CONCOURS EXTERNE ET INTERNE POUR L’ACCÈS À L’EMPLOI DE SECRÉTAIRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES (CADRE GENERAL ET CADRE D’ORIENT) AU TITRE DE L’ANNÉE 2020

ÉPREUVES ÉCRITES D’ADMISSIBILITÉ

Jeudi 19 septembre 2019

ANGLAIS

Durée totale de l’épreuve : 3 heures
Coefficient : 2
Toute note inférieure à 10 sur 20 est éliminatoire.
Barème de notation : composition en anglais 12 points ; traduction en français 8 points

COMPOSITION EN ANGLAIS

Composition, en anglais, à partir d’une question, rédigée en anglais, liée à l’actualité.
(500 mots avec une tolérance de plus ou moins 10%)

SUJET :

Has America become great again ?
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TRADUCTION EN FRANÇAIS

Traduction en français d’un texte rédigé en anglais.

TEXTE AU VERSO
Europeans’ shopkeeper mentality needs to change if the EU is to wield its commercial power

Martin Sandbu, Financial Times, June 19, 2019

(…) Many European leaders live in the hope that things will normalise when US president Donald Trump leaves office, and are wary of burning bridges by being too confrontational. But it is a mistake to treat Trumpism as a temporary aberration. Even if Americans change their president in 2020, what has happened once can happen again. The foundations of the global rules-based order have been irreversibly weakened — by the US losing interest in it and by China trying to subject it to its own dominance.

From accepting that it is “Europe alone”, EU leaders must move to acting for “Europe first” — not in the Trumpist sense of defeating others in zero-sum games, but in fighting for a system in which all who share the bloc’s values can thrive. That means making international economic policy with the explicit goal of shaping the global rules in Europe’s image.

It is in the sphere of trade that the EU comes closest to realising — in both senses of the word — its superpower potential. It has moved towards imposing its own environmental, labour and investment-dispute rules in trade agreements. (…) The EU should not shy away from imposing carbon border taxes on imports from countries without domestic carbon levies as extensive as Europe’s own. (…)

Trade policy should also reinforce the Brussels effect, extending further and more formally the writ of the EU’s regulatory authority. Talks on the bloc’s future relationship with the UK, once Brexit happens, offer a great opportunity. In her Chequers proposal, prime minister Theresa May came close to aligning the UK automatically and dynamically with EU trade and regulatory policy in return for frictionless trade in goods. The position of the opposition Labour party comes even closer.

Such a model would not just cement Brussels’ authority on goods throughout the continent; it would also set up a useful structure for the wider neighbourhood. Once a frictionless market for goods was established for Britain, Turkey, north Africa and the post-Soviet fringe could gradually be brought into it, with EU rulemaking providing stability, prosperity and a staging post for those wanting closer relations in the future.

Beyond trade, public investment can buy more geopolitical advantage than increased defence spending. Beijing’s extraordinary power of attraction among the eastern and southern EU states that have signed up to its Belt and Road project is less a reflection of how much China offers — money for greenfield projects falls far short of the hype — than of how Europe’s own investment collapsed after the financial crisis. (…)

The US remains the unmatched military superpower. But even it achieves as much through economic as through military pressure. Until now its pressure on Iran has been financial — directly through sanctions and indirectly by threats to other countries that do not toe Washington’s line.

A similar power is Europe’s for the taking. What it must find is the will to use it./.