

## What colonial legacy are we speaking of?

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Former colonial powers are regularly confronted with the sudden looming up of the past in their relationship with their erstwhile possessions. The diplomatic crises between Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom or between the Ivory Coast and France, the debate between Paris and Algiers on the colonial undertaking, the invocation of the atrocities of conquest by Colonel Kaddafi to obtain financing for the Tripoli-Benghazi highway from Italy are some illustrations, amongst many others of this statement. Japan – an underrated colonial power – is no exception, whose crimes during the Second World War and territorial expansion from the end of the XIX century continue to burden its relations with South Korea and China. In Bolivia, President Evo Morales, entirely absorbed in his nationalization of hydrocarbons singled out the Spanish firm Repsol denouncing « five hundred years of despoilment of natural wealth ».

In fact, it is not only a matter of political or diplomatic instrumentalization of historical memory by cynical and wily governments, even if, in this case, the « spontaneous » character of the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, during the year 2005, could give rise to smiles or it has become common knowledge that President Gbagbo and his entourage stir up and manipulate the nationalist turmoil of the Young Patriots of the Ivory Coast according to the circumstances. In all these situations, the memory of foreign occupation constitutes a potential of passions irreducible to the tactical use that is made of it, often restricting for national leaders themselves. Thus, the question of « comfort women » in South Korea hampered at regular intervals these last years, Seoul's diplomacy on account of the popular mobilizations that it gave rise to. In Africa, there are numerous accounts that testify to the anchoring of representations of Public benefits to the development and migrations in the colonial past.

« Leaving, it's also a challenge, a struggle between France and us. Even if you build a wall of Berlin, we will cross it. It is France that colonized us, it is to France that we must go » declared for example a young inhabitant of Mali de Kabaté, in the region of Kayes<sup>1</sup>.

And the anti-establishment singer Alpha Blondy affirmed as early as 1985:

« We are a cultural *melting pot*, cultural mutants that the West created and who make them scratch their heads. They came along and said to us: “We are going to colonize you. Drop the grass skirts and the leaves. Take to terylene, blue jeans, Ray Ban style.” And then, on the way, they changed their minds: Listen it's too expensive, you are independent! “It would be too easy! We want none of that independence. We want this cooperation, which got off to such a good start, to continue. You know you are condemned to recognize me, you cannot call me bastard; I am the fruit of your culture. I am now a projection of you [...] The Whites ought not to resign. The one who conquered me and who put his verb in the tongue had better not make a mistake. I can't let him do it<sup>2</sup>. »

As for Tiken Jah Fakoly, he sings:

« After the abolition of slavery

They created colonization

When we found the solution

They created cooperation

When we denounced this situation

They created globalization

And without explaining globalization

It's Babylon that's exploiting us<sup>3</sup>. »

The memory of colonization and of slavery nourishes cultural representations among which certain forms of sorcery such as the *ekong*, the cult of the Mami Wata or the reggae phantasmagoria among young city-dwellers are well-known African illustrations. It also supplies a discursive repertory to different social and political mobilizations, such as enlistment in the militia or armed movements or perhaps even terrorist action. From this point of view, demographic renewal has in no way altered the intensity of the colonial legacy in political consciousness. Laurent and Simone Gbagbo's Young Patriots or the ghetto folk from the Ivory Coast that the anthropologist and film-maker Éliane de Latour analysed in diverse articles and directed in her films *Bronx-Barbès* (2000) and *Les oiseaux du ciel* (2006), persist in defining their social practices and strategies in reference to colonization, even if there are some who refer to contemporary stakes of access to citizenship, employment, the soil, money, women, cultural universality or migratory opportunities<sup>4</sup>. The question of the « remanence » of the colonial past – to keep for the time being a term that is in vogue but deserves some explanation – remains a stake of acute social and political struggles in most societies that have historically been involved in the formation of colonial empires.

This was so in the former parent states themselves, where the representation of public aid for development in political opinion and classes, but also that of « immigration », « Islam », « Africa » or « Asia », are indissociable from the legacy of imperial consciousness, without for all that being reducible to it. The virulence of the present debate in France on the suburbs and the “natives of the French Republic is evidence of this<sup>5</sup> ». From ideological debate in propositions of law, colonization has become an object of public controversy forty years after Independence, perhaps simply because it had a constitutive role in the formation of national consciousness and the affirmation of nationalism in Europe since the xix century, perhaps even the xvi<sup>th</sup> century<sup>6</sup>. Étienne Balibar pointed this out with regard to the relation between France and Algeria, which in his eyes constitutes an whole of « one and a half »:

« What one must challenge, it is the idea that the dimensions of national belonging are necessarily representable by whole numbers, like one or two [...] The fact that the nation was formed in the empire means that the empire is still and always with the nations [...] <sup>7</sup>. »

The time is thus of painful memories: that of repentance at the memory of massacres, of forced labour, of slavery, that of frustration or intergenerational rage, but also, sometimes, that of nostalgia for the « good old days » and of the « positive role » of the overseas European « presence ». In the English speaking countries, an entire critical current of social sciences or more precisely *cultural studies*, whose leaders in particular are Homi Bhabha, Paul Gilroy, Stuart Hall and Gayatri Spivak, considers that the colonial situation is inherent to contemporary political experience and among others to forms of class and gender oppression and to the social conditions of migrants at the obvious risk of masking the diversity of historical contexts, of nominalizing the colonial qualifier in a unique « coloniality » and of reifying the colonial legacy to essential « post-colony »<sup>8</sup>.

It goes without saying that the former colonies are in symmetrical fashion inhabited by their own « memories of empire<sup>9</sup> ». Anti-imperialist sensibility is an apparently inexhaustible source of legitimation for dominant African, Asian or Latin-American classes and for their competitors. The social relations stemming from the colonial State and its political economy remain subjacent to splits and conflicts of the highest importance, from the fact of the reproduction of lines of domination, accumulation and exclusion inherited from the Imperial era. As a fact of consciousness, the evidence of the « colonial legacy » is thus there, that now have to be understood beyond commonplace notions and false explanations.

### ***The colonial legacy: evidences and half-truths***

It could be useful, at first, to list, in a non-exhaustive way, some of the main experienced or supposed continuities of the colonial to the « post-colonial periods without claiming to explain these manifestations or attributing to them an explanatory function, without either being in a position to enter into detail for each of these.

The most salient colonial legacy has features of the perpetuation of the political territory of the State, born of colonial occupation and administration, as well as of the interaction between colonial powers themselves. Decolonization appears in fact retrospectively, as a general rule, like a vast movement of appropriation, more or less conflicting, of the political space of the colonial State, in Africa and in Asia – with the few exceptions of the Indian sub-continent torn apart by the Partition of 1947 – and, after 1991, in the post-Soviet area<sup>11</sup>. This reproduction of the territorial framework is not just the fruit of the « treachery » of political elites subjected to « Imperialism », at the moment of Independence. It rests on complex and massive social practices and logic. An important element of its legitimation, the material and symbolic culture of the Contemporary State, for example in the field of architecture, urbanism, garments or cuisine, also finds its roots in the colonial age. Moreover most of the particular identities, sometimes qualified in a misleading manner as « primordial » – such as ethnicity in Africa, « communalism » in India or confessionalism in Lebanon – in fact crystallised at the time of the colonial era, rather than them constituting an atavistic cultural core; they have been the other modes of appropriation of institutions of the postcolonial State. Likewise, certain « global » radicalisms linked to identity – like Afro-centrism in the United States or in sub-Saharan Africa and anti-Semitism in the Arab countries, long before the creation of Israel – seem to be, in part, products derived from European racialism of the XIX<sup>th</sup> century and colonial “communautarisme” dividing Europeans, Jews and Natives, particularly in Algéria<sup>12</sup>.

As a result classes and groups dominating the national economy and the Contemporary state have frequently set in motion the mechanism of their pre-eminence in the shadow of the colonial State, and sometimes owing to the preferential relationship that they fostered with the latter. It is not possible to generalize on the level of all the former colonial situations or to draw up from these an exhaustive table. Nevertheless the colonial origins of contemporary systems of inequality and domination appear irrefutable, even though non-exclusive in the majority of cases. The political economy of the present day proceeds from the imperial configurations of the xix<sup>th</sup> and xx<sup>th</sup> centuries, which in no way excludes the possibility of real breakings off sometimes of a revolutionary kind<sup>13</sup>. The imaginations of the government ensue, for many of them, from the colonial period. This is first of all true of the exemplary notion of « development ». The latter reformulates the problem of « enhancement » and « the civilizing mission<sup>14</sup> », as well as missionary work, at the very least in its universalise sensibility, such as the London Missionary

Society or the Methodists in South Africa<sup>15</sup>. The grand political ideologies in which the actors of Nationalist movements found their way around and the administrators of the post-colonial State were also circulated at the time of the colonial era, sometimes by direct teaching in scholarly establishments and imperial universities, sometimes by capillarity, owing to the intervention of third party actors of colonization – such as communist militants, socialists, even Christians –, to trans-imperial networks of solidarity and socialization, student sojourns in the parent state, the diverse experiences of expatriation in the western world, in the Socialist camp or other imperial possessions. Furthermore, reformism, as a State mode of thought, even if neo-liberal, and as a mode of public politics, found one of its precedents in the colonial state that did not rest till it “reformed itself” at the same time as it claimed to reform societies that it was subject to. But beyond these obvious plans for « governance » or « government », and as a condition of their emergence and their efficiency, it is the very representation of the social at the heart of the colonial state that seems to be reproduced, despite independence. The positivist vision of progress, running through history, in a linear and teleological manner from the cardinal point of tradition to that of modernity, that Promethean idea of the « mastery<sup>17</sup> » of the administrator, engineer, Doctor over nature, disease, things and people were broadly born at the colonial period, in the xix<sup>th</sup> century and in the first decades of the xx<sup>th</sup> century<sup>18</sup>, being understood that the latter was but a matrix among others of such a conception of change, inseparable from the Enlightenment, their « enlightened despotism » and their *Policeystaat*, from evangelical work, the Industrial and Technological Revolution, Saint-Simonism, Freemasonry, the democratic and republican spirit, the theory of race, socialism and communism.

Yet imperial epistemology in no way amounts to the one-to-one imposition of its « modernity » on local tradition. In fact things have always been more complex, if only because since more than two centuries the « invention of tradition<sup>19</sup> » was a major vehicle of social change in the imperial home countries as well as in their colonial possessions. Even if Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger have since taken some distance in relation to its systematic or mechanistic utilization<sup>20</sup>, the concept of the « invention of tradition » usefully realises the imagination of nationalism in different ideological or institutional orientations, but also, more broadly, that of urban civilisation and its mass consumption, with its cult of « neo » and « authenticity » styles. At the same time, it designates some of the main wheels of *Indirect Rule* and the concomitant emergence of Orientalism as representation of the other and thus of self<sup>21</sup>. As such, the « invention of tradition » was a fundamental ingredient of the formation of the Nation State and of globalization since the end of the xviii<sup>th</sup> century. It still remains one of its major repertoires today. Culturalism – that is to say the innate conviction that « cultures » exist as totalities that are distinct, indeed antagonistic, to which we respectively belong – is one of the paradoxical fictions of globalisation. Since two centuries the changes in the economic, financial, social, political and cognitive levels went hand in hand with the process of retraction of identity and the production of idiosyncrasies of every order. The craze for Samuel Huntington’s hazy argument on the « shock of civilisations » or new university schools such as ethno-development and ethno-psychiatry are but cyclic expressions of this general tendency. Even before the relationship of one to the other is established, it echoes the interest of British colonial anthropology, in particular the work of Malinowski, who, admittedly, meant to give greater importance to the *contact situation* where the cooperation between Whites and Natives opened the way to social change, but who also spoke of the « clash of races » or the « clash of civilisations » as opposing phenomena set out as « distinct et non integrated ».

One could also think that the modern day exaltation of « civil society » overhauled the « invention of tradition » and constitutes a « new form of *Indirect Rule*, native culture being once again mobilized to control the natives<sup>22</sup> », for example in the fields of micro-credit, micro-enterprise or the protection of the environment. More broadly, the neo-liberal problem of the « transition » to the market economy and to democracy, which made non-governmental

organizations auxiliaries of predilection, often follows the premises of developmental authoritarianism or modernizer of yesteryear. Today, like yesterday, the enemy of progress would be the people, its traditions, obscurantism, egoism; the obstacle to cross is real society even as one glorifies its hypostasis, henceforth « civil society », in former times the nation or the proletariat. The neo-liberal « shock therapy » is symmetrical in relation to the « social surgery » characteristic of the « colonial question », to take up the expression of a historian of the 40s<sup>23</sup>. *In fine* the said reforms of liberalization of the past two decades could well prove to be apparatus of social and political control as much as the construction of the market.<sup>24</sup> And the real public-private partnership that they promote takes up again the systematic colonial collaboration between for one, the administration and for the other, investors, companies, *compradors*, Christian missions and local middle-men in the form of delegations, concessions, general farms, - all procedures for the « privatization of the State<sup>25</sup> » which were so favourable to the « *straddling* » between positions of power and positions of accumulation and which are closely akin to the practices of *Indirect Rule*.

In the first analysis, here then are some continuations that are sufficient to demonstrate the scope of the colonial legacy. One can complete this rapid statement with several observations. Colonization was occasionally for the colonized a « stupor caused by a total defeat<sup>26</sup> », or has ideologically been reconstructed as such. In certain cases its violence cannot be under-estimated: the « apocalyptic conquest » of Equatorial Africa, which lasted about forty years from 1880 to 1920, and caused the death of half of its population<sup>27</sup>. Moreover, empires have progressively instituted more or less radical forms of racial segregation, which reached its highest point in South Africa; the physical coercion in political and social relationships of production went hand in hand with a symbolic degradation just as cruel. From this point of view, colonization represented what the Historian of the French Revolution Michel Vovelle named as an « event traumatism<sup>28h</sup> » and it continues to deeply mark the historicity of conquered societies, but also that of conquering societies.

As politically subjected and militarily occupied, colonized societies developed repertoires of action prone to guile, dissimulation and derision<sup>29</sup> which moreover are not a peculiarity of the colonial situation, since we find them in Eastern European countries and in Italy and which hinge on native cultural genres of half-breeds and trickery<sup>30</sup>. « The act of colonization automatically [creates] a mental reflex of secrecy », an official of the African Federation Party declared in 1959<sup>31</sup>. Nowadays, the systematic bypassing of conditionalities claimed by sponsors is perhaps only the continuation of this historic experience. Similarly, the generality of the principle of intermediation in situations in which the colonial times have multiplied occasions of « operational misunderstandings<sup>32</sup> » between the authorities and the auxiliaries or colonial subjects and has « routinized » these sort of interactions till today. Colonial (and post-colonial) societies are thus « double bottomed<sup>33</sup> ». Constituted from a plurality of space-times, they are deeply heterogeneous and do not easily admit of being reduced to a single dimension, be it that of « collaboration », « nationalist struggle », « national integration », « participation » or again the « class struggle », to confine ourselves to the great paradigms that did their best to seize them<sup>34</sup>.

Consequently the hold of the colonial state on the societies that it subjugated was limited in time and space, yet real and durable in its effects. On this front, the notion of « westernization » is out of place. The scope of the dependence of Africa and Asia has been exaggerated for a long time. The colonial time has in fact not levelled in the least the irreducible historicity of their societies, but modified the conditions for their extroversion. Ultimately it procured for them a « dependence annuity » that their various actors tried their best to gain for their profit through social struggle, even armed conflict, autonomous in relation to public politics and the strategies of the colonizer. It altered the level and the stakes of social competition by instituting or

enshrining capitalism, and thus the juridical institution and practices of private property in its relationship to a public domain, by diffusing a new learning, by delimiting the Nation State as the main arena of public confrontation and by inserting the concerned territories in new world circuits.

### *Transmissions*

Any causal one-to-one cultural or historical interpretation would be inappropriate in the present state of the debate in the social sciences. No one dwells, for example, on the respective influence of British and French models of colonial administration in the evolution of contemporary Africa, for this dichotomy seems to have rested on an inadequate empirical analysis and given greater importance to national emotions than to the facts: French colonial administration was for the most part, « indirect », and *Colonial Rule* very interventionist<sup>35</sup>. Likewise the idea that a « political culture », colonial for example – or just as easily, by false opposition, « traditional » –, that is to say, the determining factor of contemporary social action does not stand up to analysis for long: in a given situation, different and sometimes the same actors at different moments, draw antagonistic lessons from a common past. That, incidentally, is one of the mistakes that one could fault recent works with, works that in a teleological fashion and not without passion nor anachronisms, attribute paternity and responsibility of the exceptional legislation of Vichy and Shoah<sup>36</sup> to the practices of exception of conquest and the colonial State. This, then, is the literary simplification and polemics at which « post-colonial studies » sometimes stop, taking for granted the inherence of the colonial experience in the contemporary world. Not that the assumption is intrinsically erroneous but it needs to be demonstrated case by case rather than being set up as a substantive in a quasi-metaphysical postulate.

Neither the « colonial legacy » nor moreover that of colonized societies constitute explicative factors that would suffice in themselves. The relevant approach is undoubtedly that of the historical sociology of politics that questions itself about concrete processes, in precise contingent situations, through which social change is effected and the lines of continuation affirm themselves simultaneously. There is not just one answer to the question of « colonial legacy » in contemporary forms of government. On the other hand, a more or less coherent problem outlines itself according to which contemporary government has inevitably something to do and to look into with the colonial past from which it is descended – this relationship being singular from one situation to the other. It is not then a question of constructing a theory or a global interpretation of the « colonial legacy », but of defining an analytical and operational approach in a defined context, for example in that of a development project or programme or again in the forest of a historic land, city, country or sub-region, in accordance with a « game of scales<sup>37</sup> » adapted to what one is looking for.

Max Weber's work is of great help here. In his causal analysis, the latter placed emphasis on « synchronic interactions », but also on « diachronic interactions » which he defined either as « legacy », or as « antecedent conditions<sup>38</sup> ». He refused to impute a general causal priority to a limited number of factors and still less to a unique factor. In his eyes the « pluralism of orientations of action » had to be at the centre of any causal analysis. Max Weber reasoned in terms of historical experience or, better, historical matrice: « The conceptualisation of historical phenomena [...] does not set [...] reality in abstract categories, but strives to articulate it in concrete genetic relations that inevitably assume a distinctive individual character<sup>39</sup>. » Nevertheless it is a rule that « what has come down from the past becomes everywhere the immediate precursor of what is considered as valid in the present<sup>40</sup> ». This relationship of the present to the past is fragmentary, latent, evolutionary, of long duration, and to say it all,

contingent. It is of a contextual order and in that sense the very notion of causality is dangerous if it supposes that the same causes produce the same effects. For the factors of causality are valid only in distinctive configurations of given historic situations. The action that the past configures also takes part in a cyclic interaction.

La question of the « colonial legacy» then became that of the context of action configured by the colonial past. And the modalities of these « survivals » are clearly oblique and paradoxical, instead of being a one-to-one « causal chain ». The « legacies » are in this way likely to reproduce themselves in time within the same field– for example religious or political – but also to move from one field to the other, for example from the religious or kinship to politics or economics. In the very different post-colonial contexts of Central Asia and South Cameroon, Olivier Roy and Peter Geschiere have thus demonstrated how kinship relations prove to be vectors of the market economy<sup>41</sup>. One knows, further, that they represent classic repertoires of the statement of political relations and their legitimation. It is particularly the displacements from one field to the other that explain why « legacy » and « antecedent conditions» never establish by themselves adequate causality<sup>42</sup>.

The aim is not then to calculate, in a static way, the influence of the « colonial legacy » on contemporary forms of « governance » or « government », but to restore the historical processes by which these forms of « governance » or « government » « rose up » from the colonial past, in the sense that Michel Foucault spoke of the « emergence » (*Entstehung*) or the « provenance» (*Herkunft*) of social practices or phenomena, in the interstices of historical contingency, in preference to their linear « origin » (*Ursprung*)<sup>43</sup>. Several convergent formulations come to mind:

- *-the sociology of historical actors for the handing down of the colonial legacy:* for example that of former administrators or police officers on overseas postings and retrained in bureaucracies of the home country at the time of decolonisation<sup>44</sup> ;
- *-the study of concatenation or the linking of colonial modes of government to the postcolonial State, erstwhile forms fitting into the contemporary scheme, which subordinates them, or, on the other hand, is subverted by them.* Marxist authors, in the '60s and '70s, adopted this type of analysis either in terms of « trajectories » of the passage from slavery to feudalism, then to the absolutist State and to Capitalism, (Perry Anderson), or in terms of the articulation of modes of production and the submission of social lineage relationships of production to Capitalism (Claude Meillassoux, Emmanuel Terray, Pierre-Philippe Rey *et al.*). Historians have also shown how the market networks of the Indian sub-continent which at first saw themselves cut off from their traditional markets, were redeployed in the heart of the British colonial Empire and on the world scale<sup>5</sup>. In the same way, the social relationships formed at the time of the colonial period, the modes of exploitation of the work force and the administration of economic institutions which the latter introduced and the market flow it accommodated are likely to reproduce themselves in the government of the contemporary world, which, for all that, does not mean that they would be identical with what they were in the Empires;
- *-Tocqueville's problem of the « old regime » and « revolution », the new regime pursuing by other means the same ends as its predecessor,* for example on the one hand the caesura of Independences, and on the other, the Republican split in Turkey, or the Revolution in China and in Iran<sup>46</sup>. This approach is particularly useful for analysing the public politics of contemporary States;
- *-the related Gramscian problem, of the « passive revolution » and « transformism » permitting dominant social groups to« change everything so that everything remains the same » – in*

*accordance with Tancredè's formula, in Tomasi di Lampedusa's The Cheetah – by ideologically and materially coopting potentially radical counter-elites.* It helps us to understand how dominant classes could maintain their influence successively, during colonial occupation, nationalist mobilization, de-colonization and survive the different changes in the political regime with the exception of the Fula aristocracy and the Hausa of Northern Nigeria, or on the other hand, how they failed to reproduce themselves, in the image of the Arab elites of Zanzibar or the tutsi of Rwanda at the moment of accession to Independence. Speaking more generally, this problem records very well the trajectory of the post-colonial State in sub-Saharan Africa<sup>47</sup> and the « thermidorian situations » owing to which revolutionary strata perpetuated themselves as professionalized political classes at the service of the State, consolidated their domination, seized the main channels of primitive accumulation and are today confronted with the double challenge of economic liberalization and the changing scales of globalization (Russia, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Iran<sup>48</sup>). In each case it is useful for deconstructing the « reforms without change<sup>49</sup> » which are the lot of programmes of economic liberalization from the moment the continuity of lines of domination and taking interest for the advantage of solid nuclei of power, remarkably stable in time, prevails (Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, Kenya, Cameroon);

- *-the identification of the cumulative effects of closing and eviction that, in the course of time, delimit in a negative way the « legitimate problems of the policy » (Pierre Bourdieu) by defining an unthinkable or indescribable or an impossible politics.* The narrative of the Republic in Turkey, the Revolution in Iran, the Reform in Tunisia, the Makhzen in Morocco, the National Unit in sub-Saharan Africa and the Security in Malaysia delimit and structure in this manner political fields. It remains to be seen by which « concrete genetic relations » (Max Weber) they are the result of the Colonial or Para-colonial event<sup>50</sup>;

- *-the assumption of the re-actualization, in time, of a third-party language of hegemonic transactions on which the colonial empires were built<sup>51</sup>.* We have seen the similarity between more or less useful fictions of « world governance » and the imperial statement of the « white man's burden ». But its decoding supposes, on the one hand, a systematic critical analysis of discourses, on the other relating these to the political economy of concerned situations or the times, if one wants to avoid the trap of historicist teleology according to which colonial hegemony duplicates itself.

On July 4<sup>th</sup> 1960, General Janssens, Commandant-in-chief of the public Force, had created a scandal in Léopoldville by writing on a blackboard: « After Independence = Before Independence. » What was, and still remains missing, is a demonstration in due form.

### ***The colonial times: debates, types, periods and combinations***

The colonial State is a moment<sup>52</sup>. Firstly, a moment from the point of view of social sciences, because it was not so long ago that this notion would have seemed to be an oxymoron, even a political provocation. The authors who are the most attentive to the dynamics of the colonised societies have for a long time used the term “colonial situation” at the cost of a certain reification of the said “situation”, established as a universal ideal type and as a “complete social phenomenon” even though the need to make place for the “historical background” was clearly formulated<sup>53</sup>. It will be Indian *subaltern studies*, which will be among the first to break away from this approach by postulating that “an autonomous Indian domain” (Ranjit Guha) of thought and action, which cannot be reduced to the orientalist statements and which is beyond the Colonial State's control had subsisted during the British colonial period, but not without getting into a certain nationalist populism and getting tied up in various theoretical and

methodological apories<sup>54</sup>. What will follow is a whole lot of anthropological and historical literature, striving to emphasise upon the interactions, even “dialogue” or “encounter” between the latter and the colonised societies, even if it means reviewing and refining the approach of the *subaltern studies*, henceforth divided into several schools of thought.

Such interactions between the coloniser and the colonised social players permit one to dismiss the objection according to which the concept of colonial State would be inappropriate, save for the situations of independence without decolonisation like in Latin America in the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, in Rhodesia from the *Unilateral Declaration of Independence*, even in Israel for certain denigrators of Zionism. These were inherent to processes of “construction” and “formation” of the “rational-legal<sup>55</sup>” State even if its sovereignty was established (or restored) only at the second stage. Moreover, the domination of the metropolitan colonising State, which translated into endogenous processes of formation of the State that it did not annul systematically but that it recomposed, amplified and founded, as the case maybe, and that it sometimes disintegrated into<sup>56</sup>. It is quite prescriptive and simplistic to think, given the nationalist historiography, that it had a regressive effect in this respect by blocking the birth, the maturation and the modernisation of indigenous States, though undeniably, it confiscated their sovereignty, modified their territorial stranglehold, disrupted their political economy, transformed their social foundations<sup>57</sup>. The relationship between power and production of the conquered societies’ own policies continued its journey for a long time during the colonial period, notwithstanding the caesura or distortion that it might have introduced in their trajectory.

That there was a colonial State – *i.e.*, in more exact terms, a process of formation of a colonial State – endowed with a relative autonomy and specific social foundations, that the latter was leaden with its own historicity, and that it did not erode that of the societies that it had under its control, this is something that is now better understood. And *de facto*, the colonial State, a moment in the social sciences, is especially a complex moment in the historical trajectories that existed before it and that survived it.

First of all, the colonial State must be differentiated from other imperial or colonial forms, even though it could maintain close relations with these, even be confused with these or become indistinguishable from these, as we will see. Subsequently, the colonial State *stricto sensu* had different periods that prohibit one from conjugating it in singular. One of its prototypes goes back to the Venetian colonisation of Crete (1211-1669): the Serenissima used to directly administer the island despite the distance that separated the two and to do so, did not hand over any charge at all to a conquering nobility, a merchant guild or a company with charter; it was also marked by the “reverberation” within from this ultramarine experience and it ethnicized the relationship between Greeks and Latins<sup>58</sup>. The mercantile colonial empires and notably the catholic monarchy represented another phase of transoceanic bureaucratisation<sup>59</sup>. Furthermore, the mercantilist economy of plantation was a “precursor” at the same time of the subsequent domination of the caciques and of the *caudillos* in Latin America, as part of the nation-State, and of the “rational-legal<sup>60</sup>” capitalist enterprise.

But what retains our attention in the first place is naturally the colonial imperialism of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries that replaces these first modern empires, the companies with charter and the economy of the trading posts. The colonial State acquires a new specificity. The direct military occupation on which it is built cannot be dissociated, on one hand, from the emergence of the nation-State, the industrial Revolution, the expansion of the capitalist mode of production and the technical transformations that accompany it, on the other hand, from the increasing racialization of the social relations between Europeans and natives in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The colonial conquest is also concurrent with other innovations that are anyway not necessarily congruent such as the structuring of a bourgeois and potentially critical civil society:

it is an autonomous missionary movement with respect to the State and largely associative based on the abolitionist combat, that heads the evangelisation and not anymore only a catholic Church and orders in symbiosis with the imperial powers and the Holy See; moreover, the intellectuals, the press or the University exercise a right of their own opinion on the empires which ranges from their legitimisation to their subversion<sup>61</sup>.

The ideal type of the colonial State of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries must in turn be periodised and differentiated, as it was recognised from the outset by Georges Balandier<sup>62</sup>. In the first analysis – but only in the first analysis – the colonial State experienced several ideological phases that affected its practices, its public policies and its political economy at the same time as its social base: *grosso modo* the phase of the conquest, that of the “ethical” or “civilising” colonisation, that of the “second occupation” after the 1929 crisis and the Second World War, that of the political liberalisation, finally that of the decolonisation. It was not homogenous from one empire to another, and within the same empire, from one possession to another, and even within each of these, from one region to another. The modalities of its dismantling, by unilateral or negotiated retreat, by territorial losses to another power, by political or military defeat as a result of a war for freedom, also produced different imperial consciences that are more or less peaceful, unhappy or nostalgic. Finally, it is pertinent to recall that the players of the colonisation – administrators, missionaries, planters, industrialists, businessmen, teachers, doctors, writers, etc., all in fact of diverse nationalities, regions, religions, social origins – were divided amongst themselves as it was revealed on the big day by decolonisation conflicts<sup>63</sup>; that the colonised people played an active role within the colonial State or in relation to it; and that the colonial experience “reverberated” in the metropolises as well.

Thus, colonisation was clearly a story of synchronic and diachronic interactions, a facet of this “generalised mutual interaction” that globalisation constituted from the 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards. It constituted such a prodigiously complex event, afflicted with the stamp of contingency that it is scientifically vain to want to modelise it beyond the reasonable limit. From this point of view, the important categories of usage such as the distinction between the conquering State and the colonial State, strictly speaking, the “second colonial occupation”, the types of colonisation or administration, the nationalist movement, though they might be very convenient, must not claim to be accorded an inordinate explicative or narrative status.

Moreover, the colonial moment, apprehended in its historicity, encounters other trajectories, which also have their own historicity and which never manage to annul the military occupation, political repression, “civilising mission”, evangelisation or economic development. Trajectories of pre-existent indigenous social groups that live through the colonial period to the best of their interests and as per moral strategies or repertoires that cannot be reduced to the new order, like the nobility of the robe of the *priyayi* of Java. Trajectories of societies or political formations included in the colonial State, but which will pursue their future within it, following the example of Mossi in Upper Volta, Buganda in Uganda, the princely states of the Raj, the monarchies placed under protectorate or even, in a more discreet manner but not any less effective, several lineage societies<sup>64</sup>. Special trajectories of cultural or religious movements, repertoires or ethical styles, political ideas that will retain their autonomy, like Christianity, Islam, Pan-africanism, the international communist movement, Freemasonry, clothing trends or dance forms. Finally, trajectories of other empires, either Europeans, or extra-Europeans, to whom the national and industrial imperialism will get added or with whom it will enter into competition.

It is this latter type of inter-imperial “encounter” that we wish to emphasise upon now to nurture the debate. The European colonialism of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was not an exclusive experience between a metropolis and a group of possessions. On one hand, the colonial empires had to

compromise with the legacies of empires – for example that of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa and in Machrek – that had preceded them and in a more diffused manner, with trans-national historical fields. They sometimes even co-opted “secondary empires”, favoured their expansion in the hope of instrumentalising it, like Great Britain did with Oman in the Indian Ocean and at first, France with Samory in West Africa<sup>65</sup>. The co-existence of these imperial forms in the regions stated were often durable as indicated by Nancy Rose Hunt in the matter of the superposition and collaboration of the Belgians and Arab in the eastern part of Congo<sup>66</sup>. On the other hand, the European colonialism established several “imperial interconnections<sup>67</sup>” not only within each of these empires, but also between them, and it was a political experience as much inter-governmental or multilateral as it was trans-national.

Other than its own comparative interest<sup>68</sup>, taking into consideration such imperial combinations has the advantage of drawing a more complete map of the possible “legacies”, in a given situation, of understanding better the effects of concatenation and sedimentations inherent to globalisation, and of grasping the ambivalence of the “postcolonial<sup>69</sup>” period. Memories about this are found blurred. In Arab countries, representations of the Ottoman sovereignty and the western domination are continuously balanced. In Cameroon or in Togo, the German colonisation acts as a critical myth of the French colonisation. The South African history still bears the mark of the collision between the heritage of the Voc (Dutch East India Company) and that of the British colonisation: Anglo-Boer wars, triangular confrontations between the British, Afrikaners and the indigenous African people that was further complicated by the presence of the Coloured, subsequently the strengthening of the racial segregation and its consecration in the form of the apartheid were the dramatic result of the combination of not only two imperial times, that of the companies with charter and that of the colonialism, but also between different administrative or agrarian logics, in fact not matching with the antagonism between Afrikaners and British since several of them settled down as colonists from the colony of the Cap, then from that of the Natal<sup>70</sup>.

In addition, the interference of imperial experiences other than those of the European imperialism gives media coverage to the relations with the West, with industrial and trading modernity, with “development”. Thus, the impact of European ideas on the Arab world was filtered by the Ottoman Empire, its elite, its language, whose influence was as determining a factor in the matter as the Egyptian vector or the educated Lebanese Christians in the missionary establishments which have been emphasised upon for a long time. Even the recourse to the Arab roots and the neologisms to enunciate the new political, economic or other concepts was reliant on its detour by way of the osmanli<sup>71</sup>. The classical empires have moreover left behind as heritage, specific repertoires of prosperity, justice, liberty, administration, power, State and the idea itself of civilisation that the colonialism has not eradicated at all<sup>72</sup>.

### ***Imperial hegemonic transactions***

The “classic” or colonial empires had heterogeneous constructions, distended in space, based on the cooptation as much as on repression, and giving more or less a good deal to cultural pluralism and local autonomy by way of “municipalisation”, recognition of the “barbarian nobility” – the “nobility of the others<sup>73</sup> » – or the *Indirect Rule*, indeed, as it has been seen, to sub-contracting of their pre-eminence to “secondary empires” States enfeoffed as steps. Moreover, the empires were trans-cultural and later trans-national experiences of extroversion during which not only popular categories but also politically dominant elites could live through the other’s prism of the language, beliefs, values or style. Those of the conqueror or even, paradoxically, those of the victor as in the case of the Hellenistic mediation of the Roman Empire: imperial elite or in any

case, a substantial fraction of this imperial elite, was sometimes Roman and Hellenised, sometimes Greek and Romanised, with the double cultural, linguistic and political affiliation being compatible with the roman citizenship and the exercise of public functions. One Plutarque, a Greek and Roman citizen, revealed a lot, in his multiple identifications, about this ambivalence of the imperial extroversion<sup>74</sup>. With one thing partially explaining the other, the empires were moments of intense human circulation: that of the warriors, that of the servile work force, that of the colonists, that of the subjects sucked into the colonising country or moving from one province to another for the needs of the administration and commerce, that of the cultural intermediaries as well forging and circulating the third language of the imperial hegemonic repertory.

From all these points of view, the European colonial empires are not an exception that the international trade, direct foreign investments in the industry or the plantations, university teachings, Christian missions, Islamic associates and the practice of Pilgrimage rendered multilateral and trans-national from the outset. They constituted by themselves an imperial combination, made of rivalries, economic competition, and simultaneously collaboration and exchange of knowledge and models, in the form of a true “pan-colonialism” reflecting about a kind of “comparative colonial policy”, in particular, under the aegis of the International Colonial Institute founded at Brussels in 1894, at the initiative of the French Joseph Chailley-Bert<sup>75</sup>.

The question that comes up then is about “together being a sort of (their) world of significations” (Cornelius Castoriadis), despite their cultural extroversion and territorial dispersion. Economic interactions provide a first answer whose significance is relativized quickly by the growing globalisation of the exchanges. The coercion procures another one that is known to be unsatisfying: military resources, for all their decisiveness during the conquest, were always insufficient and sometimes inadequate in order to guarantee the integrity of the empires. The latter, in fact, owed their maintenance mainly to their legitimacy. In Max Weber’s words, they were a “domination” (*Herrschaft*) that elicited obeisance and affiliation, as much as a regime of “force” (*Macht*) based on fear. Or rather, a process of recomposition from a regime of “force”, at the time of the conquest, to a regime of “domination, with “ethical”, “civilising”, “evangelising” or “assimilating” pretension – process of recomposition that was evidently fated to get stuck in an deadlock for financial, demographic, political or simply “racial” reasons and which continued to resort to the most brutal kind of coercion.

So, it is about getting a better understanding of the “hegemonic transactions” that guaranteed unity and reproduction of the empires despite their disparity. In his study of the catholic Monarchy, Serge Gruzinski sees for example in Aristotelism, the “software” of the Iberian empire that would constitute “a closed space, a tight sphere centred around the solid core made up of intellectual tools, Roman orthodoxy, systems and codes of expression” and which would be “impervious” to the miscegenation taking place in abundance in other domains, such as the arts or the evangelisation<sup>76</sup>. The *paideia* in the Roman Empire, the *tapa* at Java, the manner of being osmanli that was based notably on the affiliation to the hanafite law school, on the practice of the “Islamic sociability discipline<sup>77</sup>” and their use of the Ottoman language were such third imperial languages.

A point remains to be debated, in fact, about the real “imperviousness” of these hegemonic repertoires. Either it is whole, which would not allow one to talk of “transactions”, even if they are “hegemonic”, but which seems all the same, after reflection, hardly probable. In the Ottoman case, for example, Leslie Peirce, studying an year of functioning of the tribunal of the city of Antab – today Gaziantep – in 1540-1541, a short time after the conquest, showed that the application of the *kanun*, the imperial administrative law, was in fact one of the main areas of dialogue between the central power and the province, in particular through the testimony that the

*sharia* requires and which allowed multiple negotiations or readjustments between the authorities and the local population<sup>78</sup>. Or there is place for the transaction, even if it is under the blade of coercion, which presumes, in fact, the concept of hegemony, and in this case, the idea must be abandoned, if not of the “solid core” or of the “software, at least of its tightness.

*Quid*, from this point of view, of the colonial empires? On a certain account, the “civilising mission” or its “ethical” equivalents, its material and symbolic repertoires of being-in-society, Christianity, the idea of progress and development could contribute to them “being together”, all the more so because these ideas found their echo in indigenous registers of the “good government” or of the “Luminaries”, like, for example, in the Islamic societies or in the Yoruba country<sup>79</sup>. At the time of “colonial encounter”, there was well and truly “imperial subjectivation”, at the intersection of the techniques of domination over others and the techniques of constitution of a self – a matter of desire, passions, loyalty, belief, hygiene, sexuality, interests, fantasies, and hence also of conflicts and sufferings<sup>80</sup>. Sheikh Hamidou Kane has very well described in *l’Aventure ambiguë* this “distress at not being two<sup>81</sup>” which already, without doubt, had been that of the Greeks of the Roman Empire, that was “dominated and dominator at the same time<sup>82</sup>”. The elite which provided the interface between the State and the colonial social institutions, on one hand, and on the other, the colonised societies – for example, in the French empire, the “evolved”, the citizens of the Four Communes of Senegal or the old students of the William Ponty School<sup>83</sup> – are not without evoking the *pepaideumenoï*, “those that had acquired the *paideia*<sup>84</sup>”. They played a leading role in the reproduction of the imperial legacy, as we have schematised it, during the nationalist mobilisation and in the aftermath of the independencies. If only by their clothing style men like Senghor in Senegal, Njonjo in Kenya, Banda in Malawi, and even Mugabe in Zimbabwe symbolise the vigour and the permanence of this social layer that the colonial period has brought about and co-opted. Yet, they were naturally only the most visible part of the iceberg. In the same time, the empires sheltered multiple “transactions” whose well-known illustrations include nationalism, independent religious movements, creative practices of cultural reinvention, for example in music and apparel, and whose significance was too often calculated by subtraction. They were less of deviances with respect to the norm, incapacities of understanding it, corruptions of law and order than modes of use, sharing and appropriation of the colonial period.

However, in fact, the notion of hegemony seems to be in contradiction with the racialisation of the social relations that is inherent to the colonial experience of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries and with the objective limitations of its stranglehold on the indigenous societies. Some of the Indian “subalternists” thus speak of “domination without hegemony” with respect to the British Raj<sup>85</sup>. In his latest book, the historian John Iliffe opens an interesting topic on this subject in the case of Africa: the colonisation ruined or fragmented the notions that had the place of honour and substituted them, with a very mitigated success, with three moral repertoires, the ethos of the regiment, that of the Christian respectability and that of the working class; the success of nationalism stemmed precisely from its rehabilitation of a certain conception of honour in militarily, politically and ethically occupied societies and its demand for “dignity<sup>86</sup>”.

The magnitude of the “colonial legacy” in the contemporary forms of government suggests however, *in fine*, not to minimise the hypothesis of the reproduction of an eventual colonial hegemony through the conflicts of the decolonisation. The continuation and often the fierce defence of the territorial framework of the nation-State in its imperial frontiers would attest the acceptance and the intensity of the sentiment of national belonging, resilience of the so-called “primordial” special identities established during the colonial period, the adoption of the bureaucratic institutions not only by the political classes but also by the social forces in the religious and associative fields, the permanence of the colonial repertoires of subjectivation in the double dimension of the material culture and techniques of the bodies that are associated with

it. In brief, the colonisation led to what Max Weber calls “types of man” (*Menschentum*) which contemporary players continue to identify with, if necessary as per not only the nationalist repertory, but also through other third languages of economic, political or religious order, like those of “reform”, “good governance”, “prosperity” (Pentecostist or Islamic), “civil society” and through multiple techniques of the bodies that are the fate of the globalisation. The radicalisms, for example, Islamic or indigenist, are not themselves so much estranged as one could assume with respect to these repertories. It is finding this old evidence that the conflicts are procedures of appropriation and not only of rejection.

While this hypothesis of the contemporary reproduction of the colonial hegemony proves to be correct, it would shed a different light on the “colonial legacy”. On one hand, it is at the core of hegemony and definition of citizenship in the metropolises themselves, which leads to the virulence of the present debates in France or elsewhere in Europe. On the other hand, it fits in with the social relations that constitute the postcolonial State more than it is related to the relations of the latter with its old metropolis or the western world. One would then understand better how and why the issues of cooperation, aid for development, “structural adjustment”, “world-wide governance” are themselves stakeholders of a chain, a hegemonic concatenation, taken not as essential “postcoloniality” but as “event”. These were a way to get out of colonisation without compromising the insertion of old possessions in the international capitalist economy nor their diplomatic fidelity in the context of the cold war<sup>87</sup>. They contribute to the financing of the cooptation on which the postcolonial “passive revolutions” rely, to the identification of a new “nobility of the others” and to the emergence of “development brokers” that structure the articulation of the campaigns in the State, favouring the multiplication of the projects, programs and non-governmental organisations<sup>88</sup>. They remove the system of “indirect administration” through the intervention of the latter and through recourse to “public-private partnership” notably in rehabilitating the principle of the concession under cover of liberalisation and privatisation. They update the discourse of “pacification”, “civilising mission” and “ethnicism” by promoting peace-keeping, “good governance”, “transparency”, accountability, “civil society”. They extend the practices of interference and conditionality by which the western powers have put under administrative supervision, with mitigated results, the Ottoman Empire, the Balkan and Arab territories, which had liberated themselves from them or which had been detached from them, Persia, China. They form a third language between the centre of the neo-liberal Empire and its provinces that takes the form of a massive “hegemonic transaction” of discursive and material order. They confer a social dimension to the market as an illusion, thanks to the “Objectives of the Millennium” in the matter of “fight against poverty” and give neoliberalism a human face, at least on the symbolic and discursive plane, even if they do not ensure a true financial transfer from the North to the South.

Finally, the “colonial legacy” in the contemporary “governance”, goes well beyond the simple issue of the “memory” to which it is readily reduced. It structures in their intimacy the political societies, those of the “North” as well as those of the “South”. It largely configures the public policies of aid for development, which, as for them, not only result from international relations but also and above all, from the internal economic policies of the States, which as much donors as beneficiaries. It is basically what the old houpouëtist formula of the “Francafrica” suggests, unfortunately led astray controversially and confined to the register of moral imprecation. It concerns more seriously speaking a matter of historical sociology: the most immediately contemporary globalisation is the product of colonisation without our being, for all that, able to be satisfied with simply reporting “postcolony”. Reflecting on the “government of the world” is to reflect on, situation by situation, the complex and contingent relationship that it has with its imperial roots.

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1. P. Bernard, ‘Mali, partir pour se nourrir’, *Le Monde*, 4-5 December 2005, p. 15.
2. *Libération*, 27 September 1985.
3. Tiken Jah Fakoly, “Y’en a marre”, *Françafrique*, Universal Music, 2002.
4. E. de Latour, “Métaphores sociales dans les ghettos de Côte d’Ivoire”, *Autrepart*, No. 18, 2001, p. 151-167, and “Du ghetto au voyage clandestin : la métaphore héroïque”, *ibid.*, no. 19, 2001, p. 155-176, as well as “Héros du retour”, *Critique internationale*, no. 19, April 2003, p. 171-189.
5. For an example of militant discourse on this theme, S. Khiari, *Pour une politique de la racaille. Immigré-e-s, indigènes et jeunes de banlieues*, Paris, Textuel, 2006.
6. C. Lomnitz, *Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico. An Anthropology of Nationalism*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2001, p. 14 sq.
7. E. Balibar, *Droit de cité*, Paris, Puf, 2002 (new ed.), p. 76 and 80.
8. Please see, in the same issue, the interview of Achille Mbembe. His book: *De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine* (Paris, Karthala, 2000), initially written and published in French generated only a week echo here while it was largely discussed in the United States.
9. Romain Bertrand, *Mémoires d’empire. La controverse autour du « fait colonial »*, Paris, Éd. du Croquant/Savoir-Agir, 2006.
10. *Id.*, *les Sciences sociales et le « moment colonial »*. *De la problématique de la domination coloniale à celle de l’hégémonie impériale*, Paris, Ceri, multigr., June 2006 (*Questions de recherche*, no. 18, accessible on the site [www.ceri-sciences-po.org](http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org)).
11. On the Soviet decolonisation, please see O. Roy, *la Nouvelle Asie centrale ou la fabrication des nations*, Paris, Le Seuil, 1997, the ongoing work of T. Gordadze, in particular “Les nouvelles guerres du Caucase (1991-2000) et la formation des États postcommunistes”, in P. Hassner, R. Marchal (under the dir. of), *Guerres et sociétés. État et violence après la Guerre froide*, Paris, Karthala, 2003. For a more general problematisation, please see J.-F. Bayart (under the dir. of), *la Greffe de l’État*, Paris, Karthala,

1996, and the idea of “colonial nationalism” with B. Anderson (*Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso, 1991, new ed., chap. 10).

12. C. E. Walker, *l'Impossible retour. À propos de l'afrocentrisme*, Paris, Karthala, 2004; J. Dakhliya, *Islamicités*, Paris, Puf, 2005, p. 108 sq.

13. Thus, at Java, the robe nobility of the *priyayi*, who were able to construct themselves as obliged intermediary of the Dutch colonisation in order to affirm its rank and its reproduction as much with respect to the Court as with respect to the peasantry, that had been an important partner of the System of obligatory cultures, subsequently of the “ethical” administration, and that had discarded the first foundations of the Indonesian nationalism, was relegated to a second position during the struggle for national liberation and accession to independence to the point of getting politically erased (R. Bertrand, *État colonial, noblesse et nationalisme à Java, op. cit.*).

14. A. L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize. The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895-1930*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1997.

15. Please see for example, J. and J. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution*, vol. 1: *Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa*, vol. 2: *The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1991 et 1997; J. D. Y. Peel, *Religious Encounter and the Making of Yoruba*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2000; T. Ranger, *Are We not Also Men? The Samkange Family and African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1920-64*, London, James Currey, 1995.

16. Please see for example B. Hibou, “Tunisie : d’un réformisme à l’autre” and R. Bertrand, “Réformisme colonial et combinatoire impériale européenne. La “Politique coloniale éthique” des Pays-Bas (1901-1926)”, in J.-F. Bayart, R. Bertrand, T. Gordadze, B. Hibou, F. Mengin, *Legs colonial et gouvernance contemporaine*, Paris, Fonds d’analyse des sociétés politiques, décembre 2005, multigr., vol. 1, chap. 5 et 7.

17. A. L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize, op. cit.*, p. 5.

18. C. Bonneuil, ““Pénétrer l’Indigène”. Arachides, paysans, agronomes et administrateurs coloniaux au Sénégal (1897-1950)”, *Études rurales*, 151-152, 1999; F. Thomas, “Écologie et gestion forestière dans l’Indochine française”, *Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer*, no. 85 (319), April-May 1998; J.-C. Fredenucci, “Aux origines des pratiques de mission de l’administration de l’urbanisme de la V<sup>e</sup> République : l’Afrique noire”, *Clio en Afrique*, Cahier n°14, 2005; R. Mrazek, *Engineers of Happy Land. Technology and Nationalism in a Colony*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002.

19. E. Hobsbawm, T. Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

20. Please see for example T. Ranger, “The invention of tradition revisited: the case of colonial Africa”, in T. Ranger, O. Vaughan (eds), *Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth Century. Essays in Honour of A. H. M. Kirk-Green*, London, Macmillan, 1993, p. 62-111, in response notably to A. Smith, “The nation: invented, imagined, reconstructed?” *Millenium*, no. 20 (3), winter of 1991, p. 353-368.

21. Please see B. S. Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge. The British in India*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996 and L. Dartigues, “La production conjointe de connaissances en sociologie historique : quelles approches ? Quelles sources ? Le cas de la production orientaliste sur le Viêt-Nam, 1860-1940”, *Genèses*, no. 43, June 2001, p. 53-70.

22. J. Elyachar, “Finance internationale, micro-crédit et religion de la société civile en Égypte”, *Critique internationale*, no. 13, October 2001, p. 139-152 (notably p. 141, 148 and 151). The author uses the notion of indirect rule in the sense that M. Mamdani gave it, in *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996, a work that led to a very controversial debate notably by the historians.

23. E. Chancelé, "La question coloniale", *Critique*, no. 35, 1949.
24. B. Hibou, *la Force de l'obéissance : économie politique de la répression en Tunisie*, Paris, La Découverte, 2006.
25. *Id.* (under the dir. of), *la Privatisation des États*, Paris, Karthala, 1999.
26. F. Eboussi Boulaga, *la Crise du Muntu. Authenticité africaine et philosophie*, Paris, Présence africaine, 1977, p. 15-16. Please see also his interview in the December 2006 issue of the revue *Esprit*.
27. J. Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforests. Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa*, Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990, p. 239.
28. M. Vovelle, *Idéologies et mentalités*, Paris, François Maspero, 1982, p. 321 sq.
29. G. Balandier, in his analysis of the colonial situation, spoke of "collective reactions that one could call clandestine or indirect", of "calculated manifestation of passivity", of "doubling process", of "transfer phenomenon" (G. Balandier, *Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique noire. Dynamique sociale en Afrique centrale*, Paris, Puf, 1971, new ed., p. 494 sq.).
30. See for example D. Paulme, *la Mère dévorante. Essai sur la morphologie des contes africains*, Paris, Gallimard, 1976, which refers to the work of M. Detienne and J.-P. Vernant, *les Ruses de l'intelligence. La mètis des Grecs*, Paris, Flammarion, 1974.
31. *Congrès constitutif du Parti de la Fédération africaine. Commission de politique générale. Rapport de présentation par Doudou Gueye et résolutions de politique générale*, Dakar, 1, 2 and 3 January 1959, multigr., p. 3 and 5.
32. The expression is taken from F. A. Salamone, "The social construction of colonial reality: Yauri emirate", *Cahiers d'études africaines*, no. 98, XXV-2, 1985, p. 139-159.
33. P. Casanova Gonzales, *la Démocratie au Mexique*, Paris, Anthropos, 1969.
34. J.-F. Bayart, *l'État au Cameroun*, Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1979, p. 257.
35. B. Berman and J. Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley. Conflict in Kenya and Africa*, Portsmouth, James Currey, 1992, vol. I, p. 153; V. Dimier, *le Gouvernement des colonies : regards croisés franco-britanniques*, Bruxelles, Éd. de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2004.
36. Please see for example, the controversy around the work of O. Le Cour Grandmaison, *Coloniser, exterminer. Sur la guerre et l'État colonial*, Paris, Fayard, 2005, notably the article by Pierre Vidal-Naquet and Gilbert Meynier in *Esprit*, December 2005, p. 162-177.
37. J. Revel (under the dir. of), *Jeux d'échelles. La micro-analyse à l'expérience*, Paris, Hautes Études/Gallimard/Le Seuil, 1996.
38. We follow here, for the basics, Stephen Kalberg, *la Sociologie historique comparative de Max Weber*, Paris, La Découverte/Mauss, 2002, in particular the pages 206-248. The author remarks that Weber does not propose any systematic exposé of these two concepts, however recurrent in his texts.
39. M. Weber, *l'Éthique protestante et l'esprit du capitalisme*, Paris, Plon, 1964 (reed. in the coll. de poche Agora, 1985), p. 44.

40. M. Weber, *Économie et société*, Paris, Plon, 1971 (reed. in the collection de poche Agora, 1995), vol. 1, p. 62, cited in an adequate translation by S. Kalberg, *la Sociologie historique comparative de Max Weber*, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
41. O. Roy, “En Asie centrale : kolkhoziens et entrepreneurs” and P. Geschiere, “Parenté et argent dans une société lignagère”, in J.-F. Bayart (under the dir. of), *la Réinvention du capitalisme*, Paris, Karthala, 1994, chap. 3 and 4.
42. From this perspective the translations of the German concepts designating the “antecedent conditions” (*Voraussetzung*), the “precedents” (*Vorbedingung*) of the “precursors” (*Vorläufer*) by “requisite”, “prerequisite” or “preliminary conditions” are inadequate since they assume a relation of cause and effect and a determination eluding the part of the contingency from it (S. Kalberg, *la Sociologie historique comparative de Max Weber*, *op. cit.*, p. 216, note 31).
43. M. Foucault, “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire”, in *Dits et écrits*, Paris, Gallimard, 1994, vol. II, p. 141 and 144.
44. J. Meimon, *En quête de légitimité. Le ministère de la Coopération (1959-1999)*, doctorate thesis in political science, Lille, Ceraps, 2005; A. Spire, *Étrangers à la carte : l’administration de l’immigration en France (1945-1975)*, Paris, Grasset, 2005; F. de Barros, “Les municipalités face aux Algériens : méconnaissances et usages des catégories coloniales en métropole avant et après la Seconde Guerre mondiale”, *Genèses*, no. 53, 2003, p. 59-92 and “Des “Français musulmans d’Algérie” aux “immigrés” : l’importation de classifications coloniales dans les politiques de logement en France”, *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, no. 159, 2005, p. 26-53. Please see also the analysis by Choukri Hmed on the personnel of supervision of the Sonacotra homes in the beginning of the 1970s – *Loger les immigrés « isolés »*. *Archéologie d’une institution des politiques d’immigration françaises : la Sonacotra (1956-2004)*, Doctorate thesis in political science, Paris I-Panthéon Sorbonne, in the process of being finished; the notations on the violence of the police personnel coming from the colonial Algeria in A. Dewerpe, *Charonne, 8 février 1962. Anthropologie historique d’un massacre d’État*, Paris, Gallimard, 2006; and T. Charbit, *Saint-Maurice-l’Ardoise. Socio-histoire d’un camp de harkis (1962-1976)*, report for the \ Direction de la population et des migrations (Ministry of Social Cohesion), May 2005. Please see as well F. de Barros and T. Charbit (under the dir. of), “La colonie rapatriée”, *Politix*, no. 76, 2006.
45. C. Markovits, *The Global World of Indian Merchants, 1750-1947. Traders of Sind from Bukhara to Panama*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
46. J.-F. Bayart, “Les trajectoires de la République en Iran et en Turquie : un essai de lecture tocquevillienne”, in G. Salamé (under the dir. of), *Démocraties sans démocrates*, Paris, Fayard, 1994, p. 373-395.
47. J.-F. Bayart, *l’État en Afrique*, *op. cit.*, chap. 7.
48. *Id.*, *le Gouvernement du monde*, *op. cit.*, p. 174 sq.
49. M. Tozy, *Monarchie et islam politique au Maroc*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 1999.
50. Please see for example T. N. Harper, *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 368 sq.
51. For the Italian Marxist philosopher, Antonio Gramsci, hegemony is related to “cultural and ideological direction” – and not only to the “domination” by the recourse to coercion – that a “social class” or a “historical block” exercises by creating the “dictatorship” of a “consensus” and a “common sense” within the “civil society”. By stating that hegemony is a “disintegrated and discontinued function of the history of the States (*Il Risorgimento*, Turin, Einaudi, 1966, p. 191) and by abstaining from any mechanicist definition for it, he opens the way for the notion of “hegemonic transaction” that we propose.

52. Please see R. Bertrand and E. Saada (under the dir. of), “L’État colonial”, *Politix*, no. 66, 2004.

53. G. Balandier, *Sociologie actuelle de l’Afrique noire*, *op. cit.*, p. 23, 61 et 493.

54. For a critical exposé on *subaltern studies*, please see R. O’Hanlon, “Recovering the subject. Subaltern Studies and histories of resistance in colonial South Asia”, *Modern Asian Studies*, no. 22 (1), 1968, p. 189-224 and M. Diouf (under the dir. of), *l’Historiographie indienne en débat. Colonialisme, nationalisme et sociétés postcoloniales*, Paris, Karthala, Amsterdam, Sefhis, 1999.

55. As per the distinction established by Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale between the “construction of the State” as deliberate creation of an apparatus of political control, and the “formation of the State”, as conflicting, involuntary and largely unconscious historical process, led in the disorder of the confrontations and compromises by the mass of anonymous people (*Unhappy Valley*, *op. cit.*)

56. J.-F. Bayart, “L’historicité de l’État importé”, in J.-F. Bayart (under the dir. of), *la Greffe de l’État*, *op. cit.*, p. 14 sq.

57. Please see for example the two interesting cases of Asante and the Merina Kingdom: I. Wilks, *Asante in the Nineteenth Century. The Structure and Evolution of a Political Order*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975; F. Raison-Jourde, *Bible et pouvoir à Madagascar au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle. Invention d’une identité chrétienne et construction de l’État (1780-1880)*, Paris, Karthala, 1991 and G. Campbell, *An Economic History of Imperial Madagascar, 1750-1895. The Rise and Fall of an Island Empire*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

58. S. McKee, *Uncommon Dominion. Venetian Crete and the Myth of Ethnic Purity*, Philadelphie, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000.

59. Laurent Vidal’s recent research on “transportation” from the city of Mazagão of the banks of Morocco to the estuary of the Amazon, in 1769, gives an interesting example of it – *Mazagão, la ville qui traversa l’Atlantique. Du Maroc à l’Amazonie (1769-1783)*, Paris, Aubier, 2005.

60. P. Curtin, *The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex. Essays in Atlantic History*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

61. P. Lamant, *l’Affaire Yukanthor. Autopsie d’un scandale colonial*, Paris, Société française d’histoire d’outre-mer, 1989.

62. G. Balandier, *Sociologie actuelle de l’Afrique noire*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

63. The case of Kenya was particularly documented: N. Swainson, *The Development of Corporate Capitalism in Kenya. 1918-1977*, London, Heinemann, 1980; J. Spencer, *The Kenya African Union*, London, Kpi, 1985; B. Berman, J. Lonsdale, *Unhappy Valley*, *op. cit.*

64. C.-H. Perrot, *Lignages et territoire en Afrique aux XVIII<sup>e</sup> et XIX<sup>e</sup> siècles. Stratégies, compétition, intégration*, Paris, Karthala, 2000.

65. Please see for example F. Cooper, *From Slaves to Squatters. Plantation Labour and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya. 1890-1925*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1980 and M. Valeri, *l’État-Qabous. Identité nationale et légitimité politique au sultanat d’Oman (1970-2005)*, Paris, Institut d’études politiques de Paris, 2005, as well as Y. Person, *Samori, une révolution dyula*, Dakar, Ifan, 1968-1975, 3 vol.

66. N. R. Hunt, *A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, Medicalization, and Mobility in the Congo*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1999, p. 41 sq. and 67.

67. A. L. Stoler and F. Cooper, "Between metropole and colony. Rethinking a research agenda", in F. Cooper et A. L. Stoler (eds), *Tensions of Empire. Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997, p. 28.
68. F. Cooper, *Colonialism in Question. Theory, Knowledge, History*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005, p. 22 sq.
69. It is without doubt the notion of "connected history" that is the most fruitful, in the present historiographic debate: please see S. Gruzinski, *les Quatre parties du monde. Histoire d'une mondialisation*, Paris, La Martinière, 2004 and S. Subrahmanyam, *Explorations in Connected History. From the Tagus to the Ganges*, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2005.
70. F.-X. Fauvelle-Aymar, *Histoire de l'Afrique du Sud*, Paris, Le Seuil, 2006.
71. B. Lewis, "The Ottoman legacy to contemporary political arabic", in L. C. Brown (ed.), *Imperial Legacy. The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996, chap. 11.
72. Please see for example J. Dakhli, *l'Empire des passions. L'arbitraire politique en Islam*, Paris, Aubier, 2005 and *le Divan des rois. Le politique et le religieux dans l'islam*, Paris, Aubier, 1998; N. Sohrabi, "Revolution and State Culture: the Circle of Justice and Constitutionalism in 1906 Iran", in G. Steinmetz (ed.), *State/Culture. State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1999, chap. 8; R. Bertrand, *État colonial, noblesse et nationalisme à Java*, *op. cit.* Also please see, in the Ottoman case, the Young Ottoman thought in the years 1860-1870, with some of them ending up in conceiving a republican form of Islamic government (S. Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962, p. 249 sq., 288 sq. et 296 sq.). In addition, a number of ottomanist historians now put the western inspiration of the Tanzimats into perspective.
73. C. Badel, *la Noblesse de l'Empire romain. Les masques et la vertu*, Seyssel, Champ Vallon, 2005, chap. VI.
74. Please see for example S. Goldhill (ed.), *Being Greek under Rome. Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, notably the p. 88 sq., 157 sq., 273 sq., 305; C. Badel, *la Noblesse de l'Empire romain*, *op. cit.*, p. 312-329; P. Veyne, *l'Empire gréco-romain*, Paris, Le Seuil, 2005.
75. R. Bertrand, *État colonial, noblesse et nationalisme à Java*, *op. cit.*, p. 419-423 et 479-480.
76. S. Gruzinski, *les Quatre parties du monde. Histoire d'une mondialisation*, *op. cit.*, p. 374 sq.
77. M. E. Meeker, *A Nation of Empire. The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002, p. 44, 50, 80-81.
78. L. Peirce, *Morality Tales. Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2003.
79. On the notion of *olaju* (litt. the Luminaries), please see J. D. Y. Peel, *Religious Encounter*, *op. cit.*
80. On this issue of subjectivation during the colonial period, we refer to J.-F. Bayart, *le Gouvernement du monde*, *op. cit.*, chap. 4.
81. C. H. Kane, *l'Aventure ambiguë*, Paris, Uge, 1979 (new ed.), p. 164.

82. R. Preston, "Roman questions, Greek answers: Plutarch and the construction of identity", in S. Goldhill (ed.), *Being Greek under Rome*, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
83. M. Diouf, "The French colonial policy of assimilation and the civility of the originaires of the Four Communes (Senegal): a nineteenth century globalization project", *Development and Change*, no. 29 (4), October 1998, p. 671-696; J.-H. Jezequel, *the "Mangeurs de craie". Socio-histoire d'une catégorie lettrée à l'époque coloniale. Les instituteurs diplômés de l'école normale William Ponty (c. 1900- c. 1960)*, Paris, Ehess, 2002, multigr.
84. R. Preston, "Roman questions, Greek answers...", art. cité, p. 90.
85. R. Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony. History and Power in Colonial India*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1997 or A. Barlas, *Democracy, Nationalism and Colonialism*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1996. On the other hand, Partha Chatterjee considers that the nationalist ideologies are only "derivative discourses" originating from the orientalist and colonial imagination (*Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?*, London, Zed Press, 1986). Besides, for Benedict Anderson – maybe the most influential theoretician of nationalism in the last twenty years – the "imagined community" of the nation is the conjoint product of the "transmitted capitalism" and colonial State (*Imagined Communities*, *op. cit.*).
86. J. Iliffe, *Honour in African History*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
87. J.-M. Severino, "Refonder l'aide au développement au xxi<sup>e</sup> siècle", *Critique internationale*, no. 10, January 2001, p. 75-99.
88. Please see notably J.-P. Olivier de Sardan, *Anthropologie et développement. Essai en socio-anthropologie du changement social*, Paris, Karthala, Marseille, Apad, 1995; T. Bierschenk and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (under the direction of), *les Pouvoirs au village. Le Bénin rural entre démocratisation et décentralisation*, Paris, Karthala, 1998; T. Bierschenk, J.-P. Chauveau and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (under the dir. of), *Courtiers en développement. Les villages africains en quête de projets*, Paris, Karthala, Marseille, Apad, 2000.

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