



**groupe de travail  
sur les nouvelles  
contributions financières  
internationales**

A large, light gray line-art illustration of a globe held by two hands, mirroring the smaller globe in the top left. The globe is tilted, and the hands are positioned at the top and bottom poles. A thin blue arc is visible on the left side of the page, curving upwards.

**rapport à  
Monsieur Jacques Chirac  
Président de la République**

*english version*



**groupe de travail  
sur les nouvelles  
contributions financières  
internationales**

Président : Jean-Pierre LANDAU,  
Rapporteur général : Bertrand BADRÉ, Inspecteur des Finances  
Rapporteurs : Corso BAVAGNOLI, Inspecteur des Finances,  
Gilles MENTRE, Inspecteur des Finances.  
project director : Madeline REY

\*\*\*\*\*

- Sir Tony ATKINSON, Warden, Nuffield College, Oxford University
- M. Robert BACONNIER, Président du Bureau Francis LEFEVRE
- M. Jacques COSSART, Membre du Conseil Scientifique d'ATTAC
- M. Michel DIDIER, Président de REXECODE
- M. Fleming LARSEN, IMF, head of European office, Paris
- Mme Anne LAUVERGEON, Présidente d'AREVA
- M. Alain LE ROY, Directeur des Affaires économiques et Financières, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
- Mme Elisabeth LULIN, Directeur Général de Paradigmes, Administrateur de la Société Générale
- M. Vincent MAZAURIC, Sous-Directeur, Direction de la Législation Fiscale, Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie
- Mme Odile RENAUD-BASSO, Chef du Service des Affaires Internationales, Direction du Trésor, Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie
- M. Henri ROUILLÉ D'ORFEUIL, Président de Coordination Sud
- M. Jean-Michel SEVERINO, Directeur général de l'Agence Française du Développement.
- M. Yves-Thibault de SILGUY, Délégué Général de SUEZ
- M. Kevin WATKINS, Head of Research, OXFAM

## ***EXECUTIVE SUMMARY***

This report was commissioned in November 2003 by President Chirac to a group of independent personalities with different backgrounds and representing a wide range of opinions. Members of the group participated in their personal capacity. The views expressed do not reflect those of the institutions, organizations or companies to which they belong. While none of the group members disagrees with the general thrust and approach of the report, none would, either, fully support or endorse each and every specific reflection or recommendation.

Globalization creates tremendous prosperity. There are strong moral and social justifications to allocate part of that wealth to the fight against poverty and inequality.

Yet this moral and political imperative does not translate easily nor automatically into new financial contributions. The idea itself is very controversial, at least in its most extreme manifestation, that of international taxation.

The legitimacy of international taxation is open to question. There is no such thing as a world parliament to decide and vote on global taxes. From a democratic and legal standpoint, new contributions would require the consent of nation states and by extension, of their citizens. Such consent does not exist today. On the contrary, opposition runs deep in many countries to the principle of international taxation. Motivating the opposition is the fact that national sovereignty is viewed as untouchable, especially in matters of taxation.

There is also much skepticism, in some countries or parts of world opinion, as to the benefits of development aid. This report does not share that skepticism. Ultimately, all developing countries, including the poorest ones, must aim at achieving -through economic growth-successful integration into the world economy. But growth is impossible without a minimum level of infrastructure and income, and access to health and education. Otherwise, there is no capital accumulation and the poor are left exposed to economic shocks they are not equipped to withstand. Growth is necessary for poverty reduction. But poverty itself may be an obstacle to growth. Aid therefore becomes absolutely necessary to break this reciprocal causality.

Finally, even some of the most sincere and committed people in the development community have their doubts, wondering whether greater priority should be given to increasing national aid budgets to 0.7% of GDP (an objective to which France is committed). They tend to see the search for innovative mechanisms as a diversion, or escape route used by developed countries to avoid fulfilling their obligations and meeting their commitments.

This is a legitimate concern, and is addressed in the first part of the report. It shows why and how new contributions are necessary together with and in addition to existing forms of development aid. Potential economic, legal and financial approaches to an international taxation for development are discussed in the second part. Finally, some technical options for voluntary or compulsory contributions are examined in the third part.

## **More and better funding for development**

It is well known that official aid would have to double, increasing by at least \$50 billion a year, in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). What is less known is that: less than \$3 billion a year for 10 years would be sufficient to give every single child in Sub Saharan Africa access to primary education; \$2bn annually would finance basic medical research on those pandemics (AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria) specifically affecting developing countries; and with \$1 billion a year one could provide the resources needed to perform the ten basic surgical procedures needed all over the world.

These are very small amounts of money when measured on a global scale. And these are priorities that nobody would challenge. Yet, the financing fails to materialize.

This is difficult to explain by a decline in the generosity and altruism in developed countries. Official Development Aid (ODA), which had been decreasing for most of the last decade, has recently picked up and is on an increasing trend. Private foundations, whose interventions were traditionally domestic-oriented, are now diversifying and increasingly supporting international causes.

One therefore has to conclude that the problem is systemic. The procedures for deciding and allocating aid flows are based on permanent negotiations between donors whose strategies

change according to their priorities, their (legitimate) foreign and development policy objectives, and whose budgets are decided, for the most part, on an annual basis.

Such a process is bound to produce sub-optimal results:

- *Insufficient resources* because each donor has built-in incentives to finance its own priorities first, and then to free ride on other countries contributions to finance common objectives
- *High negotiation and transaction costs*, both for donors (in time and resources spent in reaching compromises) and recipients (who find it increasingly difficult to grapple with the system's complexity and uncertainties)
- *Aid is inadequate and inappropriate in form*; only one third of disbursements currently go to fighting poverty; grants are insufficient; less than 50% of aid actually translates into cash transfers to developing countries.
- *Aid is both volatile* (four times more volatile on average than recipients' GDP) *and unpredictable*. Far from helping countries to cushion economic shocks, it is often an additional source of instability.

What is necessary then is continuity in donors commitments over the long run: first, because human development and the fight against poverty are mainly based on recurrent expenditures in basic social services; and second, in order to ensure adequate financing for those public goods especially necessary to poor countries such as medical research on pandemics which particularly affect developing countries.

One crucial element is currently missing in the present development system: a resource that is both totally concessional and predictable. In order to produce such a resource, new multilateral (and more automatic) financing mechanisms are necessary.

#### *New international financial contributions*

One such mechanism would be the International Finance Facility (IFF), which has been proposed by the British government and is supported by France. The objective is to frontload the disbursement of expected future increases in ODA. The IFF would issue bonds on financial markets, backed by pledges from participating governments. It would produce a

stable resource, whose availability would not be dependent on the time schedule of donors' budgetary contributions. It would be flexible and could be implemented, if necessary, on a regional basis or with a limited number of participating countries. However, as with any borrowing mechanism, the final burden would be shouldered by future generations, with no guarantee as to the return on expenditures that would be financed this way. There is thus a central question regarding what happens after 2015, when a significant part of ODA expenditures, in developed countries, would be devoted to IFF repayments rather than being transferred to developing countries. And yet, many such countries, especially in Sub Saharan Africa, will still need aid. For those countries, frontloading aid entails a significant risk if, in the meantime, other stable sources of finance have not been created.

Another possible mechanism is international taxation.

International taxation can only result from a decision by nation states to cooperate, since they – and only they- have the power to tax. It means that this power, which is a basic attribute of sovereignty, is subordinated to an international common objective. This can only be achieved when there is a high degree of convergence between those objectives. International taxation may therefore prove difficult to negotiate and agree upon.

Once created however, it would deliver the precise kind of resource needed to finance human development, one that is both totally predictable and concessional. It would put the financing of poverty reduction on a sound and stable basis and would protect it from the vagaries of politics and the uncertainties of international cooperation. It would ensure stable and predictable aid flows, even in the long run. It would dispense from the difficult yearly negotiations and would solve, once and for all, the burden sharing problem. Finally, it would not increase the financial burden on future generations.

Contrary to widespread perception, no new institutional arrangement or international organization is necessary. International taxes can be created for a limited period of time. They can initially aim at financing only core programs, those that need stable and predictable resources most. Even small amounts, at the start, would make a difference by increasing the return on other aid flows and creating an environment, which would increase their overall efficiency.

The IFF and international taxes have strong complementarities: one mechanism or the other may be more appropriate according to the time horizon or the type of expenditure. They can

be combined in an integrated approach to human development finance, encompassing both the medium and long run.

### *Consequences for the development aid system*

Once a predictable and concessional resource is created, three issues would have to be addressed:

- **Additionality.** New resources would have to be truly additional and not simply substitute existing aid flows. It may be necessary to establish a more direct and visible link between the new sources of finance and the programs to which they are allocated. One question to be considered is how to organize and manage financial channels so as to make this kind of earmarking compatible with good fiscal management
- **Conditionality.** It is a condition for efficiency. It may also be a source of excessive volatility when resulting from changes in donors' priorities and preferences. Forms of conditionality adapted to a stable financing of human development would have to be defined and devised.
- **Governance.** The management of any new stable resource would have to be discussed in order to define the role and interaction of all potential participants : IFIs, global funds and civil society (NGOs and private sector)

## **Options for an international tax system**

### *Efficiency, justice and equity*

All tax systems are based on a trade-off between efficiency and equity. Similarly, international taxes could be created with different objectives such as: correcting international externalities (as with environmental taxes); moralizing international transactions (which would be the purpose of a tax on arms sales); redistributing income and reducing inequalities (something that all national tax systems do to varying degrees); and finally, financing public expenditures decided with a common purpose.

Here, the report makes choices and defines priorities. At this stage, the aim of international taxation should be to raise the necessary resources in order to achieve the MDGs. At the world level, there is no democratic process to determine what the extent of income

redistribution should be. But there is a universally accepted goal in terms of poverty reduction. The international community has decided to focus on the situation of the poorest people, not on the gap between different levels of income around the world. This approach is based on well-established philosophical and ethical premises and best legitimizes international taxation.

International taxes should therefore be devised first and foremost according to their financing potential.

Once this priority is met, however, other objectives can and should be pursued.

First, economic efficiency. International taxes can improve development financing by reducing the distortions normally associated with any taxation. Corrective taxes, such as environmental taxes, do not create any new economic distortions, and actually eliminate some. Equally, taxes levied at a very low rate on internationally mobile tax bases may be less distortionary than an increase in national taxes, whose rates are already much higher. In both cases, however, it may be impossible to create such taxes without strong international cooperation.

Second, solidarity. New international contributions would encompass a broader aspiration of greater global stability, more security and more justice in global development. They should not result in new burdens or handicaps for poor countries. New contributions should never be regressive but rather neutral or progressive.

### *Architecture*

Once the decision is made to finance development through more automatic mechanisms, several options are available to the participating countries. They can be combined into a wide array of different formulas:

- The mechanism can be legally binding to a greater or lesser extent. It could be: a simple statement of intentions to contribute according to specified criteria; a system of contributions akin to those made to international organizations, paid out of national budgets with countries, in effect “taxing themselves” ( a tax on arms would be very close to such a scheme, with countries contributing in proportion to their military expenditures)

- Financial flows could transit through national budgets where they would be treated either as expenditures (as VAT contributions by member states to the EU budget) or a deduction on receipts (as own resource contributions to the EC budget). Alternatively, as was the case for ECSC and still is for the Universal Postal Union, financial flows could bypass national budgets and go directly to the recipient institution.
- Above all, choices would have to be made as to the underlying political and fiscal approach. Several such approaches are described in the report:
  - Enhancing voluntary contributions through tax incentives in a coordinated way across donor countries;
  - Contributions in addition to existing taxes (which would replicate a GDP based contribution, as corrected by existing differences in tax bases);
  - Creating new international taxes levied, either on internationally mobile tax bases (which cannot be taxed by any country acting on its own), or on “global common goods” whose value cannot legally or practically be appropriated by any individual nation (global environmental taxes can be included in this category).

### *Global or regional tax?*

Universal consensus on international taxation might prove difficult to achieve in the immediate future. Is there then, a possibility to create regional taxes? This question is especially important for those who would like to see the European Union expanding its role in development assistance. There would be obvious adverse consequences for the competitiveness of participating countries and important risks of evasion. But it might be useful to start a process, which could later lead to broader acceptance and participation. Both sides of the argument can be made with equal force. Clearly, some taxes would be more easily applicable in a regional framework than others. Countries that would decide to implement such regional taxes should also ensure (in the allocation and management of the resources) that sufficient incentives exist for others to join in.

## Orientations

Possible contribution instruments and mechanisms are described and discussed in the final chapter of the report. They have been selected according to a common set of characteristics: all are technically feasible; all yield significant, stable and permanent resources to finance the MDGs; all are economically rational since they have been constructed so as to minimize new distortions, or eliminate existing ones; none (except an arms tax) would be levied on developing countries; none could be made to work without strong international cooperation (thus providing a justification for allocating their proceeds to development).

Instruments discussed include:

- Environmental taxes. Long-term prospects for a carbon tax are examined. In the short run, it is suggested to focus the reflection and debate on sectors not covered by the Kyoto Protocol and currently not subject to taxation, such as maritime and air transport.
- Taxes on financial transactions (with a special case on foreign exchange transaction taxes). They are not considered in the report for their anti-speculative properties but purely as revenue raising instruments. Consequently, the rates would be set very low so as to minimize or eliminate any adverse impact on market efficiency. The report concludes that (1) such taxes are technically feasible; (2) their “economic cost” is limited (3) all major financial centers should participate in order to avoid large scale evasion (but not necessarily every single country in the world) (4) market making and very short term transactions would have to be exempted since they carry very low profit margins and could not bear the burden of any tax; and, as a consequence (5) revenues raised would be significantly lower than currently expected, but nevertheless quite significant.
- a surtax on the profits of multinationals could be seen as a normal counterpart to the benefits they derive from globalization (although inter-country differences in the definition of tax bases would make such a contribution rather arbitrary in terms of burden sharing)

- A tax on arms would have to be levied on all purchases –whether domestic or international – and implemented by all producing countries in the world to be morally significant and economically non-distortionary.
- Voluntary contribution schemes could be proposed or encouraged by associating voluntary donations with credit card purchases, utility bill payments or when filing tax returns. Such schemes might be more appropriate than taxes when addressing households, even if they do not deliver as stable a resource as other contribution forms.
- Finally, the use of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and the creation of a Global Lottery for development purposes are examined.

## Conclusion

Overall, the report concludes that there is a gap in the financing of MDGs; that the search for innovative forms of financing is justified, in a spirit of solidarity; and that technical solutions are available which combine moral generosity and economic efficiency.

It was not in the group's remit to choose between different possible solutions. The report does not make any specific recommendation. But some principles, which could help make progress on the political front, are enumerated in the conclusion. New financial contributions, if created, must find in themselves their own justification and meet with maximum acceptance.

This means:

- Universal consensus on goals, which should be seen as absolutely legitimate by the whole international community;
- Programs with high visibility, and whose impact must be proven and easily measurable;
- Economic efficiency, which leads to either corrective taxes or taxes at very low rates and broad bases;

- Equity in burden sharing;
- Total transparency in governance and management, both from the point of view of recipients and the international community.

## **CONTENTS**

### Part One: more and better funding for development

- A need for more and different aid
- Private donations and attitudes to development
- The current official development assistance system
- Innovative financing mechanisms

### Part Two: options for an international tax system

- International taxation in the global environment
- Efficiency, justice and equity
- Architecture
- Global or regional tax

### Part Three: orientations

- Enhancing voluntary contributions
- International taxation
- Combating tax evasion
- Other instruments

## **FOREWORD**

The working group held twelve plenary meetings between November 2003 and July 2004. It held 19 formal hearings and 64 working meetings between the rapporteurs and outside personalities.

The report was discussed at length within the working group. All members expressed their views, each of them sitting and speaking in their personal capacity, independently of the organization to which they belong.

The Chairman and rapporteurs wish to express their gratitude to Professor Atkinson for allowing them access to the preliminary versions of the studies undertaken, under his direction, at the United Nations University WIDER Institute.

## INTRODUCTION

A multidisciplinary working group on new international financial contributions was set up by President Chirac.

This report summarizes the findings of the working group. It is the outcome of the discussions and reflections of people drawn from a wide range of backgrounds.

It would be fair to say that, at the outset, the group did not view the creation of new international financial contributions as a foregone conclusion. Indeed, the idea itself is highly controversial, at least in its most advanced form, that of a full-scale international system of taxation.

There are certainly deep-seated ethical, social and economic justifications. Globalization creates a great deal of wealth. Opinions may differ over its distribution; but the process under way for the past thirty years has brought a level of prosperity for billions of individuals and has been accompanied by a reduction, at least in relative terms, in extreme poverty throughout the world. Nevertheless, more than 1.2 billion people still live on less than 1 dollar a day; the major pandemics are spreading in the developing countries; and the planet's environment is under threat. These challenges and risks are common to humanity as a whole. There is a case to be made for using a fraction of the wealth generated by globalization to meet these challenges and mitigate those risks.

There is however, no legal and institutional infrastructure for translating these justifications into a collective political will. No global Parliament exists to vote on a global tax. The legitimacy of new contributions would therefore depend on the consent of nation states and, beyond them, that of their citizens. No such consent exists, at present. The creation of an

international tax would entail handing over some degree of sovereignty, which most countries are not willing to do, even in a limited form. So great is the opposition in the United States that a law was passed in 1997 prohibiting any contribution to an international organization advocating an international tax levied on US citizens or corporations. Even the members of the European Union, which have achieved an unprecedented degree of economic and political integration, are still a long way from creating a common tax system. Plans for a European tax are stalled at present. This is another example of the difficulty to reconcile national sovereignty with the need for international cooperation.

There is no rationale for pooling financial resources if countries do not share common objectives. But such objectives do exist for development and poverty alleviation. In an unprecedented move in September 2000, the international community agreed a set of quantified poverty reduction and human development targets. These “Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs) are to be achieved by 2015. They were adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly. Among the objectives, there are targets for halving extreme poverty (defined as 1 dollar per person per day), access to education, health improvement (reducing child and maternal mortality, combating major infectious diseases, especially HIV/AIDS and malaria), and providing sanitation and safe drinking water.

With current available resources, however, these goals cannot be achieved. The need for a radical change in scale in official financial transfers to poor countries is widely recognized. The most cautious estimates call for a virtual doubling of current official development assistance, i.e. additional transfers of USD 50 billion a year. To ensure that the MDGs do not end up as yet another noble declaration, soon to be forgotten, it is absolutely necessary to consider how they can be achieved and financed. There are political obstacles and constraints. Nevertheless, this report aims to look at the possibilities for innovative sources and new international financial contributions as well as discussing their implications for the architecture of the development aid system.

## PART ONE: MORE AND BETTER FUNDING FOR DEVELOPMENT

It is a shocking paradox that the resources required to achieve the MDGs are relatively small, less than 0.2% of global GNP, as compared to the wealth created annually by world growth. And yet they fail to materialize.

There are three possible reasons for this shortcoming:

- Skepticism: government and their citizens are not convinced of the necessity and utility of aid;
- Indifference: the fight against poverty and for development is not seen as a priority in relation to other causes;
- The current functioning of the international development aid system, which the group considers to be the main cause behind the lack of resources.

### **A need for more and different aid**

The need for official development assistance is still viewed, in some countries and parts of world opinion, with a high degree of skepticism. According to this school of thought, the Millennium Goals can best be achieved through economic growth and free trade. Poor countries should essentially implement sound policies and create a favorable environment for private investment.

This report takes a different view: poor countries need aid in order to reap the full benefits of economic growth and the expansion of global trade. Furthermore, it makes the case that a change in the form and quality of aid is necessary in order to adequately finance human development.

## ***Growth, trade, and poverty***

Economic growth is critical to poverty reduction. One additional percentage point of per capita GNP growth reduces the percentage of poor people in the population by two points. Over the past fifteen years, many countries, including some with the largest populations, have made great progress in reducing poverty, thanks to vigorous economic growth.

Thus, any development strategy should bring all countries to a situation from which they can pursue this same path. Through the Millennium Development Goals, the final objective is to create the conditions for strong economic growth, enabling those countries to catch up with the most advanced economies, and fully reap the benefits of global economic integration.

International trade is a powerful driver of development. All the major experiences of economic take-off in the past fifty years have been export-led. No country has emerged from underdevelopment without entering the world market and using exports as an engine for growth. In terms of efficiency, international trade holds out immense potential for the poor. The expansion of world trade since 1970 has lifted more than 400 million people out of poverty. A 5% increase in developing countries' market share would generate revenues of 350 billion dollars, which is seven times current total official development assistance. Trade directly generates income, jobs, and investment.

Nonetheless, there are many obstacles, which prevent poor countries from exploiting these opportunities. First, there are physical obstacles and geographic handicaps: poor countries are frequently landlocked and suffer from recurring natural calamities, lack of infrastructure and poorly organized transportation systems. Unless these very real impediments to development are eliminated, trade liberalization will have little or no impact<sup>1</sup>.

A second obstacle is economic dependence. Nearly one billion people depend on the production of commodities and staple products for their subsistence. This dependence is especially widespread in Africa. The poorest countries and their producers are the most exposed to price shocks, which can penalize or prevent economic growth if they are frequent. It is impossible to break this combination of extreme poverty and total dependence on commodity markets without external help or support.

Finally, and above all, poverty itself is an obstacle to growth. A considerable body of research in recent years has highlighted the complexity of the mechanisms and linkages that keep more than 2 billion people below the threshold of 2 dollars per person, per day. It is now well understood that poverty is not defined in terms of income alone. It is a condition of extreme vulnerability caused by an absence of physical, financial and human “capital”<sup>2</sup>. Poor households and producers are consequently unable to withstand the shocks that naturally affect all market-based economies. They cannot afford to take risks, and therefore do not respond “normally” to economic incentives. This is the reason why the very poor are in no position to benefit from the opportunities created, for instance, by market liberalization.<sup>3</sup>

As a consequence, there are thresholds of geographic isolation, health, education and vulnerability to natural disaster below which all economic progress is impossible.

The role of aid is to help countries to break out of this poverty trap when their domestic resources are insufficient. Human development and economic growth are mutually dependent. It is essential for countries to achieve sufficient levels of physical infrastructure and human development, particularly in terms of health and education. Those parameters determine a country’s capacity to attract and stimulate investment, including private investment, without which sustained growth is impossible.

The need for aid is increasingly acknowledged, including outside the public sphere<sup>4</sup>, as illustrated by the recent trends in private foundations activities, especially those located in the United States.

Those foundations are totally independent. As they are sustained by their endowments, they are immune to political pressures and the constraints of having to raise funds. Their funding structure allows them to undertake very long-term multiyear programs, something not generally possible with official assistance. Also, they are freer to take risks, innovate and experiment. The change in their attitude is significant of a growing awareness of the importance of development aid.

Until the last decade, development, and more generally international action, absorbed only a very small proportion (5%) of these foundations’ disbursements. But the trend has now turned sharply upward and today 11% of their total outlays benefit developing countries<sup>5</sup>. This trend has notably occurred under the influence of some of the new foundations set up in the last ten years, foremost among them being the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. With

an endowment of USD 24 billion, annual disbursements are above USD 1 billion annually, 93% of which benefit development directly or indirectly. More and more, foundations are emerging as essential partners of development alongside official institutions and the NGOs.

***The need for instruments which are both more powerful and better adapted to financing human development***

For human development, the quality of aid matters as much as its quantity. At present, official development assistance is mostly dependent on a yearly budgetary cycle<sup>6</sup>. Aid is usually conditional. It still comes frequently in the form of loans, even to the poorest countries.

To finance the MDGs, a significant change is needed. What is currently lacking is an instrument combining two characteristics: concessionality and predictability.

*Concessionality: the need for grant money*

Loans are appropriate when used to finance investments offering a high private return. But the logic of development in poor countries is different and requires heavy reliance on grants.

- First, there is a need to finance, over the long run, *recurring operating expenditures in basic social and public services*. Physical investments are necessary, but not sufficient. Efficiency depends on the ability to sustain expenditures over the long run. Equipments have to be maintained, doctors, nurses and teachers have to be trained and paid.

These recurring expenditures frequently exceed the fiscal capabilities of the poorest countries, which are constrained by the narrowness of their tax bases ( tax revenues frequently amount to less than 15% of GDP)<sup>7</sup>. While the social return on these expenditures is theoretically high, they do not yield external revenues within any foreseeable time frame that would permit repayment of any loan. This is why external aid—through budgetary and program support—is destined to play a growing role in covering these expenditures in the immediate future<sup>8</sup>. What is needed is a change in scale<sup>9</sup>. Africa would need to grow by 7% annually between now and 2015 to be able to finance- with no external transfers- the educational expenditures necessary to

achieve the MDGs. Burkina Faso, for example, has set a target of raising its primary school attendance rate from 40 to 70% by 2015. And yet, despite gradually raising the percentage of the national budget devoted to education from 12 to 20%, a further 20 million euros in aid will be required in order to close the funding gap.

- *Many poor countries are in no position to take on additional debt.* The poorest countries depend entirely on aid for their external financing. Therefore, any change in their debt is strictly dependent on the proportion of grants within that aid. The considerable efforts made within the framework of the “highly indebted poor countries” (HIPC) initiative have brought most of these countries to the limits of long-term viability and sustainability, based on standard projections of growth and of conditions in the international environment. This means that any unforeseen shock, and these countries are particularly exposed to them, would need to be absorbed entirely by fully concessional transfers. Otherwise, such shocks would trigger yet another downward spiral of debt and weak long-term growth. The international community currently lacks adequate instruments .
  
- It is also necessary to be able *tackle poverty in countries in situations of extreme distress or of armed conflict*, whose government and administrative structures have collapsed and whose borrowing capacity is nil. Nearly 60 countries experienced violent conflict in the 1990s. Fourteen million people are still suffering from famine as a result of these conflicts. There is clearly a risk that internal breakdown will be compounded by the collapse of local administration and basic social services— all this while rising military spending crowds out social spending. One can limit this risk by means of direct grant-financed assistance programs. Already humanitarian aid represents 6% of official development assistance and its share looks set to rise. These post-conflict situations thus call for totally concessional funds in order to restore government structures and resume public and social services<sup>10</sup>.
  
- Finally, one needs to ensure financing for global public goods, especially those necessary to poor countries. Foremost among them is medical research into the pandemics affecting the developing countries. This typically can be defined as a "pure" public good, for which there is no alternative to public funding.

Because medical research takes time and is risky, stable and guaranteed public funding is absolutely necessary. Otherwise the "public good" simply will not be produced. That is the situation today for vaccines and for drugs to treat pandemics

found exclusively in poor countries. At the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, infectious diseases are still the number one cause of mortality in the world<sup>11</sup>. Of the 1,200 drugs authorized each year, a mere 13 are designed to treat tropical diseases<sup>12</sup>. The United States National Institutes of Health<sup>13</sup>, the world's leading public medical research institution, spends USD 65 million annually on tuberculosis, which kills more than 3 million people per year in the third world, versus USD 2.7 billion annually in the fight against cancer<sup>14</sup> (see box 1).

### *The need for a predictable source of finance*

ODA flows are highly volatile: four times more, on average, than recipient countries' GDP<sup>15</sup>.

This volatility stems from several causes: the budgetary procedures in donor countries; changes in their priorities; administrative delays in making or implementing decisions; implementation of conditionality when the beneficiary's performance deteriorates. The poorer the country, the greater the volatility. Generally, it is impossible to ascribe this volatility to objective and identifiable causes. It is therefore impossible to anticipate. Aid is not only volatile; it is also, and above all, unpredictable.

The consequences are highly damaging<sup>16</sup>.

Fluctuations in aid flows create additional macroeconomic shocks, whereas these countries need, on the contrary, resources, which would actually act as cushions against such shocks. Volatility also exacerbates internal and external financial imbalances if expenditures are carried out in advance, in the expectation of aid payments that then fail to materialize.

Unpredictability also considerably reduces aid effectiveness. It penalizes those investments<sup>17</sup> and programs most vital to development: investments may be cancelled because it becomes impossible to plan for them over several years in recipient country budgets; their effectiveness may be seriously impaired by lack of maintenance; frequent interruptions lead to an unsustainable increase in costs. These uncertainties especially affect programs most in need of long-term stability and continuity. Those are the programs that contribute most powerfully and directly to poverty reduction and the achievement of the millennium goals.

Many poor countries are caught in a spiral of diminishing aid where, for lack of stable and predictable resources, they cannot undertake the necessary physical and human investments in order to reduce poverty. As a result, the aid which does reach them is spent in a less favorable environment and is consequently less effective. Ultimately, this leads to further cuts in incoming aid flows.

These observations shed some light on the debate over absorptive capacity. There is a strong endogeneity here: if aid were more stable, it could be absorbed and administered more effectively, and in larger amounts. Increased predictability is thus *a sine qua non* of any global increase in aid volumes<sup>18</sup>.

## **Private donations and attitudes to development**

Private philanthropic transfers to developing countries – including donations and grants from private foundations- amount to several billion dollars a year<sup>19</sup>. In developed countries, however, much remains to be done to gather sufficient and strong support for the cause of development.

### ***Uncertain motivations***

Polls (both French and international) paint a mixed picture of peoples' feelings about development

### ***Competing priorities***<sup>20</sup>

- Private donations seem to be motivated first by a sense of urgency or proximity, followed by the occurrence of natural disasters and a sense of "being lucky." The Millennium Goals present a specific challenge, in this regard, because the objective (poverty reduction) may be perceived as both diffuse and distant (2015).
- Ranking third among motives for giving is a feeling of vulnerability: "it could happen to me one day". This is the reason behind the success of anti-cancer campaigns.

- It seems easier to mobilize against the perceived evils of globalization than around a positive objective: as a slogan, “reduce poverty” carries less weight than “fight injustice”. Also, environmental degradation appears to be a bigger source of concern than the situation of poor people. Nevertheless, global hunger ranks first among concerns expressed (see box 2).

When asked, people do not give a high priority to solidarity with the poor countries. A mere 3% of the 220 billion dollars given privately by Americans goes to development. In-depth qualitative surveys carried out in France lead to a similar conclusion: if questions are open-ended (with no answer suggested), the fight against poverty is never mentioned. It only comes in response to specific questions. Development aid ranks 4<sup>th</sup> among motives for actual donations (17%), behind domestic healthcare, research, and education. When asked, in the abstract, about causes they think worthy of their financial support, French people rank development 6<sup>th</sup> (with 24%), far behind, for instance, medical research (70%) and children’s rights (46%).

### *Developing Countries: solidarity and concern*

Public opinion in developed countries is increasingly sensitive to the pressures and risks of globalization. In this environment, developing countries may be perceived as competitors as well as partners. The resulting pressures can create a negative political dynamic if people become more reluctant to accept the consequences of economic openness and less inclined to make financial sacrifices for development. All the more so if, at the same time, they have to go through difficult adjustments in their own social benefits.

### *Mistrust of development institutions*

Aid flows transit through national and international institutions, which do not always enjoy unequivocal support from the citizens. Underlying altruism may be inhibited by doubts about whether the resources will be efficiently managed. This institutional dimension is an important cause behind the lack of enthusiasm and support for development.

Citizens may doubt their government’s willingness to allocate their contributions to causes they really care about. They may question recipient countries’ aptitude for spending aid effectively. Indeed, 51% of French people say they would be prepared to increase

development aid if it were better spent. People may also harbor a certain distrust or hostility toward international development institutions. It is known, for example, that part of the United States' opposition to any form of international taxation is historically linked to its view of the United Nations system. In France, on the contrary, the UN ranks first among trusted institutions (with 69% positive responses), followed by the European Union (61%), NGOs (57%) and the government (52%). Similarly, the image of the Bretton Woods institutions varies greatly from country to country and among opinion groups. In all, doubts about the effectiveness of ODA come second to personal financial constraints as a reason for not wanting to contribute. Significantly, hostility to taxation ("I pay enough tax already") only comes 8<sup>th</sup>.

## ***How to make progress***

### ***Better information***

Citizens know little about the costs and benefits of aid. Polls taken in the United States show that they tend to overestimate its level by a considerable margin. This may explain some of the resistance to an increase in ODA. Information may lead to a better assessment of the benefits of aid. It would show that, beyond worthy domestic causes, it is in peoples' rational interest to support an increase in ODA if that reduces the global risks to which they are exposed.

In recent years, and especially since September 11, 2001, these risks have become more apparent. But the public might not spontaneously see a linkage between these risks and the persistence of poverty in large regions of the world. Indeed, some experts would dispute that such a link exists at all, specifically with respect to terrorism. They would argue that the perpetrators of terrorist attacks usually come from countries that are already fairly developed, belong to the middle, or even privileged classes, and are relatively well educated. On the other hand, "failed states" clearly provide havens for terrorist organizations, and, by themselves, are a source of geopolitical destabilization<sup>21</sup>. Finally, some risks associated with globalization—health risks notably—are clearly linked to poverty and under-development. More intensive information about those risks would make it easier to grasp the importance and urgency of increasing aid, not only for the benefit of recipient countries but also for the sake of developed countries and their national interests.<sup>22</sup>.

## *Transparency of aid*

Transparency is essential to create trust and support for an increase in aid. It may necessitate important changes in the way resources are managed and allocated. This issue is discussed in depth below, when "innovative financing mechanisms" are examined.

## **The current official development assistance system**

To many observers, an increase in ODA is the best response to the challenges presented by poverty and human development. All it takes, for developed countries, is to honor their commitments through additional budget expenditures. Some would consider plans to create innovative mechanisms as an escape route or a diversion from the real issue : the need to transfer more resources to poor countries (see box 3).

This is a powerful argument, but one which misses an essential point about the inner workings of the international aid system.

This system is currently organized through network of bilateral and multilateral relations between recipient and donor countries. This complex architecture rests upon informal coordinating mechanisms between countries whose objectives may converge or (more frequently) diverge. There is no shortage of structures and procedures for agreeing on joint programs and actions. But donors still keep discretionary power over their contributions, sometimes informally binding themselves into jointly agreed programs or frameworks.

The impact and efficiency of such a system, is dependant on how the actors interact with each other.

## ***Voluntary equilibriums***

Informal and flexible coordination works best when countries wish to pursue their own specific goals. This is often the case for development aid<sup>23</sup>, which is also an instrument of foreign policy. Beyond pure geopolitical motives, donors may want to promote their own view of the world, their own approach to development, and define their conditionality accordingly. (Three quarters of development grants are made bilaterally and two thirds of the poorest countries receive only one third of ODA).

For recipient countries, the resulting competition between donors can be judged either beneficial or harmful. Developing countries certainly pay a price in terms of increased inefficiency, and they are faced with numerous constraints and inconsistencies. But the system also gives them an element of freedom and choice. They can avoid subordinating their development policy and strategy to a single and monolithic vision. Current practices also allow for some degree of innovation and experimentation, as well as for comparison between competing visions and doctrines.

### ***MDGs and the need for a cooperative equilibrium***

With the MDGs, donors and recipient countries have jointly and explicitly agreed on specific objectives. Here, purely voluntary cooperation does not produce optimal results (see box 4).

- First, it does not deliver adequate resources<sup>24</sup>. Each country naturally seeks to free ride on others' contributions<sup>25</sup>. There are numerous strategies for achieving this. Donors generally direct most of their bilateral aid toward their own priority programs or countries. At the same time, they try to delegate the implementation of joint programs to those institutions to which they contribute least. The outcome is distinctly sub-optimal.
- Second, it imposes high transaction and negotiation costs. Donors spend a great deal of time and resources seeking compromises. Recipients find it increasingly difficult to cope with the system's complexity and uncertainties. Reconciling the various and not entirely consistent demands of donor countries greatly complicates the task of administration and planning.
- Finally, the volatility of aid flows may be seen as unavoidable when aid is conditional and largely left to the donors' discretion. Currently only debt reduction mechanisms contain an element of automaticity. Other forms of aid, even when framed within annual or multi-year programs, remain subject to the uncertainties of coordination among donors and their dialogue with recipients. We know from experience that those processes produce unstable equilibriums. Agreements have to be reached for each program or type of expenditure and there is no mechanism that would provide a guarantee against the risk of free riding.

In sum, aid flows are determined by: the behavior of donors whose goals and priorities may be frequently shifting; recipient countries' performances, which is uneven over time; and

finally, external shocks, which may themselves have an impact on recipients' economies and performance. The interaction of these three forces is a major source of uncertainty and instability (see box 5).

Admittedly, significant improvements are being brought to the system. The declining trend in aid has been stopped and reversed in the last few years. Untied aid is increasingly predominant. Program (or budgetary) support is now supplementing or replacing project aid. Aid is also becoming more concessional. Conditionality is changing, with greater emphasis being put on institutional quality and good governance .

Finally, the effectiveness of aid has been subject to a number of reviews in recent years, and considerable efforts have been made since 2002 to harmonize aid procedures in order to reduce the constraints and the efforts they impose on recipient countries.

But these reforms have not fundamentally altered the system's architecture and its instruments. One essential element is still lacking, namely a resource that is both concessional and predictable. Such a resource can only be produced by a strong and permanent coordinating mechanism.

## **Innovative financing mechanisms**

Most national budgets are decided and voted annually, which makes it difficult for developed countries to provide stable and predictable aid flows. Innovative financing mechanisms seek to relax and ultimately lift this constraint while at the same time mobilizing additional resources.

### ***The International Finance Facility***

The International Finance Facility (IFF) is a development financing mechanism proposed by the UK Government and supported by France.

The rationale behind the IFF is the urgent need to mobilize resources in order to meet the Millennium Development Goals. While many governments have committed to increasing their ODA, this increase is bound to be progressive.

The IFF is designed to use capital markets to frontload future increases in development aid. The IFF is a funding platform and performs a treasury function. It would periodically collect formal and irrevocable multi-year pledges by member countries to make future contributions. It then issues bonds whose repayment is guaranteed by those pledges (allowing funds to be raised on the best possible terms). The proceeds are then used to finance development, mainly in the form of grants. If the mechanism works, it will generate stable resources, the rate of disbursements being disconnected from that of contributions.

The IFF presents many attractive features, and also raises a number of questions.

It can be implemented on a regional basis or by a limited number of countries, since it does not immediately weigh on the economy and hence does not create problems of competitiveness<sup>26</sup>. Faster disbursement of aid is justified for some human development actions. Finally, it makes perfect sense to use capital markets to manage the disconnection between flows of revenues and expenditures with different schedules over time, provided their values are equivalent.

Several important issues need to be addressed, however. The IFF governance structure and allocation mechanisms have yet to be defined. In many countries, budgetary rules would impose accounting for future pledges as immediate expenditure commitments. As with all borrowing, the IFF transfers the burden of repayment onto future generations, with no guarantee as to the return on the investment concerned. A major question mark thus hangs over the long-term future. After 2015, a proportion of developed countries' ODA budgets will be absorbed by IFF repayments. At that point, this could lead to a sharp reduction in net flows toward poor countries. The risk is limited but nonetheless very real, should future budgetary pressures in countries, particularly those with aging populations, prevail over the desire to reduce poverty.

Hopefully by then, several countries that currently receive aid will no longer need it, having reached a sufficient level of development. Others however, will still be in need of help. This is certainly the case for many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Even with optimistic assumptions for growth and national tax rates, these countries will still be unable to shoulder the burden of public spending essential to human development. The poorest countries will still need help after 2015<sup>27</sup>; and it is precisely those countries that would ultimately bear the risk attached to frontloading, unless other stable sources of funding have been put in place by then (see box 6).

## ***International taxation***

It is important to define and clarify, from the outset, the concept of international taxation.

There is no such thing as an international authority with the power to tax. In today's world, only sovereign states have the legitimacy and capacity to enact and enforce compulsory taxation.

Similarly, there is no such thing as an "international" tax base, i.e. one that could be mobilized outside the authority of national governments. Economists and political scientists have identified planetary "common goods," which are the common heritage of the world's inhabitants. They include the oceans, space, and the atmosphere. But only national governments can capture these goods for the purposes of pricing or taxing their use. One feature of globalization is that some economic factors have become increasingly mobile, to the point where they seem to have vanished into some other, more international space. But this impression is deceptive. This mobility occurs between the fiscal jurisdictions of different countries, between which there is no such thing as a legal international space.

Consequently, an international tax would necessarily be the outcome of an act of cooperation between sovereign countries. It can be defined as a set of identical or convergent national tax mechanisms, implemented jointly by these countries within a common, agreed framework, encompassing the utilization of the funds levied by each of these states.

This cooperation would need to be negotiated and legally formalized. It means that an instrument of sovereignty, the power of taxation, would be subordinated to an international common objective.

Creating an international tax would imply international agreement on a basis and rate of taxation, together with institutional arrangements for collecting it.

International taxation therefore, calls for a high degree of international and institutional cooperation, and it may entail some pooling of sovereignty. In that sense, it is only applicable if and when countries' preferences are fully convergent.

Once these conditions are met, however, an international tax would bring huge benefits:

- It would solve once and for all the coordination and burden sharing problems;
- It would ensure the continuity and predictability of aid flows, including over the very long term;
- It would eliminate transaction costs and dispense with cumbersome negotiating procedures;
- It would establish a system for fighting poverty on solid foundations, and protect it from the vagaries of politics and international cooperation;
- Finally, it would not put any additional burden on future generations. In that sense it would appear particularly suited to three categories of spending, namely:
  - Solidarity among existing generations (e.g. immediate healthcare expenditures, and countries in emergency situations);
  - Expenditures with risky, uncertain social returns (e.g. medical research);
  - Expenditures needing to be carried out over the very long term.

### *The IFF and international taxation are complementary*

There are powerful complementary features between the IFF and international taxation:

- First, economic: The two instruments can be used jointly when expenditures designed to benefit present and future generations are closely combined within a single program or action. In healthcare, for example, some expenditures, such as vaccination, prevention or education, are in fact an investment in the future, whereas others are more a question of immediate solidarity. It must be possible to find suitable funding for both;

- Second, financial: a tax resource may serve to secure or consolidate a more sophisticated package based on loans and guarantees;
- Finally, they are complementary over time: the tax resources will still be available in the long run, when the IFF's disbursement period is over.

### *How much is needed?*

Numbers usually associated with the millennium goals reflect total financing needs whether they take the form of loans, official grants, or private flows. They cannot automatically be translated into a revenue target for international taxation.

Two approaches can be considered. One could seek to cover the majority, or even the near-totality, of the financing gap by means of a tax resource; if successful, this would provide maximum security for funding the MDGs. However, such a high level of new taxation would most certainly strengthen the opposition.

Alternatively, one could concentrate, at least initially, on a “core” of fundamental needs that absolutely require stable and concessional funding. This approach may seem insufficiently ambitious. Yet, irrespective of the amount, the mere fact that such a resource exists would transform the landscape and the nature of development aid. Initially, even a limited contribution would raise the return on other forms of funding by creating an environment in which they can be effective.

It is hard to estimate precisely and comprehensively the needs for this type of resource. It is worth noting, however, that<sup>28</sup> :

- With less than USD 1 billion a year, all of the world's poor could have access to approximately thirty basic surgical procedures;
- USD 2 billion a year would finance research into a vaccine against malaria;
- USD 2 billion annually could cover the cost of emergency humanitarian aid and provide assistance to failed or distressed states.
- USD 2 billion a year would guarantee primary education for all children in the poor countries of sub-Saharan Africa;

### *Managing the resources*

How can stable and predictable resources be administered effectively? Relations between donor and beneficiary countries rest on a delicate and unstable balance between altruism and conditionality. Greater stability in transfers to poor countries could modify this equilibrium; however this raises some questions and doubts.

A first set of issues relates to the management of funds if the proceeds of an international tax were to be specifically allocated to one or several MDGs. One would have to insure the coherence between actions carried out in those specific sectors with actions carried out in other sectors (as is currently being done in donors' country programs). Also, earmarking revenues may run contrary to traditional principles of fiscal management (more on this later in the report).

The central, and most difficult, question, however, is about conditionality. In principle, conditionality is intended to ensure that the resources transferred are used efficiently. Stable resources create a moral hazard problem, whereby recipient countries may lack sufficient incentives to pursue "sound" policies. This question is a complex one, however, since a variety of causes can be responsible for the disappointing performances recorded in many countries: quite apart from poor administration, other factors involved may include unexpected shocks, including those brought about by the volatility of aid itself, as pointed out earlier. One may also ask whether populations, especially in countries in a state of extreme distress, should have to suffer the adverse consequences of government failures; or whether, on the contrary, aid should be used to protect them from the consequences of those failures (see box 7).

### *Additionality*

A new tax or levy does not necessarily bring additional resources. Evasion may erode the tax base. The resulting revenues may, for a variety of reasons, be diminished by a reduction in the proceeds of other taxes.

This question is especially acute in the case of an international tax. By definition, this tax would coexist with existing official development assistance flows. However, there is a risk

that, instead of increasing aid flows, the proceeds from an international tax would actually crowd them out. Each government may choose to scale back its ODA budget in response to the emergence of a new source of funding, e.g. in the form of a tax. In extreme cases, the substitution might be total. Thus, the introduction of a tax into a primarily voluntary system might not necessarily increase the overall amount of aid.

Most developed countries today are subject to stringent budgetary constraints, which may lead to a reduction in ODA, should new revenues be created from an international tax. In the past, that debt reduction has sometimes replaced, not added to, other existing forms of aid.

There is no perfect solution to this problem, which the IFF also has to face to the same extent. In the short run, there would certainly be a need for greater multilateral surveillance of aid policies and commitments.

Beyond that, additionality of an international tax is linked to its acceptability, which in turn, strongly depends on its allocation mechanisms and conditions of governance.

### *Earmarking*

In pure public finance, it is generally considered inadvisable to earmark a given revenue for a specific expenditure, since this introduces an element of rigidity to the allocation of resources<sup>29</sup>. The dynamics of revenue and spending rarely coincide over time, leading either to waste or to inadequate funding. Earmarking also makes democratic control and governance more complicated, and tends to perpetuate programs and structures which have outlived their purpose.

In the case of an international tax however, at least partial earmarking may prove necessary and useful.

First, it introduces a direct link between donors and beneficiaries. This link would lend greater legitimacy to an international tax, therefore making it more acceptable and consequently, more additional.

Earmarking can also serve to experiment with new approaches for distributing aid and make it easier to reach poor people, who frequently find themselves with no access to normal channels of public and private finance.

Earmarking can take different forms. Responsibility for administering part of the tax revenues could be delegated to non-governmental partners. New or existing trust funds could also serve as a natural receptacle for international tax revenues ( creating for non participating countries an incentive to join). Finally, where funded actions closely complement those undertaken by the international institutions, the taxes could be paid into trust funds lodged within these institutions, being administered according to the priorities and rules laid down by the donor countries while benefiting from the leverage provided by multilateral funding.

### *Governance*

As pointed out earlier, the public image of some institutions does not fully reflect their level of competence and expertise. This contradiction needs to be managed with pragmatism and imagination. It may not be realistic to solicit taxpayers to provide unspecified funding for existing organizations. But it would be equally detrimental to systematically exclude those organizations from the allocation and management of tax revenues. Innovation in governance should, therefore, develop in parallel to innovation in financing.

New forms of governance could help and promote new practices of public-private partnerships in development aid. As evidenced by philanthropic foundations, such partnerships can be highly productive, and could no doubt provide a worthwhile channel for the proceeds of any international tax. Bringing in non-governmental partners could offer a guarantee of sound administration as well as generating catalytic effects. Some public development actors may view the emergence of these partnerships with misgivings or even reluctance, and may legitimately fear a dilution of their power and priorities. Here again, institutional innovation will be essential. If properly organized, the involvement of these private partners in actions financed through an international tax would unquestionably enhance its legitimacy.

All in all, an international tax can be truly additional if and when:

- Burden sharing is explicit and transparent;
- It comes with guarantees (political, institutional, and legal) regarding the volume of existing flows;
- It can be linked to specific and unanswered needs, thereby revealing hitherto unexpressed preferences
- It is allocated and administered in a climate of transparency and integrity beyond suspicion and criticism.

## **PART TWO: OPTIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM**

Here, we describe and analyze the possible characteristics of an international tax mechanism for development<sup>30</sup>.

Three issues are addressed: first, how an international tax would fit in the global tax environment; second, the policy choices regarding the efficiency and equity of such a tax; and, finally, the legal architecture and possible design of international taxes.

### **International taxation in the global environment**

Globalization has created a new environment for tax policy. Existing tax systems have been mainly designed for closed economies, where all factors of production could be considered as immobile. As economies have opened up, factors such as capital or skilled labor have become mobile, and hence more responsive to levels of taxation. This new environment creates both the conditions for increased competition between national tax systems and better opportunities for tax evasion.

These are two different issues:

- Tax competition, as opposed to harmonization, is a matter of policy choice. There are considerable divergences among countries (and throughout public opinion), including within the European Union, on the costs and benefits of tax competition, and on the necessity of greater harmonization. This debate falls outside the scope of this report.
- Tax evasion is a form of behavior by private agents, either within the limits of the law (through tax optimization), or on the borderline of legality.

Tax evasion is closely related to the topic of this report. It may compromise the morality of international financial activities. It may be based on the same techniques and methods as those employed in criminal activities. It may also illegally reduce governments' tax revenues and hence resources available to finance public goods.

Above all, tax evasion deprives poor countries of the resources necessary to their growth and development. The loss in tax revenues generated by evasion in developing countries may be equivalent to the sums needed to achieve the Millennium Goals. So it would be pointless to think about international taxation or, more generally, about innovative financing mechanisms, if at the same time little is being done to help rebuild these countries' taxation capabilities, which is an essential condition for their development. Contrary to tax competition, governments agree, in principle at least, on the need to fight tax evasion. Considerable efforts are being made through tax cooperation within the OECD, especially on the issue of tax havens.

Finally, international taxation is a new, and still undeveloped, method of cooperation between governments for the funding of common priorities. It could prove to be a suitable instrument for accommodating competition between tax systems, by partially attenuating its impact on governments' funding capacities. Unlike harmonization, it leaves governments free to determine their own tax policies. It also creates a limited space for coordination for the purpose of joint actions.

## **Efficiency, justice, and equity**

All tax systems are based on a trade-off between efficiency and equity. This trade-off is defined by the ultimate objectives assigned to the system. In a global setting, there are four such possible objectives: correcting externalities; moralizing the international economy; redistributing income; and financing development.

### ***Correcting externalities***

Externalities arise whenever actions from economic agents have consequences, which are not fully captured into prices and costs, and therefore not taken into account by themselves or other agents when making their decisions. Externalities can be positive or negative. Atmospheric pollution, when created by human activity, is a standard example of a negative externality. Because externalities are not naturally reflected into prices and costs, they create a market failure and generate economic inefficiency (i.e. for instance, too much pollution as compared to what people would naturally be prepared to accept). A good way to correct or eliminate negative externalities is to levy a so-called "Pigovian" tax, whose effect is to bring private costs in line with the social cost, thus "internalizing" the externality. The tax leads agents to take account of the whole social cost when making their decisions. Unlike all other taxes, such taxes do not create any new distortion. On the contrary, they restore the efficiency of the market mechanism (see box 8).

The case for Pigovian taxes can also be made on a global scale.

Many externalities, especially environmental externalities, transcend national borders. They naturally call for an international response. No country could or should act alone to correct such externalities. Individual action is pointless if the externality lies beyond the reach of any individual country. It is also dangerous, since corrective taxes inevitably have an impact on the relative competitiveness of activities, economies, and regions. Taxes designed to combat greenhouse gases are a case in point. Unilateral implementation by one country would have no significant effect on overall emissions and could seriously affect its competitiveness, especially if rates were set so as to fully compensate for their environmental damage. As a consequence, such taxes can only be envisaged where there is strong international cooperation.

Of course, taxes are only one among many available tools to deal with environmental externalities. Other possible instruments include emissions standards and quotas, as well as marketable permits.

In a global setting, the choice between these instruments depends on judgment about their effectiveness, their distributional impact between countries as well as, more generally, the intensity and modalities of international cooperation.

### ***Moralizing the international economy***

A tax could contribute, in some cases, to discouraging specific activities. To the extent that some activities are deemed immoral or dangerous, such a tax could be welfare-enhancing from the point of view of the international community.

The proposal to tax arms sales partly falls within this definition. To many observers, military expenditures have detrimental effects on political stability and economic growth. They absorb an excessive share of developing country budgets, especially in countries with undemocratic regimes. Arms sales are also considered insufficiently transparent and act as a conduit for corruption.

A "moralization" tax seems very natural and, by itself, legitimate, whatever use is made of its proceeds. Its rate can be set as high as deemed necessary, without any consideration of the demand elasticity and any concern for the negative impact on the tax base. Such a tax could have a signaling effect and help to mobilize public opinion against immoral activities.

There is also, however, an element of paradox to such a tax. Raising public revenues from an "immoral" activity may be awkward, especially if it helps to give additional legitimacy to that very activity. A purely moral approach would prevent or forbid immoral activities, not tax them.

### ***Income redistribution***

In most countries, taxes are used, to some extent, to modify income distribution and correct inequalities. Could and should global taxes be designed with such a purpose? This is a valid question, which needs to be addressed: rightly or wrongly, global inequalities are often perceived to be on an increasing trend. But it is doubtful that international cooperation will produce a concrete response to that perception either now or in the foreseeable future.

First, there is no consensus on the diagnosis. Judgments differ widely as to whether global inequalities have increased or decreased over the last decades, together with the most recent phase of globalization. As measured by synthetic indicators of worldwide income distribution (gini coefficient), global inequality has been stable over the last three decades- or even decreased slightly - after a sharp increase in the first sixty years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. A

different measure, such as the gap between the highest and lowest levels of income, would on the contrary, show a significant increase.

Second, there is no consensus as to the best approach to deal with global inequality. Inequalities between countries are far greater than those within each country. But one can draw opposing conclusions from this. Some take the view that financial transfers between developed and developing countries are a crucial instrument for reducing global inequalities. For others, economic growth is the main driving force behind the reduction of global inequalities, by allowing emerging and developing countries to catch up with developed countries and promoting convergence in worldwide living standards.

### ***Financing development***

Finally, international taxes may be created for the sole purpose of raising revenues. The choice would then be determined by two simple characteristics. First, the revenue potential: ideally the tax base should grow fast enough to meet the need for increased resources over time. Second, collection costs should be as low as possible.

### ***Priorities***

No tax however, serves a single purpose, and many actually seek to achieve several goals at once. A tax on arms, for instance, would both raise revenues and aim to discourage sales. Environmental taxes seek to correct environmental degradation while, at the same time, bringing additional resources.

Here, the report makes choices and defines priorities. At this stage, the aim of international taxation should be to raise the resources necessary to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Any international tax should be designed first and foremost as a financing tax. Revenue potential is the main criteria through which all available options should be assessed.

There are two fundamental motivations behind this choice:

- Income redistribution is the outcome of a political process which, in most countries, is based on democratic decision making mechanisms. We know from observation that

countries differ widely as to the desirable or acceptable level of income inequality. There is no worldwide democratic process to reconcile these differences and decide on the appropriate level of income distribution and modalities for reducing inequalities.

What does exist, however, is a universally accepted goal of global poverty reduction. The approach here is different. The international community has decided to focus on the situation of the poorest people, not on the gap between different levels of income around the world. This approach is based on well-established philosophical and ethical premises<sup>31</sup>. It can therefore serve as a reference point for defining and implementing mechanisms for transferring resources to the poor countries. This is the approach which best legitimizes international taxation today<sup>32</sup>.

- International taxes can improve the overall economic efficiency of development financing.

First, corrective taxes, such as environmental taxes, would raise revenues without creating any new economic distortions, and actually eliminating some. This is the so-called "double dividend" whose existence and reality, however, is debated (see box 8).

Second, taxes levied, at a very low rate, on internationally mobile tax bases would be less distortionary than additions to existing national taxes, whose rates are already much higher. Thus, financing supplementary development needs through such international taxes would bring net benefits in terms of economic efficiency. This would, all things being equal, allow for a greater level of aid: it is a standard result of economic theory that one can finance a greater volume of public goods by reducing the distortions created by taxation.

It is impossible, however, to create such international taxes without strong international cooperation.

One possible answer to this problem is tax harmonization. As already mentioned, there is no consensus on this issue. Many countries view tax competition as a normal, even desirable, practice. They don't want the freedom to determine their own tax, fiscal and social policies to be impeded by tax harmonization. In addition, tax

competition is seen as a good way to limit to the growth in public spending and government interventions.

But, if and when countries agree to jointly finance additional development spending, then it would be more efficient to do so through international taxes rather than by increasing national taxes. An international tax system would, therefore, preserve tax competition between countries, if they so wish, while at the same time provide an economically efficient base for funding an increase in development aid.

Once this financing priority is met, however, other objectives can and should also be pursued (and serve as secondary criteria for decision).

Creating an international tax would represent a major political decision and would be inseparable from a much broader vision. It would encompass an aspiration to greater global stability, more security and more justice in global development. It would give practical expression to the sense of a common bond between all of the planet's inhabitants: between those -the vast majority- for whom globalization is a source of progress and greater prosperity, and those -still too numerous- whom globalization has left behind, and who are penalized by an accumulation of historical, natural or geographic handicaps.

This vision is embodied in the Millennium Development Goals. A global tax should contribute to this vision and, as such, should not result in new burdens or handicaps for poor countries. New contributions should never be regressive but rather neutral or progressive (with the level of income). They could also, when appropriate, help moralize economic and financial activities.

## **Architecture**

The power to tax is an essential attribute of sovereignty and, in democratic countries, has always been closely associated with direct political representation. Such representation does not exist at the world level. This could call into question the legitimacy of any international tax.

Some proponents of international taxes would see their creation as part of a bigger project : the creation of new forms of global governance, that international taxation would help to promote and consolidate <sup>33</sup>.

This is the perspective adopted by the Zedillo Commission on development finance, which calls for a world council of Heads of State and Government to promote better global governance. The Commission also recommends the creation of a world tax organization to study, among other things, the technical feasibility of an international tax. This is a very ambitious approach, but one that would ultimately create the most robust structure for international taxation.

However, institutional progress takes time. And it is not clear that institutional changes would, by themselves, bring an evolution in international funding mechanisms. The European Union is a case in point. Although they have achieved unprecedented economic and political integration, backed by strong institutional arrangements, member countries have yet to agree on the principle of a European tax.

A more realistic approach, and one best suited to the urgent need for resources, is to work within the existing international system, where only sovereign states have the power to tax. Any new -and more automatic- development funding mechanism would have to be built on their explicit consent.

### ***Legal framework***

An international tax would be based on a two-tier legal architecture:

- First, national legislations would enact the tax within each country's jurisdiction;
- Second, countries would agree on a coordinating mechanism whereby they would jointly implement their national decisions.

How those two tiers would relate to each other <sup>34</sup> would determine whether the tax is more or less "international" and would give the legal architecture its defining characteristics (see box 9).

Several options would be available to participating countries as regards the coordinating mechanism:

- it could be more or less detailed and prescriptive. At one end of the spectrum, countries would only agree on a specific formula to set their contributions, while retaining their autonomy as to how those would be funded. This is a case of countries “taxing themselves”<sup>35</sup>. At the other end, they would implement the same tax, with identical tax rates and tax bases in all countries.
  
- It could be more or less binding. In a flexible, non-binding framework, cooperation on taxation would be strictly voluntary and revocable, and could be based for instance on a joint declaration. As regards the MDGs, the declaration could specify, for instance, those taxes whose proceeds would be allocated to specific development purposes, together with some monitoring mechanisms.

Another approach would be, for participating countries, to sign an international treaty that would bind them for as long as they do not denounce it. The treaty would prescribe the rules governing national contributions, and, if so decided, the tax base, and rate as well as the mechanisms for collection and allocation of revenues. There are no such treaties at present. This approach would mark a major qualitative change in the field of international tax cooperation: governments have never yet agreed to such strict limitations on their sovereignty. But they have consented to other, fairly similar limitations. Trade treaties in particular, bind tariffs duties and narrowly circumscribe signatories’ freedom to subsidize productive activities or even to use internal taxation power (to the extent that it would discriminate between residents from different nationalities).

### ***Approaches to taxation***

A great number of options are available for the design of an international tax system. Here, we identify three broad possible approaches.

#### *Coordinated tax incentives to international private philanthropy*

Most developed countries encourage private philanthropy through tax incentives. But those mechanisms do not specifically discriminate between domestic and international donations (for development). And they might differ widely from one country to the other. Up to now, domestic tax systems do not give any priority to development aid, nor do they signal any

such priority, which could shape the perceptions of private individuals and influence their behaviour.

Great progress would be achieved if developed countries were to establish a coordinated, uniform system of tax incentives for private donations to development<sup>36</sup>.

If this were additional to existing mechanisms, such a system would undoubtedly be costly. But it would also bring important benefits:

- Implementation would be easy. No new institutional or legal arrangement would be necessary. A joint declaration by participants would suffice, together with implementing legislation in each country.
- Public funds would be leveraged by private contributions.
- It would thus help mobilize public opinion for the cause of development.
- It would be especially suited to countries where public opinion is most reluctant towards all forms of compulsory taxation and government intervention.
- It would introduce a more direct, and hence powerfully educational, bond between individual donors, contributors and the ultimate recipients of aid.

Such a system would not necessarily deliver stable resources nor would it establish a predictable burden sharing mechanism between countries. But it would give governments greater insight into public opinion by acting as a "preference-revealing" mechanism and, as such, would help in efforts for development resource mobilisation.

These "new" donations could conceivably crowd out other forms of philanthropy. The risk however is limited. Observations show that total private donations are higher in those countries with high levels of ODA. This suggests that substitution effects between different forms of contribution might be weak. The risk is worth taking, furthermore, if the priority for development is to be taken seriously. Finally, it should be noted that appropriately targeted tax incentives could strongly help NGOs in their fund raising, thus increasing the leverage effect of public spending.

### *Additions to existing taxes*

Contributions to development aid could be made through additions to existing taxes. Such contributions would be easy to implement, with very low additional collection costs, and would yield automatic and fairly predictable revenues. If they come in addition to taxes based on broad economic aggregates, significant resources could be obtained with a limited increase in the tax rate, thus minimizing the economic cost.

To the extent that the tax bases would mirror national wealth and prosperity, those additions could be seen as a form of international solidarity contribution.

As an instrument of solidarity, however, an addition to existing taxes is less than perfect: the burden sharing would also reflect existing differences and distortions between tax bases of a similar nature between participants. However, this drawback needs to be weighed against the key benefit of using existing tax bases and methods.

### *New global taxes*

There are three possible categories of such taxes:

- Those levied on infinitely mobile tax bases at the national level (e.g. financial assets), which, therefore, can only be taxed through international cooperation. In addition to being dynamic, thereby ensuring strong revenue growth, these bases are sufficiently broad as to allow for very low, i.e. non-distorting tax rates.
- Those, which, if implemented nationally, would lead to a substantial loss of competitiveness (environmental taxes are a case in point). Despite their corrective function, the rate for those taxes could be determined primarily with a revenue-raising objective, at least initially.
- Taxes levied on planetary common goods belonging to humanity as a whole and which, under the existing system of tax jurisdictions, are captured by no one (such as space and ocean resources with the notable exception of polymetallic nodules). These are scarce and non-renewable resources. Nevertheless, the existing international legal framework paradoxically provides unlimited and free access. In the

long run, when over-consumption will become more apparent, this will become a major challenge for cooperation among countries. In the immediate future, taxation may be useful to help move closer to optimal pricing of these resources.

### ***Financing channels***<sup>37</sup>

A first option would be for the tax revenues to be collected directly by an international organization. This could only be possible if the tax base is clearly identified and subject to immediate verification. In this case, direct collection may lower collection costs and makes the final allocation of the proceeds perfectly clear. Such architecture already exists in some international treaties. One example is the Universal Postal Union, whose development assistance instrument, Quality of Service Fund (QSF), is financed by a contribution from each of the industrialized countries equal to a small fraction of terminal dues paid between postal administrations. Similarly, until its demise on January 1, 2002, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was partly funded out of direct levies on steel firms.

Under a second option, the tax would be collected as a national tax, recorded as a non-earmarked revenue item in the budget, like any other tax revenue, and then paid out to the international organization as an item of expenditure. This is the mechanism used for the "VAT resource" in the European Union; it preserves parliamentary control and opens up the possibility of revenue sharing. Its allocation is less guaranteed and less transparent, however, which may make it harder to defend before public opinion.

A last option, a variant of the previous one, is the earmarked tax. It is identical to the previous one with one major exception, namely that there is an unbreakable legal link between the revenue and the expenditure. This mechanism is used for European Union agricultural levies and customs duties.

## **Global or regional taxes ?**

Universal consensus on international taxation is certainly an objective, but one which might prove difficult to achieve in the immediate future. Is there then, a possibility to create regional taxes?

This question is especially important for those who would like to see the European Union expanding its role in development assistance. With such a tax resource, Europe would be able to play this role to its fullest - a role that could well be seen as both justified and necessary given the strong sensitivity to development issues on the European continent.

There would be obvious adverse consequences for the competitiveness of participating countries and important risks of evasion. Any new tax also has a signalling effect to the extent that it may fuel expectations of future rate increases. This may be especially detrimental if the initiative is confined to Europe, given our continent's already high level of taxation. Finally, those countries that do apply a regional tax may find themselves funding a public good that benefits the "exempted" countries, thereby making a significant transfer to the latter.

On the other hand, it might be useful to start a process, which could later lead to broader acceptance and participation. Most of the major advances in international cooperation in recent decades have been made by a pioneer group of countries.

Both sides of the argument can be made with equal force. Clearly, some taxes would more easily applicable in a regional framework than others in terms of both the risk of evasion and the impact on competitiveness. This de facto limits the range of available instruments<sup>38</sup>. Countries that would decide to implement such regional taxes should also ensure (in the allocation and management of the resources) that sufficient incentives exist for others to join in (or be penalized for abstaining).

## PART THREE: ORIENTATIONS

This section reviews specific measures discussed and studied by the group. Some were scrutinized in great detail, while others have been discussed in more general terms at this stage.

These measures can be grouped together in a number of ways<sup>39</sup>.

### *Voluntary or compulsory contributions*

Some are genuine taxes. Others are purely voluntary, as in the case of an additional charge on credit card payments or on water, electricity and telephone bills. While individuals remain free to contribute, these mechanisms may be enhanced through various incentives. Voluntary contributions do not provide totally stable resources nor is their allocation to development actions guaranteed. A possible way forward for the major developed countries might be to encourage private generosity and philanthropy toward international development and poverty reduction, using similar incentive mechanisms.

Proposals for a global lottery also fall into this category, with the additional advantage that the proceeds can be allocated to causes clearly identified by governments.

### *Fiscal, quasi-fiscal or monetary*

An additional allocation of special drawing rights (SDRs), has been frequently suggested and would be highly beneficial to the poor countries. However, SDR is a monetary instrument, and, as such, cannot be used directly to finance budgetary expenditures for human development. It could, however, substantially alleviate poor countries' constraints in external financing, notably in the event of sudden, unforeseen shocks.

Similarly, fighting international tax evasion would not immediately yield any new and guaranteed revenues. However, it would help consolidate developing countries' tax bases and increase their budgetary receipts in the long run.

## *Universality*

Some taxes lend themselves more easily to an application limited to a few countries. Others do not. A corporate income tax surcharge, for example, would necessarily have to be implemented globally since partial implementation would impair the ability of participating countries to attract foreign direct investment. Some taxes on aviation or shipping, on the other hand, could technically be imposed on a limited scale with little serious risk of delocalisation.

Taxes on financial transactions are more complex to judge, from this point of view. Partial implementation would only be possible if markets were segmented. It would be impossible for large-scale transactions in fungible and homogenous assets. In general, high capital mobility and globalized financial markets make it difficult, if not impossible to create a tax which would not be applied in all major developed countries.

## *Criteria for choice*

All contributions discussed in this section share common characteristics:

- They are technically feasible;
- They would raise significant revenues and contribute to the financing of the Millennium Development Goals;
- They are economically rational, designed to minimize new economic distortions, or eliminate existing ones
- Finally, it would be impossible to collect any of them without extensive international cooperation.

This last point is crucial, since it provides the justification for using the proceeds to finance development. One could argue that there is no logical reason why a tax on financial transactions, for instance, should be used to finance poverty reduction. But such a tax could not be implemented by any single country acting alone. It can be considered a “product” of

international cooperation, therefore legitimizing the use of its revenues to finance the pursuit of common goals.

## **Enhancing voluntary contributions**

### ***Voluntary contributions in addition to tax payments***

The standard tax return can be used as a medium for encouraging people to make voluntary contributions, especially if backed up by specific tax incentives.

Such mechanisms exist in many countries :

- Some countries allow taxpayers to make an optional additional payment when determining their income tax, which may then be totally or partially deductible. The decision is made when filing one's tax return. Switzerland, Denmark and Germany, for example, apply a "church tax," which can generate considerable revenues (9 billion euros in Germany, in 2002,). Depending on the country, taxpayers can either opt in or out of the system. Opting in is less binding, but it has been shown that opting out generates higher revenues.
- Voluntary contributions to development may be matched by public funds. This formula works best, however, when people are asked to display generosity in everyday acts such as making purchases or paying their utility bills.

### ***Contributions when engaging in routine acts of consumption***

#### ***Credit card payments***

Bank card debits in Europe totaled USD 824 billion in 2003 (for Visa cards alone), with payments accounting for 70% of that figure and cash withdrawals for 30%. A 1% contribution could potentially raise USD 8 billion .

Cardholders could make a voluntary contribution in two ways:

- At each payment or cash withdrawal. This formula preserves maximum freedom on whether or not to give, but it is technologically very complex and its cost would probably be prohibitive. Legally, it is essential that the amount shown on the paper receipt precisely match the amount debited from the holder's account. If holders were given the option of making a contribution at the payment of each transaction, it would be necessary to adapt all existing payment terminals (there are 1 million in France).
- On all payments made with a specific card. In this case, the amount is debited periodically and appears on the holder's card statement. The payment circuit is unchanged and the card-issuing bank debits a lump sum from the donor's account. This option thus takes the form of an automatic debit contract between the card user and his bank (or financial service provider that issued the card). In France, Crédit Coopératif's "Agir" card utilizes a specific contract whereby customers agree to a debit of 0.06 euro for each cash withdrawal using the card. Approximately 10,000 such cards have been issued.

*Regular bill payments: the "additional centime on the water bill" as an example*

Another form of voluntary contribution may consist in soliciting the consumer at the time of payment of a utility bill, e.g. water, electricity or telephone.

This solution could take as its example the campaign launched in the United Kingdom in 2002 by Wateraid, an NGO, in association with 10 water distribution companies. 22 million households were asked to give for development when paying their water bill.

From this experience, two observations can be drawn:

- Few people ultimately signed up. Out of 22 million households, 15,000 subscribed. About 7% leave every year.

- For those who stay, Wateraid's figures show an increase in their donation: while the average initial payment is 8 euros per month, this can rise to a monthly figure of 15 euros after a few years given proper information and reminders.

## **International taxation**

### ***Taxes on financial transactions***

Monetary and financial assets are traded in broad, deep and liquid markets, many of which operate across the globe. The resulting volumes are substantial, even when measured against the most common macroeconomic aggregates.

National and international financial transactions (foreign exchange and securities) therefore represent an attractive and highly dynamic basis for taxation. Because these activities are highly competitive and in some cases very homogeneous, they form an exceptionally mobile tax base. Very low rates of taxation could therefore yield high revenues, provided they are levied in a relatively coordinated manner among major nations. Moreover, these taxes can help correct negative externalities if they serve to eliminate transactions deemed not useful, or indeed harmful, from the standpoint of market efficiency, notably those transactions which generate excessive price volatility.

These taxes are frequently criticized from the standpoint of their economic efficiency<sup>40</sup>. They raise the cost and reduce the volume of transactions; they artificially modify investors' time horizons at the expense of the short term; they reduce market liquidity and may thus indirectly contribute to increased volatility. They are by nature subject to cascade effects. Their real incidence is unknown and unpredictable, and may greatly exceed their theoretical rate. There is a high risk of double taxation (notably with regard to transactions conducted through intermediaries or collective investment vehicles).

These arguments have greatly contributed to the disfavor with which economists currently view those taxes.

However, financial assets are already subject to considerable tax distortions, notably due to the profusion of preferential regimes, the differential treatment of income and capital gains or losses, and to the difficulty of applying this treatment to derivative products (where the distinction between income and capital is blurred); in addition, there are difficulties related to

the measurement of income and stocks of assets held, along with the possibilities of evasion afforded by the increasingly international nature of markets<sup>41</sup>.

In addition, the impact of a transaction tax on investment decisions is probably negligible, as compared to other tax measures or prudential regulations to which many financial intermediaries and institutions are submitted in their decisions on portfolio allocation.

Finally, for many assets, there are already significant transaction costs, and taxation, in comparison, would probably have only a marginal impact. This is not the case for all markets, however, and caution should be exercised in determining tax rates accordingly.

Overall, a low rate of taxation on financial transactions could prove far less distorting than a higher rate of taxation applied to other bases.

### ***A tax on foreign exchange transactions***

Foreign exchange transactions totaled USD 1,200 billion daily in 2001. The bulk of these transactions took place between the three main currencies (30% euro/dollar, 20% dollar/yen, and 11% dollar/sterling).

Foreign exchange transaction taxes have been thoroughly debated as a means to prevent speculation and stabilize exchange rates. This report takes a different approach. Such a tax is considered for the sole purpose of raising funds for development. Accordingly, the rate should be set at a very low level (around 0.01%) in order to minimize market disruption and limit the risk of evasion.

### ***The tax is technically feasible on a global scale***

The tax can be levied either at the transaction or settlement/ payment stage.

In either case, the transaction must be declared. Contrary to a common assumption, payment systems (with the exception of the Continuous Linked Settlement System or CLS, which accounts for approximately 30% of transaction volumes) are not specific to foreign exchange systems, and do not allow identification of the nature of the operations passing through them.

In order to limit the risk of evasion, the tax should be levied at the settlement stage. Settlement systems operate with very large-scale infrastructures and require a very secure legal environment. In addition, these systems require access to central bank money order to clear the balance on their transactions. For all those reasons, delocalisation to “exotic” financial centers is impossible.

*It is very doubtful that such a tax can be levied on a regional basis*

Even if this tax is levied at the place of settlement, there is a very high risk of delocalisation if some main financial centres do not participate. Settlement systems may then execute internal clearing transactions outside of the taxation zone and settle only the balance of net positions in central bank money.

Central banks could theoretically thwart this evasion by refusing to open accounts for settlement systems located outside the taxation zone. But that would turn the central banks into auxiliaries of the tax authorities, which is hardly their function. In addition, this would encourage banks to develop settlement systems requiring less central bank money, which would ultimately diminish the effectiveness of monetary policy<sup>42</sup>. Central banks could therefore be expected to put up powerful—and doubtless legitimate—resistance to such a proposal.

*All market making activities should be exempted from taxation*

Banks conduct two types of transactions in the markets, namely transactions on their own account, which are no different from those of other operators, and market making transactions. In the latter, they continuously swap foreign exchange positions in order to balance their net position at a level compatible with the degree of risk market makers are authorized to take (which is subject to strict supervision). These are practically zero-cost operations, with estimated daily profits of less than 0.01% of the volumes exchanged. A tax would push these activities into permanent loss, which could lead either to further concentration among a very small number of major players, or to the complete disappearance of these activities, with the market adopting a different model of centralized price quotation. In terms of market efficiency and stability, the effect is uncertain. From the point of view of the tax, a sizable fraction of the tax base would definitely disappear.

These two considerations argue in favor of exempting market making activities. There is no certainty of being able to distinguish, legally and functionally, between a market making transaction and an own-account transaction within the interbank market. Market making transactions account for the majority (59%) in volume terms. One could consider exempting all interbank transactions, though at the risk of discriminating between banks and other actors (investment funds, notably), and shrinking the taxable base still further.

#### *A risk of over taxing certain financial instruments*

Swaps and options transactions may find themselves taxed several times over.

A swap transaction combines a spot (short leg) transaction with a forward (long leg) transaction. These transactions account for nearly a third of daily foreign exchange operations. They would be taxed twice, which represents an unwarranted penalization since for the most part these are operations designed to optimize cash balances across an array of currencies.

Over-taxation would be further amplified in the case of options, even if the amounts involved are smaller (average daily transactions generate USD 60 billion in premiums). For the seller of a currency option, managing it over its lifetime implies a continuous stream of spot transactions on a fraction of the underlying amount.

### *Risks of technical evasion*

The tax can be circumvented by:

- The use of derivative products, for example by synthetically reconstituting a spot currency position by combining a loan and two options transactions (a call and a put).
- By swapping liquid securities denominated in the two currencies, in place of the currencies themselves.

However, these operations are more expensive and riskier than the straight transaction and would probably not be worthwhile if the tax rate were set sufficiently low.

### *An uncertain economic impact*

The tax would probably fall entirely on end-customers, i.e. corporations with international operations and fund and asset managers engaged in reallocating portfolios internationally including hedge funds, which can occasionally play an important role in foreign exchange markets. The tax may be seen as an indirect means of reaching an elastic and highly mobile base; it would also penalize international portfolio diversification, with little economic justification.

It would furthermore penalize those countries with very open markets, whose volume of foreign exchange transactions relative to GNP is fairly high.

### ***A general tax on securities transactions***

If the aim is to tax all financial transactions, totally eliminate discrimination at the expense of international flows and, more generally, minimize resulting economic distortions, it may be worthwhile examining the possibility of taxing all securities transactions in the developed countries' markets (listed shares and bonds, including government securities if appropriate):

- These are very broad, dynamic markets, although their structures vary from country to country. Except in the United States, equity markets are organized along

centralized quotation lines, whereas bonds are bought and sold over the counter through market makers<sup>43</sup>;

- Many countries, including those where the major financial centers are located, tax security transactions, thereby raising substantial revenues. However, none of them currently taxes bond transactions. There is a trend towards a reduction in tax rates or a suppression of taxes themselves, although it is not clear whether governments are acting out of a concern for market efficiency or in response to the pressures of international competition;
- Revenues are potentially high. Daily transactions on global equity markets amount to USD 210 billion. Based on French data, the figure for bond transactions may be estimated (subject to verification) at four times that amount. Using these bases, annual revenues of USD 10 billion correspond to a (tiny) rate of 0.005% (or one half of a basis point);
- However, this rate would have to be modulated according to the nature and function of each instrument and each market. For some of these (government securities, notably), transaction costs are lower still, and taxation even at this rate would seriously penalize market liquidity. For others, a higher rate of taxation could be feasible;
- Some instruments would have to be exempted, especially those used as vehicles for monetary policy operations;
- As with foreign exchange transactions, market making activities, which take place at practically no cost, should be exempted from taxation;
- Market making activities, and more generally the transactions themselves, are very easy to delocalise, which would call for a very broad application of a tax covering all major financial centres.

There ought to be no major technical difficulty in levying such taxes. In all of the developed markets, securities are held by a limited number of custodial institutions, and settlement generally takes place through specialized systems.

## ***Environmental taxes***

### *General considerations*

Environmental taxes are economically rational. Contrary to other taxes, they do not create additional distortions, but rather contribute to the elimination of existing ones. They act as an incentive for economic agents to adopt behaviors conducive to sustainable development by changing their consumption patterns and adapting their technologies.

To a large extent, environmental problems demand global solutions. Environmental taxes could therefore be an excellent starting point for a worldwide taxation system.

This is the rationale behind proposals for the introduction of a global tax on carbon emissions:

- Carbon emissions are the main factor responsible for the greenhouse effect which contribute to global warming. The concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has increased very rapidly since 1950 and it now exceeds the level reached at any time since the dawn of humanity. Furthermore, the surface temperature of the earth has increased over the course of the 20th century. Many of the countries, which are worst affected by this phenomenon, are among the poorest and least privileged.
- These emissions are diffuse, caused by a wide range of human activities (heating, transportation, electricity production, etc.) and affecting a great many individuals. In this situation, taxation would be the most effective instrument relative to other forms of intervention, e.g. regulatory standards.
- By nature, the greenhouse effect is a global phenomenon, and the limitations of national policies are quickly apparent.
- Finally, a global carbon tax could generate substantial revenues. If the rate were set at a level, which would fully compensate for the economic cost of the greenhouse effect (at least USD 100 per ton of carbon equivalent), this tax alone would suffice to close the Millennium Development Goal funding gap. Even a much lower rate (around

USD 10 per ton) would still make a considerable contribution of between USD 10 and 20 billion annually.

In the long term, the issue of a carbon tax will certainly take centre stage in the international taxation agenda.

The outlook is less certain for the foreseeable future, though:

- There is debate within the international community on the suitability of taxes in relation to other instruments, and in particular tradable emissions permits.
- Another approach is currently guiding international cooperation in tackling the greenhouse effect: the Kyoto protocol, which entails commitments to cap emissions backed, in some countries, by a system of tradable permits.
- A carbon tax would have major redistributive effects between activities and countries. Its introduction would therefore necessitate an international agreement on the evaluation, administration and offsetting of these effects, where appropriate. Any such agreement would presuppose a common vision of equity in the apportionment of efforts and rights, which is why reaching it would be a lengthy and difficult process. Indeed developing countries are exempted from obligations under the Kyoto protocol. It is possible, in such circumstances, that a large proportion, if not the entire proceeds of the tax would be used to compensate the “losers” in this arrangement<sup>44</sup>.

In light of the above, one cannot expect a general carbon tax to produce a significant contribution to development funding in the short term. Even if such a tax were to be implemented, proceeds may be needed to finance actions more directly linked to the reduction of the greenhouse effect, as part of a comprehensive policy involving an array of instruments (including regulations and emissions permits).

This is not to say that international environmental taxation should be ruled out: it could play an immediate role, but one, which would be strictly confined to those areas not covered by the Kyoto protocol.

In this respect, transport deserves special consideration. Certain modes of transportation—road and rail—pay general and specific taxes on their fuel consumption in all countries, part

of which at least are specially designed to internalize negative effects on the environment; their emissions are included in the Kyoto emissions quotas. But the aviation and shipping sectors are totally exempt and unaffected by Kyoto. This exemption appears to flow from the acknowledged “international” character of these activities, which operate to a large extent in areas beyond the reach of national sovereignty. This does not mean however, that it is technically impossible to envisage some form of taxation. This deserves particularly close consideration, given that environmental damage caused by aviation and shipping is far from negligible.

### ***Air transport***

Civil aviation has experienced a long period of rapid expansion. Global traffic has grown by 8% annually since 1960, in value terms, and its volume is forecast to grow by 5% between now and 2015 (on a median assumption). The growth in intercontinental flights is especially pronounced; in recent years this growth has been concentrated primarily on the first and business class passenger segment, which represents two-thirds of airline revenues, on average.

This very positive overall trend is accompanied by sharp annual volatility in activity and profits. Since 2001, the sector has been experiencing a cyclical downturn with significantly reduced earnings; the best-performing players achieved an operating margin of less than 1% in 2003.

Yet, air transportation is the source of significant environmental damage: local pollution in the form of polluting gases and noise pollution in the vicinity of airports, and global pollution in the form of greenhouse gas emissions (chiefly carbon dioxide). These forms of pollution have a high social cost, estimated at 32 billion euros a year for the European Union alone.

Several countries have introduced low taxes, which partially compensate for local pollution. Where global pollution is concerned, however, aviation falls outside the Kyoto protocol, and indeed bilateral agreements between states on air transport explicitly prohibit the taxation of jet fuel.

In many countries this exemption extends to domestic transport as well. Incidentally, it confers a substantial competitive advantage on air transportation relative to other modes of transportation, given the share of fuel costs in the total cost of air transport. This advantage

is greater still within the European Union, where air transportation carries lower VAT rates than rail or road. The scale of these advantages has led the German rail operator to file a complaint before the European Communities' Court of First Instance against the indirect tax regime enjoyed by the airlines.

There are three possible ways to tax aviation-related pollution:

- A tax on kerosene consumed. This tax would be paid in the country of supply. There are several advantages to this approach: it hits the polluting factor directly, and the tax base is readily captured since sales of kerosene are regulated and necessarily occur within the airport precinct. However, there is an important legal obstacle, namely the bilateral agreements prohibiting this taxation. A multilateral treaty would need to be signed within the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO);
- Taxing the use of air corridors, using a method of calculation representative of the kerosene consumed during passage through a given corridor. This could be supplementary to the route fees, which airlines currently pay to the air space administration bodies, and could therefore be collected by the same procedure, with no particular difficulty. The charge/levy would be calculated in proportion to the aircraft's emissions.
- Finally, direct taxation of tickets, which would permit discrimination between passengers and, where appropriate, destinations, so as to avoid penalizing tourism to developing countries.

Each of these possibilities can be viewed from either a global or regional perspective, with unequal though limited possibilities of evasion in the latter case, depending on the option chosen.

Estimates of the yield of such a tax in the first two cases run at around USD 10 billion for a tax applied worldwide and internalizing roughly a third of the external cost of emissions (as a rough guide, this would add nearly 20% to the cost of kerosene). The average price of a ticket would rise by approximately 2.5% on this assumption.

In the third instance, a 5% tax on first and business class tickets would yield approximately USD 8 billion.

Airlines have little room for maneuver to reduce their fuel consumption per unit, in the short run; as a consequence, the entire burden of the tax would fall on operating costs. In the longer run, the tax would lead airlines to switch to less polluting aircraft.

Nonetheless, the current difficulties of the global airline industry may argue against creating a tax in the short term.

### ***A tax on shipping***

International shipping is the primary means of transport for world trade (80% of total trade, in real terms, uses shipping). This sector's growth is in line with the expansion of trade (+4% annually, in real terms, between 1990 and 2001, and +5% forecast for the period 2005-2010). The bulk of this traffic either originates from or is bound for OECD countries. Yet ships registered in OECD countries account for only a minority of the world's fleet (a little under a third), which has progressively become concentrated in the so-called "open shipping register" countries since the 1970s.

### ***Pollution caused by shipping***

Shipping causes two kinds of pollution, each of which could be subject to taxation for corrective purposes:

- Greenhouse gas emissions and emissions of pollutants that contribute to acid rain in the vicinity of the place of combustion. These emissions are growing at a rate comparable to the rate of growth in shipping: improved energy efficiency in ship design and propulsion systems have been offset by distortions in traffic patterns, where container ships and roll-on roll-off vessels, which cruise at faster speeds and therefore consume more fuel, form the fastest-growing segment. Even if, contrary to the aviation sector, there is no international norm (except in the European Union) to prevent such taxation, no country has undertaken taxing these emissions. Moreover, emissions produced by international shipping are excluded from the national quotas established by the Kyoto protocol;
- The spreading of pollutants in the marine environment and on the shoreline, i.e. oil spills. This concerns two segments of the shipping sector, mainly, the bulk liquid

segment (for oil and hazardous chemicals), and container traffic (for industrial products dangerous to humans or the environment). 10,000 oil spills have been recorded in the past 40 years. Not all of these incidents are of equal gravity. 85% concern leaks of less than 7 tons, which do considerable damage but have little impact on opinion; they furthermore, mobilize little in the way of cleanup resources, especially when they occur in developing countries. On the other hand, a small number of large-scale spills prompt a sharp surge in awareness, leading to changes in regulations and in insurance conditions for international shipping.

Over long periods, the frequency and scale of incidents described as “important” (i.e. spills of more than 7 tons) has tended to decline. The significant increase in traffic since the end of the 1980s has gone hand in hand with a drop in the incidence of oil spills, testifying partly at least to the efficacy of preventive measures which countries are taking. The decline should not be taken to mean that the problem is no longer a matter for concern: some 1.1 million tons of oil products have been spilled at sea since 1990. Nor have we seen the end of major spills, as witnessed by the *Erika* or *Prestige* disasters, further sharpening public sensitivity to the issue.

This sensitivity also stems from the heavy geographic concentration of spills in a small number of crowded shipping straits. More than a quarter of the spills recorded have occurred off the coasts of Europe, with a particularly high concentration off the Atlantic coast, the English Channel and the Baltic Sea (these three areas account for 18% of the world total); approximately 10% have occurred off the coasts of Japan and in the strait between South Korea and Japan. Taking only the major oil spills, the concentration around the European littoral is greater still, with 13 of the 20 major disasters since 1960 having occurred in this region.

The damage caused by hydrocarbon pollution varies depending on the accident and is not directly correlated to cargo size; nonetheless, it is always very extensive in the case of the largest accidents. The Exxon Valdez catastrophe caused damage worth USD 9 billion, and the Prestige nearly USD 1.1 billion.

*An appropriate tax could be devised for each of these two kinds of pollution*

- a tax on bunker fuel consumption is needed in order to correct the problem of greenhouse gas emissions. According to initial estimates, a 10% tax would yield around 1 billion dollars if applied worldwide. This is a good deal less than the rate

necessary to internalize this pollution. A tax to achieve this goal would imply a penalizing 150% increase in fuel prices and yield an estimated USD 20 billion.

Apart from the possibility of adjusting shipping speeds, the tax would be fully passed on to the sector's operating costs, in the short run. Given the intense competition between ship owners, this surcharge would not be fully passed on in freight rates, especially if its level were kept low. In addition, the absence of a more economical alternative to shipping for long and medium distances ought to limit the impact of the levy on volumes carried;

- To offset the risk of oil spills, a tax is needed whose level can vary according to the polluting nature of the cargo and how dangerous the vessel is (several parameters could be envisaged: obsolescence, state of repair, training of crew, etc.). Failing that, a charge could be levied whose sole purpose is to raise revenue, and could be legitimized by virtue of the negative image of this type of transport in the eyes of public opinion. In either case, the tax would be conceived as an additional contribution to the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC) paid by these same agents and on the same terms. The risks of evasion, if the charge were levied solely at the regional level, would be limited given the cost of the necessary transshipment operations in order to further transport products from the nearest port in a region not applying the tax to their final destination.

### *Possible tax mechanisms*

Corrective taxes on these two sources of pollution could be administered according to one of the following mechanisms.

The tax could be levied at the end of each journey by the port authorities, which already collect various fees from ship owners for the use of docking and unloading infrastructures.

Alternatively, the tax could transit through the International Oil Pollution Compensation fund (IOPC) mechanism, established in 1971. The IOPC, the result of an international agreement between 83 nations (except the United States), is a risk-pooling mechanism to which oil companies contribute by means of a fee proportional to the quantities of oil and gas they carry by sea; the resulting funds are used to indemnify oil spill victims. The levy rate, which is identical for all contributors, is fixed annually by the fund in light of compensation claims

received ; the amounts are paid directly into the fund by the oil companies without transiting via national budgets. Similarly, compensation for oil spill damage is paid directly by the fund, and is strictly limited by a global ceiling on compensation set by the IOPC for each individual disaster.

These taxes would weigh most heavily, or exclusively, on users of shipping and may be equated to taxes on international trade; in that sense they would penalize developing countries' integration into the global trade process. Exemption mechanisms could be envisaged based on the nationality of the merchandise or on the routes taken, but this raises considerable difficulties of principle (how to define the nationality of an item of merchandise, how to handle re-exports), and controlling them would be costly .

The tax would fall predominantly on the shipping sector in the OECD countries, which has been suffering structurally due to competition from countries with less stringent registration requirements. Even if the levy fell equally on the entire world fleet, this could still amplify the transfer of registrations from the OECD countries to those countries with more advantageous tax and regulatory regimes. In that sense, the tax might clash with the goal of improving the regulation of international shipping.

### ***An example of pricing planetary common goods: straits***

In many respects, the environment is a global “common good” of all inhabitants of our planet: it is a scarce resource; consumption cannot technically be restricted. This inevitably leads to over-exploitation and overcrowding. Other common goods exist already, or potentially, for which these problems also arise. Maritime straits offer a particularly telling example.

The right of way through maritime straits under international law makes these a legal “common good,” granting all commercial vessels the right of innocent passage through them regardless of flag or destination. Coastal states are entitled (under supervision of the International Maritime Organization) to regulate navigation in a strait in order to improve the flow of traffic, but they may not impede the right of passage even temporarily. They are also prohibited from charging a fee for transit through the seaway<sup>45</sup>.

International sea traffic accounts for three quarters of world trade in terms of volume, and its smooth flow depends primarily on navigation conditions in a small number of very busy straits. These include the Strait of Dover, the world's foremost shipping channel with 82,000 movements annually (225 daily), the Strait of Malacca, near Singapore, the world's second

busiest shipping channel with 75,000 movements annually (200 daily), the Sunda and Lombok Straits in the Indonesian archipelago, and the Straits of Gibraltar and Taiwan.

From an economic standpoint, straits can also be seen as common goods as their traffic grows, to the point where some are now overcrowded. This overcrowding can create several negative consequences:

First, for coastal states it diminishes the safety of shipping and forces them to invest in larger infrastructures to control and manage shipping. In certain straits, moreover, such as those in Southeast Asia, heavy traffic and slower navigation speeds are a breeding ground for piracy.

As for the users of these straits, it lengthens transit times through the channels concerned and can lead to costly queues.

One way to manage this overcrowding would be to charge a fee on commercial vessels passing through these straits. Because the right of transit is recognized as a common good, revenues could legitimately be appropriated by the international community.

The scale of fees could be set with reference to the gain derived from passing through the strait by comparison with the use of alternative, longer shipping routes. Partial estimates have already been established for certain straits. For the Strait of Dover, for example, a levy equal to one third of the economic gain from using this channel (for longitudinal traffic only) would yield approximately USD 1.1 billion annually. For the Malacca, Lombok and Sunda Straits, which are fairly close to each other, a one-third levy for oil tanker traffic bound for Japan would yield around USD 1.2 billion annually. A fee levied on all oil traffic would yield roughly three times that figure.

Other international common goods are also potentially subject to overcrowding, such as geostationary orbits and their associated radio frequencies. With the possible exception of certain particular positions, this overcrowding does not yet appear to be sufficiently intense to warrant charging a fee for their use. However, the absence of charging can lead to the use of economically irrational criteria for allocating orbits and frequencies, hence aggravating rivalry among operators instead of helping to resolve them (see box 10)

### ***A tax on arms sales***

World arms exports total USD 50 billion annually. These exports are frequently viewed as a politically and financially destabilizing factor in developing countries; first, they fuel conflicts, civil disorder and violence and second, because they are a burden on poor countries' national budgets to the detriment of other, more productive expenditures or ones essential to development.

Most international organizations would either like to see or simply recommend cuts in developing countries' military spending. The idea of taxing arms exports with a view to discouraging this spending has frequently been suggested. A 10% tax would yield 5 billion dollars.

This calls for two comments:

- It is unquestionably desirable that “unproductive” military spending be limited and controlled. However, many developing countries have no control over their geopolitical environment. The legitimate desire to introduce greater morality must allow for these countries' equally legitimate concern for their security, even in the absence of a national arms industry of their own;
- In terms of negative externalities, the main destabilizing effect, particularly in weak or failed states, comes less from the sale of heavy equipment than from the more or less legal channels through which small arms are purchased. An international tax would unlikely affect these flows; on the contrary, it could even encourage further opacity and clandestine dealings.

It is therefore worth examining the desirable extent and scope of application of an arms tax.

### *Universality as a precondition*

The structure of the tangible international arms trade is highly concentrated:

- On the export side, there are four major players, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Russia, which together accounted for more than 65% of export volumes over the period 1992–2001. Further, arms production is relatively concentrated within these countries, as witnessed by the case of the land forces weapons industries;
- On the import side, especially among developed and middle-income countries. A very high proportion of world trade takes place among developed countries. Among the remainder, ten middle-income countries accounted for 50% of imports over the period 1992–2001. Some countries are totally or partially excluded from world arms trade due either to embargos (arms export bans) or restrictive measures (recommendations against arms exports to these countries).

The scope for changing suppliers or diverting arms shipments is very high in this market structure. Consequently, it would be enough for one of the major exporters not to apply the tax for it to be robbed of its deterrent power and become totally ineffectual. It is essential, therefore, that all countries with strong arms export potential (including China, Israel and Ukraine) participate in this tax. This condition is all the more vital given that responsibility for collecting the tax would lie with the exporting governments themselves.

### *Taxing domestic purchases*

Once it has been decided to tax a presumably reprehensible form of expenditure (military hardware), the question arises: should the tax base be confined to exports alone? In the first instance, the burden would fall particularly heavily on countries that have no national defense industry and are therefore completely dependent on imports. This discrimination may be considered unjustified with respect to countries in tense geopolitical situations or a difficult strategic environment.

It may be fairer, and consistent with the moral aim of the tax, to base it on all military equipment purchases, including internal purchases within producer countries. The corresponding tax base would be much broader, with total arms spending amounting to nearly USD 200 billion annually.

Clearly, in such a situation producer countries would essentially be “taxing themselves.” However, this taxation represents a legitimate and moral basis for an additional contribution to development—at any rate at least as justifiable as asking developing countries themselves to finance this contribution.

### *Which equipments should be taxed?*

The tax base could be confined to tangible equipment to make the taxation more easily verifiable. Indeed, certain existing multilateral frameworks could serve this purpose. The UN Register of Conventional Arms obliges states to declare their exports, imports, deliveries of weapons to armed forces, and purchases relating to national production of certain categories of conventional weapons; the Wassenaar arrangement has 33 participating countries, and since 1999, requires the reporting of certain types of weapons.

However, intangibles represent an increasingly important aspect of arms transactions, e.g. manufacturing licenses (technology transfers), provision of services (training and maintenance), equipment or services supplied at no cost (at government discretion), or offsetting arrangements. These intangibles are less easy to control and their volume is, essentially, unknown. Their inclusion in the tax base would pose serious problems of verification.

### ***A tax surcharge on corporate profits***

#### *Objective*

If preference is given to using an existing tax base, then the option of an additional tax on the profits of major international corporations should be considered. The number and size of international corporations is increasing: in 1990, there were 37,000 multinationals with 175,000 subsidiaries, while in 2003, there were 64,000 multinationals with 870,000 subsidiaries.

The profits of these international corporations depend heavily on globalization and the opening up of economies, thereby justifying their contribution to financing development. Moreover, these corporations may be presumed to be paying less tax inasmuch as they are able to optimize their tax liability through intra-group transfer pricing (depending on the source, intra-group trade accounts for 60 to 70% of world trade). In Italy, for example, while the nominal corporate tax rate is 36%, the actual tax yield on large corporations is equivalent to 11% of reported profits.

### *Modalities*

The introduction of such a tax would require a more precise definition of an international corporation. One criterion could be the number of countries in which a corporation is present; but this carries the risk of introducing a threshold effect, which would need to be applied flexibly.

The tax would be levied exclusively on the parent company in order to avoid double taxation.

### *Advantages*

The main advantage of a surcharge on the corporate income tax paid by large international corporations is that it would be levied on an existing tax. There are precedents for corporate income tax surcharges; they have been imposed in Germany (to pay for reunification and for the 2002 floods), and in France (in 1995, still partially applicable, and on large corporations in 1997). Further, they would not complicate the task of administering the tax.

Finally, such a tax could yield substantial revenues even at a low rate, if one considers that total annual corporate income tax revenues amount to approximately 850 billion euros.

### *Observations*

A surcharge on the corporate income tax paid by large international corporations raises a number of questions:

- Concerning its incidence; although opinions differ, many consider that in an open economy the burden of a tax on profits would ultimately fall on wages;
- The use of existing tax bases compounds existing distortions and differences between national tax systems (the size of the corporate income tax base varies by a ratio of one to four among the major EU countries);
- If the tax is applied regionally, there is a high risk of either physical delocalisation or a delocalisation of profits.

Professor Wachtel has proposed a variant whereby a flat-rate tax would be applied in the parent company's country to a) book, b) global, and c) consolidated profits, after deduction of tax paid in the different countries.

A tax based on book profit would eliminate evasion by definition, as well as distortions caused by the different countries' tax bases. This would represent a major change, whose difficulties should not be underestimated. The proposal is tantamount to harmonizing corporate taxation, a controversial issue in Europe (see box 11).

## **Combating tax evasion**

It is important to ensure that any new tax instruments introduced with the aim of increasing funds available for development contain no obvious loopholes that would encourage tax evasion. This affects the range of possibilities and choices. Also, if internationally coordinated instruments are put in place, it is important to ensure that they are properly administered and controlled by the countries responsible for them, so as not to drain the new contributions of their purpose.

Moreover, tax evasion particularly affects developing countries. And yet rebuilding these countries' tax bases is essential to their development. It would be logical, therefore, to step up efforts being made by these countries in this sphere (frequently with assistance from the European Union or the IMF), not as a counterpart, but as an accompaniment to new ways and means to be put in place.

In addition, tax evasion frequently involves offshore financial centres, as concealment seeks the protection of systems combining zero or low taxation with banking secrecy.

The financial sector in these countries conducts the bulk of its business with non-residents, the volume of external claims and commitments being out of all proportion to the financial intermediation needs of the domestic economy; further, most transactions made or recorded by the financial sector originate elsewhere. These characteristics are not exclusive to offshore financial centers. In particular, tax affairs are covered by banking secrecy in many countries, to varying degrees, notably in Europe (cf. Switzerland, Luxembourg, Belgium and Austria) and Asia (Singapore).

There is an international consensus in favour of combating tax evasion and lack of transparency in financial transactions. Several multilateral exercises have been carried out in this sphere (see box 12).

- The OECD exercise in tackling harmful tax competition launched in 1998. The OECD published a list of 36 jurisdictions in 2000, calling on them to commit to signing agreements to exchange tax and bank information with the OECD member states. Only 5 jurisdictions: Andorra, Liechtenstein, Liberia, Monaco and the Marshall Islands, had failed to produce a commitment to exchange information and remained uncooperative as of March 22, 2004; none of the jurisdictions that has thus far committed has yet exchanged any information; bilateral agreements are under negotiation and the deadline for exchanges on cases where there is no prima facie evidence of fraudulent intent is set for 2006;
- The OECD Financial Action Task Force on money laundering (FATF) has defined 25 criteria with respect to money laundering and in 2000, identified 23 countries that did not respect them. On January 1, 2004 the list comprised only 5 countries, namely: Guatemala, Philippines, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Myanmar;
- The G7 financial Stability Forum, comprising representatives of governments and financial regulators, has adopted a set of financial risk criteria leading to the identification of 42 offshore financial centers. Of these, 28 were classified “Group III” by virtue of their level of supervision and their legal infrastructure.

The commitment displayed, particularly by the G7 and G20 countries, is inseparable from the objective of improving development funding. While distinct, these undertakings have in common the aim of correcting the excesses or negative effects of globalization.

The difficulty lies in the fact that we are dealing here with a “weakest link”-type problem, where the outcome depends on the effort made (or accepted) by the least dynamic link in the chain, in other words, the least cooperative country. In this context, there is frequently only a very weak connection between results obtained and the scale of efforts made.

Countries engaged in this process must plan for one final option in case existing efforts fail to bear fruit. This last resort should not be an instrument of deterrence or reprisal, but should rather reflect the realization that, if the main financial centers are unwilling to play their part and shoulder their responsibilities in a globalized economy, then there would be grounds for adopting a different attitude. Alternative action could comprise a range of regulatory frameworks regarding capital flows, and adjustments to tax legislation aimed at putting pressure on transactions with these financial centers.

Another approach might be to levy a tax to internalize the effects of bank secrecy on the tax bases of the developed and developing countries. Countries that practice bank secrecy necessarily maintain financial relations with the rest of the world, thereby providing opportunities for levying a tax.

This levy could be based on monetary flows in the direction of countries that permit bank secrecy. It could even be based on the liabilities of banks in countries that do not practice bank secrecy toward the residents and banks of countries that do permit it, since in all likelihood these balances are owned or controlled by residents of countries that permit bank secrecy. The tax would necessarily have to be applied by all countries that do not practice bank secrecy.

## **Other instruments**

## ***Special drawing rights***

Special drawing rights (SDRs) are created by means of “allocations” decided by an 85% majority. SDRs can be used for payments between Central Banks, by transfer from one account to another within the IMF’s specialized department; this makes them monetary reserve assets.

Using SDRs to fund development is an old idea. Many developing countries, especially some of the poorest, have balances of payment that are structurally in deficit, and their borrowing capacity is either limited or saturated. SDR allocations would allow them to loosen this external constraint and, all things being equal, to finance faster growth. More simply, SDRs may be seen as a “free” financial resource whose creation is controlled by the international community, a portion of which could legitimately be allocated to the poorest countries.

All proposals are based on one or the other of two mechanisms: either a special allocation reserved for developing countries, or a general allocation, with developed countries transferring all or part of their SDR allocations to developing countries. The first formula—a special allocation—would call for an amendment to the Articles of the IMF and would probably be cumbersome and complicated. Consequently attention for several years now has focused on the second mechanism—a general allocation.

There is a great deal of opposition to the idea. Some of this stems from countries traditionally unenthusiastic about SDRs, considering them—independently of how they are utilized—to be redundant or dangerous at a time when capital markets provide sufficient international liquidity (albeit not uniformly so). Others argue that the need to obtain parliamentary approval, or even ratification, represents an insurmountable obstacle.

Beyond these, two fundamental objections warrant consideration.

First of all, SDRs are not really a “free” resource. Countries pay, or receive, interest on their SDR debit or credit positions with the IMF. By transferring the SDRs eventually allocated to them, developed countries would be liable for an additional interest charge (or a revenue shortfall). If the purpose is to make interest-free loans to poor countries, it might be preferable to consider other, more suitable and more transparent, instruments and procedures.

Second, SDRs are not ideally suited to fighting poverty. They are not a budgetary resource. They cannot be used for domestic operating expenditures, those necessary for human development.

These arguments are valid, but they are surely incomplete. What poor countries need is the assurance that they will be able to satisfy their external financing requirements in normal conditions (and provided their economic policies are sound ). These countries are among those most exposed to external shocks, notably by virtue of their dependence on commodities and staple products. SDRs remain an appropriate instrument for the purpose of setting up multilateral mechanisms to assist developing countries in coping with these shocks and better withstand the impact on their balance of payments. Despite these difficulties, then, it would be preferable for the international community to continue paying this instrument the attention it deserves.

### ***a global lottery***<sup>46</sup>

In most countries (and notably in all OECD countries except for the UK), lotteries are heavily regulated. Operators are required to hand over a substantial proportion of their revenues to the state or to causes deemed to be in the general interest, in exchange for their license to operate. In France, for example, 26% of the stakes go to the state, while in the United States 30% goes to general interest causes.

Here, the system envisaged would entail establishing a special purpose global lottery, with the portion of revenues normally going to general interest causes instead being allocated to financing official development assistance.

A variant on this proposal might be to supplement this international lottery with additional lotteries assigned to specific causes such as HIV/AIDS, education, etc., so as to align the solidarity offered as closely as possible with individual preferences.

Lotteries are subject to prior authorization, and in most countries are governed by a system of monopoly or oligopoly concessions.

A global lottery could be instituted in one of two ways:

- either by working through the established operators in each country, i.e. by organizing the global lottery as a coordination of national ones; this system corresponds to the

one used recently when setting up the European lottery, which works on the “additional” principle, with pooled stakes and harmonized prizes;

- or by creating a single global operator, with each country licensing it to operate in that country. This approach however, would be more cumbersome to implement.

In addition, it would be necessary, in designing a global lottery, to allow for purchasing power differentials between countries, with resulting differences in the ticket price and of course prizes. These differentials suggest that it would more appropriate to delegate management to national lotteries.

There is little evidence, judging from past experience with lotteries, which directly support general interest causes, that announcing that part of the revenues would go to funding ODA will attract a substantial number of new players or give this lottery a substantial competitive advantage over existing ones. Hence , the relationship between yield and redistributive effect is particularly uncertain.

To begin with, surveys of people’s behaviour in different income categories vis-à-vis games of chance show that low-income groups make up a larger proportion of the lottery clientele. If the principle of a global lottery to fund development failed to alter the clientele for this kind of gambling, then—from a domestic standpoint in each country—this type of mechanism could prove to be a regressive form of ODA financing.

Moreover, from an international perspective, the current lottery market breakdown (82% in Europe and North America) suggests that the great majority of revenues from a global lottery to finance development would come from the OECD countries. Governments and general interest causes in these countries which currently benefit from these revenues might lose out, gradually being supplanted by the international lottery. Seen from this perspective, the global lottery would merely serve as a vehicle for additional budgetary transfers to developing countries.

## **CONCLUSION: *The way forward***

The creation of a global tax is more a political than an economic or technical issue. Similarly, the potential obstacles are more political in nature and are on par with the revolution such a tax would create.

Globalization is not a one-way street. The spontaneous emergence of a system of negotiated and coordinated global governance is unlikely. The present favourable momentum notwithstanding, any plan for a large-scale international tax would face massive opposition. Devising a strategy for implementing a global tax mechanism therefore requires managing the constraints and opportunities of the present situation.

Certain types of global taxes, such as financial or environmental taxes, could potentially benefit vast swathes of the world population. At the same time, in certain scenarios, the costs could in large measure be borne by a small number of operators or sectors of the economy. This situation is well known to political scientists, which explains why some policies fail to materialize, even though they create a public good. The choice of tax or taxes should seek therefore to avoid too great a concentration of contributors.

A number of recommendations may help to ensure that tax proposals do not immediately become bogged down in conflicts of interest :

- A global tax should preferably be used to finance an action whose benefits will not be excessively dispersed, making it easier to mobilize beneficiaries in its favor. One suggestion might be to give priority to sections of the population that could readily identify themselves as potential beneficiaries (young people, people suffering from a disease, etc.);
- It would also be desirable to opt for a tax whose costs are widely spread, thereby mitigating as far as possible the (inevitable) opposition. This points to a broad-based tax on private individuals, businesses, etc.

Which tax should one choose? Which action should one finance? And by what mechanisms should it be administered? This three-pronged design needs to be guided by a range of considerations:

- *Maximum impact and visibility.* The action financed must be visible and effective, and rapidly so, if we want to impart credibility to broader tax projects in the medium term. Resources should be concentrated on a small number of objectives, which should be defined by indisputable, easily measured quantitative indicators.
- *Maximum legitimacy.* This principle would favour focusing on a “grande cause” that everyone would naturally recognize as legitimate, ethically indisputable and backed by very strong economic rationale.
- *Unquestionable equity.* This consideration primarily concerns the choice of an international tax. For maximum legitimacy, the tax chosen should clearly signal solidarity between North and South, between developed and developing countries, or even directly between rich and poor. Very close attention should be paid to possible unwanted redistributive side effects of the tax.
- *Absolute transparency.* This refers to the need for a mode of governance of these funds that is indisputable in the eyes of both beneficiary governments and their populations, and of observers in the international community.
- *Economic efficiency.* Given the political opposition and prejudice, whichever tax is chosen must be economically flawless, to avoid the criticism that it impedes on economic growth. With that in mind, the exercise should favour either broad-based taxes permitting a low rate and thus creating few distortions, or taxes designed to correct existing distortions<sup>47</sup>.

Furthermore, there is a need to forge a civil and political momentum, aimed at building enduring coalitions. It is worth noting in this respect, that successful campaigns to mobilize public opinion often depend on the breadth and innovative character of the visions they project. This should serve as a reminder not to jettison major taxation ambitions in the name of short-term political realism. The best strategy is not to eschew grand visions, but rather to move toward them step by step.

# BOXES



## BOX NO. 1: INTERNATIONAL TAXATION AND GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS

Can global public goods provide a rationale and a justification for the creation of global taxes?

Public goods are both non-rival and non excludable.

Non-rivality means that consumption by one person does not reduce the quantities available to other individuals. A public good is available in equal measure to all consumers. Because of non-rivality, there is no incentive for anyone to voluntarily contribute to the production of a public good. All consumers will try and free ride on someone else contribution. In turn, free riding leads to underproduction of the public good.

Non-excludability occurs when it is technically impossible to prevent consumption by any individual. Because of non-excludability, it is impossible to charge a price for the use of a public good. Thus, the public good has to be publicly financed, i.e. directly or indirectly through a compulsory charge or tax.

Global public goods are those whose benefits extend beyond the borders of a single country (clean air, basic knowledge). Free riding may be especially pervasive in this case: for any single country, the costs of producing such goods are prohibitive and seldom matched by the benefits that the country would derive from its effort.

Consequently, global public goods have to be publicly financed. Whether this is best done through global taxes or other mechanisms, such as "traditional" ODA for those goods essential to developing countries, is a complex issue. It all depends on how the good is produced, its "technology".

- *With an aggregation technology*, output of the good is determined by a summation of all actions undertaken by individual countries. Examples would include the reduction of river pollution or the fight against global warming. Efficient production of such a good is dependant on appropriate policies being implemented in all countries. Traditional ODA, if necessary backed by conditionality, would appear to be the most appropriate financing for poor countries.
- *With a "weak link" technology*, the result (or output) is determined by the smallest of all individual contributions. The standard example is the eradication of a contagious disease, where failure to eradicate in one single country invalidates all actions undertaken elsewhere. Here again, decentralized and conditional financing- as provided by ODA- may be the most efficient approach.
- Finally, production of a public good may demand a *massive and concentrated effort( best shot technology)*: the output depends on the largest individual contribution. Production (though not necessarily dissemination) of new pharmaceutical drugs belongs to this category: In this case, it is optimal to allocate all the resources to the most efficient producer(s). If many countries are called to contribute, a global tax mechanism may be appropriate, and necessary to avoid free riding.

Funding through taxation may be most appropriate when production (a) extends over a long period of time, and (b) entails a risk, as is the case for research, especially medical and pharmaceutical research.

Research can be privately financed when intellectual property regimes ensure adequate rewards for innovation. For those medicines specifically necessary to the poorest countries, however, this might not be the case. Private demand is too financially constrained to make research and production profitable. Furthermore, patents regimes have been attacked as being unfair and regressive. Thus, there might be no alternative to publicly funding research on a great many pathologies prevalent in poor countries.

## BOX no. 2 PRIVATE DONATIONS TO DEVELOPMENT

### ❶ facts and figures

total private donations in the United States (including foundations): 220 billion US dollars (183 billion euros), of which 40% to churches and 3% to international aid.

- total private donations in France: 2 billion euros, of which 10% to international aid; donations to international aid are growing faster than GDP (+45% between 1991 and 2000).
- there are wide disparities in private donations to developing countries. The table below compares average per capita giving with per capita income in a sample of OECD countries.

	Ger.	Bel.	Sp.	Fr.	Ita.	Net h.	Swi tz.	UK	US
average donation to development / (GDP per capita) * 1,000	46	9.2	8.1	22	5.6	44	42	22	53

### ❷ Support for development aid

- *Support for development aid in principle*: 92% in Germany, 79% in the United States, 78% in the United Kingdom, 74% in France and Japan.
- *Support for an increase in ODA*: 83% in Germany, 81% in the United States, 72% in the United Kingdom, 68% in Japan, and 96% in France.

### ❸ Broad trends in France

- Total giving (for all causes) increases with age, both as a proportion of donors (56% of people aged over 65 give, versus 36% of those aged under 25) and by amount given.
- Relative generosity declines with rising income: the least well off (€6,100/€7,600 €) give an average of 2.05%, whereas the wealthiest (+€76,000) give 0.85%.
- International development does not rank high among the causes French people are prepared to support financially. With 24% of people willing to support international development, it comes after medical research 70%, protecting children's rights, and combating poverty and exclusion in France (46% each).
- Nevertheless, 47% of French people want the target of 0.5% of GDP in 2007 to be respected, and 37% would like it to be raised.

- Among institutions, the UN is most trusted, (69% want it to play a leading role in development), followed by the EU (61%), the NGOs (57%), the French government (52%), the anti-globalisation movements (42%), and the IFIs (32%).

**BOX no. 3: OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA): KEY FACTS AND FIGURES**

**① An assessment of the needs**

- Net official development aid totalled USD 68.5 billion in 2003. An estimated additional USD 50 billion of ODA per year is required to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
- By way of comparison, global economic growth spontaneously generates annual incremental wealth of between USD 800 and 1,000 billion. Consequently the effort required is equivalent to around 3 weeks of additional global growth.

**② Current ODA trends<sup>1</sup>**

- Net ODA has been rising since 2001.
- It increased by USD 6 billion in 2002, including 3 billion in debt cancellation, 1 billion in additional aid for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and 2 billion in additional flows to the developing countries.
- The sharp growth registered in 2003 (+USD 10.5 billion) was largely (8 billion) due to the dollar's decline against the euro, the yen and the UK pound, the currencies in which payments by non-US donors are denominated, as well as to contributions to the reconstruction of Iraq (2 billion).
- Actual cash transfers only amount to USD 35.3 billions in 2002 (61% of the total ODA), the remainder consisting of:
  - 15.5 billion in technical cooperation,
  - 4.5 billion in debt relief,
  - 3 billion in administrative costs.
- These cash transfers have only been growing since 1998 at half the rate of total ODA:

In USD billion	1998	2001	2002	98-03 change
Financial transfers proper	33	33	35	+6%
Net ODA	52	52	58	+ 12%

<sup>1</sup> Sources: OECD/DAC Statistics, "Global Development Finance 2004: Harnessing Cyclical Gains for Development," World Bank, 2004.

**❶ The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria**

- UNAIDS estimates<sup>2</sup> that USD 12 billion will be needed in order to tackle AIDS in low and middle-income countries in 2005, USD 16 billion in 2006, and USD 20 billion in 2007.
- The Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was set up in 2001 to meet this challenge. By January 1, 2004, the Fund had received pledges of USD 4.9 billion, and had actually collected USD 2.1 billion. Disbursements have thus far amounted to USD 285 million in the two years following the Fund's creation<sup>3</sup>.

**❷ The Education for All Fast Track Initiative**

- An estimated annual USD 3.7 billion is required in order to achieve universal primary education, of which 2 billion for sub-Saharan Africa<sup>4</sup>.
- The World Bank Development Committee launched the Fast Track Initiative in April 2002. This is not a specialized fund but a donors' coordinating mechanism. Eighteen countries have been declared eligible for the mechanism based on general economic criteria, and ten of these<sup>5</sup> have effectively submitted programs. These countries' annual financing needs (excluding three of them<sup>6</sup>) are estimated at USD 510 million. At December 31, 2003, donors had pledged a total of USD 170 million, of which USD 6 million have actually been spent<sup>7</sup>.

**❸ The Vaccine Fund**

- The Vaccine Fund was set up to finance access to vaccination in the 75 poorest countries in the world (per capita GDP < 1,000 US dollars). An estimated USD 400 million a year is required until 2006. The development of new vaccines is expected to increase the needs significantly thereafter, up to USD 1 billion annually as from 2011.
- The Fund was set up in 1999 and began operating in 2000. Since then, it has collected pledges totalling USD 1.3 billion, including 750 million from the Bill and

---

<sup>2</sup> UNAIDS, *2004 Report*, 2004.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. interviews held by the mission with the Global Fund.

<sup>4</sup> IMF/World Bank Development Committee, *Global Monitoring Report: Policies and Actions for Achieving MDGs and Related Outcomes*, April 16, 2004.

<sup>5</sup> Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, and Yemen.

<sup>6</sup> Gambia, Mozambique and Yemen.

<sup>7</sup> IMF/World Bank Development Committee, *op. cit.*

Melinda Gates Foundation. The Vaccine Fund had disbursed a total of USD 500 million by the end of 2003.

## **BOX no. 5: HOW VOLATILE IS ODA?**

### **Volatility of aid flows**

Several recent studies have highlighted the volatility of official aid flows received by the developing countries. They show that:

- For developing countries, aid flows are more volatile than tax revenues. The results are summarized below:

<b>Ratio of variance of aid to that of tax revenues</b>		
	countries for which aid accounts for less than 50% of public revenues	countries for which aid accounts for more than 50% of public revenues
aid and revenues as % of GNP	4.96	7.42
aid and revenues in dollars per capita	1.73	3.00

- Program aid tends to be more volatile than project aid.
- Volatility increases with a country's dependence on foreign aid, (volatility rises from 50 to 75% when the ratio of aid to tax revenues crosses the 50% threshold).
- Aid tends to be (slightly) pro-cyclical: it rises (or falls) with economic activity, amplifying rather than attenuating fluctuations. This is especially true for grants and technical assistance.

### **Unpredictability of aid flows**

Aid is also unpredictable:

- On average, actual disbursements amount to roughly 80 % of commitments ( 65% only for program aid and 90% for project aid). In a sample of 71 countries studied, only 18 had received amounts in excess, on average, of what had been promised.
- There may be temporary sharp increases in commitments, which are then not followed up by actual disbursements. These can be explained by fluctuations in donors' sentiment, following, for instance, a change in the political environment (e.g. the Central African Republic following the demise of the Bokassa regime).
- Generally speaking, the statistical relationship between commitments and disbursements is very weak; and the poorer the country, the weaker the correlation.

What are the causes? The quality of recipients' macroeconomic policies is an important factor. But the studies also assign some responsibility to the fluctuations in donors' behaviour and the uncertainties resulting from their own fiscal constraints and decision-making processes.

[ Sources : [ a ] Bulir and Hamann : "How Volatile and Unpredictable Are Aid Flows and What Are the Policy Implications?", IMF Working Paper WP/01/167 (2001); [ b ] Bulir and Lane : "Aid and Fiscal Management", IMF Working Paper WP/02/112 (2002); [ c ] "Foster (Mick) : The Case for Increased Aid", Report to the Department for International Development; (UK). December 2003.]

**BOX NO. 6: INTERGENERATIONAL ISSUES IN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**

Is borrowing for ODA economically sound and ethically justified? In those countries (such as United Kingdom) where fiscal rules formally make a distinction between current expenditures and investment, ODA is treated as a current expenditure, which means it cannot be financed through borrowing.

Proposals for “innovative” forms of financing, such as the IFF and international taxation, cast the issue in a new light. One essential difference between these two instruments is their impact over time. The IFF is based on borrowing and, as a consequence, the burden is ultimately borne by future generations of taxpayers, whereas, with international taxation, payments are made by existing generations.

Thus, the choice between those instruments raises important intergenerational issues, which are discussed in this box.

The rationale for borrowing is twofold: (1) to allow for a decoupling in time between fiscal payments made by donors and aid flows received by recipients; and (2) as a consequence, to make it easier to accelerate (frontload) aid disbursements to poor countries. We examine each of these aspects in turn.

(1) Time decoupling between donors' contributions and aid flowing to recipient countries:

- Taking the total amount of aid as given over a period of time, it makes economic sense to have different schedules for donor's contributions, on one hand, and payments to recipients, on the other<sup>8</sup>. There is no reason for those schedules to coincide optimally over time<sup>9</sup>. It also makes sense to use capital markets to make adjustments between those schedules, if total contributions and aid payments are actuarially equivalent<sup>10</sup>.
- This decoupling carries some risks, however, if future ODA flows are uncertain. Since borrowing will have to be repaid in any case, the risk is entirely borne by future aid flows to poor countries, i.e. by future generations of poor<sup>11</sup>. How important is this risk? ODA expenditures are projected to increase, but whether this will actually happen depends on several factors. Amongst them:

---

<sup>8</sup> Source : Schneider (Jean-Luc): “Du bon usage de l'IFF” mimeo; French Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry (2004).

<sup>9</sup> Formally, the optimum time profile for fiscal payments should be such that it equals the marginal rate of taxation for each year [ 3 ]; at the same time, the optimum timetable for transfers to beneficiaries should equal the marginal return on aid each year.

<sup>10</sup> Source : Schneider (Jean-Luc) : “Du bon usage de l'IFF,” op.cit.

<sup>11</sup> The logic behind the currently envisaged mechanisms consists in basing borrowing on future increases in ODA, i.e. in anticipating fulfillment of the 0.7%/GNP target. But if this increase fails to materialize, the operation would result in a steep drop in aid actually paid when the loan falls due for repayment, which would hit the poor at that time especially hard.

- The degree of financial constraints on donor countries' budgets. An easing seems unlikely. Most developed countries have high public debt/GDP ratios and will have to absorb the fiscal burden of aging populations. This will raise the opportunity cost of ODA.
- On the other hand, some public expenditures which, today, are seen as unavoidable and urgent (such as unemployment benefits) may decrease or disappear in the future, thereby leaving more room for ODA.
- Greater altruism in developed countries is possible in the future, which would allow for increased taxation for development. While this cannot be ruled out, it would be hazardous to build an innovative approach to development financing on this assumption alone.
- Finally, better public information in the developed countries, raising awareness of the difficulties facing the poor and of the more or less direct risks those difficulties pose for the welfare of developed countries' citizens.

(2) faster ODA disbursements.

Frontloading a given amount of ODA may be justified in three cases:

a / - if more value is attached to the welfare of today's poor than of tomorrow's poor,

This is the basis for discounting future costs and benefits when assessing the impact of any economic action. Is this methodology applicable to poverty reduction? The discount rate has two components, namely:

- a "pure" social time preference rate, which, for poverty reduction, cannot be given any objective value. Whether one puts more value on immediate, rather than future, poverty reduction is purely a matter of personal choice and cannot be rationalized.
- an economic component, resulting from the decreasing marginal utility of consumption. Since future generations will (on average) be richer, the argument goes, a smaller value should be attached to an incremental increase in their income. But, by definition, poverty is measured by reference to an *absolute* level of income. The poor to-morrow will be as poor as the poor today; so the marginal utility attached to an increase in their consumption should be the same.

In sum, the correct discount rate for calculating the benefits of poverty reduction is very low, possibly zero. To choose any other number would be to favour one generation over another, on purely subjective grounds. That choice would be all the more problematic that it would entail a geographic choice as well: the majority of today's poor are in Asia; in the future, they will mainly be in Africa.

B/ - if aid disbursed today is more efficient in reducing poverty than aid disbursed tomorrow

This might well prove true in some cases:

- Studies show the social return on aid—measured at the microeconomic level of projects—is very high (of the order of 20%); which suggests that a great many efficient projects are not currently being financed<sup>12</sup>.
- There may be increasing returns to ODA whereby aid disbursed today raises the efficiency (i.e. increases the return) of aid disbursed tomorrow. Human development may be a case in point.

But there is no certainty. It is also possible that absorption capacity increases with time. This is so, notably, if technical progress is “endogenous,” i.e. if the return on capital in the economy rises in line with per capita GDP. In that case, on the contrary, future aid will be more effective than today’s aid. Frontloading would lead to an economic loss since it would substitute less efficient investments today to more efficient ones tomorrow. If absorption capacity does increase over time, some analysts recommend a “reverse IFF” mechanism, whereby donors’ immediate contributions would be paid into trust funds, which would then be used to finance future transfers to the developing countries<sup>13</sup>.

c/ - if a decline in the number of poor reduces future aid requirements

The decline in the number of poor people by 2015 is a certainty. The MDGs will be achieved in a number of countries. Whether this will reduce aid requirements significantly is less certain. Residual poverty after that date may prove much harder-and more costly-to roll back.

### *Conclusion*

- There is no ethical nor economic justification for “choosing” between present and future generations of poor people, and hence for establishing mechanisms whose effect would not be to increase the overall impact of aid on poverty reduction, but solely to shift it over time.
- Consequently, frontloading ODA disbursements (and recourse to borrowing) can only be justified on the basis of increased efficiency. Frontloading must apply to expenditures generating high (and if possible rising) social returns, at any rate greater than the returns on expenditures made at a later date. More precisely, expenditures made today must have a greater overall impact on poverty across all generations than expenditures made tomorrow. This requirement calls in turn for precise definition of the expenditures eligible for this mechanism and of the conditions for its implementation. The other aid expenditures must be financed by the present generations. This distinction must be applied rigorously especially with regards to arguments such as : “all useful investments are an investment for the future,” which, if taken literally to justify frontloading, could reduce the overall efficiency of aid.
- Finally, on the same ethical grounds, future generations of the poor must be protected from the risk of a drying-up of aid resulting from the repayment of previously

---

<sup>12</sup> Source: Foster (Mick): “The case For Increased Aid” Report to the Department for International Development; (UK). December 2003 (Annex III).

<sup>13</sup> Source: Heller (Peter); Gupta (Sanjeev), “Challenges in Expanding Development Assistance” IMF Policy Discussion Paper 02/5 (2002).

contracted loans. And any such schemes should be designed with cast-iron guarantees on that score.

**BOX no. 7: THE VACCINE FUND AS AN EXAMPLE OF CONDITIONAL FUNDING MECHANISM FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT**

The Vaccine Fund has established an original system of governance for programs aimed at reconciling predictability of aid for beneficiary countries with effective oversight by the Fund of how resources are used.

The system is based on the following rules:

- The Vaccine Fund and recipients jointly define vaccination goals, establish a funding plan, and calculate resources to be supplied by the Fund in consequence. This planning adopts a five-year time frame during which the Fund pledges to supply the agreed assistance.
- Plans for each country and the level of contributions by the Fund are approved by an independent committee of experts which is also responsible, during the five-year period, for verifying compliance with the states' and the Fund's respective undertakings. The Fund commits to programs only if it is certain of being able to finance them.
- Recipients are free to utilize the funds provided at their discretion and are accountable to the Vaccine Fund and to the panel of experts solely for the results of their actions.
- Disbursements occur in two steps. Between a third and a half of the total amount is paid up-front; the balance is paid after completion of an intermediate verification of the receiving state's performance and that it has respected its undertakings.
- In some countries, government agencies have been deemed unfit to manage the programs financed by the Fund. The latter has therefore cut off their funding, redirecting resources to NGOs entrusted by it with carrying out the program in place of the government agencies.

## BOX NO. 8: THE DOUBLE DIVIDEND

There is a “double dividend” when a tax yields two benefits simultaneously, i.e. generates revenues and also eliminates economic distortions. A double dividend potentially arises whenever taxation serves to correct a market imperfection, especially in the environment.

There might be a double dividend in two different situations:

- When revenues are used to fund public expenditures, such as ODA. This definition is most commonly used in everyday language.
- When the proceeds serve to reduce or eliminate other more distorting taxes such as, for instance, social security levies. The overall revenue is unchanged, but there is a net gain in economic efficiency. This definition is found more commonly in the economic literature.

The existence of the double dividend is sometimes disputed. If the tax fully eliminates the distortion, it eliminates the tax base at the same time, thereby doing away with the revenue. If, conversely, it continues to generate substantial revenues, this means the tax has not succeeded in changing people’s behavior and eliminating the distortion.

The reality is more complex, however, and intermediate situations may occur. All depends on the price elasticity of demand for the good. With low (but not zero) elasticity, the tax will yield revenues without eliminating the tax base.

Elasticity may be low in the short run and higher in the longer run. In that case, the tax will generate revenues in a first stage, while acting as an incentive for changes in technology, choices and behaviors in the longer run. In that case, a strategy of progressively raising the tax rate can generate revenues in the short term while signaling a long-term need for adjustment. This could be an appropriate approach for a carbon tax.

**BOX NO. 9: THE IOPC FUND: AN EXAMPLE OF AN EXISTING “INTERNATIONAL TAX”**

The International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Fund is an international organization created in 1971 whose purpose is to pool the financial risks incurred by oil and gas carriers as a result of oil spills. The organization compensates victims with revenues levied oil companies.

The IOPC Fund's legal structure illustrates how a tax-like international financial contribution might operate:

- The IOPC was created by an international treaty signed by the Fund's 83 members states (the United States is not a member).
- This treaty has been ratified and implemented through national legislation by the signatories (in France, a law and a decree), thus making annual contributions by the companies compulsory.
- Contributions are decided annually by a simple majority vote in the executive organ of the IOPC Fund.
- Contributions are directly collected by the IOPC ( no transit through national budgets).
- Governments have a legal obligation to ensure implementation of the Treaty, through verification of companies' returns and imposition of sanctions in case of non-payment. Those sanctions are determined in accordance with the national legislation in each country (fines and jail sentences are applicable in some countries).

**BOX NO. 10: INTERNATIONAL GEOSTATIONARY ORBITAL POSITION ASSIGNMENT PROCEDURE**

Positions on the geostationary orbit and broadcasting frequencies are assigned on a first-come, first-served basis by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a specialized agency of the United Nations with 172 member states. Licenses are delivered free of charge<sup>48</sup> with flexible limits on their duration:

- The duration of the license is left to the applicant's discretion (durations of 30 years are common, and several recent applications have opted for 60-year durations);
- Holders may prolong their licenses unilaterally, subject to notifying the ITU three years before expiration.

This system leads countries to reserve more orbital positions than they need, since it costs nothing to hold a concession; there is practically no limit on its duration; holders' rights take precedence over those of new applicants in case of interference; and it gives holders room for maneuver in negotiations in the event of a new application, since it allows them to offer concessions to an "inconvenienced" country.

Under this system, countries and operators with a large number of reserved positions thereby enjoy an advantage over others. Finally, the system creates barriers to entry for new operators or countries.

**BOX NO. 11: ESTIMATING THE BASE FOR A CORPORATE INCOME TAX SURCHARGE  
ON MULTATIONALS**

❶ The major multinational corporations' profits have been estimated based on the annual rankings of the 500 largest global corporations by *Fortune* magazine.

The revenues and aggregate net profits of these 500 corporations, which are generally the most international corporations, have been extrapolated to a sample of a further 500 corporations in order to calculate a revenue and net profit base for 1,000 corporations.

Revenues have been extrapolated using the trend line closest to the revenue dataset for the Fortune Global 500. The chart below illustrates the outcome for the year 2000:

*Profil des chiffres d'affaires 2002 (500 entreprises les plus importantes)*



Net profit was extrapolated by applying the weighted average margins observed for the first 500 corporations to 500 additional corporations.

Due to the limitations inherent in this type of calculation, these findings should be seen more as a rough estimate than as a precise quantification of the tax base in question.

❷ Results of the foregoing extrapolations are tabulated below:

(in constant USD billion - 2002)	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002
Total revenues (a)	7,800	17,160	19,580	19,080	18,200
Total net profit* (b)	346	531	924	420	181
Net margin (a/b)	4.4%	3.1%	4.7%	2.2%	0.99%

According to the table, results vary considerably in the short term (profits and margins fell by 80% between 2000 and 2002). Any additional revenue from a surtax on large multinational firms would therefore be likely to be highly volatile.

**BOX NO. 12: BANK TRANSPARENCY AS A PUBLIC GOOD**

Some countries view bank secrecy as an essential component of individual freedom, and an element of the right to privacy. But, in an open world, bank secrecy in one country has effects on other countries. It may serve, in particular, as a prime conduit for tax evasion or supporting illegal activities. In that sense, bank secrecy exactly meets the economists' definition of a negative externality. In other words, bank secrecy can be seen as producing a "global public bad".

In theory, a negative externality can be offset by a tax designed to internalize its cost to the global community. It is not yet clear how this theoretical intuition could be translated into reality. Some countries practicing bank secrecy claim that their development assistance greatly exceeds the average for the developed countries, although it is not possible to determine whether this difference fully compensates for the externality created by bank secrecy.

**CONTRIBUTIONS BY MEMBERS OF THE GROUP**

# Towards global taxation in the service of alternative globalisation

by Jacques Cossart (ATTAC)

In a letter dated 21 October 2003, the President of the French Republic, Jacques Chirac, appointed Jean-Pierre Landau, Inspector General of Finance, to chair a working group set up to "reflect upon the feasibility of new international financial contributions to reduce poverty, to promote development and to finance global public goods such as the environment, public health and rare resources", and to submit a report on its conclusions.

ATTAC was requested to participate and agreed to contribute its expertise.

It would like to compliment Jean-Pierre Landau upon the excellence with which he has steered not only the plenary sessions of this working group but also its reports, which are essential to measure general progress.

ATTAC was able to express its views freely and constructively.

It is entirely understandable that the general report of such a diversified group endeavors to give more weight to points of agreement than to the isolated opinions of individual group members. ATTAC endorses this principle unreservedly. The report nevertheless gives a highly objective account of diverging opinions.

This is the background against which ATTAC decided to accept the Chairman's invitation to the members to send him a special paper highlighting what they consider to be essential points.

ATTAC acknowledges the relevance of the President of the Republic's statement that "globalization creates wealth and promotes freedom and growth. But it also generates new global risks and aggravates the persisting poverty and inequality in the world".

We believe that the globalization stigmatized by the President of the Republic is one which allows itself to be regulated by the markets and so abandons those considered insolvent to a state of "persistent poverty and inequality". The "new global risks" are unfortunately aggravated by the presence of billions of people in the world. This is what we refer to as neo-liberal globalization, i.e. a form of globalization, which undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of public intervention in regulation. But how can we produce "global public goods" without public regulation?

## I. REASONS FOR INTERNATIONAL TAXATION

### 1) Globalisation and tax competition

The existing tax systems were developed when borders and tax jurisdictions coincided with national states. Indeed, these systems predate national states by several centuries. The existence of national borders allowed states for many centuries to adopt sovereign and largely independent monetary and tax policies. **The ongoing globalization process has radically changed the environment of tax policies.** The elimination of borders and the mobility of certain production factors have brought the era of independent national tax policies to an end. Tax policies have become interdependent, primarily because of their impact on trade and financial flows. Today, third countries can take advantage of tax hikes in neighboring countries, which then lose the additional tax revenues expected from their measure. Right or wrong, many developed and developing countries are nowadays taking tax-related decisions based on external factors.

The well-known theory of the "prisoner's dilemma" permits two strategies. Either countries do not cooperate and play the game of "harmful tax competition" by lowering their taxes in order to attract foreign capital and multinationals. **Such Dutch-auction tactics reduce tax revenues.** Or countries cooperate in order to maintain homogeneous tax pressure, allowing them to preserve their public revenues. Tax cooperation can be strengthened by harmonizing national tax policies or by creating common global taxes. Theoretically, the result is the same in both cases if countries adopt the same tax assessment bases and the same tax rates. This eliminates the practice of "free riders".

Within the context of market integration, cooperative tax policies are clearly difficult to implement, as witnessed by the European Union. One of the reasons for this is that multinationals, as part of their international tax optimization strategies, push countries to compete with each other in order to lower the tax pressure upon their business. This tactic is particularly applied to foreign direct investment.

## 2) Taxation and mobility of factors

Production factors can be taxed all the more effectively when their mobility is low and their assessment basis does not respond elastically to changes in the tax rate. The removal of national borders in application of liberalization policies has raised the mobility of certain production factors, primarily capital, whose main holders are industrial multinationals, banks and international investors. **The mobility of these players allows them to establish themselves in territories with lower tax pressure in order to optimize their tax strategy.** Businesses do not just want a state offering the best tax deal but also one offering subsidies, which allow them to cancel their tax burden or even to generate a negative tax burden. The profits of these major groups have become a moving and increasingly elusive target for the national tax authorities. **The net result is that the assessment basis of states has collapsed while multinationals have enlarged the space in which they can minimize their tax burden and maximize their profits.**

Multinational businesses use many techniques to avoid taxation. The most radical method is of course to base operations in all sorts of tax havens or free zones. Another solution is to use highly sophisticated window-dressing methods, of which the best known is to charge fictitious transfer prices between a parent company and its subsidiaries. In recent years we have seen particularly revealing examples of this tactic.

## 3) Globalization and tax inequalities

Globalization aggravates tax inequality between the different categories of holders of production factors, depending upon their degree of international mobility. On the one hand there are farmers and wage earners, who hold the land and labor and who represent almost all of humanity. **For most workers it is very difficult to move geographically due to obvious obstacles, such as cultural and language barriers and immigration laws.** As a result they are generally unable to shrug off their tax burden.

On the other hand we have senior managers who are at the top of the global income pyramid and who, because of their high mobility, have a very elastic assessment basis, i.e. they can move about to avoid taxation. **Globalization has thus driven a new divide between wage earners, with on the one hand those who can relocate to take advantage of pay and**

**tax spreads and on the other the overwhelming majority of wage earners who cannot do so.**

The available statistics clearly show the link between the eroding tax base and the mobility of production factors. **The gap between the tax rate for labor and for capital has increased steadily since the inception of the globalization process.** In the EU Member States, the weight of capital taxes dropped significantly from 50% in 1980 to 35% of total tax revenue in 1994, while the fraction of labor taxes rose from 35% to 40% in order to preserve national tax revenue. **Inequalities can only be fought by readjusting the entire balance.**

#### **4) Global taxes and common goods of humanity**

Another basic reason to consider the creation of global taxes is the certainty that globalization generates new needs and the necessity to appropriate new or existing needs requiring the use of an international tax instrument. The concept of common goods of humanity - generally referred to as global public goods (GPG) - was created to describe these needs, which are felt at a worldwide scale and cannot be satisfied by the markets because of their two key features: no one can be excluded from consumption of a public good (principle of non-exclusion) and the use of a public good by any individual may not deprive the other members of a community (principle of non-rivalry). **The aim of balanced global development can only be achieved if such public goods as health, education and security are covered by clearly defined policies financed at an international level from public resources, such as global taxes.**

At the present time, production of GPGs falls far short of what is required. This lack of investment results in particular in international financial instability, pandemics, financial crime, lack of dissemination of knowledge and internet access and environmental damage. Shaken by globalization and lack of global public goods, the planet has become unstable, inegalitarian, polluted and unhealthy. There are several reasons why there is a lack of GPGs. First, there is the problem of evaluating costs and returns, mostly because of their time horizon. Their results can only be measured in the long term. For instance, policies to fight financial instability and the destruction of biodiversity have a high cost and remote and uncertain returns, which may discourage initiatives by public players. Secondly, the current lack of GPGs is due to their sphere. Budgetary and tax policies are national in scope whereas the profits from these goods greatly benefit third countries. **We can only provide sufficient public resources if we develop and implement a global tax system operating across a larger area.**

## 5) Millennium Development Goals (MDG)

*As pointed out by the President of the Republic, the MDGs are the result of a decision by the General Assembly of the United Nations and are therefore difficult to call into question.*

*The MDGs remain for the most part to be assessed. **One thing is certain: the needs are considerable and require additional resources and it is hard to see how these could be provided without taxation.***

*Goal 1, target 2, for example, is to "halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger". This is really a very modest objective in an area such as this, which has a direct impact on growth. In its report for 2003, the FAO tells us that midway through the period under review the number of people suffering from hunger, which had decreased in the first half of the nineties, had risen again to nearly 800 million people. The report also explains that it is impossible to fight hunger if we do not also fight AIDS, which is covered by Goal 6.*

## II. WHICH INTERNATIONAL TAXATION?

**An international tax system can only be effective and fair and perform its three key roles - reducing various nuisances, redistributing income (in other words, complying with the MDGs) and producing international revenue, particularly to finance GPGs – if it includes several different kinds of international financial contributions.** The general report fully covers the factors to be taken into account when introducing an international tax system. We will therefore not repeat them here. **We merely want to stress the advisability of a diversified international tax system rather than a single tax, however relevant.**

### 1) Financial taxation

*In our globalized economy there is a wide variety of easily identifiable flows. These generate income for the parties who originate them. It is therefore perfectly fair to use them as a tax base for a collective tax system. As some of these flows are known to be harmful for the world order, their taxation would also play a dissuasive role and so benefit the world at large. This tax could be incentive-based (basically the purpose of taxes on foreign exchange transactions and carbon dioxide emissions) but it could just as well be levied on financial operations (i.e. a tax on FDI).*

#### A. Tax on foreign exchange and securities transactions

ATTAC will not come back to taxation of foreign exchange transactions, which has become a global symbol and is extensively discussed in the general report. All the same, we need to remember that international speculation is one of the scourges of financial globalization with a potentially high economic and social cost, particularly for the countries in the southern hemisphere, as the last decade has shown.

The purpose of taxation is also to collect revenues. A securities trading tax of about 0.01% for all financial markets would be a major source of tax revenues.

Regardless of the application difficulties and the methods to avoid collection, it is hard to see why such a tax should not be proposed. Taxation is also a matter of morality! **In view of its principles, the European Union needs to show the way in this area.**

#### B. Measures against tax havens and banking secrecy

Taxes can only perform their function in a fair manner if the tax authority can verify their calculation and collection.

This basic principle is constantly undermined by the existence of tax havens and banking secrecy. **There is only one effective measure against tax havens: their elimination. No other regulation is genuinely productive in this area.**

The remedies against tax avoidance promoted by banking secrecy seem relatively easy to implement. Banks claim that they are morally obliged to preserve the secrecy of customer transactions. Fine! **Let them file anonymous returns and pay tax on these. Banks that refuse to do so could easily be subjected to a flat tax.**

### ***C. Tax on foreign direct investment (FDI)***

**The two key objectives of such a tax align perfectly with the MDGs: opposing tax avoidance by dissuading the selection of countries with low taxes and preventing the deterioration of employee rights in the countries with the lowest wages and laxest labor laws.**

We must not delude ourselves about the contribution made by FDI to the economy of their host country. In 2000, the 10 largest beneficiaries accounted for 75% of global foreign direct investment. Nine of these were wealthy countries, the only exception being China (including Hong Kong). 90% of FDI was used for mergers & acquisitions. It is therefore hardly surprising that technology transfers tend to be limited and that few jobs are created. One particularly harmful consequence is that competition by local firms bought and restructured by foreign investors causes bankruptcies and layoffs at other local businesses. The net result is negative for employment. The balance is just as bad for wages, working conditions and social protection since multinationals stir competition between countries in the southern hemisphere and locate their activities in countries offering the most attractive terms. ATTAC supports the proposal of a 20% tax on all investments in host countries whose respect for basic rights is at the bottom of the scale. This tax could be modulated and slide to 10% for countries with greater respect for these rights or significant efforts in the right direction. Their "social rating" would be assigned by the International Labour Organization.

### ***D. A unified corporate profit tax***

The aim is to restore the capacity of states to tax corporate profits. **The states have granted multinational companies the power to apply pressure by permitting free movement of capital. It is hard to see how states can get out from under this pressure unless a global unified tax is levied.** In the current situation, multinationals systematically threaten to invest in another country or to relocate if their home state does not grant tax cuts. This practice, which is a form of blackmail, has triggered a tax war between states, which are showering businesses with tax gifts. The contribution of the business community to national tax revenue has dropped as a result. In the United States, corporate income tax accounted for only 17% of federal tax revenues in 1990, down from 27% in 1965. The principle - if not the application - of a unit tax is simple: regardless of the country or the region in the world where a multinational establishes itself, it is subjected to the same income tax rate. This would not only go far towards defusing the tax war, it would also curb tax avoidance and evasion possibilities. **Tax revenues are potentially high. In 2000, the thousand largest companies in terms of market capitalisation reported aggregate profits of USD 847 billion<sup>(49)</sup>. In 2000, UNCTAD estimated the sales of the hundred largest multinationals at USD 4,800 billion<sup>50</sup>, representing 4.3% of global GDP, up from 3.5% in 1990<sup>51</sup>.**

**ATTAC is strongly in favour of this method of taxation, which would end the attrition of income tax from multinationals and is a vital step towards scaling back inequalities and achieving the MDGs.**

This method of taxation is well documented in the general report.

### *E. Wealth tax*

Although wealth is a stock rather than a flow, it can nevertheless be included in this report, since it is possible to tax the stock itself, according to the French model, or its income, according to the American model. A flat tax could be assessed, based upon the size of the fortune in question. We do not wish to give final figures here. We merely wish to point out that the assessment basis is relatively easy to establish using the figures published regularly by the UNDP. For instance, the report for 2003<sup>52</sup> states that "the richest 1% receives as much as the poorest 57%". Several valuations estimate the aggregate assets of the 200 wealthiest people on earth at USD 1,000 billion. **Assuming taxable assets are worth roughly USD 5,000 billion, a very low flat tax rate of 1% would nevertheless generate USD 50 billion.** In other words, without applying intolerable tax pressure on these fortunes, the revenue from this tax would be about as much as total ODA at the start of the new millennium.

## **2) Ecological taxation**

This increasingly necessary taxation method is clearly intended to limit the negative externalities which jeopardize the future of our planet more and more seriously. **Only public regulation can bring this decline to a halt.** An international tax can become a strong regulatory instrument if its type and amount are judiciously chosen. The following list of five types of tax is not exhaustive and needs to be analyzed more thoroughly. The public revenue from this tax could be used for the budget of a World Environment Organization attached to the United Nations. The function of this WEO would be to oversee international rules to preserve the environment and to finance international programs intended to promote research of alternative, renewable and pollution-free energies and of waste recycling techniques and to develop economical, pollution-free production techniques.

### *A. Carbon emission tax*

The purpose of this report is not to discuss the many harmful externalities connected with activities producing carbon derivatives, particularly carbon dioxide<sup>53</sup>. **It is crucial to develop a tax which gives producers a strong incentive to reduce their emissions and makes them pay costs previously borne quite unfairly by the whole community.**

The tax rate will have to be chosen very carefully to create a strong incentive to reduce emissions. The projections are flexible. They reflect the lower end of the bracket. Some proposals for such a tax would generate revenue of USD 500 billion.

### ***B. Tax on nuclear waste with a very long life and very high activity***

*A compensative and dissuasive international energy tax designed to make the responsible parties pay for the negative externalities caused by carbon dioxide emission will only be taken seriously if it is accompanied by a nuclear waste tax. The purpose of this tax would be to reduce the production flows and even stocks of waste with a very long life and very high activity, particularly plutonium, minor actinides and other fission products.*

The aim of this brief outline is not to discuss this vast issue, thoroughly analyzed in the Charpin, Dessus, Pellat study<sup>54</sup>. We merely want to point out that it would be highly inadequate to limit energy taxation to carbon emissions.

We can dismiss the question whether plutonium and the minor actinides contained in irradiated nuclear fuel is an energy resource or a waste. In the current state of the art, these materials can only be stocked, not used. As long as they cannot be used for economic purposes as an energy source, they are negative externalities and need to be reduced. The externalities connected with plutonium in particular not only include very long term radioactivity, but also a considerable risk of proliferation of nuclear arms.

A tax is therefore not just a feasible option, it is indispensable.

The simplest and least controversial tax base would be the production of plutonium and minor actinides.

France's significant experience in this area would enable it to evaluate a possible tax. For instance, we know that France is willing to spend about EUR 150 million per ton to reduce its plutonium and minor actinide production flows by about 20%. The authorities appear to have accepted a cost of up to EUR 300 million per ton in order to magnify the decrease of these materials.

It seems therefore reasonable to contemplate a tax of EUR 200 million per ton produced. With a worldwide flow of about 60 tons of plutonium and minor actinides a year, the tax revenue would be EUR 12 billion annually.

The question of a tax on stocks remains to be solved. If such stocks are considered negative externalities, they should also be taxed in order to give an incentive to scale them back. If so, civilian and military stocks are obviously equally harmful and must therefore be taxed the same way. We could imagine an annual tax equal to 10% of the tax on flows.

### ***C. Air transport tax***

The fact that air transport occupies an important position in today's economy and that airlines currently generate low profits does not make it any less relevant to tax kerosene consumption. How could we consider a tax on carbon emissions and not on air transport? The economy needs to be adapted to the needs of humanity, not the other way round. This raises the question of how high the tax should be and how it should be assessed. On first analysis, ATTAC considers a tax of about USD 4 per ton of kerosene wholly feasible. This is definitely part of the fight against negative externalities, as witness the fact that the "average" Frenchman making a return flight to Miami is responsible for the same quantity of carbon dioxide as if he were traveling a whole year by car in France. This also shows the inequality of the situation.

### ***D. Tax on arms sales***

The externalities in this area are well known. Any tax proposal is therefore given fair consideration. This is probably why President Lula Da Silva wants such a tax to finance part of his proposed World Fund to fight Hunger. This said, arms exports account for only USD 50 billion of the global defense budget of USD 800 billion. Moreover, light weapons and mines represent only a very small part of these USD 50 billion despite their intensely destructive consequences for humanity.

### ***E. Taxes intended to protect the countries of the southern hemisphere***

The brain, muscle and asset drain of the countries in the southern hemisphere continues at a large scale. Without suitable taxation, multinationals will probably continue to exploit these goods without giving anything in return to those countries whose development we are trying to achieve.

We will not discuss North-South imbalances in this report. They are adequately documented. They are so large that a global tax seems an indispensable instrument to start closing the gap and to leverage the necessary transfers.

This type of tax deserves closer examination.

## **III. CONCLUSION**

**There is an objective basis for an international tax system.** Such a system is likely to generate large resources and possibly even the figures given in the appendix, although these may not all be reached at the same time. The economic operation of our planet would not be jeopardized by such a system but helped.

**This nevertheless leaves a basic political question:** do the leaders of our nations, particularly those of the G8 countries, intend to shoulder this historic responsibility? Taxing the wealthiest to facilitate access by the poorest to minimum goods and services. The goal is not so much to achieve a moral victory, which is left to the discretion of each citizen, but to comply with a decision adopted in 2000 by the General Assembly of the United Nations agreeing the eight Millennium Development Goals, the MDGs referred to in this report. This would moreover make it possible to reduce dangerous activities for humanity and for the planet.

**The creation of a global tax system is therefore intended to give public policy renewed room** to transform the existing globalization process, which is exclusively dominated by market regulation. It would nevertheless be insufficient to consider global taxation merely an instrument to correct "market failures". This narrow notion would not entirely factor in another rationale for globalization than the prevailing idea, commonly known as the "Washington consensus". **The purpose of this alternative rationale is to achieve more sophisticated regulation of the world economy and an innovative understanding of taxation and public goods.**

ATTAC obviously does not consider taxation, even global taxation, adequate to transform the entire rationale of neo-liberal globalization. Other measures are required to regulate the activity of private actors and businesses in general in order to restore the power, which the United Nations has lost in the wake of liberalization. It is also necessary to define an international law system with strong international judicial institutions in the service of alternative globalization, i.e. another scale of international values and standards.

The theoretical framework of this alternative approach, which focuses on the concept of global public goods or common goods of humanity, permits a new architecture for global governance. It must therefore be constructed around procedures designed to define and prioritise national and international public goods. This new architecture will have to include regulation and enforcement mechanisms as well as transnational official financing techniques. Global taxes would be the backbone of such new public regulation and finance mechanisms.



**APPENDIX: Estimated yield of a few global taxes  
In USD billion**

<b>Name of tax</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	<b>Annual yield USD billion</b>
Tax on foreign exchange transactions	Rate of 0.1%; 50% reduction of assessment basis <sup>55</sup>	110
Tax on portfolio investments	Average rate of 25%, lowering volumes by 33%	190
Tax on FDIs	Average rate of 15% on an average assessment basis of USD 800 bn	120
Tax on multinationals' profits	Rate of 25% on the profits of the 1,000 largest companies (basis: 2000)	200
Wealth tax	Fixed rate of 1% applied to USD 5,000 bn	50
Carbon emission tax	Levy of USD 21 per tonne of carbon contents	125
Tax on the production of plutonium and minor actinides	Tax of USD 240 bn per tonne produced	15
Air transport tax	- Tax of 1% on ticket and freight prices - Tax of USD 3.65 per tonne of kerosene	2 74
Bit tax	1 cent per 1,000 kilobytes (basis: 1996)	70
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>956</b>

## Contribution by Henri Rouillé d'Orfeuil – President – Coordination Sud

Mr President,

I would like to take advantage of the presentation of the report produced by our working group to send you a few comments on the report itself and on the perspectives which it opens up at a French and international level.

Allow me to make five comments:

- **First, I would like to thank you for inviting French international solidarity players, represented by myself, to participate in this working group.** We appreciate this invitation, particularly since the group's work and analyses reflect the focus of many of our concerns; furthermore, the debates were fascinating thanks to the excellent moderator. Once you have incorporated the report's proposals, or some of them, into a political message, we will make every effort to interest our partners in those considered promising by the associations. While we cannot predict their decision we will make sure these issues are discussed at our meetings. We definitely intend to contribute to the public debate at our level, to launch awareness and information campaigns on the relevant issues and, together with our non-governmental partners throughout the world, to advocate these proposals at important international meetings.
- **We do not want the fight against poverty to obscure the fight against impoverishment.** Poverty is not a natural state but the result of sinister processes whose origins must be looked for at the very core of the economic mechanisms. For example, should common rules on trade liberalization apply to everyone; should only 2 to 3% of the working population be required to feed the national community and even burst the world markets with enormous surpluses; should farms, to be internationally competitive, require at least a few dozens hectares or even have to adopt the model of the Brazilian fazenda. More than 2.9 billion people in the world will have to give up farming by 2015. A report by a major international organization states that we should expect (hope?) 400 million peasants to abandon farming in India - of course under the worst conditions, i.e. ruined and debt-ridden after having exhausted the natural resources of the areas they are leaving. And we have not even begun to look at China and other regions of the world. This is not just an isolated example but the projected fate of half of mankind and probably many more considering that these future masses of sub-proletarians will make it impossible to build an international labor market worthy of such a name. This leads to two conclusions. First, there is no "stock" of poor people to dissolve; there are only flows which can be expected to swell to considerable proportions, particularly incoming flows of poverty, and it is unrealistic to think that problems can be treated in any other way than at their source and as a whole. **The second conclusion, which concerns the choices you will be making, is that the proposals in this report, which deals with social issues (new financing solutions for the MDGs), need to be balanced by economic proposals.** For example, in view of the above reasoning it would only be fair to make proposals both to raise and to stabilise agricultural prices, which alone can stop massive flows of ruined peasants into the economic void.
- **Nor do we want the search for a few billion euros in new contributions to conceal the erosion of public finance and the impoverishment of public services.** Our efforts would be wasted if, while we work out new international financial mechanisms, tax evasion or more simply harmful tax competition or even more simply adjustment policies were to reduce national capacity to collect taxes in order to finance development and to

achieve the MDGs. In our opinion, international taxation proposals are politically meaningless unless the fight against the erosion of national public finances and the impoverishment of public services is stepped up.

- **We do not want to give the impression that efforts to achieve the MDGs must be limited to the adoption of international social policies.** Our country earmarks 44% of GNP to public spending, i.e. the production of public goods and redistribution transfers. At world level, only 0.22% of the GNP of the OECD countries is used to produce global public goods and to make international redistribution transfers, i.e. 180 times less to solve infinitely larger problems! Granted, we need to do much more than we currently are doing but we will nevertheless remain far below what is needed if we limit our reasoning to compensative social policies. We have already discussed one of the MDGs, the reduction of poverty. In fact, we need to work out a separate approach for each MDG. In a report on access to drinking water, Mr. Camdessus mentions an annual financing requirement of USD 200 billion. For each MDG we need to see how much official development assistance is necessary to leverage other resources, including local resources, and which type of partnership is required to deal successfully with these complex issues. As said before, we also need to find the right balance between economic measures and social (or environmental) measures. The weight of public resources must be higher for education and health than for food, water or the fight against poverty. This leads to several conclusions : **we need to treat the MDGs separately, we need to affirm the need for a partnership involving a broad sample of players, we need to determine the exact function of official funding, particularly their capacity to act as an incentive and as a lever to rally other resources, and we therefore need to reform radically the instruments used to implement official development assistance** whose credibility is already low. The idea of finding ways to collect new resources merely to fund these instruments is unlikely to convince either our fellow citizens or our partners, who do not make a cult out of public services, as we do, often rightly so.
- **We want everything to be done to ensure that new resources will be used to support initiatives by the "victims of the millennium", those who are hurt by violation of their basic economic and social rights and who disappear in the anonymous statistics presented in international debates on MDGs.** The 1.3 billion poor and the 800 million hungry must be prominent players in the fight to achieve the MDGs. We must therefore look very closely at the capacity of ODA instruments to reach these frontline fighters and to support their crisis management strategies. We must also see whether intermediation facilitates relations or on the contrary interferes with the individuals and entities who contribute and the beneficiaries who fight in the field. **While intermediation is necessary, we must have the capacity to eliminate excessive and useless expenses incurred on the way. We must also be in a position to compare the costs and advantages of various national and international, governmental and non-governmental, and economic (loans) and social (grants) channels.** In our opinion, it is less important to prioritize channels and instruments than to improve the evaluation of comparative advantages in order to forge more effective instrument-driven partnerships. In any event, we believe that the typical balance of the existing cooperation system, i.e. 99% of public cooperation and 1% non-government cooperation, is wholly outdated.
- **We consider it important to choose our battles with several possible horizons and not to dismiss proposals, which seem unrealistic in the short term.** Indeed, most if not all proposals are unrealistic in the short term. The actual process needs to be given a horizon of at least five years. Each proposal needs to be promoted by government and/or non-governmental organizations and be advocated as a topical issue in the public arena and in international negotiations. It will take time to forge such alliances, particularly in the non-governmental sector. **We are members or originators of international coalitions,** which

could conduct their own campaigns and participate in the overall movement to **obtain the basic decisions required to implement new international financial mechanisms** and to reform public and private assistance.

These general comments explain what, in my opinion, is needed to turn approved proposals into levers to reform official development assistance and to create a new scale of ODA. As choices are made and the relevant promotion and negotiation strategies are developed we will work out the specific contribution we can make to the collective effort or, I imagine more rarely, explain why we believe that we must decline to participate.

Respectfully yours,

Henri Rouillé d'Orfeuil  
Chairman, Coordination SUD

## REFERENCES

- Addison, T., Chowdhury, A.R. (2003), "A global lottery and a global premium Bond" *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global Prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- African Development Bank (2002), "Achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Africa: Progress, prospects and policy implications" *World Bank/African Development Bank Global - Poverty Report 2002* <http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC9884.htm>.
- Allen, M. (2002), "Financing the global public good of international financial stability", *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue* <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>.
- Alworth, J. S. (1998), "Taxation and integrated financial markets: the challenges of derivatives and Other Financial Innovations" *International Tax and Public Finance, No 5*, pp. 507-534.
- Amoako, K.Y. (2002), "Synergies between aid and the financing of global public goods: a regional partnership approach" *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue* <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>
- Amor, J.M. (2002), "Government bond markets in the Euro zone", *Wiley Finance series*.
- Anand, P.B. (2004), "Financing the provision of global public goods" *The World Economy* n°27, février 2004, pp. 215-237.
- Andersson, G-B. (2002), "Exploring financing options for the provision of global public goods" *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue* <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>
- Andersson, G-B. (2003), "Sustainable financing of global public goods" *Wilton Park Conference, Financing Global Public Goods for Health*, [www.egdi.gov.se/pdf/speech\\_wiltonpark.pdf](http://www.egdi.gov.se/pdf/speech_wiltonpark.pdf)
- Annan, K. (2001), "Existing proposals for innovative sources of finance", *Conference on Financing for Development, Technical Note 3, United Nations A/AC.257/27/Add.3*, [www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/ffd/summit00/UNGloTax102001.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/ffd/summit00/UNGloTax102001.htm)
- Aryeetey, E. (2003), "A development-focused allocation of the special drawing rights", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- Atkinson, A.B. (2003 -1), "Innovative sources for development finance – Global public economics", *World Bank-ABCDE-Europe 2003*, [http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/eurvp/web.nsf/Pages/Paper+by+Atkinson/\\$File/ATKINSON.PDF](http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/eurvp/web.nsf/Pages/Paper+by+Atkinson/$File/ATKINSON.PDF)
- Atkinson, A.B. (2003 -2), "New sources for development finance", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- Atkinson, A.B. (2004). New Sources for Development Finance. *Présentation au groupe de travail*
- Atkinson, A.B., Stern, N.H. (1974), "Pigou, taxation and public goods", *The review of economic studies*, Vol. 41, n°1 - Jan. 1974, pp. 119-128.
- ATTAC (2002), "Great Britain: 'Tobin tax' motion at the House of Commons" <http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/glotax/currtax/2002/0327tobinbritain.htm>
- ATTAC Espagne (2002), "Un Groupe Tobin au Parlement espagnol" <http://www.france.attac.org/a1605>.

- ATTAC France (2002) “En Grande Bretagne, le Tobin des Bois !” <http://www.france.attac.org/a1590>
- ATTAC France (2000), “Fil Conducteur pour un débat international,” <http://www.france.attac.org/a607>
- ATTAC France (2001) “10 Questions-Réponses sur la taxe Tobin” <http://www.france.attac.org/a79>.
- ATTAC France (2002), “La douleur des pauvres, vaut-elle une taxe Tobin?” <http://www.france.attac.org/a1088>.
- ATTAC France (2002), “Quelles priorités nationales de développement ?” <http://www.france.attac.org/a6>.
- ATTAC France (2002), “Taxation des transactions de change et financement du développement” <http://www.france.attac.org/a45>.
- ATTAC France (2002) “Les syndicats des banques demandent la taxe Tobin” *Uni Finances*, <http://www.france.attac.org/a620>
- ATTAC France (2002) “Quels programmes internationaux financer?” <http://www.france.attac.org/a5>
- ATTAC France (2002) “Définition et analyse des taxes globales” <http://www.france.attac.org/a31>.
- Auerbach, A.J., Hines, J.R. (2001), “Taxation and economic efficiency”, *National Bureau of Economic Research, Working paper n°8181*, <http://netec.mcc.ac.uk/WoPEc/data/Papers/nbrnberwo8181.html>
- Baker, D. (2001), “Effective currency transactions taxes: The need to tax derivatives”, *Halifax Initiative, Conference Papers* [http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference_Papers.pdf).
- Bank for International Settlements (2003) “The role of central bank money in payment systems.” *Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems*, Basel, Switzerland.
- Baumert, K. (1998), “Global taxes and fees: recent developments and overcoming obstacles”, *Global Policy Forum*, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/alternat/baumert.htm>.
- Beynon, J. (2003), “Poverty efficient aid allocations – Collier/Dollar revisited”, *Overseas Development Institute*, ESAU Working Paper n°2.
- Bezanson, K., Sagasti, F. (2001), “Financing global public goods – The conceptual framework”, *Proceedings of a seminar convened by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on “Financing global public goods”*, [www.ud.se/prefak/files/f\\_p\\_20011005.pdf](http://www.ud.se/prefak/files/f_p_20011005.pdf).
- Bezanson, K., Newell, P. (2002) “Climate change abatement as a global public good”, *Proceedings of a seminar convened by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on “Financing global public goods”*, [www.ud.se/prefak/files/f\\_p\\_20011005.pdf](http://www.ud.se/prefak/files/f_p_20011005.pdf)
- Binger, A. (2003), “Global public goods and potential mechanisms for financing availability”, *United Nations - Committee for Development Policy - Background paper*, [www.un.org/esa/analysis/devplan/al\\_binger.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/analysis/devplan/al_binger.pdf)
- Boadway, R. (2003), “National taxation, fiscal federalism and global taxation”, *Wider Conference on “Sharing Global prosperity”* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- Boadway, R., Keen, M. (2003), “Theoretical perspectives on the taxation of capital income and financial services”, in *“Taxation of financial intermediation – Theory and practice for emerging economies”*, Oxford University Press pp 31-80.
- Bond, E. (2004), “Malaria’s overlooked resurgence” *The Washington Post* 12 July 2004.

- Bond, P. (2000), "Cooling Hot Money in South Africa: Arguments for a Tobin Tax and Related Financial Capital Controls", *Halifax Initiative, Conference Papers* [http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference_Papers.pdf).
- Bourguignon, F. (2002), "Global redistribution of income: excursion to Utopia or walk into the future?" *Séminaire Iddri et AFD "Fiscalité internationale et financement du développement durable : Quelles perspectives ?"* Paris.
- Bretton Woods Project (2002) "Development Finance Summit a fiasco, say campaigners" [http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/article.shtml?cmd\[126\]=x-126-16172](http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/article.shtml?cmd[126]=x-126-16172)
- Buira, A. (2002), "Allocating special drawing rights to increase international financial stability", *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue* <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>
- Buliř, A., Hamann, A.J. (2001) "How volatile and unpredictable are aid flows, and what are the policy implications?" *International Monetary Fund Working paper WP/01/16*.
- Buliř, A., Lane, T. (2002) "Aid and Fiscal Management" *International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/02/112*.
- Bureau, D., Hourcade, J-C., (1998), "Les dividendes économiques d'une réforme fiscale écologique», *Les rapports du Conseil d'Analyse Economique*, n° 8, La Documentation française.
- Bureau, D., Hourcade, J-C., Godard, O. (1998), "Fiscalité de l'environnement" *Rapport du Conseil d'analyse économique n° 8*, La Documentation française.
- Burnell, P. (2003), "Foreign aid resurgent: New spirit or old hangover?", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- Burnside, C., Dollar, D. (1997), "Aid policies and growth" *World Bank - Policy Research Working Paper n°1777*.
- Burnside, C., Dollar, D. (1997), "Aid Spurs Growth – in a Sound Policy Environment" *International Monetary Fund - Finance and Development - December 1997*. [www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1997/12/pdf/burnside.pdf](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1997/12/pdf/burnside.pdf)
- Burnside, C., Dollar, D. (2004), "Aid, Policies and Growth: Revisiting the Evidence" *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper n°3251*.
- Burrows, G. (2003), "Arms and the taxman." *The Guardian* 1 July 2003.
- Cardim de Carvalho, F. J. (2001), "The Tobin Tax is feasible: but how should it be implemented?" *Global Policy Forum - Global Taxes for Global Priorities* <http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/ffd/2001/carvalho.htm>
- Castro, G. (2001), "Comments on financing biodiversity as a global public good", *Proceedings of a seminar convened by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on "Financing global public goods"*, [www.ud.se/prefak/files/f\\_p\\_20011005.pdf](http://www.ud.se/prefak/files/f_p_20011005.pdf)
- Cater, N. (2002), "Philanthropy 'sans frontières.'" *The Guardian Unlimited* 13 February 2002.
- Cecil, R. (2001), "Sovereignty, automaticity and international trust funds: A proposal for implementation of Tobin-style taxes", *Halifax Initiative, Conference Papers* [http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference_Papers.pdf).
- Chassagnieux, A. (2002), "Le Gouvernement allemand amène la taxe Tobin à Monterrey", *ATTAC France*, <http://www.france.attac.org/a1603>
- Chomthongdi, J. (2001) "Tobin tax and capital controls: The situation analysis in East and South East Asia", *Halifax Initiative, Conference Papers* [http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference_Papers.pdf).

- Chowdhury, A., Mavrotas, G. (2003), “FDI&Growth: What causes what?”, *Wider Conference on “Sharing Global prosperity”* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>
- Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité (2001), “Innovative resources for development” <http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/1001ngo-CIDSE-innovative.pdf>
- Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité et Caritas Internationalis (2001) “Financer le Développement par la Redistribution” *Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité et Caritas Internationalis* - Document de position [www.cidse.org/pubs/ppffdfre.doc](http://www.cidse.org/pubs/ppffdfre.doc) .
- Clunies-Ross, A. (2002), “Paper for the World Commission on the social dimensions of globalisation on resources for social development”, *United Nations University – Working paper*, <http://www.unu.edu/p&g/gesgp/workingpapers/>
- Clunies-Ross, A. (2003), “Immediate prospects for additional finance: What might be done now or soon and under what conditions”, *Wider Conference on “Sharing Global prosperity”* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>
- Cohen, D., Soto, M. (2003), “Why are poor countries poor?” *Wider Conference on “Sharing Global prosperity”*, <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>
- Colman, T. (2002), “Funding a Global War on Poverty.” *The Observer* 24 February 2002.
- Colman, T. (2002), “Tobin Tax – a tool for Global Justice” *The Fabian Society*, <http://www.fabian-society.org.uk/documents/ViewADocument.asp?ID=44&CatID=52>.
- Collier, P. (1997), “The Failure of Conditionality” in “*Perspectives on Aid and Development*” Editions C. Gwyn and J. Nelson. Washington. DC.
- Collier, P. Guillaumont, P., Guillaumont, S., Gunning, J.W. (1997), “Redesigning Conditionality” *World Development* Vol. 25 n°9 pp. 1399-1407.
- Collier, P., Hoeffler, A. (2004) “Conflicts and arms proliferation” in “*Global crises, global solutions*” ed. Bjorn Lomborg, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
- Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., Pattillo, C. (2003), “Aid and capital flight” *Wider Conference on “Sharing Global prosperity”*, <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- Commission des Communautés Européennes (2000), “Taxation du carburant d’aviation” COM(2000) 110 final [europa.eu.int/eur-lex/fr/com/cnc/2000/com2000\\_0110fr01.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/fr/com/cnc/2000/com2000_0110fr01.pdf) .
- Commission des Communautés Européennes (2002), “Responses to the challenges of globalisation: a study on the international monetary and financial system and on financing for development”, *Working Document, Doc/02/4* [http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy\\_finance/publications/globalisation/r2002\\_185en.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/globalisation/r2002_185en.pdf)
- Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (2002), “Impact of Market Based Options on Developing Countries.” WP/23.
- Cooper, R.N. (2001) “The Kyoto Protocol: A flawed concept” *Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei* <http://www.feem.it/web/activ/activ.html>.
- Cooper, R.N. (1999), “International Approaches to Global Climate Change” *Economics Department - Harvard University*.
- Cooper, R.N. (2002), “The double dividend of emissions taxes: greenhouse gas reductions and revenues”, *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue* <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>
- Dale, S. (1997), “Saving the United Nations: a global tax on international financial transactions”, *International Development Research Centre* [http://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-8958-201-1-DO\\_TOPIC.html](http://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-8958-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html)

- David, P.A. (2000), “A tragedy of the public knowledge: ‘commons’? – Global science, intellectual property, and the digital technology boomerang” [www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0400.pdf](http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0400.pdf)
- Delaye, B. (2002), “Opening remarks of the conference on global public goods financing: new tools for new challenges - A policy dialogue” <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>
- Delleure, Ph. (2004), “Commerce, croissance et réduction de la pauvreté” mimeo non publié.
- Denny, C. (2002), “US blocks Brown-led drive for increase in Aid.” *The Guardian* 23 January 2002.
- Deutsh, J., Silber, J. (2003), “On the impact of Economic development, trade and investment openness on income inequality” *Wider Conference on “Sharing Global prosperity”* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- Devarajan, S., Miller, M.J., Swanson, E.V. (2002), “Goals for Development: history, prospects and costs” *World Bank* [www.econ.worldbank.org/files/13269\\_wps2819.pdf](http://www.econ.worldbank.org/files/13269_wps2819.pdf) .
- Dijkstra, G., (1999), “Programme aid policies and politics: Program aid and conditionality” *Sida Evaluation*.
- Easterly, W., and Whittle, D. (2002) “Give the poor a choice.” *The Financial Times* 25 August 2002.
- Elliot, L. (2001), “Brown Urges New Deal for Poor.” *The Guardian* 16 November 2001.
- European Environment Agency (2002), “External Costs of Transport” *European Environment Agency* [http://themes.eea.eu.int/Sectors\\_and\\_activities/transport/indicators/cost/external\\_costs/index.html](http://themes.eea.eu.int/Sectors_and_activities/transport/indicators/cost/external_costs/index.html)
- NGO Caucus for Financing for Development (2001) “European NGOs Consensus Paper on Financing for Development” <http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/ffd/summit00/1220ffd.htm>
- Evans, T.G. (2002) “Health-related global food: initiatives of the Rockefeller Foundation”, *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue* <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>
- Feige, E. L. (2000), “Taxation for the 21<sup>st</sup> century: the automated payment transaction (APT) tax”, *Centre for Economic Policy Research –Economic policy n°31* pp. 475-511.
- Felix, D. (2001), “Annual revenue from a global Tobin tax under alternative tax rates”, *Halifax Initiative, Conference Papers* [http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference_Papers.pdf)
- Ferroni, M. (2002), “Financing regional public goods”, *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue* <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>
- Fleet, J. (2001), “Comments on funding public goods: the case of AIDS research”, *Proceedings of a seminar convened by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on “Financing global public goods”*, [www.ud.se/prefak/files/f\\_p\\_20011005.pdf](http://www.ud.se/prefak/files/f_p_20011005.pdf)
- Foster, M. (2003), “Criteria for assessing the case for overseas aid: A note.” *Development Policy Review* n°21.3 pp. 293-300.
- Foster, M., Keith, A., (2003) “The Case for increased aid.” *Final Report to the Department for International Development*, Mick Foster Economics Ltd, A consultative report.
- “Les Français face à l’enjeu de la lutte contre la faim dans le monde” *La Croix* 16 octobre 2003.
- Frankman, M. J. (2002), “Global taxation : extending the fractal”, *Institut du développement durable et des relations internationales* [www.iddri.org/iddri/telecharge/fiscalite/frankman.pdf](http://www.iddri.org/iddri/telecharge/fiscalite/frankman.pdf)

Frankman, M. J. (1996), "The trajectory of an idea from Lorimer to Brandt", *World Development* n°24 (May 1996), pp. 807-820.

Gaiha, R., Imai, K. (2003), "Millennium development goals, agricultural growth and openness", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>

Gillinson, S. (2004) "Why cooperate? A multi-disciplinary study of collective action" *Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper* n°234.

Giodarno, T. (2003), "Quel avenir pour la fiscalité mondiale?", *Les synthèses de l'Iddri*, n° 1, mars 2003.

Godard, O., Henry, C. (1998), "Les instruments des politiques internationales de l'environnement: la prévention du risque climatique et les mécanismes de permis négociables", *Les rapports du conseil d'analyse économique* n° 8 - La Documentation française.

Gomanee, K., Girma, S., Morrissey, O. (2003), "Searching for aid threshold effects", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>

Gordon, R. H., Hines Jr, J. R. (2002) "International taxation", *NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper* n°8854, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w8854>.

Gorgodze, O. (2003), "Multinational enterprises and economic growth", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>

Grabel, I. (2003), "The revenue and double dividend potential of taxes on international private capital flows and securities transactions", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.

Green, D. (1999) "Human Development and the Asia Crisis" *Cafod, Policy Papers* <http://www.worldbank.org/eapsocial/library/green.pdf>

Greenpeace (2002) "Greenpeace statement on the UN international conference on financing for development" <http://archive.greenpeace.org/earthsummit/docs/mont.pdf>

Griffith-Jones, S. (2002), "New financial architecture as a global public good", *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue* <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>

Grubb, M. "The Economics of the Kyoto Protocol." *World Economics* 4.3 (July-Sept 2003) pp.143-189.

Guillaumont, P. (2002), "Linkages between official development assistance and global public goods", *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue* <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>

Gupta, S., Clements, B., Pivovarsky, A., Tiongson, E. R. (2003), "Foreign aid and revenue response: does the composition of aid matter?", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.

Habermeier, K., Kirilenko, A. (2001), "Securities transaction taxes and financial markets", *International Monetary Fund, WP* 01/51.

Haile-Mariam, T. (2002), "The fallacy of foreign aid as engine of economic development." *Addis Tribune* 4 October 2002.

Haugen, H. M. (2001), "A Global Public Goods Approach to a CTT", *Halifax Initiative, Conference Papers* [http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference_Papers.pdf).

- Hefeker, C., Michaelowa, K. (2003), "Can process conditionality enhance aid effectiveness? The role of bureaucratic interest and public pressure." *Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA)*.
- Heimans, J. (2003), "Multisectoral global funds as experiments in global governance and the financing of global priorities", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- Heimans, J.J. (2002), "Multisectoral global funds as instruments for financing spending on global priorities", *United Nations – DESA Discussion paper n°24*, [www.un.org/esa/esa02dp24.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/esa02dp24.pdf).
- Heller, P. S., Gupta, S. (2002), "Challenges in expanding development assistance" *International Monetary Fund - Policy Discussion Paper PDP/02/5*.
- Herber, B.P. (1992) "International environmental taxation in the absence of sovereignty" *International Monetary Fund - Working Paper WP/92/104*.
- Hernandez-Cata, E. (2000) "Raising growth and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa : what can be done ?" *IMF Policy Discussion Paper, PDP/00/4*, International Monetary Fund.
- Hertel, T.W., Ivanic, M., Preckel, P.V., Cranfield, J.A.L. (2003), "Trade liberalization and the structure of poverty in developing countries", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- Hillman, D. (2002) "Un pas de plus vers la taxe Tobin." *War on Want, ATTAC France* <http://www.france.attac.org/a676>.
- HM Treasury and DFID (2003) "International Finance Facility" *Crown Copyright*.
- HM Treasury and DFID (2003) "International Finance Facility: a technical note" *Crown Copyright*.
- Hopkins, R., Powell, A., Roy, A., Gilbert, C.L. (1997) "The World Bank and Conditionality" *Journal of International Development* Vol 9 507-516.
- Horner, F. M., "Do we need an international tax organisation?" *Tax Notes International* vol. 24 (October 8, 2001) p.179
- Hoskins B., (2002) "The Environmental Effects of Civil Aircraft in Flight" *Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, Special Report*.
- "Hotting up in the Hague." *The Economist* 18 November 2000.
- House of Commons International Development Committee (2002) "Financing for Development: Finding the Money to Eliminate World Poverty" *The Stationary Office Limited. London*.
- "How to make Africa smile: a survey of sub-saharan Africa" *The Economist* 17 January 2004.
- Hubbard R.G., (1993), "Securities Transactions Taxes: Tax design, revenue, and policy considerations", *Tax Notes* 985-1000.
- Hubbard R.G., (2002) "Tax Policy and International Competitiveness" *Council of Economic Advisers International Tax Policy Forum*, [www.whitehouse.gov/cea/international\\_taxpolicy\\_forumspeech\\_dec9\\_2002.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/international_taxpolicy_forumspeech_dec9_2002.pdf)
- Huffschmid, J., (2001), "Is a currency transaction tax feasible as a european project?" *Halifax Initiative, Conference Papers* [http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference_Papers.pdf).
- International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, World Bank (2002) "Developing the international dialogue on taxation", *IMF, OCDE, World Bank - A joint proposal* <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/18/2074194.pdf>.

- International Monetary Fund, World Bank (2004) “Global monitoring report: Policies and actions for achieving the MDGs and related outcomes” *International Monetary Fund, World Bank - Development Committee*.
- International Chamber of Commerce (2001), “Tobin tax would snarl international trade and investment”, (2001) *International Chamber of Commerce* [http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news\\_archives/2001/stories/tobin.asp](http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2001/stories/tobin.asp)
- Islam, F. (2001), “Soros: Tax my Speculation Profits.” *The Guardian* 11 March 2001.
- Jayaraman, R., Kanbur, R. (1999), “International Public Goods and the Case for Foreign Aid,” in “*Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century*” I.Kaul, I. Grunberg and M.A. Stern, Oxford University Press.
- Jetin, B. (2001), “The Efficacy of a Currency Transaction Tax”, *Halifax Initiative, Conference Papers* [http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference_Papers.pdf).
- Jones, S. (2000), “The limits of conditionality: implications for bilateral donor support for sector wide approaches” *Udenrigsministeriet, Danida*.
- Joyce, J.P. (2003), “Promises made, promises broken: A model of IMF program implementation”, *Wellesley College Department of Economics Working Paper* 2003-03.
- Kanbur, R. (2000), “Aid, Conditionality and Debt in Africa.” In “*Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future*” Routledge New York
- Kanbur, R. (2003), “The Economics of International Aid” in “*The Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism*”. Macmillan Press. New York.
- Kasa, K. (1999), “Time for a Tobin Tax?” *Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Economic Letter* 9 April 1999; pp. 9-12. <http://www.frbsf.org/econsrch/wklyltr/wklyltr99/el99-12.html>
- Kaul, I., Le Goulven, K. (2003), “Financing global public goods : a new frontier of public finance”, *World Bank* [www.worldbank.org/eurvp/web.nsf/](http://www.worldbank.org/eurvp/web.nsf/)
- Kaul, I., Le Goulven, K., Schnupf, , M. (2002), “Financing global public goods : policy experience and future challenges”, *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue* <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>
- Khan, M.S., Sharma, S. (2001) “IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs” *International Monetary Fund Working Paper* WP/01/142.
- Killick, T. (1988), “Principals, Agents and the Failings of Conditionality”, *Journal of International Development: Vol 9, No 4*, pp 483-495.
- Killick, T. (2000), “HIPC II and Conditionality: Business as before or a new Beginning” *Commonwealth Secretariat for Policy Workshop on Debt, HIPC and Poverty Reduction*.
- Kohli, R. (2003) “The transition from official aid to private capital flows: implications for a developing country”, *Wider Conference on “Sharing Global prosperity”* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- Kregel, J. A. (2002), “Financing global financial stability and market efficiency”, *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue* <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>
- Kremer, M. (2002), “A purchase commitment for vaccines”, *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue* <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>
- Kremer, M. (2003) “Public policies to stimulate the development of vaccines and drugs for the neglected diseases” *Commission on Macroeconomics and Health: Working Paper Series WG2*.

- Lamb, G. (2002), "Synergies between aid and the financing of global public goods", *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue* <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>
- Landell-Mills, N. (2001), "Comments on climate change abatement as a global public good" *Proceedings of a seminar convened by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on "Financing global public goods"*, [www.ud.se/prefak/files/f\\_p\\_20011005.pdf](http://www.ud.se/prefak/files/f_p_20011005.pdf)
- Langmore, J. (2001), "Negotiation and Management of a Currency Transaction Tax", *Halifax Initiative, Conference Papers* [http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference_Papers.pdf)
- Lele, U. (2001), "Comments on financing global public goods", *Proceedings of a seminar convened by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on "Financing global public goods"*, [www.ud.se/prefak/files/f\\_p\\_20011005.pdf](http://www.ud.se/prefak/files/f_p_20011005.pdf)
- Lensink, R., Morrissey, O., Osei, R. (2003), "The impact of uncertain capital flows on economic growth in developing countries: an empirical analysis for the 1990s", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>
- Levin, M., Ritter, P., "Taxation of financial intermediation in industrial countries" in *"Taxation of financial intermediation – Theory and practice for emerging economies"* Oxford University Press pp 197-239.
- Mankiw, N.G. (2004), "Principles of economics" Thomson South Western 3ème edition.
- Mavrotas, G. (2003), "The UK HM Treasury – DFID proposal to increase external finance to developing countries: the International Finance Facility", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>
- Mavrotas, G. (2003), "Which types of aid have the most impact" *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>
- Mboya Kiweu, J. (2003) "Leveraging donor funds: the switch to commercial sources of funding", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>
- Mc Donnell, I., Solignac Lecomte, H-B., and Wegimont, L. (2003) "Public Opinion and the Fight against Poverty" OECD Publications.
- McMahon, F. (2001) "A global tax: unworkable, unnecessary and dangerous." *The Fraser Institute* Vancouver, BC Canada.
- McQuaig, L. "US scuttles Tobin tax – and hope for the World's poor." *National Post* 29 March 2002.
- Medlin, C. (2003), "Financing global public goods for health", *Wilton Park Conference, Working paper n°714* <http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/web/conferences/reportprintwrapper.asp?confref=WP714>
- Mendez, R. P. (2001) "The case for global taxes: an overview." *Draft paper presented to the United Nations ad hoc Expert Group Meeting on Innovations in Mobilizing Global Resources for Development*.
- Mendez, R. P. (2002) "Global taxation: the rise, decline and future of an idea at the United Nations", *Institut du développement durable et des relations internationales - Working paper, D.R.*
- Micklewright, J., Wright, A. (2003), "Private donations for international development", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>

- Mirrlees, J.A. (2003) "Global public economics", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>
- Morrissey, O. (2001) "Pro-poor conditionality for aid and debt relief in East Africa" *University of Nottingham credit research paper n°01/15*.
- Morten Haugen, H. (2001) "Taxe Tobin et biens publics mondiaux" *ATTAC France* <http://www.france.attac.org/a167>
- Morten Haugen, H. (2001), "A global public goods approach to a currency transaction tax", *ATTAC France* <http://www.france.attac.org/>
- Moruzzi, S., Rescigno, S. (2002), "Campagne italienne pour la taxe Tobin", *ATTAC France*, <http://www.france.attac.org/a252>
- Mosley, P., Noorbaksh, F., Paloni, A. (2003), "Compliance with World Bank conditionality: Implications for the selectivity approach to policy-based lending and the design of conditionality", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- "Net Gains Not for All." *Irish Times* July 1999.
- Nelson, J.M. (1996) "Prompting policy reforms: the twilight of conditionality?" *World Development* vol. 25 N°9.
- Nissanke, M. (2003), "Revenue potential of the Tobin tax for development finance: a critical appraisal", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- Norregaard, J., Reppelin-Hill, V. (2000), "Taxes and tradable permits as instruments for controlling pollution: theory and practice" *International Monetary Fund Working paper* WP/00/13.
- Odedokun, M. (2003) "Sustainable External Development Financing", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- Odedokun, M. (2003), "Analysis of deviations and delays in aid disbursements", *Journal of Economic Development* 28.1 (June 2003) pp.137-169.
- OECD (2001) "Environmentally related taxes in OECD countries: issues and strategies" *OECD Publications*.
- ONUSIDA (2004) "Rapport Global 2004", <http://www.unaids.org/en/default.asp>.
- Overseas Development Institute (2003) "Can we attain the Millennium development goals in education and health through public expenditure and aid?" *ODI Briefing Paper*.
- Paul, J.A. (1996) "Statement on innovative funding" *Global Policy Forum* <http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/alternat/ecosoc/jpecosoc.htm>.
- Paul, J. A. (1997) "Alternative financing for global peace and development", *Global Policy Forum* <http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/alternat/analysis.htm>.
- Paul, J.A., Wahlberg, K. (2002), "Global Taxes for Global Priorities", *Global Policy Forum*, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/glotax/general/glotaxpaper.htm>
- The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press (2002), "What the world thinks in 2002" *The Pew Global Attitudes Project*, Washington D.C.
- The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press (2003), "Views of a changing world" *The Pew Global Attitudes Project*, Washington D. C.
- Rawls, John (1971). *A Theory of Justice*. *Harvard University Press*. *Cambridge Massachusetts*

- Reisen, H., Soto, M., Weithöner, T. (2003), "Financing global and regional public goods through oda: Analysis and evidence from the OECD creditor reporting system", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- Reisen, H. (2003), "New sources of development finance: an annotated conference report" *OECD Development Centre*.
- Reisen, H. (2004), "New Forms of Funding Development Goals" *OECD Development Centre*.
- Rogerson, A., Hewitt, A., Waldenberg, D. (2004), "The international aid system 2005-2010: Forces for and against change" *Overseas Development Institute*, Working Paper n°235.
- Round, R. (2001), "UN multilateral environmental agreement/financial mechanisms as a model for currency transactions tax governance and revenue redistribution", *Halifax Initiative, Conference Papers* [http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference_Papers.pdf).
- Round, R., (2001), "Une taxe sur les transactions financières pour favoriser le développement", *Mémoire présenté aux Nations Unies lors de la Conférence sur le Financement du Développement, L'Initiative d'Halifax*. [http://www.currencytax.org/files/policy\\_papers/ffd\\_submission\\_fr.pdf](http://www.currencytax.org/files/policy_papers/ffd_submission_fr.pdf)
- Ruggeri, F. (2002) "Un traité européen sur la taxe Tobin." *ATTAC France* <http://www.france.attac.org/a36>
- Sachs, J.D. (2001), "The strategic significance of global inequality" *The Washington Quarterly* 24:3 (2001) pp. 187-198.
- Sachs, J. D. "Weapons of mass salvation" *The Economist* October 2002.
- Sachs, J.D. (2002), "Financing global public goods: approaches to health", *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue*. United Nations Publications. <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>
- Sachs, J.D., Mc Arthur, J.W., Schumidt-Traub, G., Kruk, M., Bahadur, C., Faye, M., McCord, G. (2004), "Ending Africa's Poverty Trap", *Brookings papers on economics activity* n°2 pp 117-216.
- Sachs, J.D. (2004), "Doing the Sums on Africa." *Economist* May 2004.
- Sachs, J.D.(2004), "The G8 must fund the war against poverty" *The Financial Times* June 2004.
- Sagasti, F., Bezanson, K. (2001), "Financing and providing global public goods – Expectations and prospects", *Ministry for foreign affairs Sweden*, [www.ud.se/prefak/files/gpg.pdf](http://www.ud.se/prefak/files/gpg.pdf)
- Sagasti, F., Charpentier, S. (2001), « Financing biodiversity as a global public good », *Proceedings of a seminar convened by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on "Financing global public goods"*, [www.ud.se/prefak/files/f\\_p\\_20011005.pdf](http://www.ud.se/prefak/files/f_p_20011005.pdf)
- Salamon, L.M., Anheier, H.K., List, R., Toepler, S., Sokolowski, S.W. (1999), "Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector" *The John Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies* Baltimore, MD.
- Salanié, B. (1998), "Incidence fiscale et fiscalité optimale à l'équilibre" *Les Rapports du Conseil d'analyse économique, n° 11 "Fiscalité et redistribution"* La Documentation française pp 91-95.
- Salanié, B (2003): *The Economics of Taxation*. The MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts
- Sandler, T. (2001), "On financing global and international public goods", *World Bank - Working Paper* <http://netec.mcc.ac.uk/WoPEc/data/Papers/wopwobago2638.html>.

- Sandmo, A. (2003), "Environmental taxation and revenue for development", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- Santiso, C. (2001), "Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality." *The Georgetown Public Policy Review* 7:1 (Fall 2001) pp.1-22.
- Schmidt, R. (2000), "Is the Tobin Tax Practicable?" *Halifax Initiative, Conference Papers* [http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference_Papers.pdf).
- Schneider, J-L. (2004) "Du bon usage de l'IFF" *miméo non-publié du Ministère de l'Economie des Finances et de l'Industrie, Direction de la Prévision*. [jean-luc.schneider@dp.finances.gouv.fr](mailto:jean-luc.schneider@dp.finances.gouv.fr).
- Singh, K. (2001), "Tax financial speculation – The case for a securities transaction tax in India", *Halifax Initiative, Conference Papers* [http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference_Papers.pdf).
- Slemrod, Joel Ed. (2000) *Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing The Rich*. Russel Sage Foundation. *Harvard University Press*
- Solimano, A. (2003), "Remittances by emigrants: issue and evidence", *Wider Conference on "Sharing Global prosperity"* <http://www.wider.unu.edu/conference/conference-2003-3/conference2003-3.htm>.
- Spahn, B. (2001), "Stabilizing exchange rates with at Tobin-cum-circuit-breaker tax", *Halifax Initiative, Conference Papers* [http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference_Papers.pdf).
- Spahn, B. (2002), "On the feasibility of a tax on foreign exchange transactions", *Commissioned by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Bonn*, <http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/professoren/spahn/tobintax/>
- Stansfield, S.K. (2002), "Philanthropy and alliances for global health", *Global Public Goods Financing: New Tools for New Challenges - A policy dialogue* <http://www.undp.org/ods/ffd-monterrey.html>
- Stansfield, S.K., Harper, M., Lamb, G., Lob-Levyt, J. (2002) "Innovative financing of global public goods for health" *Commission on Macroeconomics and Health - Working Paper Series WG2/21*.
- Stecher, H., Bailey, M. (1999) "Time for a Tobin Tax?" *Oxfam* [http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what\\_we\\_do/issues/trade/trade\\_tobintax.htm](http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/trade_tobintax.htm).
- Stiglitz, J. E. (2000), "Economics of the public sector" *Edition Norton 3ème edition*
- Summers, L.H., Summers, V.P. (1989), "When Financial markets work too well: a cautious case for a securities transactions tax", *Journal of Financial Services Research, No 3*, pp 261-286.
- Svensson, J. (1997) "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality" *World Bank - Policy Research Working Paper n°1740*.
- Tanzi, V. (1996), "Globalization, tax competition and the future of tax system", *International Monetary Fund – Fiscal affairs Department*, IMF WP/96/141.
- Tanzi, V. (2000), "Globalization, Technological Developments, and the Work of Fiscal Termites," *International Monetary Fund*, IMF WP/00/181.
- Terry, G., Calaguas, B. (2003) "Financing the Millennium development goals for domestic water supply and sanitation." *Water Aid*, London.
- Thomas, S. (2001), "Funding public goods: the case of AIDS research", *Proceedings of a seminar convened by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs on "Financing global public goods"*, [www.ud.se/prefak/files/f\\_p\\_20011005.pdf](http://www.ud.se/prefak/files/f_p_20011005.pdf)

- Tirole, J. (2003 -1), "Intellectual property and health in developing countries" *IDEI*.
- Tirole, Henry, Trommetter, Tubiana (2003-2) .Propriété Intellectuelle. *Les Rapports du Conseil d'analyse économique, n° 41* La Documentation française
- Tran Thiet, J., (2003) "Vers un impôt européen?" Publication n° 40 10/22/2003 Institute Montaigne.
- United Nations, (2001) "Report of the High-level Panel on Financing for Development" *United Nations - Chair Ernesto Zedillo*.
- Wachtel, H. (1998), "Trois taxes globales pour maîtriser la spéculation." *Le Monde Diplomatique* Octobre 1998 <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/1998/10/WACHTEL/11192>
- Waller, P. (1994), "Aid and Conditionality" *Development and Cooperation* vol 1, Jan-Feb 1994 pp.4-5.
- Weaver, J., Dodd, R., Baker, J. (2003), "Debating the Tobin tax : New rules for global finance coalition" Washington DC.
- White, H., Morrissey, O. (1997) "Conditionality when donor and recipient preferences vary", *Journal of International Development* vol.9 n°4 pp.497-505.
- Willmott, E., Tibbett, S., Simms, A., (2001), "The Robin Hood Tax – Concrete proposals for fighting global poverty and promoting sustainable development by harnessing the proceeds from the currency transactions tax", *Halifax Initiative, Conference Papers* [http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference\\_Papers.pdf](http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/updir/Conference_Papers.pdf).
- Wit, R.C.N., Dings, J.M.W. (2002) "Economic incentives to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions from air transport in Europe." *CE*, Delft, NL. [http://www.cedelft.nl/eng/publicaties/02\\_4733\\_10.html](http://www.cedelft.nl/eng/publicaties/02_4733_10.html)
- World Bank, (2001), "Effective use of development finance for international public good", *Global Development Finance - Building Coalitions for Effective Development Finance*, pp109-133, <http://www.worldbank.com/prospects/gdf2001/vol1.htm>
- Wolfensohn, J.D., Stern, N., (2002) "A case for Aid: building a consensus for development assistance" *World Bank* Office of the Publisher.
- World Health Organisation (2001), "Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for Economic Development", Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health.

---

<sup>1</sup> Some studies estimate the gains to all developing countries from a halving of world trade barriers at USD 200 billion. Of this total, sub-Saharan Africa would secure a mere 2.4 billion and South Asia (excluding India) 3.3 billion. Source : African Development Bank (2002).

<sup>2</sup> "of the 1 to 3 millions malaria related deaths every year, it is estimated that 90% occur in Sub Saharan Africa the great majority of them among children" (Sachs and al. 2004)

<sup>3</sup> most rural households in Sub Saharan Africa have an income between 0.33 and 0.80 USD per day, do not have access to drinkable water or basic social services and illiteracy rates are very high(Sachs and al. 2004)

<sup>4</sup> NGOs disburse annually 7 bn USD for development (including redistribution of public funds coming from national budgets). (Rogerson and al (2004)

<sup>5</sup> See for example Evans (2002).

<sup>6</sup> multiyear commitments are sometimes made but for never more than three years

- 
- <sup>7</sup> The poor countries devote between 12 and 14% of their budgets to social services, which is distinctly below the 20% called for at the UN Summit on Social Development in 1995.
- <sup>8</sup> according to studies quoted by Foster and Keith (2003), less than 20% of ODA is allocated to health and education and less than 10% to basic social services.
- <sup>9</sup> A mere 27% of net ODA flows to Africa take the form of budgetary support. Source: OECD cited by Sachs et al. (2004).
- <sup>10</sup> more than 50% of poor people in Africa live in countries which have been torn by internal or international conflicts, which create significant difficulties in the normal functioning of aid processes ( Foster and Keith, 2003)
- <sup>11</sup> Oral testimony to the Working Group by *Médecins sans frontières*.
- <sup>12</sup> source : Heimans (2003)
- <sup>13</sup> source : Heimans (2003)
- <sup>14</sup> according to Tirole (2003-2) : " nearly 5 millions people die every year from tuberculosis, malaria, and from AID/HIV African varieties and yet, very little effort is devoted to research on vaccines for those diseases."
- <sup>15</sup> see Bulir and Hamann ( 2001)
- <sup>16</sup> according to Foster and Keith (2003), "there is strong evidence that interruptions to aid flows have been very damaging to economic performance"
- <sup>17</sup> Infrastructure spending declined by 2 to 4 percentage points of GDP in the low-income countries in the 1990s. During the same period, ODA financed less than 10% of poor countries' infrastructure spending, on average.
- <sup>18</sup> see Foster and Keith (2003)
- <sup>19</sup> Micklewright, Wright (2003).
- <sup>20</sup> Sources: Mc Donnell et al, OECD (2003); CCFD "*Baromètre de la solidarité internationale des Français*" (1999) and CCFD "*Les Français face à l'enjeu de la lutte contre la faim dans le monde*" (2003).
- <sup>21</sup> Sachs (2001) points out that all US military interventions in the developing countries since 1960 have occurred in countries that had suffered a collapse of their state structures in prior years.
- <sup>22</sup> according to Rogerson and al (2004 ),there would be some risk in giving to much weight to "security" criteria in aid allocation : this would not necessarily coincide with the maximum impact on poverty
- <sup>23</sup> see Gillinson (2004).
- <sup>24</sup> ODA has decreased by 7% between 1990 and 2000. It would have to increase by 23 bn USD to get back to its 1990 per capita level . Foster and Keith (2003)
- <sup>25</sup> according to Tirole (2003-1) "the fight against poverty is, by itself, a global public good. However altruistic they are, countries may prefer let others produce such a good. " Looking at medical an pharmaceutical R and D, Tirole also wonders (2003-2) if " any government would be prepared to finance by itself a global public good".
- <sup>26</sup> some authors, quoted by Rogerson and al (2004 ), reason that, if a limited number of countries participate to the IFF, they might have to shoulder, when reimbursements come due, a disproportionate share of the global ODA effort
- <sup>27</sup> It is clear that African countries will still need large scale transfers beyond 2015. From this point of view, Millennium Development Goals should be considered as interim targets only.
- <sup>28</sup> Sources: World Bank for education and malaria; oral testimony to the Working Group by *Médecins sans frontières*; and rapporteurs' estimates based on interviews for healthcare and emergency humanitarian assistance.
- <sup>29</sup> See Heller, Gupta (2002).
- <sup>30</sup> See Gordon, Hines (2002) and Tanzi (1996, 2000)
- <sup>31</sup> Rawls (1971)
- <sup>32</sup> a further step would be to explore the design and characteristics of an international tax system designed with an explicit income redistributing objective. Some economists have looked at the

---

possibility to use/ transpose in an international setting, some results derived, for a closed economy, from the theory of optimal taxation.

In its simplest form, the theory considers a tax system with two basic components: a linear (proportional) tax on income; and lump-sum transfers to each individual household. The system is progressive, because the average tax rate increases with the level of income (although the marginal tax rate is constant). Optimality results from the government choosing the tax rate and amount of transfer so as to maximize a social welfare function, under some assumption on the income elasticity of labor supply.

Bourguignon (2002) looks at the combination of two such systems, one in each country and one for the whole world: individuals would pay a proportional tax on their income to a world authority and receive a lump-sum transfer. There is no tax competition. Bourguignon notes that:

- many characteristics of such a model can be found in the real world. Domestic systems in developed countries are reasonably close and developing countries are converging towards it. ODA commitments expressed as a % of GDP can be seen as a proportional tax on national incomes at the world level ; and, similarly, ODA is increasingly used to finance direct or indirect income support for households.
- implementation of such a system, however, would meet with two difficulties : individual incomes are not known, especially in developing country. And there is no legitimate world authority to decide upon the tax rate and the amount of lump-sum transfers.

Mirrlees (2003) imagines a global, unified and integrated tax system which he compares to national systems. He notes that inequalities between countries are wider than within countries. This means, everything else equal, that the integrated system must have a higher tax rate and a lower lump-sum transfer than national systems. Again, precise measures of individual incomes would have to be available to calibrate the two parameters.

In a presentation to the group, Atkinson (2004) made a proposal which circumvents the issue of income measurement and still pursues an explicit redistributive goal. Countries could jointly (and publicly) auction, every year, a limited number of “tax permits” whose beneficiaries would be considered as having paid both their income and capital gain taxes. Proceeds would be shared between the issuing country (one third), other countries in proportion of their GDP (one third) and the financing of development (one third).

<sup>33</sup> See Mendez (2002).

<sup>34</sup> See Herber (1992).

<sup>35</sup> this point is developed by Atkinson (2003-1 and 2003-2)

<sup>36</sup> 57.000 individuals in the world have a net wealth over 30 MUSD, which totals 8370 bn USD ( Heimans 2003)

<sup>37</sup> a complete description and analysis of various possible legal and financial schemes can be found in Atkinson ((2003-1 and 2003-2)

<sup>38</sup> a point strongly developed by Atkinson (2003-1 and 2003-2)

<sup>39</sup> For a telling yet synthetic classification see Reisen (2003) and (2004), and Clunies-Roos (2002) and (2003).

<sup>40</sup> a critical assessment of financial transaction taxes can be found in ; for a less critical view, see

<sup>41</sup> see Alworth (1998)

<sup>42</sup> see BIS (2003)

<sup>43</sup> see Amor (2002)

<sup>44</sup> see Cooper (1999, 2001)

<sup>45</sup> with two exceptions : Bosphorus and Dardanelles ( ??)

<sup>46</sup> this development mostly comes from Addison, Chowdhury (2003)

<sup>47</sup> according to Atkinson ((2003-1 and 2003-2), an optimal scheme will have to combine several different instruments.

<sup>48</sup> Since 2001, a fee of between 1,500 and 700,000 Swiss Francs is payable to cover costs incurred by the ITU in examining applications. This system is not working very well at present, the ITU having recorded more than CHF 12 million in unpaid fees in 2003.

---

49) including USD 436 billion for companies based in the United States, USD 55.5 billion in Japan, USD 43 billion in Germany and USD 39 billion in France. See the special issue of Business Week, May 2001.

<sup>50</sup> World Investment Report, UNCTAD, 2002

<sup>51</sup> World Investment Report, *op.cit.*, p. 91

<sup>52</sup> Human Development Report (Global Report) 2003, p. 39, UNPD

53 CO2 emissions were estimated at 6.5 billion tonnes in 1995 and expected to rise to nearly 12 billion by 2035

<sup>54</sup> *Etude économique prospective de la filière électrique nucléaire française* [Prospective economic study of French nuclear power industry], La documentation française, 2000

55 Does not factor in possible differentiated applications of such a tax