



DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE DE L'ADMINISTRATION  
ET DE LA MODERNISATION

DIRECTION DES RESSOURCES HUMAINES

Sous-direction de la Formation et des Concours

Bureau des Concours et Examens professionnels  
RH4B

## CONCOURS EXTERNE ET INTERNE POUR L'ACCÈS A L'EMPLOI DE CONSEILLER DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES (CADRE D'ORIENT) AU TITRE DE L'ANNÉE 2020

### ÉPREUVES ÉCRITES D'ADMISSIBILITÉ

Lundi 9 septembre 2019

### ANGLAIS

Durée totale de l'épreuve : 3 heures

Coefficient : 2

Toute note inférieure à 10 sur 20 est éliminatoire

Barème de notation : composition en anglais 12 points ; traduction en français 8 points

### COMPOSITION EN ANGLAIS

*Composition, en anglais, à partir d'une question, rédigée en anglais, liée à l'actualité  
(500 mots avec une tolérance de plus ou moins 10%)*

SUJET :

« Should we create a United Nations organization for the environment  
and climate change? »



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### **TRADUCTION EN FRANÇAIS**

*Traduction en français d'un texte rédigé en anglais*

**TEXTE AU VERSO**

## **America is deploying a new economic arsenal to assert its power**

That is counterproductive and dangerous

The Economist - Print edition | Leaders

Jun 6th 2019

When Donald Trump arrived in the Oval Office he promised to restore America's might. His method has turned out to be a wholesale weaponisation of economic tools. The world can now see the awesome force that a superpower can project when it is unconstrained by rules or allies. On May 30th the president threatened crippling tariffs on Mexico after a row over migration. Markets reeled, and a Mexican delegation rushed to Washington to sue for peace. A day later preferential trading rules for India were cancelled. Its usually macho government did not put up a fight and promised to preserve "strong ties". China faces a ratcheting up of tariffs soon, and its tech giant, Huawei, has been severed from its American suppliers. The country's autocratic leaders are enraged, but on June 2nd they insisted they still seek "dialogue and consultation". A tighter embargo on Iran, imposed over European objections, is strangling its economy.

President Trump must view this scene with satisfaction. Nobody takes America for granted any more. Enemies and friends know that it is prepared to unleash an economic arsenal to protect its national interest. America is deploying new tactics—poker-style brinkmanship—and new weapons that exploit its role as the nerve centre of the global economy to block the free flow of goods, data, ideas and money across borders. This pumped-up vision of a 21st-century superpower may be seductive for some. But it could spark a crisis, and it is eroding America's most valuable asset—its legitimacy.

You might think that America's clout comes from its 11 aircraft-carriers, 6,500 nuclear warheads or its anchor role in the IMF. But it is also the central node in the network that underpins globalisation. This mesh of firms, ideas and standards reflects and magnifies American prowess. Though it includes goods traded through supply chains, it is mainly intangible. America controls or hosts over 50% of the world's cross-border bandwidth, venture capital, phone-operating systems, top universities and fund-management assets. Some 88% of currency trades use greenbacks. Across the planet it is normal to use a Visa card, invoice exports in dollars, sleep beside a device with a Qualcomm chip, watch Netflix and work for a firm that BlackRock invests in.

Foreigners accept all this because, on balance, it makes them better off. They may not set the rules of the game, but they get access to American markets and fair treatment alongside American firms. Globalisation and technology have made the network more powerful although America's share of world gdp has fallen, from 38% in 1969 to 24% now. China cannot yet compete, even though its economy is approaching America's in size./