting of the Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (CICID). The commitments made on this occasion are ambitious in the light of the initial situation and decisively set out the way forward.

Thus, by 2022, France has committed to allocating EUR 500 million to humanitarian and food aid and stabilization actions, and to increasing its official development assistance (ODA) to 0.55 per cent of gross national income. By 2020, France has committed to doubling the resources it allocates to the French Development Agency’s (Agence française de développement, AFD) Peace and Resilience Fund with a view to reaching EUR 200 million annually.

It would, however, be reductive to think that it is only a matter of financial resources. This approach is based on the desire to do more, but also to do better, as it establishes common lines of commitment. The cornerstone of this strategy is the consolidation of the social contract between states and their societies as well as prevention as it seeks to tackle the deep-rooted fragilities that underlie crises that are already responsible for too many lost generations. Doing more, doing better and innovating in order to adapt to changing forms of instability are at the heart of the new ways of operating embodied in the Sahel Alliance initiative in particular.

Efficiency considerations oblige us to be – as well we should – accountable to French citizens and the international community for our commitments, but especially to the countries and populations that we assist.

These goals are both at the heart of the strategy on Prevention, Resilience and Sustainable Peace adopted by France at the February 2018 CICID meeting and this government’s goal to combat fragility and provide support to people in situations of vulnerability.

**Jean-Yves Le Drian**

Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs

# Executive summary

The definition of fragility used in this strategy derives from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)'s Fragility Framework and points to a combination of exposure to interconnected multidimensional risks (economic, environmental, political, security and societal) and insufficient coping capacity of the state, society or community to manage, absorb and/or mitigate such risks. These may give rise to instability, crises and conflict if realized. Fragility is both a universal phenomenon, since it affects all countries, and a dynamic one, since it is the result of a process related to changing factors that come under at least one of the five aforementioned dimensions over different timeframes.

The overall aim of the strategy is to achieve lasting peace in countries experiencing situations of fragility through the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 is to "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels." To this end, a pivotal role has been assigned to prevention and strengthening resilience before, during and after crises and conflicts, and to addressing their root causes by drawing upon the comparative advantages and the complementarity of mandates of all the "Team France" actors (diplomacy, security, development, stabilization and humanitarian). Furthermore, strengthening gender equality in situations of fragility is considered essential in order to meet global commitments on the empowerment of women, lasting peace and the SDGs.

Specifically, the focal areas for action will be guided by the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) designed to consolidate peace and bolster states of fragility set forth in "A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States" (2011):<sup>1</sup> legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, revenues and services.

In line with the main thrusts of its assistance and cooperation programs, France's approach in response to fragilities, in addition to being comprehensive, emphasizes the need to restore or strengthen the social contract between state and society (a contract-based approach to fragility). Indeed, development and stability, if they are to be sustainable, hinge on governance that is based on the state's democratic relationship with society, in all its diversity, within the framework of internal regulation and the definition and implementation of fair and inclusive public policies. Consequently, and with a view to strengthening cohesion between populations and between the latter and the state, the promotion of democratic governance will be the guiding principle underpinning this strategy.

In keeping with a broad understanding of fragility and in order to meet the requirement for swift action that states of fragility impose, it was decided not to establish a pre-determined list of "fragile" countries. However, given the increasing number of fragilization processes globally, priorities for action need to be ranked. This process will be based on pre-emptive, collaborative and regular analysis of four criteria which, when viewed on a cumulative basis, will guide France's choices on how it responds to fragilities:

- high vulnerability of the relevant area to tensions and shocks;
- poor capacity of states and societies to address such vulnerability;
- high degree of risk that fragilization processes could spread further afield;
- France's comparative advantage.

In view of the broad sectoral and temporal spectrum of fragilities, France's approach to responding to fragilization processes is based on six principles for action:

- reaffirm the role of political and diplomatic actors in addressing fragilities and pilot a comprehensive approach to aid;
- prevent crises from arising and recurring by supporting inclusion and resilience;
- base strategies and interventions on a collaborative, forward-looking and dynamic analysis of fragilities and risks;
- adopt an integrated and long-term response to the various aspects of fragility;
- support local processes, thus ensuring the ownership, legitimacy and sustainability of action;
- take a rights-based approach to our action.

The multidimensional, structural and volatile natures of states of fragility – as well as their manifestations across different geographical scales – require a major response drawing upon the whole array of instruments at the disposal of the French cooperation system, whether through ambitious bilateral assistance or multilateralism involving increased pooling and coordination.

Interministerial coordination, technical assistance and cooperation as well as partnerships with civil society in the Global South and the research community will be key elements in the implementation of this strategy. Finally, to ensure its operationalization, the implementation of the strategy will be steered by a committee chaired by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (MEAE) and will comprise the main French ministries, agencies and organizations concerned by interventions in crises and situations of fragility. The strategy will also be subject to an annual action plan, monitoring and evaluation.

1. International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, "A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States", 2011.

# Introduction

Despite progress made in the areas of governance and development, making our era a time of unprecedented peace, the growing number and intensity of armed conflicts since 2010, coupled with the exacerbation of environmental crises, points to mounting and cumulative levels of instability.<sup>2</sup>

The number of subnational conflicts which are asymmetrical and between non-state actors has increased, particularly in Africa and the Middle East. Such conflicts entail specific operating methods (including attacks on the state and civilians) and are located not only in the least developed countries (LDCs) but also in middle-income countries with spillover effects beyond their borders. Women and girls are particularly affected as victims of gender-based violence, which is exacerbated in times of conflict and is increasingly being used as a weapon of war. States of fragility and conflict are also becoming increasingly protracted in nature and are largely responsible for unparalleled numbers of forcibly displaced persons (65.6 million in 2016),<sup>3</sup> the highest figure since World War II. As for post-crisis situations, they entail major risks, are not linear, can reverse peace processes and can result in the resurgence of conflicts.

The beginning of the 21st century was also marked by major natural and health disasters such as the tsunami in Southeast Asia in 2004, the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and the Ebola epidemic that broke out in December 2013. In the most fragile contexts, these events resulted in political and/or social crises.

In addition, after a steady decline for over a decade, hunger in the world has been on the rise again since 2016. In 2017, 124 million people from 151 countries and territories thus faced at least crisis levels of acute food insecurity<sup>4</sup> due to the combined effects of conflict, insecurity and climate-related disasters, such as drought.

These recent salient trends should not occult the other chronic fragilities stemming from them, while maintaining them. The shortcomings and failures of systems of governance, growing inequalities fuelling exclusion, population explosion, technological risks, climate change and associated economic vulnerabilities,

unregulated globalization, uncontrolled urbanization in areas that are often already at risk and violence (including social and criminal violence in the absence of high-intensity conflicts) are all factors that contribute directly to the fragilization of states and societies.

## Definition of – and approaches to – fragilities

Although the international community does not agree on a single definition of fragilities, this strategy chooses to use the definition provided by the OECD Fragility Framework, which best reflects the phenomenon as it is currently observed, namely its multidimensional and universal nature (affecting all states and all societies to various degrees and at different geographical scales). Based on such considerations, the OECD prefers to use the term “states of fragility” as opposed to the previously-used “fragile states”.

The OECD defines fragility as “...the combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, system and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks. Fragility can lead to negative outcomes including violence, the breakdown of institutions, displacement, humanitarian crises or other emergencies”.<sup>5</sup> Risks and capacities are considered according to five dimensions: economic, environmental, political, security and societal. In addition, capacities are measured at the state level and incorporate the various formal and informal mechanisms that societies can draw upon to cope with negative events and shocks. The OECD model is also intended to be systemic: the five dimensions of fragility are interconnected and impact on each other.

The French concept of fragility must also be considered in a dynamic fashion. Hence, the phenomenon should be viewed as the result of a process related to changing factors that come under at least one of the five aforementioned dimensions and with varied timeframes:

- root, structural and latent causes, which often unfold over a protracted period of time and can gradually become sources of tension;

2. OECD, *States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence*, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2016. United Nations, World Bank, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2018.

3. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016*, UNHCR, Geneva, 2017.

4. Food Security Information Network, *Global Report on Food Crises 2018*, 2018.

5. OECD (2016), *Op. cit.*



- immediate causes, crises and/or sudden, violent shocks, which often play a catalytic role and reveal situations in which fragilization is underway.

For this reason, the term “fragilization” is preferred here to the term “states of fragility” in order to better characterize a phenomenon which is more in keeping with deterioration processes and can lead to a crisis. The terms “fragile” and “fragility” have been used in this document in line with this dynamic interpretation and with prevention in mind.

In keeping with the thrust of its development assistance and cooperation policies, France’s approach to responding to fragilities, in addition to being comprehensive, centres on restoring and strengthening the social contract between state and society. This contract-based approach to fragilities stems from the inability or the weakness of states to meet the expectations of their people, be it in terms of security, justice, economic opportunities or basic social services. It can also cover the lack of cohesion observed among the different social groups in a society that fail to overcome their differences and form a community with a shared destiny under the auspices of the state, guarantor of the general interest.

## Scope of the strategy

While fragility is a global phenomenon, the contexts of fragility in the countries eligible for ODA<sup>6</sup> are the main focus of this strategy, which seeks to determine guidelines for France’s policy on fragile states and societies.

The strategy therefore covers all of France’s actions both in terms of its diplomacy and its cooperation policy in the field of international solidarity, security and defence. These actions concern all fragilization processes and span the whole crisis cycle, notwithstanding that the latter is not necessarily linear.

In this light, and in line with a comprehensive approach, the strategy – in conjunction with political and security actions – addresses all the modalities of action for aid: development, stabilization and humanitarian emergencies.

## OECD Fragility Framework

Dimension	Description
<b>Economic</b>	Vulnerability to risks stemming from weaknesses in economic foundations and human capital including macroeconomic shocks, unequal growth and high youth unemployment.
<b>Environmental</b>	Vulnerability to environmental, climatic and health risks that affect citizens’ lives and livelihoods. These include exposure to natural disasters, pollution and epidemics.
<b>Political</b>	Vulnerability to risks inherent in political processes, events or decisions; lack of political inclusiveness (including of elites); transparency, corruption and society’s ability to accommodate change and avoid repression.
<b>Security</b>	Vulnerability of overall security to violence and crime, including both political and social violence.
<b>Societal</b>	Vulnerability to risks affecting societal cohesion that stem from both vertical and horizontal inequalities, including inequality among culturally defined or constructed groups and social cleavages.

Source : OECD, *States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence*, OECD Publishing, 2016.

## Purpose of the strategy

In line with the resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council on peacebuilding,<sup>7</sup> the strategy pursues the goal of achieving sustainable peace based on the 2030 Agenda, including the Sustainable Development Goal on peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG 16). In this context, a central role is assigned to prevention and strengthening resilience before, during and after crises and conflicts, and to addressing their root causes by building on the comparative advantages and complementarity of the mandates of all the “Team France” actors, who collaborate with the international community to achieve collective results.

6. See the OECD DAC (Development Assistance Committee) List of ODA Recipients, [www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm)

7. A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282 respectively, 27 April 2016.

Gender inequality, conflict and fragility are key challenges to sustainable development and lasting peace. They are inextricably linked: unequal gender relations can drive conflict and violence, while women's active participation contributes to peace and resilience.<sup>8</sup> At the same time, conflict and fragility place enormous burdens on women and girls, while peacebuilding

and statebuilding can provide unique opportunities to advance the recognition of their rights.<sup>9</sup> Strengthening gender equality in fragile situations is therefore critical to meet global commitments in favour of women's empowerment, sustainable peace and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

## BOX 1

### French ODA in response to situations of fragility: not only doing more, but doing better

Over the period 2007-2016, France allocated over EUR 32 billion of net ODA (EUR 3.2 billion annually on average) to countries experiencing situations of fragility, as defined by the OECD.<sup>10</sup> In 2016, education (EUR 227 million), water distribution and sanitation (EUR 192 million) and energy (EUR 161 million) were the main sectors in which France's action was deployed in these countries.

France focuses its development assistance policy on the Sahel in particular. Since 2007, the countries in this region have benefited from more than EUR 5.5 billion of French ODA. In 2016, new ODA flows were concentrated in the following fields: education (EUR 83 million), water distribution and sanitation (EUR 45 million), energy (EUR 45 million) and budgetary support (EUR 40 million). The vast majority of French bilateral assistance for this region comes from donations; it has remained relatively stable over the period, since fluctuations in French ODA were mainly due to debt cancellation.

The CICID met in February 2018 and undertook new financial commitments to address crises and fragilities. The government will

double the resources allocated to the AFD's Peace and Resilience Fund to reach EUR 200 million annually by 2020. Furthermore, in 2022, France will make a bilateral and multilateral contribution to the tune of EUR 500 million for humanitarian assistance and stabilization. These funds will essentially be channelled through the MEAE's Crisis and Support Centre and its Emergency Humanitarian Fund, UN humanitarian agencies and bilateral commitments, such as programmed food aid. While the volume of aid is critical to achieve results, the quality of such aid ultimately determines the attainment of the SDGs. It is therefore not simply a question of doing more, but of doing better; the creation of the Sahel Alliance, launched in July 2017, is an illustration of this commitment. This initiative, originally Franco-German, seeks to link the issues of security and development through the promotion of innovative methods, a donor accountability system and targeted objectives to improve living conditions for the most vulnerable populations. The implementation of projects will favour short, transparent circuits that will directly reach the populations concerned.

8. OECD, *Gender equality and women's empowerment in fragile and conflict-affected situations: A review of donor support*, OECD Development Policy Papers, 2017.

9. OECD, *Ibid.*

10. [stats.oecd.org](http://stats.oecd.org)

# Chapter 1

## CONTEXT

### 1.1 France's policy paper on Fragile States and Situations of Fragility (2007)

France's policy paper on Fragile States and Situations of Fragility,<sup>11</sup> the first of its kind, was crafted in 2007 by an interministerial working group. Back then, its concept of fragility included countries emerging from crisis, confronted with armed conflict, in the reconstruction phase, facing humanitarian crises, natural disasters and extremely vulnerable situations likely to spill over into a crisis or large-scale violence – which also prompted reflection on prevention.

In line with the historical thrust of French development cooperation, and in order to address fragilities, priority was given to state building at all levels (including at the local level) and states' capacity to manage public affairs but also to meet, in accordance with the notion of a social contract, society's expectations by organizing interrelations in such a way that society could be included in governance mechanisms. Subsequently there was a broader understanding of fragility that, while giving a prominent role to the state, went beyond this and extended to relations between the state and society. The underlying paradigm was therefore that of democratic governance, which was also reflected in the comprehensive crisis management approach in effect.

In terms of tools, the strategy emphasized the need to have instruments which can be deployed in a timely manner and flexible enough to accommodate the changing nature of fragilities. They should also integrate mid- and long-term dimensions and permit interventions at a regional level in response to the spillover effects of crises. Lastly, it advocated enhanced linkages with multilateral instruments as well as greater consistency in interministerial action, thereby ensuring an integrated response.

### 1.2 Preliminary stocktaking

Ten years after the first strategy was published, some relevant points can be identified demonstrating significant improvements in the French cooperation system.

Under the impetus of the MEAE and the Ministry for the Armed Forces, a series of sectoral strategy papers on fragility has gradually been compiled, setting forth and consolidating France's stance on the matter.<sup>12</sup> To strengthen this process of policy consolidation, France has supported research on the issues of resilience and fragilities.<sup>13</sup> The priority given to situations of fragility in French cooperation was also enshrined in the framework act on France's development and international solidarity policy of 7 July 2014 and reiterated by the CICID on 8 February 2018.

At the institutional level, large-scale reforms have been enacted within the French cooperation system so as to better rationalize and concentrate resources. A crisis centre was set up in 2008; it evolved into the Crisis and Support Centre in 2014. Subsequently a Stabilization Unit was created alongside the Humanitarian Action Mission and the Preparedness and Partnerships Unit. Another notable reform was to refocus the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Development<sup>14</sup> on the strategic management of ODA, thereby enabling the emergence of a clearly defined diplomacy for development. In parallel, ODA agencies have defined specific units of measurement and tools for situations of fragility and crises. Based on the CICID model, coordination between the Ministries for Foreign Affairs, the Interior and the Armed Forces on security and defence issues has been bolstered through the establishment of an Interministerial Strategic Direction Committee, which promotes greater synergies between security and development efforts.

11. *Fragile States and Situations of Fragility: France's Policy Paper*, 2007.

12. *Security System Reform: France's Approach*, 2008; *French Humanitarian Strategy*, 2012, 2018; *France's Approach to Armed Violence Reduction*, 2012; *French White Paper on Defence and National Security*, 2013; *New Horizons for Transitional Justice, A French Approach*, 2015; *France's second National Action Plan: Implementation of the United Nations Security Council "Women, Peace and Security" resolutions, 2015-2018*, MEAE; *International Strategy to Combat Radicalisation and Terrorism*, 2016.

13. Jean-Marc Chataigner, Hervé Magro (eds.), *Fragile States and Societies: Between Conflict, Reconstruction and Development*, Karthala Paris 2007; Jean-Marc Chataigner (ed.), *Fragility and Resilience: The New Frontiers of Globalization*, Karthala, Paris 2014.

14. Subsequently known as the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs.

France has also developed new *modi operandi* for situations of fragility from a financial and methodological point of view. In order to assist in decision-making processes, the Preparedness and Partnerships Unit operates an early warning system. The Humanitarian Action Mission has a fund for humanitarian emergencies that dovetails with the Stabilization Unit's fund. AFD has also adapted several of its financial tools in order to adjust its means of action to contexts requiring more flexibility and responsiveness. At the international level, France has also supported or been behind the creation of innovative instruments to respond to crises, such as the Bêkou Fund for the Central African Republic (CAR), the first European Union (EU) multi-donor trust fund of its kind.

Moreover, France's military deployments in the context of its external operations led to the development of a comprehensive approach marked by the importance of creating, in addition to achieving the military objectives of peace enforcement and peace-keeping, synergies with development actors in order to build sustainable peace.

French actors have therefore adapted to meet the specific contexts of fragility. However, several reports by the OECD<sup>15</sup> and the French parliament<sup>16</sup> highlight potential areas for improvement which this strategy seeks to address.

As regards the comprehensive approach, it was underscored that there was room for improvement in the modalities for post-crisis situation management and the linkage between humanitarian and development programmes. The remaining weaknesses in the strategic management of aid were highlighted; they have resulted in a lack of coordination, in particular with military actions. Finally, the level of ODA in contexts of fragility appeared to be insufficient, drawing attention to funding needs.

Both the progress achieved and the challenges facing French actors were a central feature of the revamping process of the 2007 strategy and echo the shifting international paradigm of fragility.

## BOX 2

### “Security and Development in northern Mali” program (SDNM)

This project supports the development of local infrastructure that can be set up swiftly and that meets the most pressing needs of the populations in the northern regions of Mali. The approach taken by the SDNM is adapted in particular to contexts of crisis and those with a limited state presence. It is based on:

1. establishing a participatory process to select projects and to restore dialogue regarding completed infrastructure, thus helping to restore social ties, trust and dialogue between communities;
2. providing direct support so that economic activity can resume through investments in areas with limited state presence that have been fragilized by conflict, thereby fostering the restoration of legitimacy in public action;
3. leadership by the local authorities, which strengthens the decentralization process underway (cornerstone of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali).

This project comprises two phases: the first (EUR 1 million, EUR 750,000 of which was provided by AFD) was centred around Kidal and was implemented immediately after the signing of the Agreement (2015-2016). It enabled the completion of an investment programme in priority areas, as identified by the population: electrifying the communes of Aguel'hok and Anéfif; constructing a floating barrier in Tessalit; the construction and restoration of community health centres in Djounhane and Essouk; water engineering works in Tin-Essako, Intadyeni and Tintersen/Kida, and so forth. Owing to the success of this phase, the project was extended to five additional regions with funding from AFD (EUR 5 million), the Government of Mali (EUR 1 million) and the EU (Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, EUR 13 million attributed to AFD).

15. OECD, *OECD Development Co-operation Peer Review: France 2013*.

16. Sénat, *Rapport d'information sur l'aide publique au développement au Sahel, 2016*; Sénat, *Rapport d'information sur le bilan des opérations extérieures, 2016*, available in French only.

## 1.3 The shifting international paradigm of fragility

The approaches and thinking adopted by the international community on fragility have evolved considerably. They have helped redefine the paradigm in this field, both conceptually, with a broadened scope of the notion, and operationally, with more appropriately adapted methods of intervention.

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) remains a key player in the shifting international paradigm. In 2007, it developed a set of ten Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, the aim of which was to provide common guidelines for consistency and more effective action in fragile contexts.

Additionally, the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 2011) provided an opportunity for over forty states and organizations, including France and the EU, to endorse a new initiative to address fragilities: the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. This framework document for coordination developed by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding gives pride of place to the principles of ownership and leadership by fragile states. It proposes new partnership arrangements based, in particular, on strengthening mutual trust between donors and aid recipients, and on the five PSGs.

The World Bank has also undertaken an analysis of conflict and post-conflict contexts and, more broadly, the issues of fragility. Accordingly, it has developed a set of indicators with a view to establishing a list of fragile countries and created tools to provide specific responses to the challenges facing these states. Conceptually, the *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*<sup>17</sup> represented a pivotal change in framing the international debate on fragility by underlining the complementarity between activities in the fields of security and development, as well as strengthening governance and effective institutions for the benefit of citizens' security, justice and job creation.

More recently, the reflections of the OECD and the World Bank have led to a multidimensional and universal redefinition of fragility, thus moving away from a binary and uniform understanding of the phenomenon. Fragility no longer refers only to low-income and/or conflict-affected countries, but includes middle-income countries, the general phenomenon of violence (especially urban), as well as subnational (pockets of fragility) and supranational geographic scales (spillover effects of conflicts).

### BOX 3

#### Investing in conflict prevention: a strategic and economic necessity

Conflict prevention is a necessity in a geostrategic environment in which conflicts between states have given way to internal conflicts; these have risen sharply since 2010. Consequently, the number of civilian victims of conflict doubled between 2010 and 2016, as did as the number of refugees between 2005 and 2016, thereby further increasing the risk of regional spillovers. A recent joint UN-World Bank study<sup>18</sup> demonstrates that conflict prevention is "economically beneficial"<sup>19</sup> and proposes three main recommendations to switch from crisis response to prevention:

1. Prevention should address factors of exclusion and inequality and their perception, in addition to institutional weaknesses.
2. Prevention policies should be inclusive from their inception in order to properly address the grievances of the population and reduce the likelihood of violent mobilization of armed groups and elites. But above all:
3. Prevention requires sustained efforts.

As regards the actors, conflict prevention entails close coordination between diplomatic and mediation activities, security and development. It proves more effective when it seeks to understand and target those who have the greatest interest in peace: local communities.

17. World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*, World Bank, 2011.

18. World Bank, United Nations, 2017, *Ibid.*

19. Even in a pessimistic scenario where prevention is only effective in 25 per cent of cases, the average net savings to the international community would be close to USD 5 billion per year (in terms of damages avoided and humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping interventions not required). In an intermediate scenario where prevention is successful in averting violent conflicts in 50 per cent of cases, the savings made are estimated at USD 33 billion per year.

Given that pre-crisis and pre-conflict interventions are in many respects more effective and, in any case, less costly than post-conflict responses, the UN and the World Bank have put prevention at the heart of their strategies to support fragile states and states affected by conflict and violence.<sup>20</sup> The UN is building on the concept of “sustaining peace”<sup>21</sup> while the World Bank is now pursuing an approach that is increasingly based on risk management.

In addition, the latest major international commitments have set targets to address fragilities: the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (March 2015); the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (September 2015) with its cross-cutting nature and through a specific goal (SDG 16); the Paris Agreement on climate change (December 2015) on the risks generated by climate-related disasters and irresponsible management, or indeed non-management of natural resources; the Agenda for Humanity (May 2016), which stresses, in particular, the need to strengthen

political leadership for conflict prevention and resolution, the localization of aid and the need to bridge the gap between humanitarian aid and development assistance.

Finally, the new European Consensus on Development (June 2017) recognizes that particular attention must be paid to countries affected by fragility and conflict, and the need for a coordinated commitment for long-term international action in these contexts. It also reflects the need to address the root causes of fragilities and crises using a comprehensive approach that links sustainable development, humanitarian action, peace and security.

In sum, in order to improve the efficiency of aid, taking into account recent policy, institutional and operational developments and the growing need for accountability to French citizens and the countries in which France intervenes, as well as their populations, it was necessary to update France’s strategy on responding to situations of fragility.

#### BOX 4

### Environment, climate and fragilities

Environmental and climate-related factors are both part of the problem and part of the solution to situations of fragility and conflict. The effects of extreme weather events arise from climatic variations that are rapid (floods) or slow (droughts) and exacerbated by climate change. This can give rise to: migration (according to the International Organization for Migration, between 200 and 250 million people could be displaced by climate change by 2050); conflicts related to water and land; health threats (water stress, displacement and a rise in vector-borne diseases); increasing food insecurity (reduction of arable land due to urbanization, intensive agricultural practices, water scarcity and rising sea levels; dwindling fisheries resources due to ocean acidification); and the destruction of infrastructure, especially in coastal cities, as a result of extreme events.

The choice of economic and social policies promoting sustainable modes of production and consumption, at the relevant territorial level, could help diminish the vulnerability of people’s lifestyles and reduce

interstate tensions over access to natural resources as well as local conflicts, such as those between farmers and breeders. The Sendai Framework for Action (2015-2030) lists several recommendations regarding natural disasters. Thus, human exposure and vulnerability can be diminished through knowledge of the risks, resilient investments and good governance based on public policies which aim to reduce risks, both across sectors and through partnerships, and on concerted management plans.

Launched by France with the aim of averting the loss of human life related to extreme climate events, the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems initiative (CREWS) strengthens the early warning systems of the most vulnerable countries through hydrometeorological services. The projects support the production of climate services and the dissemination of alerts at the local level, the implementation of preparedness plans, national coordination, improved data and the inclusion of women.

20. World Bank, United Nations, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, 2017.

21. Resolutions A/RES/70/262 and S/RES/2282, 27 April 2016.

## BOX 5

### Health, prevention and resilience

On 8 February 2018, the CICID recalled that health, a fundamental pillar for development, was a priority for France and reiterated its financial and political commitment to these issues. France accompanies states with fragile health situations in order to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages (SDG 3).

It promotes a holistic approach to health in these contexts across the continuum of interventions, ranging from responses to health crises to strengthening health systems thanks to its diverse range of tools and methods of intervention, by:

- Combating global pandemics which affect vulnerable areas and populations in particular, since it is a major contributor to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Unitaid (International Drug Purchase Facility) and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (over EUR 500 million annually).
- Helping these countries to strengthen their health systems at the national and community level, since it contributes to the World Health Organization (WHO) (mandatory and voluntary contributions: EUR 43.4 million in 2017; France ranks fourth in terms of the former).
- Supporting these states' governments in the fields of sexual and reproductive health, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health and nutrition through the French Muskoka Fund (EUR 10 million annually).
- Mobilizing NGOs, research institutes and government agencies swiftly and effectively during health crises, both during the emergency and recovery phase, such as during the Ebola outbreak in 2014 (EUR 158 million for the emergency phase and EUR 150 million for the post-Ebola phase).

# Chapter 2

## OBJECTIVES AND FOCAL AREAS

### 2.1 The role of peacebuilding and statebuilding in attaining sustainable development and peace

The overall aim of this strategy is to help countries experiencing situations of fragility achieve lasting peace in accordance with the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. SDG 16 sets out to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”. The focal areas for action are guided notably by the five PSGs set forth in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011):

1. legitimate politics: foster inclusive political systems and conflict resolution;
2. security: establish and strengthen people’s security;
3. justice: address injustices and increase people’s access to justice;
4. economic foundations: generate employment and improve livelihoods;
5. revenues and services: improve the management of public finances and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.

### 2.2 An approach based on democratic governance

Development and stability, if they are to be sustainable, hinge on governance that is based on the state’s democratic relationship with society, in all its diversity, within the framework of internal regulation and the definition and implementation of fair and inclusive public policies. More specifically, such democratic governance is based on the social contract between governments and

#### BOX 6

### Stabilization and recovery in the CAR: project on redeploying decentralized services, reinforcing social cohesion and early recovery (the 3Rs project)

Remote areas of the CAR have been a fertile breeding ground for violence in recent years. State structures in the country are marked by low staffing levels, poor technical capacities in local government and precarious working conditions, resulting in, *inter alia*, the poor delivery of basic social services and the erosion of trust between the state and the population.

The 3Rs project, led by Expertise France and financed by the EU Bêkou Fund, aims to promote stabilization and early recovery among the local population by building local capacities and strengthening dialogue. In Berbérati and Bria, it will support the re-deployment of the local authorities, better consultations, the participation of the media in the social cohesion process and territorial coordination, as well as access to justice and mediation mechanisms. It also aims to encourage socio-economic recovery by supporting micro projects emerging from inclusive local dialogue.

their citizens. It is linked just as much to decision-making processes that arise from this social contract as it is to their nature and their results.

Governance is clearly critical in preventing and responding to situations of fragility and crisis. Violent conflicts, whatever their causes, are ultimately the result of a breakdown in the capacity of the system of governance to peacefully regulate the relations and balance of power between actors, resulting in contestation – inherent in each society – that manifests itself in the form of violence.<sup>22</sup>

22. World Bank, *World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law*, 2017.



In addition, when persons vested with public authority put their personal interests above public interest or are not in a position to guarantee public interest and the principles of the rule of law, the climate that ensues can lead to the breakdown of the social contract between the state and citizens. This is a source of instability giving rise to widespread feelings of injustice, exclusion, impunity and corruption within the population.

Consequently, and in order to strengthen cohesion among the population and between the population and the state, promoting democratic governance will be the guiding principle of this strategy to achieve the aforementioned aims. Far from exporting and imposing a model, it seeks to foster the construction of endogenous governance modes in accordance with two interdependent areas of intervention:

1. Support states in their capacity to perform their sovereign functions (control of national territory and borders, maintenance of internal security and the rule of law, exercise of justice, civil protection and so on) and to regulate and/or effectively provide basic services (water, health, education, critical infrastructure and so on) without discrimination and in an inclusive and participatory manner for the benefit of the population as well as economic stakeholders, who drive development.
2. Strengthen the legitimacy of states, increase their accountability and encourage the expansion of civic space, be it with regard to methods for appointing leaders, how to exercise power, the independence of the judiciary, structuring political and social organizations and associations and, more broadly, enhancing the participation of civil society in the crafting, implementation and monitoring of public policies. Such legitimacy is ultimately based on respect for the rule of law and the democratic ideals recognized in international conventions and agreements in particular.

The most vulnerable territories are marked by an absence, a weak presence and/or lack of democratic legitimacy of the state, especially in peripheral marginalized regions or border areas. In such zones, there may, however, be other subnational forms of organization (local authorities, but also traditional and religious authorities, civil society organizations, private companies and so forth) that can bring about the emergence of hybrid governance systems and play a role in territorial administration and service

## BOX 7

### Security sector reform

Security sector reform (SSR), an essential part of conflict prevention and crisis recovery, is defined by the UN as a process led by national authorities which seeks to improve the efficacy and accountability of security sectors for the state and its people (human security) without discrimination and in full respect of human rights and the rule of law.

France officially adopted the concept of SSR in 2008 through the publication of a policy paper,<sup>23</sup> which is currently being updated. This paper ties in with the guidelines developed by the UN and the OECD. In this context, in 2017 France financed a project conducted by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces to enhance police accountability in Madagascar through the provision of targeted support for its General Inspectorate of the National Police. The project ties in with Madagascar's SSR process initiated in 2015 and contained two components: strengthening Madagascar's General Inspectorate through an in-depth analysis of its shortcomings and through intensive ethical training for officers; conducting activities with civil society in order to build trust between the police and the population.

In line with the principle of a comprehensive approach, the project was crafted and implemented on the basis of synergies between several French security and development actors, including internal security and cooperation services, the cultural section of the French embassy in Madagascar, the Paris-based services of the MEAE (Democratic Governance Department, Directorate for Security and Defence Cooperation) and Ministry of the Interior (International Cooperation Directorate and France's General Inspectorate of the National Police).

delivery. In this regard, these actors can provide support in the framework of a crisis resolution process, contributing adroitly to stabilization and rapidly reaping the dividends of peace. They can also play a role in terms of prevention through their ability to identify risks and provide local responses.

This observation calls for us to rethink an approach to governance which is focused solely on state institutions; we should

23. Interministerial Coordinating Committee on Security System Reform, *Security System Reform: France's Approach*, 2008.

consider, in addition to constitutional and legal order, the *de facto* role of actors other than state or public ones. This means working with all local governance actors, in line with a momentum to strengthen the rule of law, national sovereignty and national unity.

## 2.3 Intervention criteria

In keeping with a broad understanding of fragility and in order to meet the requirement for swift action that fragile contexts impose, France has chosen not to establish a pre-determined list of “fragile” countries. However, given the increasing number of fragilization processes worldwide, priorities for action must be ranked. This will be based on pre-emptive, collaborative and regular analysis of four criteria which, when viewed cumulatively, will guide France's choices in responding to fragilities.

### 2.3.1 High vulnerability of the relevant area to tensions and shocks

The stability of a region may, nationally and locally, be severely affected by fragilization processes usually arising from a combination of tensions (structural causes) and multidimensional shocks (economic, environmental, political, security and social). They may be endogenous (internal) in nature or exogenous (regional, even international).

*The degree to which a region is vulnerable to tensions and shocks will be assessed on the basis of their likelihood or frequency if they are seasonal and related to natural or recurrent phenomena due to the fact that their underlying causes have not been resolved.*

### 2.3.2 Weak capacity of states and societies to address such vulnerability

Fragilization processes are triggered or amplified in situations in which state institutions and societies are exceptionally vulnerable to tensions and shocks. Their impact will therefore depend not only on their intensity but also on the resilience capacities of states and/or societies.

*Existing local capacities will be at the centre of prevention, preparedness and response opportunities.*

#### BOX 8

### Intervening in non-governed spaces

The notion of ungoverned or under-governed spaces emerged in the 2000s with reference to spaces supposedly devoid of authority. While such spaces can be characterized by the absence of public services, many practitioners consider that the absence of government (due to a withdrawal or contestation of state authority) does not signify the absence of governance. Indeed, the absence of a state can be filled by other actors: traditional authorities, civil society, or armed groups that may, depending on the situation, exercise power, levy taxes or provide basic services.

In the short term, these structures are likely to be a factor of stability as well as facilitate the delivery of aid. When uncontrolled, these forms of alternative governance may, however, entail risks (criminal and terrorist activities). In the perspective of longer-term stabilization, it is thus vital for the state to seek to restore a positive presence, primarily through basic services (even if the state only plays a regulatory and coordinating role) and through progressively building up institutions, often based on governance structures that have emerged locally: these are referred to as hybrid governance systems.

In Syria, although seven years of (ongoing) conflict have had a significant destabilizing effect on local governance systems and access to public services, opposition-controlled areas soon saw the emergence of a new generation of actors involved in the delivery of basic services: local civil society organizations and the diaspora. France has supported the initiatives of these actors through stabilization programs and efforts to improve access to primary care and, in doing so, it has supported the capacity building of local civil governance structures. These programs, implemented by Expertise France, sought in particular to develop the role of such structures in epidemiological monitoring and the supervision of health centres.

### 2.3.3 Proven risk of fragilization spreading

Globalization and porous borders have led to the emergence of transnational threats. Armed conflicts, terrorism and violent extremism, organized crime, climate change and pandemics, as well as the subsequent mass forced displacement of populations are all factors that contribute to destabilization and the spread of

fragilization processes. The risk of contagion must also be analysed in the light of the mutual negative influence that various dimensions of fragility have and the effects of which can spread from one domain to another and cumulate simultaneously in economic, environmental, political, security and social fields. Situations in which governance structures and/or economies have collapsed, as well as marginalized border regions are, by their very nature, associated with increased risks of negative external factors that extend beyond their national territory.

*Fragilities will be assessed on the basis of their inherent systemic risk, regional dimension and threats they pose to international peace and security. Concerted multidimensional actions will be developed for fragilities, when necessary, at the level of the surrounding geographical region in order to take into account the spillover effects of crises.*

### 2.3.4 France's comparative advantage

France has historical ties, similar administrative, legal and constitutional systems and shares a common language with several third countries (most notably French-speaking countries in

sub-Saharan Africa) which gives it certain comparative advantages, including in-depth knowledge of the areas of intervention. The importance of the levers of action that France can mobilize in fragile contexts gives it undeniable added value in these geographical areas. As regards development assistance and international solidarity, France is one of the top ODA donors, has technical expertise and adapted intervention tools, and is part of the governing bodies of most of the core organizations within the UN development system. Politically, the presence of France's diplomatic network worldwide and its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council enable it to be a key player in international negotiations. Finally, in the fields of defence, internal security and civil protection, France conducts operational and structural cooperation activities and is able to deploy forces as part of an external operation, either autonomously or within an international coalition.

*France intends to systematically evaluate its comparative advantage in relation to its other partners. Should it be unable to demonstrate a value added, it will use its influence with its partners to ensure that the best possible response is provided.*

# Chapter 3

## PRINCIPLES OF IMPLEMENTATION

In view of the broad sectoral and temporal spectrum of fragilities, France's approach to responding to fragilization processes is based on six principles for action:

- reaffirming the role of political and diplomatic stakeholders in addressing fragilities and managing the comprehensive approach to aid;
- preventing crises from arising and recurring by supporting inclusion and resilience;
- using a collaborative, forward-looking and dynamic analysis of fragilities and risks;
- adopting an integrated and long-term response to the various aspects of fragility;
- supporting local processes, thus ensuring the ownership, legitimacy and sustainability of action;
- taking a rights-based approach to our action.

### 3.1 Reaffirming the role of political and diplomatic actors in addressing crises and managing aid

The role of the political actor, whose principal medium is diplomacy, has not been fully explored. Aid cannot, of course, be a substitute for a political solution to fragilities and crises. Upstream of any crisis, it is essential to support mediation and prevention efforts aimed at finding a peaceful solution to situations of fragility that are likely to deteriorate. In this regard, regional actors have a crucial role to play, with the support of our embassies, which are able often to bring the greatest influence to bear in these negotiations, usually as part of concerted efforts at the EU level or with other countries. Diplomatic circles should engage in multilateralism with a view to finding a lasting political solution to the root causes of ongoing conflicts. In this regard, France supports efforts made by the UN system in the fields of conflict prevention and resolution, which include institutional capacity building.

Political leadership should also participate in the management and coordination of the various communities of actors operating as part of the comprehensive approach. This applies to both the countries intervening in fragile and crisis settings and those benefiting from such interventions. To this end, ongoing strategic dialogue at the national and multilateral levels should be strengthened and/or established; it should evolve as necessary into an institutionalization of coordination through, for example, the adoption of formal mechanisms (agreements, memoranda of understanding, coordination committees, task forces and so forth). In this context, the role played by heads of diplomatic missions abroad when it comes to coordinating and managing teams in the field proves essential.

Furthermore, political mobilization, in addition to sending out a strong message to the international community and in particular to the actors operating as part of the comprehensive approach, is decisive in effectively mobilizing human and financial resources to respond to fragilities and crises. In addition, the involvement of policy makers helps create a shared dynamic which allows for greater clarity, consistency and ownership.

### 3.2 Preventing crises from arising and recurring by supporting inclusion and resilience

Prevention encompasses “sustaining peace”, namely: “activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development (...)”.<sup>24</sup>

The cost of violence, with the associated risks of its spreading, far exceeds the cost of prevention.<sup>25</sup> Preventing crises by

24. UNSC, Resolution 2282 (2016), 27 April 2016.

25. OECD, *States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence*, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2016. United Nations, World Bank, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2018.

tackling the root causes of fragilities is therefore more effective in terms of resource utilization, in addition to being a means of limiting the virtually irreversible damage done to states, their populations and their economies. Although investment in prevention is more cost-effective than post-crisis reconstruction, it is an area that is often neglected. Indeed, uncertainty means that it is difficult to evaluate a process that leads to a “non-event”.

While tension and risk-reduction approaches must be put in place as far in advance of a crisis as possible in order to maximize their impact on the fragilization processes, they are even more effective when the activities undertaken apply to the whole crisis cycle (i.e., as soon as the first risks are identified; when the crisis is imminent; during and after it) and are of a long-term nature.<sup>26</sup>

Taking anticipatory action on fragilization processes entails developing and supporting, in France or third countries, alert systems to detect low-level and early risk-related signs. The diplomatic network constitutes, in this respect, added value in terms of analysing and relaying the risks observed on the ground.

Early warning should also facilitate decision making and lead as early as possible to appropriate action. Prevention is often ineffective when action (development, security and diplomacy/mediation) is not taken in a timely and coordinated manner. Prevention would be improved if international cooperation programs were to take better account of the nature of risks and the way they evolve.<sup>27</sup>

Under this preventive approach, particular attention will be paid to two critical areas in which both bilateral and multilateral cooperation can yield tangible results in the field of prevention:

- Inclusion at all levels in systems of governance and in terms of access to social and economic opportunities and safety. Indeed, violence develops in contexts marked by grievances

26. World Bank, United Nations, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2018.

27. World Bank, United Nations, *Ibid.*

28. World Bank, United Nations, *Ibid.*

29. Christophe Béné, Rachel Godfrey-Wood, Andrew Newsham and Mark Davies, *Resilience: New Utopia or New Tyranny? Reflection about the Potentials and Limits of the Concept of Resilience in Relation to Vulnerability Reduction Programmes*, Institute of Development Studies, 2012.

30. World Bank, United Nations, *Op. cit.*

## BOX 9

### Leaving no one behind

Economic inclusion is based on:

- Horizontal relations between groups, marked by dialogue and trust: various social groups have access to basic services and economic opportunities and participate in decisions that structure public life. These groups interact, rather than cohabit separately.
- Vertical relations between those governing and those being governed marked by dialogue on the basis of a social contract: those in power meet the expectations of those being governed and are accountable to them; those being governed participate in public debate in a constructive and non-violent way.
- Particular attention is paid to groups that may be excluded in terms of access to fundamental rights, basic services, employment and livelihoods, participation and representation in public debate: for example, in many societies, this concerns women, young people, and certain clans and ethnic or religious groups.

Specifically, programs and projects to promote inclusion aim to target multiple social groups so as to strengthen the ties between them as well as the relationship between citizens and the state and take into account groups that tend to be excluded in a given society.

related to exclusion and inequalities (including gender inequalities) which are not addressed by states with weak capacity and a lack of legitimacy.<sup>28</sup>

- The resilience of states and societies, which is understood in a broad sense since it encompasses not only the states' capacities to absorb but also to adapt and transform<sup>29</sup> with a view to making sources of resilience sustainable and more robust.

Furthermore, support for preventive action should tie in with the broader framework of national prevention strategies; their crafting and implementation should be supported.<sup>30</sup>

### 3.3 Drawing on a collaborative, forward-looking and dynamic analysis of fragilities and risks

The diversity of issues means that situations of fragility and crisis occur in complex contexts, thereby making it impossible to apply ready-made responses. Similarly, because long-term stabilization depends, among other things, on recipient countries taking ownership of processes, actors in contexts of fragility must also be able to adapt their interventions to the political, economic, socio-logical and cultural dimensions of the target regions.

Given the complexity of each situation, collective intelligence is essential. It is therefore important to pool and build on the knowledge held heterogeneously by the different communities of actors within the French system, the international community and countries of intervention in order to gain an optimal and shared understanding of contexts and issues, especially upstream of interventions. Only diagnoses agreed upon and established between the various actors, together with the research community and local civil society, will enable the most appropriate decisions to be made on the basis of empirical findings.

Situations of fragility necessarily unfold in sensitive and shifting contexts that can quickly escalate. It is vital to put in place – on a case-by-case basis – very reactive, *quasi* real-time monitoring systems to produce up-to-date analysis of the processes unfolding.

Fragile contexts also often involve unavoidable risk taking, which must be assessed in terms of the negative effects that our actions may have. Interventions and methodologies must be mindful of social, environmental and conflict risks. They must also give due consideration to the problems of creating dependencies, or encouraging duplicity among partners. These various action-related risks for the intervention itself and for those carrying out the intervention must be analysed in terms of possible alternatives, bottlenecks and factors of change and in keeping with the principle of “do no harm”, as well as take into account the “risk of not acting”.

While contextual analysis is an essential prerequisite for any intervention, it should be operationalized in supported programs and projects. This sensitivity to conflicts and fragility is a cross-cutting principle for all of France’s cooperation activities. The

#### BOX 10

### Building more resilient states and societies

Resilience, which concerns both states and societies, is defined as the ability to absorb and recover from shocks. Such capacity for resilience varies greatly, ranging from simply absorbing shocks to adapting and even going as far as transforming the system so that it can withstand any impact.

The prism of resilience is an invitation to build on the foundation of existing “positive peace” within states and societies, i.e. behaviours, structures and institutions that promote and maintain lasting peace. Building resilience capacity also helps ensure the sustainability of development investments.

While the ability to anticipate risks early and take appropriate action in a timely manner is an essential condition for resilience, it is equally important to address the root causes of fragilities and conflicts. In this respect, good governance capable of making institutions more effective, inclusive and legitimate is crucial. The pivotal role of the state, particularly in terms of security and justice, should be underscored. However, the importance of mobilizing local communities, the private sector and civil society is also essential to ensure, for example, access to basic services for all without discrimination.

In this light, international donors have made supporting resilience and anticipating risks a priority. The EU has developed a strategy for resilience building as part of its external action (2017). It aims, through an integrated approach to instruments, to reduce humanitarian needs and ensure sustainable and equitable gains in development, security and stability.

aim is to reduce the gap between knowledge and operations through rapid interaction between information providers and policy makers with a view to simultaneously developing pertinent actions and adjusting implementation trajectories if the changing nature of situations of fragility requires it.

### 3.4 Adopting an integrated and long-term response to the various aspects of fragility

The increased number of crises and their protracted, multidimensional and transnational nature call for the adoption of a comprehensive approach as part of a contiguuum of actions in the areas of diplomacy, security, humanitarian affairs, stabilization and development. In this respect, the French cooperation system's wide range of expertise in all segments of the comprehensive approach is key when taking into account the different needs caused by fragilization processes.

The overall objectives of this approach are to enhance coordination between the various "Team France" actors and ensure the complementarity of their actions, particularly with regard to the linkages between short- and long-term considerations imposed by a structural response to fragilities. The approach is embodied in an integrated response that, from an operational point of view, has two variants:

- By establishing shared reference frameworks with common goals, the attainment of which involves each community of actors being assigned actions based on their comparative advantage, expertise and specific way of working. This arrangement should ultimately foster synergies between initiatives and, conversely, prevent competition and/or redundancy that could prove to be counter-productive. It makes it possible to move beyond a sectoral "silo" approach, thereby enabling bridges to be built between the various aspects of the response to fragilization.
- By developing program-based initiatives that are multidimensional and/or jointly implemented by the various communities of actors, making it possible to respond to urgent needs while providing a sustainable response to the root causes of fragilities and also to promote socio-economic development while seeking to improve governance and security.

This integrated response to situations of fragility must also be taken up within the UN system. France will therefore promote concerted action among peacekeeping, humanitarian and development actors by encouraging needs assessments and action planning in these three fields, by systemizing the organization of leadership among them and by supporting pooled funds, vectors of coordination and consistency.

#### BOX 11

### The comprehensive approach


Within the confines of the mandate of each community of actors, the comprehensive approach is based on the linkage between diplomacy, security, humanitarian action, stabilization and development as part of a contiguuum of actions in these fields.

The notion of a contiguuum characterizes that which is simultaneous, in contrast with the notion of a continuum, which corresponds more to a sequential approach. When applied to fragility, it refers to the simultaneous interventions of all actors concerned, in all phases of the fragility and crisis cycles and at varying degrees of intensity, according to needs. This approach, which also encompasses a shared analysis of needs and priorities for interventions, involves addressing a labyrinth of different issues related to increasingly complex fragilities and crises (protracted nature of crises, coexistence of immediate and long-term needs and processes to end conflict where there is still a fine line between peace and war).

Ultimately, the goal of the comprehensive approach is to find a lasting solution to the root causes of conflict through an integrated response. International frameworks for cooperation have evolved by reaffirming the vital importance of such an approach. This position is taken up, for example, by the UN in its 2030 Agenda, the Agenda for Humanity and the proposed peacekeeping reform put forward by the UN Secretary-General. It is also supported by the EU: the European Consensus on Development (2017) recognises "the nexus between sustainable development, humanitarian action, peace and security". In France – and as reflected in the conclusions of the CICID (February 2018) – the priority given to countries experiencing crisis situations, post-crisis situations and situations of fragility, as well as the need to "act comprehensively", has been strengthened. In this regard, France's new humanitarian strategy (2018) underscores the need for lasting solutions to crises through a comprehensive approach that strengthens, in particular, synergies between humanitarian aid and development.

In addition to the comparative advantages of each group of actors, the comprehensive approach and integrated response stemming from it should be deployed within the respective mandates of the actors and in compliance with humanitarian principles and OECD DAC definition of ODA. Blurring the boundaries can indeed be detrimental both to projects and those heading them.

**“Team France”’s comprehensive approach in response to the fragilization of states and societies**



**BOX 12**

**Combating violent extremism without weapons: the development response**

As part of a comprehensive approach based on synergies between security and development actions, development assistance can contribute to the prevention of violent extremism by addressing its root causes, in particular the lack of inclusion.

Given the development of violent extremism in contexts where populations have low levels of participation in governance processes, the difficulties experienced by state authorities in ensuring basic services, security and justice, and the non-respect of the principles of the rule of law (human rights abuse, corruption, culture of impunity and so on), support for democratic governance is of the utmost importance, just as it is for the efforts to counter terrorism and tackle radicalization,

Since they are particularly sensitive to violent discourse, related in part to a lack of economic and social opportunities, violent extremism

among young people is a prominent issue. In this respect, education is a powerful prevention tool as it offers a life-cycle approach targeting the three stages of youth integration: education, training and employability. In its strategy for education, vocational training and insertion (2017-2021), France sets out to tackle all forms of exclusion by supporting these three dimensions that are at the heart of an integrated response to addressing vulnerabilities and to preventing violent extremism. Recognizing the major role of education in reducing vulnerabilities and building resilience, France has contributed to the Education Cannot Wait fund, which is dedicated to education in emergency situations (EUR 2 million in 2017). France’s contribution to the Global Partnership for Education will also be increased by EUR 200 million over the next three years and EUR 100 million of additional funding through AFD will be allocated to basic education.



### 3.5 Supporting local processes ensuring ownership, legitimacy and sustainability

If stability, the reversal of fragilization processes and peace are to be lasting, they need to be built on the basis of local processes involving all levels of the state and all strata of society. It is apparent, however, that local actors are not sufficiently mobilized in terms of the contribution they could make to addressing fragilities and crises. Finally, their relative role must be seen in the context of their capacities, which are often limited.

In line with the principle of the localization of aid, as proposed under the Grand Bargain,<sup>31</sup> adopted at the World Humanitarian Summit 2016, national actors in countries experiencing situations of fragility (including at the local level) will be fully involved in the implementation of this strategy, whether they are public authorities (national, decentralized or devolved), civil society organizations or populations. Particular attention will be paid to women and young people, both because of their vulnerability and their potential role as levers for change.

This inclusive approach, which ensures that policies and actions are rooted in reality, legitimate and therefore sustainable, is obtained by:

- ongoing dialogue and consultations with national counterparts to craft policies that closely reflect real needs;
- capacity-building activities for the benefit of national stakeholders in order to strengthen their leadership in development processes;
- using national sovereign and non-state project managers, who may have the expertise and dexterity appropriate for fragile contexts and whose involvement in project implementation helps to better structure them.

#### BOX 13

### Women, peace and security

In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted the historic Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. It recognizes that war has different consequences for women and girls. Indeed, conflicts foster higher rates of sexual violence than usual and, in situations of conflict, women and girls are particularly vulnerable to poverty, loss of employment, forced marriage, human trafficking and destruction of their property. Resolution 1325 also reaffirms the need to strengthen the role of women in decision making on prevention and conflict resolution.

France is extremely active in implementing Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions. In its second National Action Plan (2015-2018), France focuses on the participation of women in the management of conflict and post-conflict situations, the fight against impunity, the protection of women from violence, and prevention. In addition, France's international strategy on gender equality (2018-2022) incorporates the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in its sectoral priorities. In order to develop synergies, France's strategy on responding to situations of fragility will ensure the coherence of its action with these two strategy papers.

On a budgetary level, France finances projects through the Ministry's Crisis and Support Centre and its Stabilization Unit; these contribute to the protection and economic empowerment of women in areas affected by armed conflict. One of its priority countries is Yemen, a country profoundly affected by gender inequalities, where France provides women and girls who have been victims of violence with psychosocial and legal support, skills development training as well as assistance in the creation of livelihood opportunities. Support is also provided for projects to reintegrate women and girls associated with armed groups such as Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria in order to combat the stigma they face and to promote social cohesion.

31. Seeking to contribute to the reform of the global humanitarian system, the Grand Bargain is both a list of priorities and three core commitments: to increase support for local actors; increase the share of unearmarked aid; support response plans and joint multi-year funding, which helps to bring humanitarian and development actors closer together. France joined the Grand Bargain in October 2017.

## 3.6 Taking a rights-based approach to our action

Too often, interventions in contexts of fragility or crisis are limited to providing services to meet immediate needs without necessarily going as far as protecting and promoting the rights of recipients. It is, however, essential to protect these rights, especially with a view to legitimizing the state.

A rights-based approach is therefore of particular importance, especially with regard to human rights, international humanitarian law and gender equality. In addition, the respect of human rights and rights in general can be an objective in itself as well as a stake in the way international cooperation functions. The methodology of the rights-based approach can thus be formalized through five principles:<sup>32</sup>

- The legality, universality and indivisibility of human rights: France's interventions are carried out in accordance with the international human rights obligations signed and ratified by France (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and so forth).
- Participation in, and access to, decision-making processes: when crafting and implementing our action, we encourage the participation of beneficiary populations, especially the ones most affected by fragilization processes (women, young people, displaced persons) as they can be major players in building resilience.
- Non-discrimination and equal access: given that the inclusion of populations is the bedrock of stabilization, it is essential that action taken to combat fragilization processes be accessible to all without distinction as to ethnicity, religion, gender, age, language and so on. However, this does not preclude programmes from concentrating on building the resilience of one part of the population, especially those most vulnerable to crises and conflicts.
- Accountability and the rule of law: France's action must aim to increase the responsibility of states and the accountability of their officials, with a view to ensuring that the latter respect, protect and implement the principles of human rights, gender equality and the rule of law.

32. European Commission, *A Rights-Based Approach, Encompassing all Human Rights for EU Development Cooperation*, Commission Staff Working Document Tool-Box, 2014.

33. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, *Op. cit.*

### BOX 14

## Combating impunity: the role of justice

Violations of the rule of law are one of the characteristics of situations of fragility and conflict that can degenerate into crimes and violence (mass atrocities, organized crime and corruption). To prevent such violations, a state based on the rule of law subjects not only all individuals but also its own public entities to the legal standards that it has itself enacted. Justice plays a primordial role in such contexts, since it is the institution in charge of enforcing and punishing infringements of the rule of law.

With regard to mass atrocities, the quest for justice is often mingled with a need for introspection on the events that have unfolded, accompanied by the need to settle these periods of tension through legal procedures materializing in transitional justice processes.

Transitional justice is key for reconciliation as long as it seeks to establish truth, deliver justice, obtain reparations and ensure non-repetition. It is usually part of a political transition and does not only concern those involved in the administration of justice but all the state's judicial, police and administrative authorities. It is often, but not only, ensured by establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

France has a Transitional Justice Strategy (2014)<sup>33</sup> and addresses this subject through different channels: multilaterally, by supporting international strategies in this field, such as the EU's Policy Framework on support to transitional justice (2015); and bilaterally, by supporting transitional justice processes such as those in the CAR (assistance to the Special Criminal Court) or in Gambia (capacity building of civil society and civil servants in the field of transitional justice).

- Transparency and access to information must be promoted and guaranteed so that actors are held to account for their actions, both at the level of beneficiary countries and that of development actors and donors.

# Chapter 4

## MEANS OF ACTION

The multidimensional, structural and volatile nature of situations of fragility, as well as the fact that they break out across different geographical scales, necessitate significant levels of assistance, drawing upon the whole array of instruments at the disposal of the French cooperation system, whether bilaterally or multilaterally. France's action in situations of fragility must be carried out to the highest standards possible and adapted to fragile contexts. There are a number of parameters to take into consideration when it comes to using available resources. These include the political oversight of action, consideration of national capacities, continuity and long-term predictability of resources, synergies between the various instruments, and flexibility in their mobilization (including preventively, as soon as the first signs of a deteriorating context are detected).

The concessionality level of aid depends on how fragile the intervention contexts are. It is also crucial to remain realistic when identifying the goals that should be achieved, keeping in mind that aid alone will not be able to cover all needs and that other levers of action such as private investment, domestic resources and diplomacy will need to be used.

### 4.1 Instruments spanning the whole crisis cycle

#### 4.1.1 Conducting the comprehensive approach through renewed and strengthened bilateral assistance

In addition to its technical expertise on all the dimensions of fragilities and crises, France has a diverse range of bilateral instruments at its disposal, enabling interventions across the whole spectrum (sectoral, temporal and geographical) of the crisis cycle.<sup>34</sup> These instruments essentially cover humanitarian aid, stabilization aid, development assistance and, more

#### BOX 15

### The Minka Peace and Resilience Fund

In 2016, the CICID set up a facility known as the Minka Fund to prevent and mitigate vulnerability, crises and their impacts; this peace and resilience fund is managed by the AFD. It was allocated EUR 100 million per annum as of 2017 and this amount will be doubled by 2020. Minka provides funding for regional initiatives, and aims to:

- provide resources in the way of donations, in addition to AFD's usual financial instruments, that are available at any time through a reserve;
- make multi-year commitments in order to address the root causes of crises and conflicts and to accompany long-term post-crisis recovery;
- develop a specific approach for each crisis basin given that they often have a regional dimension;
- adopt a partnership approach that ties in with the collective action of "Team France" and its European and international partners;
- draw up analytical and operational methodologies adapted for proactive risk management;
- build national capacity without neglecting to comprehensively take into account the needs of vulnerable communities.

It is implemented in line with the political priorities agreed in consultation with the CICID co-secretariat and is based on four cumulative criteria: level of vulnerability of the relevant area to major shocks; ability to address such vulnerability; risk of tensions or shocks spreading; the comparative advantage of France and AFD.

Four initiatives were launched in 2017: "Ga Sôngo" (CAR), focusing on the impacts of the crisis in the CAR and integrating the cross-border nature of the crisis; "Sawa" (Middle East), targeting areas affected by the Syrian-Iraqi crisis in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey; "Tiwara" (Sahel), in response to the regional impact of the Malian crisis in the Sahel region; and "Kouri" (Lake Chad), in support of the regions affected by Boko Haram in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

34. See the Annex.

generally, international cooperation. They are deployed to support the social, economic, governance, justice, defence and security sectors. They take the form of program/project assistance, budget support and loans.<sup>35</sup>

With a view to better addressing the specific needs associated with fragilities and the need for flexibility and swift action that these contexts impose, these instruments have been recently updated and their resources enhanced. Hence, for example, the creation of the CDCS Stabilization Fund and the AFD's Peace and Resilience Fund, which complement the range of existing instruments.

Bilateral assistance will be enhanced to more effectively target our priority countries. Thus, by 2022, two-thirds of the cumulative average increase in commitment authorizations for the ODA budget will contribute to the bilateral component of ODA.

Instruments will continue to evolve and greater coherence and synergies will be developed around the principles of the strategy, in particular the need for an integrated response by "Team France" based on the complementarity of mandates and the comparative advantages of the various instruments. By respecting and clarifying the specific mandates of each instrument, including the humanitarian aid instrument which is governed by international humanitarian law, consistency between the instruments (which is essential for the success of the comprehensive approach) can be ensured.

In addition, under this approach, preventing crises and conflict and strengthening the resilience of states and societies for sustainable peace and development will constitute the unifying collective goals that guide the use of instruments.

#### 4.1.2 Promoting the pooling and coordination of resources at the multilateral level

Due to the magnitude of the needs that must be addressed, fragile contexts and humanitarian crises often require the participation of many actors, who must then coordinate with each other in order to be effective. Thus, bilateral action must be supplemented by action on the part of multilateral institutions (UN, World

Bank and IMF, EU) with which it is vital to work. In this regard, peacekeeping operations, special political missions, humanitarian organizations and the UN development system play a crucial role in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Significantly, provided they are properly coordinated and are in line with the comprehensive approach (as opposed to a silo approach) promoted by the UN Secretary-General, these components of UN action are able to

#### BOX 16

### Forced displacement

According to UN estimates, the number of international migrants (244 million) and forcibly displaced persons (65 million) reached a record high in 2016.

Development is an integral part of the response to forced displacement when this takes place over the long term. The average displacement period is twenty years for refugees and over ten years for 90 per cent of internally displaced persons. The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (September 2016), which sets forth the principle of shared responsibility between the countries of origin, transit and destination, calls for sustainable measures that strengthen the link between humanitarian action and development.

At the national level, the AFD is implementing an action plan on international migration which aims to support the positive contributions of regular migration to development, to address the structural factors of forced migration and to coordinate emergency responses and long-term action. In this context, the "Sawa" initiative, financed by the AFD Peace and Resilience Fund, was able to mobilize EUR 65 million to finance projects related to the refugee crisis in countries around Syria and Iraq. These projects seek to swiftly meet basic needs, while being coherent from a development perspective. They promote social cohesion between host and displaced populations through assistance that targets both categories of populations and fosters the economic and social integration of refugees. At the multilateral level, France helped to craft and finance multi-donor trust funds such as the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (the Madad Fund). Such trust funds enable the pooling of resources and a better coordination of humanitarian action, stabilization and development.

35. France applies a responsible and targeted lending policy. Sovereign loans are reserved for countries whose risk of over-indebtedness is deemed to be low on the basis of analyses conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, but also for countries with a moderate risk of over-indebtedness, if they abide by an IMF adjustment program and are one of French cooperation's poorest priority countries. These loans cannot be granted to countries that have not yet gone through all the steps of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.

implement the peace-humanitarian-development nexus, which is necessary to meet the challenge that situations of fragility represent. In this respect, the UN system must also be in a position whereby it can coordinate its action as well as that of bilateral and regional actors and multilateral development banks.

In contexts of fragility, trust funds are innovative mechanisms used to pool sizeable resources from various donors in order to provide a swift, common, complementary and flexible response to the various dimensions of an emergency. Given their flexible approach, the speed at which they can be implemented and their ability to catalyse funding available for the same crisis, they are useful instruments that should be used when they provide added value. At the EU level, France contributes to several trust funds and is one of the main operators in their implementation (funding to support post-conflict process in Colombia, the Bêkou Fund for the CAR, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and Madad for the Syrian crisis).

Financial contributions to the international aid architecture should be supplemented by a strategy to steer and monitor the initiatives to which France is a party so as to ensure consistency with bilateral aid and consideration for France's and third countries' priorities in addressing fragilities.<sup>36</sup>

In addition to aid, multilateralism should be taken up at the diplomatic level in order to create conditions across the world to avert or prevent crises and conflicts and allow a sustainable political solution to emerge when they do arise. Through its diplomatic network worldwide, its permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its membership of many agencies' governing bodies, funds and development programmes within the UN system and its leading role in the EU, France is a major player in negotiating and implementing international initiatives to reduce fragilities, prevent violent conflicts and build lasting peace.

## BOX 17

### Private sector and fragilities

The 2030 Agenda and Addis Ababa Action Agenda place emphasis on the involvement of private sector actors, including businesses, in implementing the SDGs and in supporting countries experiencing situations of fragility. Both operationally and financially, their contribution to development is paramount and rounds out public policies. Several activities conducted by France seek to encourage contributions of this kind:

- Support for the private sector in developing countries. AFD and its subsidiary Proparco adapt their methods of intervention in fragile countries where operational, regulatory and sometimes reputational risks are particularly high. New approaches, based on a combination of public and private resources, can mitigate such risks and boost foreign direct investment, which is crucial for the recovery of local economies and for the promotion of their integration into regional and global value chains. In addition, the interventions of the AFD group of agencies focus on: strengthening financial intermediaries so as to improve the financial inclusion of the most vulnerable groups and promote the growth of micro, small and medium enterprises;<sup>37</sup> supporting agricultural sectors to reduce food insecurity and territorial inequalities; enhancing vocational training with a view to increasing the employability of populations.
- The MEAE's strategy Innovate Together seeks to promote new social and inclusive economic models internationally. The strategy is piloted by a steering committee which is active in various areas, including: corporate social and environmental responsibility, the role of foundations and philanthropy, the social and solidarity economy, social entrepreneurship, impact investing and promoting new inclusive business models, such as fair trade.
- Improving the business climate and mobilizing French companies in the context of development assistance activities financed through instruments managed by the Directorate-General of the Treasury (concessional and non-concessional loans, education funding and private sector support).

36. French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, *France's Multilateral Aid Strategy (2017-2021)*, 2017.

37. The sum of EUR 1 billion will be allocated to financing African SMEs and intermediate-sized enterprises, including through Proparco and the Investment and Support Fund for Businesses in Africa (FISEA), which targets vulnerable populations and unstable and post-conflict regions as well as sectors that have traditionally been neglected by investors.

### 4.1.3 Diversifying funding

In line with the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, sources of financing for development other than ODA must be fully taken into account, such as private entrepreneurial investments and domestic resources, including tax revenue. This entails providing support for the implementation of mechanisms to ensure the legal and economic security of investments (including through guarantees); it also involves building states' capacities to mobilize their fiscal resources while improving their management of public expenditure. In this regard, France will support the implementation of the EU External Investment Plan and the G20 Compact with Africa initiative to strengthen private investment in the most fragile countries. France's actions to support domestic resource mobilization in developing economies will become more coherent under its interministerial strategy on this issue.

Regular migration also has great potential for the development of both countries of destination and origin through the financial, economic, social and cultural contributions of migrants. Thus, diasporas, whose remittances to their countries of origin are three times higher than ODA,<sup>38</sup> constitute a major resource, including in post-crisis reconstruction. Until now, remittances have mainly been dedicated to consumer spending;<sup>39</sup> however, they should be more broadly channelled into productive investments. Consequently, it is important to support the potential for solidarity and entrepreneurial initiatives of diasporas by, on the one hand, building the capacity of migrants' international solidarity organizations and, on the other hand, introducing business support programs and incentives for productive investments by diasporas in their countries of origin.

## 4.2 Methodology

### 4.2.1 Interministerial coordination

The coordination of "Team France" activities, essential for the implementation of the comprehensive approach, is based on institutionalized partnerships between different professional communities that are made up of humanitarian, development and security actors. The existing interministerial coordination forums, whether the Council for Development, CIOID, task forces or committees

#### BOX 18

### Combining anticipation and stabilization mandates to prevent electoral violence

Given their ability to consolidate a peace agreement, channel political violence and establish a legitimate democratic system, elections represent a major step in crisis resolution processes. Nevertheless, recent post-electoral crises that have occurred in Africa in particular are a reminder that the electoral competition can also be the cause of political crises, including in the run-up to the polls.

While the number of elections is on the rise owing to a momentum that is both endogenous (linked to the growing expectations of populations in terms of democratization) and exogenous (linked to the demands of the international community), electoral violence is exacerbated when the process turns into a fierce competition to win over public support or a power struggle on an ideological, ethnic, clan, denominational and/or regionalist basis.

For contexts where elections represent both a democratic opportunity and a destabilizing factor, France, through the Crisis and Support Centre, has equipped itself with tools to combine anticipation and stabilization mandates:

- Under the risk assessment methods defined in the UN International Framework of Action for the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (which, however, does not take into account the notion of fragility), the Crisis and Support Centre tries to calculate the likelihood of violence erupting on the sidelines of electoral processes by conducting post-predictive correlative analyses, the results of which are then remedied through the participation of the relevant services of the MEAE and other relevant ministries.
- On the basis of such early warning activities, the Crisis and Support Centre can then finance in a very short space of time actions contributing to the prevention of electoral violence, in particular in areas identified as being most likely to trigger a crisis (participation of vulnerable groups in the electoral process, voting transparency, strengthening the legitimacy of the electoral administration and so forth).

38. According to the World Bank, officially recorded remittances to developing countries totalled USD 450 billion in 2017: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/10/03/remittances-to-recover-modestly-after-two-years-of-decline>

39. Sonia Plaza and Dilip Ratha (eds.), *Diaspora for Development in Africa*, World Bank, 2011.

on specific topics, aim to promote information sharing in order to maximise synergies and facilitate the steering of aid, anticipation and decision making. While the nature of the topics addressed and action taken justifies the diversity of consultation and coordination frameworks, consistency would be achieved by facilitating the flow of information between them. With regard to anticipation, the Preparedness and Partnerships Unit, an interministerial coordinating structure attached to the Crisis and Support Centre, developed an early warning system as of 2014. Referred to as “SyAI”, the tool is designed to anticipate crises using a comprehensive approach. This early warning system, which is set to be enhanced, will enable France to mobilize – optimally and in a preventive fashion – its means of cooperation with the countries in which it decides to intervene, but also to respond more swiftly to a major crisis.

#### 4.2.2 Technical assistance and cooperation

In addition to financial instruments, technical assistance and cooperation (which focus on project management, assistance and advice, support and capacity building based on a peer-based approach) appear to be particularly useful in the case of fragile and post-conflict countries where national capacities are often weak.

Public assistance and technical cooperation agencies such as Expertise France are vital for the French cooperation system. In contexts of crisis, fragility and violent conflict, Expertise France intervenes by implementing stabilization projects. Following on from the immediate response to a crisis, these projects integrate elements that promote the sustainability of action and capacity building of governance structures, states, local authorities and civil society organizations. Capacity building can be achieved by deploying international experts alongside national counterparts in countries of intervention in line with diverse modalities adapted to the heterogeneous needs expressed by partner countries (residential technical assistance, intermittent technical assistance, support missions, training, administrative cooperation and so forth).

The network of technical military collaborators and international technical experts – military, police, gendarmes and fire fighters – of the Directorate for Security and Defence Cooperation also contributes to this effort in the field of security, defence and civil protection. Furthermore, its network of national training

centres with regional outreach (ENVR) is an ideal instrument for transmitting and sharing know-how.

#### 4.2.3 Partnership with civil societies of the Global South

While French civil society organizations remain our traditional partners, emphasis will be placed on civil society in the Global South and their added value in terms of their knowledge of fragile contexts and their territorial ties.

Owing to their specific skills and expertise, their potential for citizen and political mobilization and the decisive action that they can provide in areas where states are not able to intervene, civil society organizations play an indispensable role in the field of development and international solidarity, especially in fragile contexts.

For this reason, civil society organizations in the Global South can potentially propose solutions and make meaningful contributions to the development and the implementation of public policies, over which they can exercise control. Moreover, they can constitute a means to foster the participation of citizens and raise awareness about sustainable development and peace. In line with the policy paper on the partnership between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and civil society (March 2017)<sup>40</sup> and commitments made under the Grand Bargain on the localization of aid, it is essential to support the activities of civil society organizations in the Global South so as to help them structure themselves and enhance their coordination.

#### 4.2.4 Opening up to the research community

Exchanges between the actors responding to fragilities and the research community (French research institutes abroad, think tanks, university networks and so on) is still relatively limited and heterogeneous. Yet, their analyses, concepts, recommendations and forward-looking vision can help guide decision making and build on ongoing initiatives. In the spirit of the report on French think tanks<sup>41</sup> published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, relations between the actors of the French cooperation system and the French and French-speaking research community will be reinforced.

40. *Partnering between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development and civil society: A Policy Paper*, 2017.

41. *Report on French think tanks*, September 2016.

# Chapter 5

## IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY

An annual action plan, drafted by the steering committee, drives the implementation of the strategy. It determines the actions to be undertaken to disseminate the strategy and ensures that it is included in “Team France” interventions. A monitoring and evaluation system reports on the conducted activities and their impact and, where appropriate, proposes recommendations to improve their effectiveness and relevance.

### 5.1 Steering and monitoring the implementation of the strategy

- The steering and monitoring committee on the implementation of the strategy comprises the core ministries, French agencies and entities concerned by interventions in situations of crisis and fragility. Under the chairmanship of the MEAE and in accordance with its statutes, this committee meets once a year in Paris and as and when necessary. It strives to coordinate partnerships and ensure that the different instruments and support mechanisms associated with this strategy are monitored coherently. Furthermore, the committee puts together an annual action plan for the dissemination and implementation of the strategy.
- A secretariat assists the steering committee in monitoring the implementation of the strategy. It prepares the committee meetings, is responsible for the follow-up of the annual action plans and sets up activities to disseminate the strategy, accumulate knowledge, establish networks and provide training for “Team France” actors.

### 5.2 Monitoring and evaluation

The monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the strategy will generate three reports:

- An annual activity report (2018-2022): the purpose of this document is to measure the activities of “Team France” and the extent to which members of the team and its partners have taken ownership of the guidelines that underpin the strategy. This report will draw upon a descriptive and analytical summary based on the use of standardized matrix grids.
- A mid-term evaluation (2020): an exhaustive review of the first activities conducted will be compiled and the initial results of the implementation of the strategy will be scrutinized, allowing “Team France” to adjust the scope of the strategy if necessary. In addition, this evaluation will document success and feedback with a view to developing recommendations to optimise France’s action by 2022.
- An *ex post* final evaluation of the implementation of the strategy (2022): drawn up by independent experts, this document will be based in particular on the evaluation criteria defined by the OECD DAC (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, coherence and sustainability of the evaluated action). This evaluation will also contain a retrospective component allowing for lessons to be learned from experience and a forward-looking component to provide food for thought for the development of future strategies.





# Annex

## A cursory typology of the main instruments that can be deployed by France to prevent and respond to situations of fragility and crises – June 2018

Organisation/referent agency	Instrument	Description	Numerical indicators	Counterparts
<b>FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS</b>				
<b>BILATERAL</b>				
MEAE, Minister's office	Post-crisis loans	Response to needs expressed, including on a budgetary level, by countries in crisis or post-crisis situations, particularly as part of support for electoral processes.	Budget: EUR 21 million (2018). Project funding range: tens of thousands of Euros to several million Euros.	International organizations, states, international NGOs.
MEAE, Directorate-General for Global Affairs, Culture, Education and International Development (DGM)	Programmed food aid	Support for population resilience: safeguarding and restoring their livelihoods and responding to their most urgent nutritional needs, whether in situations of emergency or chronic food insecurity.	Budget: EUR 33 million (2018). Project funding range: EUR 95,000 to EUR 1.5 million	International organizations, international NGOs, states (in some contexts).
MEAE, DGM	Solidarity fund for innovative projects, civil societies, La Francophonie and Human Development (FSP)	Support for development initiatives in sectors such as strengthening civil society, higher education, research, the French language, La Francophonie and education, media support, heritage, regional integration, gender and youth. Priority is given, inter alia, to countries experiencing crises and situations of fragility.	Budget 2018: EUR 6.2 million. Project funding range: EUR 100,000 to EUR 500,000.	Local NGOs, MEAE government agencies, states.
MEAE, CDCS/MAH	Emergency Humanitarian Fund	Humanitarian assistance in the form of subsidies, sending material, credit allocation supervised and managed by diplomatic missions abroad. The Fund also hosts: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the Assistance Fund (donations from individuals and companies);</li> <li>• the External Action Fund for Local and Regional Authorities (FACECO; donations from local authorities);</li> <li>• the support fund for victims of ethnic and religious violence.</li> </ul>	Budget 2018: EUR 17.5 million. Project funding range: EUR 50,000 to EUR 750,000.	International and local NGOs, international organizations (exceptionally).
MEAE, CDCS/MS	Stabilization Fund	Post-crisis assistance through support for stabilization projects aimed at the redeployment of the state, the restoration of basic services and capacity building of civil society.	Budget 2018: EUR 17.5 million. Project funding range: EUR 30,000 to EUR 500,000.	International and local NGOs, MEAE government agencies.

Organisation/referent agency	Instrument	Description	Numerical indicators	Counterparts
MEAE, DCSD	Structural security and defence cooperation	Implementation of cross-cutting projects in the fields of defence, security and civil protection.	Budget 2018: EUR 36 million for operating and intervention budgets; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EUR 66 million for payroll (80 per cent of which is abroad);</li> <li>• EUR 2.5 million for projects (priority solidarity fund).</li> </ul>	States (internal security and defence forces, civil security).
AFD	Peace and Resilience Fund (Minka Fund)	Multi-year and multi-sectoral initiatives targeted at crisis basins and reducing vulnerabilities.	Budget 2017: EUR 100 million, increasing to EUR 200 million per annum by 2020.	All counterparts.
AFD	Calls for crisis and post-crisis projects	Calls for proposals in crisis and post-crisis settings to restore or deliver basic services.	Budget 2015-2017: over EUR 41 million. Project funding range: minimum EUR 1.5 million.	Local and international CSOs.
AFD	Crisis and post-crisis intervention tool	Support for projects requiring small amounts of money, mainly for the benefit of non-sovereign actors and in the sectors of public infrastructure, economic recovery or the restoration of basic services necessary for the recovery of the state.	Budget 2017: EUR 750,000. Project funding range: EUR 100,000 to EUR 750,000.	States, local authorities, international and regional NGOs.
AFD	NGO envelope reserve of 10 per cent, the CSO Initiative	Response to unpredictable crises (particularly related to natural disasters) by improving the responsiveness of the CSO Initiative co-financing mechanism.	Budget: maximum of 10 per cent of the annual CSO Initiative envelope. Project funding range: minimum overall amount of EUR 300,000.	French CSOs working in partnership with local CSOs.
Proparco (AFD)	FISEA	Support for business growth and financial institutions that create jobs through access to equity and support in managing their investments. Targeted: vulnerable populations or unstable and post-crisis regions.	Budget 2018-2028: EUR 275 million. Project funding range: EUR 1 million to EUR 10 million.	Companies, banks, microfinance institutions and investment funds deploying their activities in Africa.
Proparco (AFD)	EURIZ – fragile countries component	A guarantee mechanism specifically for fragile contexts to finance micro, small and medium enterprises whose risk profile is too high, whereby the cost of the additional risk is absorbed by an EU counter-guarantee.	Budget 2018: EUR 9 million. Project funding range: EUR 5,000 to EUR 1 million.	Financial institutions.
Ministry for the Economy and Finance, Directorate-General of the Treasury	Rescheduling or partial cancellation of debts.	Within the Paris Club, negotiation of debt restructuring (rescheduling or partial cancellation) for countries benefiting from an IMF programme and whose debt is recognised as untenable and has a negative impact on their development prospects. Under this restructuring agreement, additional efforts can be made by the member countries of the Paris Club, in particular through the establishment of debt relief/development contracts that convert the debt of some countries that have benefited from the HIPC initiative to development project financing.	Budget: financial effort of EUR 104 million corresponding to the cost of ongoing debt charges of poor countries (initial budget act 2018).	States.

Organisation/referent agency	Instrument	Description	Numerical indicators	Counterparts
<b>FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS</b>				
<b>BILATERAL</b>				
Ministry for the Economy and Finance, Directorate-General of the Treasury	Budget support for macroeconomic stabilization	As a tool for macro-economic stabilization, general budget support can be mobilized swiftly for countries benefiting from an IMF programme, that are in a post-crisis situation or that have experienced an exogenous shock.	Budget: EUR 60 million (draft budget act 2018).	States.
<b>MULTILATERAL<sup>42</sup></b>				
MEAE, Directorate for the United Nations and International Organizations, Human Rights and Francophonie	Contribution to international organizations.	Voluntary or mandatory contributions to the budgets, programmes and trust funds of international organizations working in situations of fragility and crisis response.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EUR 352 million for peacekeeping operations (2017);</li> <li>• EUR 405 million for FAO, ILO, WHO, OSCE-Ukraine, international criminal tribunals, etc. (2017)<sup>43</sup>.</li> <li>• EUR 94.9 million in 2017 for ICRC, UNFPA, UNHCR, IOM, WFP, UNDP, UNRWA, etc. (2017)<sup>44</sup></li> <li>• EUR 1.03 million (2016) and EUR 570,000 for the High-Level Advisory Board on Mediation and the UN Peacebuilding Fund (2017).</li> </ul>	United Nations system and other international organizations supporting states and CSOs.
MEAE, DGM	Contribution to multilateral health funds.	Voluntary contributions to the three international health programmes: Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Unitaïd (medicines) and Gavi (vaccines).	EUR 500 million per annum.	Multilateral health funds supporting states and CSOs.
MEAE, DGM	Contribution to the CREWS Trust Fund	Fund to improve the meteorological services of fragile states (LDCs; small island developing states, SIDS) and enhance their capacity to produce and disseminate effective early alerts.	EUR 10 million (2017).	CREWS Trust Fund in support of states (LDCs and SIDS).
MEAE, DGM	Contribution to EU trust funds.	Voluntary contribution to the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, Békou Trust Fund (CAR), Madad Fund (Syrian crisis), and to support the post-conflict process in Colombia.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: EUR 9 million (2015-2018);</li> <li>• Békou Trust Fund: EUR 30 million (2014-2019);</li> <li>• Madad Fund: EUR 3 million (2016);</li> <li>• Trust Fund for Colombia: EUR 3 million (2017).</li> </ul>	The EU in support of states and CSOs.

42. The numerical indicators refer to France's financial contribution to multilateral instruments.

43. FAO (UN Food and Agriculture Organization), ILO (International Labour Organization), OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe).

44. ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross); UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund); UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees); IOM (International Organization for Migration); UN Women (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women); WFP (World Food Programme); UNDP (United Nations Development Programme); UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East).

Organisation/referent agency	Instrument	Description	Numerical indicators	Counterparts
Ministry for the Economy and Finance, Directorate-General of the Treasury	Contribution to the International Development Association (IDA)	Contribution to IDA's 18th replenishment process, which helps the world's poorest countries. USD 14 billion will be channelled through IDA18 to fragile countries, conflicts and violence.	EUR 1.34 billion for IDA18 (2017-2020).	IDA in support of states.
<b>TECHNICAL EXPERTISE AND COOPERATION INSTRUMENTS</b>				
MEAE, DCSD	International technical cooperation.	Consultancy on various topics (defence, police, gendarmerie, cybersecurity, maritime security, civil protection, demining, etc.) through a network of ENVRs and collaborators.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 14 ENVR located in Africa and one in Lebanon.</li> <li>• 320 collaborators (military, police, gendarmes and civilians).</li> </ul>	States, international and sub-regional organizations.
AFD	Crisis and post-crisis education and expertise funds.	Missions of expertise, needs appraisal and technical feasibility studies in crisis-exit contexts.	Budget 2017: EUR 2 million. Project funding range: EUR 200,000 to EUR 500,000.	Consultancy agencies, private companies, CSOs, MEAE government agencies, local public entities, etc.
Expertise France	International technical cooperation	Instrument for the operationalization of "Team France" strategies, and a centre of technical expertise and integrated solutions as part of the security and development continuum, ensuring the implementation of programmes for crisis prevention, population resilience, transition and post-crisis stabilization, governance and strengthening fragile states.	Budget 2018: EUR 84 million for crisis prevention, crises and post-crisis stabilization. Project funding range: EUR 100,000 to EUR 12 million.	States, local authorities, international and local NGOs, civil society organizations.

# Acronyms and abbreviations

<b>AFD</b>	Agence française de développement (French Development Agency)	<b>LDC</b>	Least developed countries
<b>CAR</b>	Central African Republic	<b>MAH</b>	Humanitarian Action Mission (MEAE/CDCS)
<b>CDCS</b>	Crisis and Support Centre (MEAE)	<b>MEAE</b>	Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, formerly known as Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development)
<b>CICID</b>	Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development	<b>MS</b>	Stabilization Unit (MEAE/CDCS)
<b>CREWS</b>	Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems	<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organization
<b>CSO</b>	Civil society organization	<b>ODA</b>	Official development assistance
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)	<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and development
<b>DCSD</b>	Security and Defence Cooperation Directorate (MEAE)	<b>PSD</b>	Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goal
<b>DGM</b>	Direction générale de la mondialisation, de la culture, de l'enseignement et du développement international (Directorate-General for Global Affairs, Culture, Education and International Development)	<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goal
<b>ENVR</b>	École nationale à vocation régionale (National training centre with regional outreach)	<b>SDNM</b>	Projet « Sécurité et développement du Nord-Mali » ("Security and Development in northern Mali" program)
<b>EU</b>	European Union	<b>SME</b>	Small and medium-sized enterprise
<b>FISEA</b>	Fonds d'investissement et de soutien aux entreprises en Afrique (Investment and Support Fund for Businesses in Africa)	<b>SSR</b>	Security sector reform
<b>Gavi</b>	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation	<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>HIPC</b>	Heavily indebted poor countries	<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund	<b>Unitaid</b>	International Drug Purchase Facility
		<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council

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## PREVENTION, RESILIENCE AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE (2018-2022)

### A Comprehensive Approach to the Fragilization of States and Societies

In 2013, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) conducted a review of France's policy on development cooperation. The review recommended that France should update its strategy as defined in its policy paper "Fragile States and Situations of Fragility" (2007). It is on this basis and in order to enhance the effectiveness of its assistance that this strategy has been overhauled.

The development of this document was subject to extensive inter-ministerial consultations, together with institutional and civil society partners split into two distinct groups: an advisory committee comprising various departments of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (MEAE), other ministries (Secretariat-General for Defence and National Security and the Ministries of the Armed Forces, Interior, Justice, Economy and Finance) and relevant agencies (Expertise France, Justice International Cooperation, Civipol and Canal France International); a scientific committee bringing together the OECD, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, the World Bank and the Groupe URD (a think tank for emergencies, recovery and development) which performed research to support this strategic reflection. In order to frame these consultations, a steering committee comprising the Sustainable Development Directorate, the Crisis and Support Centre of the MEAE and the French Development Agency (AFD, Crisis and Conflict Unit) was established under the leadership of the Democratic Governance Department.

The aim of the strategy is to secure lasting peace in countries experiencing situations of fragility based on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions). It establishes guidance for France's policy on fragile states and societies and, in accordance with a comprehensive approach, it considers – in coordination with political and security action – all the modalities of aid intervention: development, stabilization and humanitarian emergencies.

On 8 February 2018 the prime minister convened the Interministerial Committee for International Cooperation and Development (CICID) and officially adopted France's new strategy on responding to situations of fragility.