THE STATE AND THE CHALLENGE OF ‘NEW ACTORS’

SAMY COHEN

Since the early 1990s, much has been written about relations between the state and transnational actors (TNAs). If we are to believe certain authors, over the past 15 years we have seen a new balance of power between states and a miscellaneous assortment of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), multinational corporations, financial operators, migrant workers, terrorists, drug traffickers and an infinite number of other independent actors. Apparently, the increasing power of TNAs has considerably transformed the international landscape, abolishing the monopoly that states once held on the world stage. Foreign policy, we are informed, has become ‘obsolete’. The ‘decline of the state’ discourse has gradually taken root and has fostered a new orthodoxy.

The ‘third chessboard’

At the beginning of the 1990s, James Rosenau, one of the leading theorists of this trend, developed the idea that globalisation and ‘transnationalisation’ has led us into a period of global ‘turbulence’. While the state is not about to disappear, it no longer has a free hand and has lost control of events. Rosenau claimed that the inter-statist system, once the central pivot of international affairs, now coexists with a ‘multi-centred’ system; the determination of foreign policy has largely passed to non-state actors. The submission and loyalty of individuals and groups to the authority of the state is diminishing, whereas their capacity to be moved by a distant drama is increasing. The competence of national governments has been eroded by the proliferation of transnational groups. A veritable ‘bifurcation’ has occurred between the ‘world of states’ and the ‘multi-centred world’, each of which obeys contradictory principles: whereas the former is still driven by traditional motivations – the appetite for power and the safeguarding of sovereignty – the latter is primarily in quest of autonomy.

This view was shared by the British economist Susan Strange, who analysed the increasing power of the great multinational corporations and independent financial markets: “Whereas states were once the masters of the market, it is now the markets which, on these crucial issues, are the masters of governments and states.” According to Strange, traditional actors such as diplomats and generals are less decisive than bankers, businessmen and media operators. In France, Bertrand Badie, one of the most representative exponents of this school of thought, rejoices over what he sees as “civil society’s revenge” on the state, an entity which appears increasingly challenged by actors who are “essentially subnational (clans, ethnic groups, tribes, minorities that claim the status of ‘nations’), or transnational (pan-religious or pan-linguistic movements)”. Badie takes up the idea that the “multi-centred world marks the triumph of the
principle of autonomy”.⁷ “The existing world of states, with its own traditional principles and practices, is confronted by another world composed of a vast number of actors who seek first and foremost to defend and promote their autonomy; they prefer cooperation (or the refusal of cooperation) to force, and avoid the traditional norms of diplomacy”.⁸

The principle of territoriality has been reduced to a “framework of outdated allegiances”, notes Josépha Laroche.⁹ Even the state’s most traditional security functions have been “put in check” by terrorist networks and mafias. The state faces a “challenge to its monopoly on legitimate physical force, and its ability to preserve and control the value of national assets is also threatened.”¹⁰ The proliferation of infra-state threats such as terrorism and drug trafficking has contributed to the “erosion” of the state. The attacks of 11 September revitalised this view of the “impotent state”, which cannot control the enfants terribles of globalisation.

To such commentators, everything seems to support the accuracy of the ‘third chessboard’ metaphor advanced by Joseph Nye. Nye compares the new global power divide to a three-dimensional chessboard. The first level represents military power, a largely unipolar world dominated by the United States. The second level represents economic power, the tripolar rule of the US, Europe and Japan. The third level represents a realm of transnational relations and non-state actors in which power flows across borders and is beyond the control of governments.¹¹

This approach appears debatable for two major reasons. On the one hand, the influence attributed to transnational actors is excessive; their existence has not produced a reconfiguration of the international system. On the other, the transnationalist view contributes to the delegitimisation of the state by focusing on its inability to regulate global problems. It also fails to ask the right questions, which arise less from the problematic of the ‘impotent’ state than from the poor management of government policies designed to counter the growth of terrorism, international crime and other ‘threats to security’.

The heterogeneity of non-state actors

Relations of power between states and non-state actors have indeed changed over the last ten years, but not to the point of effecting a ‘reversal’ on a global scale. There is no question here of denying the transformations that have affected our societies. The number of transnational actors has increased considerably during the last decade, thanks to developments in communications technology and the globalisation of problems such as environmental damage and human rights abuses. Many NGOs have appeared on the world stage and their activities cannot be ignored. But have transnational actors really forced the state to retreat? Has power swung to non-state actors? It is doubtful.

We should avoid anachronism from the start. The transnationalist perspective conveys the impression that the upheavals of the last twelve to fifteen years are the result of the end of the Cold War; they represent a change from the period when all power resided in the state. This is not the case at all.
The world of governments and the world of nations have always coexisted and intervened in each others affairs. Globalisation itself is not a contemporary phenomenon. Migration and trade, the circulation of ideas and the propagation of religious beliefs, have long indicated that no state exercises absolute sovereignty. Borders were always porous during the confrontation between East and West. Terrorists and drug traffickers did not wait until the Berlin Wall collapsed to verify that. Historians such as Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein have revealed the origins of ‘historic globalisations’. Braudel in particular emphasises how the expansion of the Roman Empire fostered the notion of global citizenship, how fifteenth and sixteenth-century colonisation contributed to the dissemination of knowledge, and how religions such as Christianity and Islam spread throughout the world.

More seriously, the transnational approach ignores the heterogeneity of each of the ‘two worlds’. It combines disparate elements in order to arrive at a single and comprehensive conclusion: the ‘uselessness’ of the nation-state. Does the ‘power’ of some therefore correspond to the ‘weakness’ of others? It all depends on the type of transnational actor and the type of state it is confronting.

Let us begin with the ‘multi-centred world’. The world of transnational actors (often referred to as ‘new actors’) has no real coherence. The theory of global ‘turbulence’ lumps together the appearance of ‘new threats’ (the risk of nuclear proliferation, the growth of mafias, terrorism, drug trafficking, etc.), and the increasing power of TNAs such as multinationals, NGOs and immigrant groups, as if all these phenomena affected every state in the same way. Now this is not the case: organised crime is a threat to the state, but NGOs are not. Some NGOs work closely with the state and often act as sub-contractors (especially with regard to development aid and humanitarian action).

The supposition that the power of TNAs is ‘increasing’ is usually based on dubious data. For example, it is claimed that there are 38,000 NGOs. This figure is virtually meaningless. It amalgamates organisations whose aims, values activities and relations with the state are very different. This is a heterogeneous and often competitive world. The very idea of an NGO involves realities that differ according to country, period and the nature of the issues at stake. Very few of these organisations are capable of influencing a state. When we turn to ‘international crime’, we find that information is often derived from unreliable sources (reports from intelligence services, sensationalist investigative journalism, fragmentary eye-witness accounts, unverifiable statistical data, etc.). Furthermore, the legal definitions of ‘organised crime’ and of transnational economic and financial crime are extremely vague and attract no international consensus. Mafias, guerrillas, drug traffickers and terrorists are simply woven together in a complicated skein that is often difficult to untangle, given that a single actor may be playing several roles simultaneously. Some commentators limit the definition of ‘money laundering’ to the proceeds from drug trafficking; others maintain it extends to all forms of illegal activity. The mafia phenomenon is not exactly ‘new’. The Italian Mafia, Chinese Triads and Japanese Yakuza are long-established organisations; they are deeply embedded in the history of their nations, and have frequently formed almost symbiotic links with the leaders of
their governments. Moreover, such organisations do not seek to dismantle the state, but to influence it through corruption in order to achieve their economic goals.

The resistance of the ‘post-modern’ state

When we look at the ‘world of states’, we find that it is no more homogenous than its non-state counterpart. We should not oversimplify the argument by treating the erosion of sovereignty as a global phenomenon which affects every state in the same way. To speak of the ‘state’ as if it were a material entity has no meaning. Some erosion is ‘positive’ as well as ‘negative’, it depends on the type of state that experiences it. Here again we notice the existence of contradictory tendencies. Sovereignty is distributed in a highly ‘unequal’ way. It is difficult to compare ‘failed states’17, ‘quasi-states’18 and other ‘pseudo-states’, which have been undermined by civil wars and which cannot maintain a minimum of social cohesion, with the western democracies which enjoy prosperity and relatively robust institutions. The notion of ‘global turbulence’ does not mean the same thing to a superpower like the United States as it does to a micro-state like Gambia. Every country has a different view of globalisation: some regard it as an advantage, while others see it as a source of insoluble short to medium-term problems. The claim that a state confronted with transnational crime and terrorism can no longer fulfil its responsibilities is also excessive. It all depends on the type of state and the type of threat it faces.

We could, in the interests of clarity, adopt Robert Cooper's schema of the three main types of state.19 ‘Pre-modern’ states have not acceded to the existence of a nation-state; they have no fixed borders or a government with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force and the ability to construct a viable foreign policy. Somalia and Afghanistan fall into this category. ‘Modern’ states (China, Pakistan, Brasil, etc.), attach great importance to national interests and the concepts of sovereignty and borders. ‘Post-modern’ states are represented by western democracies which have renounced the use of force to settle their differences, and whose security largely rests on the transparency of their foreign policy and the interdependence of their economies.20

‘Pre-modern’ states are the least well-equipped to deal with the consequences of globalisation, especially illicit traffic and the growth of clandestine migration. These failed states, impoverished or racked by civil war, have no authority or legitimate central government that can take effective action. The situation of the so-called ‘post-modern’ states is completely different, for these countries have taken the risk of opening their borders. Although considered particularly vulnerable to the challenges of transnationalism, they offer, paradoxically, the strongest resistance to ‘attacks’ on their sovereignty. They have liberalised trade and opened their borders and have profited the most from such measures.21 The European Union has enabled states whose economic influence was in decline to penetrate foreign markets and establish themselves as global commercial powers.22 Globalisation, incidentally, is not synonymous with the complete withdrawal of the state, which retains the option of intervention.
in key areas such as research, education, public spending, taxation, investment and industry.

The power of multinational companies, those ‘new masters of the world’, should also be put into proper perspective. Numerous studies show that, contrary to popular belief, these businesses do not systematically shift their activities to areas where labour costs are cheapest. Direct investment flows towards the main poles of the global economy (the United States, the European Union and Japan), and to the emerging countries. The decisions of a multinational are influenced by many other factors such as political and legal stability, the quality of the infrastructure, and the opportunity for growth in a system which guarantees the security of staff and transactions. In short, it looks for all the characteristics of a robust, stable and well-organised state. The companies which localise their activities on a truly global scale and cannot be defined by country of origin may be counted on the fingers of one hand.23

The post-modern state lost its monopoly on foreign relations long ago, but even so, it cannot be described as ‘just another actor’. It is a leading actor in the international system and, apart from its traditional function as the guarantor of security, it retains other vital prerogatives: it oversees adaptation to the international environment, the embodiment of national identity, the preservation of the geopolitical balance and the defence of common values. Its role in the regulation of international conflicts and trade remains crucial. Despite the increasing power of transnational actors, post-modern states are still the main providers of security. Collectively or individually, they have a responsibility to protect their citizens and ensure their safety. The claim that states have ‘lost the monopoly on legitimate force’ is simply received wisdom. In democracies, this legitimacy is accepted. The loss of the monopoly on legitimate force has a greater significance when applied to those ‘failed’ states which are plagued by internal anarchy or racked by civil wars, and whose governments are challenged or combated by a minority of the population (as in the case of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan and the Great Lakes region of sub-Saharan Africa, to cite but four examples).

When ‘new actors’ reinforce the state

Far from pushing back the state, transnational actors have a tendency to strengthen it.24 Transnational terrorism and the attacks of 11 September have led directly to the ‘return of the state’ in neo-liberal America. As Marie-Claude Smouts observes, “It is a striking paradox that the terrorist practice emanating from non-state actors has not marked transnationalism’s victory over the state. On the contrary, the recourse to the authority of government seems to be the only bulwark against so diffuse a threat. The state emerges reinforced from the challenge.”25

The example of international NGOs is even more convincing. The pressure these organisations exert has helped to recreate state interventionism. Directly or indirectly, they have forced states to depart from their customary practices. NGOs mobilise states and reinforce their presence on the international
stage. Governments are entrusted with new functions designed to ensure that the new rules of international law are observed. The big international NGOs have helped to sensitise governments and citizens to the scale of environmental damage, the distress of populations devastated by civil war, the horror that landmines represent for civilians and the great viral epidemics that ravage the third world.

However, the influence of NGOs is variable and largely dependent on the type of state they are dealing with. While their international stature enables them to suggest solutions, states are never bound to adopt them. International NGOs such as Oxfam and Care wield great influence in certain countries of the South which are relatively stable and open to international trade. As they are empowered by the considerable aid they distribute and by their huge budgets (which are often greater than that of the country they are assisting), they are ideally placed to exert intense pressure on government policy. In some cases, they compensate for the weakness of the administration. On the other hand, their role in Russia, North Korea, Cuba, China and most Arab and Islamic countries is almost non-existent. Leading NGOs such as Médecins Sans Frontières, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Greenpeace are viewed with suspicion in the closed world of dictatorships. In situations of conflict, their influence tends to melt away.

In post-modern states, the role of NGOs varies according to the case. The relationship is a complex and often ambiguous blend of cooperation and rivalry. The major NGOs may be able to complicate the international diplomacy conducted by western democracies, but they cannot force them to substantially alter foreign policy or to take decisions which they believe to be contrary to their fundamental interests. On matters concerning the hard core of national sovereignty – security, the model of economic development, strategic interests – NGOs, despite their expertise and the dedication of their activists, have no weight other than that readily conceded to them by the state.

It is not difficult to see the lengths to which states will go in order to resist NGOs. The latter have obtained more verbal commitments and declarations of intent from governments than decisive action. The few advances are usually partial victories. Most, like the banning of landmines and the establishment of an International Criminal Court, involve only some of the world’s states; others are still free to behave as they choose, without fear of sanction. The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, signed in December 1997, was seen by many as the birth of a ‘new form of global politics’ and a successful model for the intervention of ‘international civil society’. The Convention indeed owes much to the campaigning of NGOs. But it is not seeking to diminish the role of these organisations to point out that they did not act in isolation: the convention was the result of a long process during which the ‘international community’ became aware of the destruction caused by this type of weapon. The signatory states had long ceased to use them; some had never even possessed them. Conversely, many countries which still use them are not parties to the Convention. Moreover, this particular case provides an insight into the relations of power which have become established on a global scale. ‘New actors’ – NGOs – intervene in
negotiations that extend from state to state; they may have some effect on the international agenda, but their influence is confined to states which are already converted or have nothing to lose by going along with the movement.

Similarly, despite the aspirations of NGOs and the pressure they have applied, the status of the International Criminal Court is strongly marked by the principle of non-intervention; it remains dependent on the good will of states. Alternative globalisation movements also militate for greater state intervention; they demand greater government involvement in areas such as the regulation of the economy, the fairer distribution of wealth, the protection of the national heritage, and call for tighter control of businesses and markets. Their activists travel the world, organise demonstrations and communicate through the Internet. But all their demands are for ‘more state’ rather than ‘less state’. The major public opinion polls reveal a comparable tendency. According to a SOFRES survey conducted in May 2000, 69% of the French population think that the state should regulate the economy, while only 26% would entrust this task to civil society (in the form of citizens’ movements, consumer associations, etc.). It should also be noted that business leaders will appeal for government aid when their interests are threatened by competition from abroad or by an economic downturn.

The state is not simply one of the most deeply rooted aspects of the international system; it is also one of the most highly prized forms of political organisation. Rebel, separatist and autonomist movements which revert to violence do not attack the essence of the state; their aim is rather to reconstitute it on all or part of the national territory; they want a state that they can control. Far from being hostile to the concept of the state, they avidly seek it, as long as it is ‘theirs’, under their control and equipped with the ‘normal’ attributes of sovereignty and the advantage of ‘secure and recognised’ borders. The Palestinians are not fighting against the state but against the state of Israel. The PKK does not seek the disappearance of Turkey, but the constitution of an autonomous Kurdistan. The Tamil Tigers rebelled against the government of Sri Lanka, but not against the nation-state, a form of organisation which is still highly appreciated by the very people who combat it. Witness the ‘proliferation of states’ which followed decolonisation and, later, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Every disappearance of a state is characterised by its division and the creation of several other entities, all of which assert their sovereignty and lay claim to land and borders.

**Transnational solidarity and national allegiance**

Transnationalists see ‘new actors’ as being ‘free of sovereignty’, free from the constraints of the state and from any allegiance to nation or territory. “New forms of identification are emerging…weakening the citizen’s relationship with territory and state,” observe Badie and Smouts, echoing one of Rosenau’s pet theories. But this decline is also debateable. In reality, many NGOs are ‘governmental’ or ‘quasi-governmental’ organisations; they maintain close links with the state and its representatives. There is often more solidarity between
NGOs and their governments than there is between the various NGOs themselves, as noted by Véronique Avril in her study of Kosovo.\textsuperscript{33}

Multinational corporations, usually regarded as the archetype of the ‘transnational actor’ responsible for the waning of the state, are, in most cases, still closely tied to their territory and state of origin. They often act in a way that complements state diplomacy. The relationship is more a matter of mutual dependency and connivance than of domination. Throughout history, the state has encouraged the development of great national enterprises.\textsuperscript{34} Governments want them to succeed, and expect to reap rewards in the form of job creation and electoral support. Diplomats are regularly called upon to help them conquer new markets. States and multinationals assist each other; the growth of the latter favours the economic expansion of the former.\textsuperscript{35} The power of these huge companies continues to be seen by many leaders, in France and elsewhere, as a factor of international influence. They are so important that diplomats do not hesitate to use them as conduits for foreign policy. In this respect, the example of oil companies is quite instructive.

Moreover, there is no evidence that transnational solidarity has been reinforced by any disconnection or weakening of the link between the citizen and the nation-state. According to the studies conducted for \textit{Les valeurs des Français}, the feeling of belonging is primarily rooted in ‘locality’ (43%), then in the ‘country as a whole’ (30%). This is followed by the region and the world (10%), and finally by Europe (a mere 5%). ‘Most French people derive their sense of identity from their locality and its surrounding area. The majority do not go beyond national borders,’ notes Yannick Lemel.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{The impotence of the state or the inadequacy of government policy?}

The very notion of the ‘impotence’ of the state is worth clarifying. Is the inability ‘structural’? Is it a matter of insufficient means or the breakdown of political will? The transnationalist analysis proves to be less than helpful when trying to understand the complexity of the fight against global problems such as money laundering, drug trafficking and terrorism. Factors such as the policies and diplomacy of the state need to be reinserted into the debate. The way in which states and their leaders perceive these threats, the price they are prepared to pay in order to combat them and the internal dilemmas they face cannot be ignored. Are states doing everything in their power to foil these threats to their security? There are grounds for serious doubt.

Certain illegal activities are tolerated by democratic governments because they represent substantial sources of income. To be sure, many states have enacted legislation against money laundering. There are centralised institutional mechanisms to deal with suspicious transactions, as well as procedures for freezing accounts and for the seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crime.\textsuperscript{37} When the G7 met in Paris in 1998, it created an intergovernmental body, the FATF (Financial Action Task Force), with the aim of encouraging the battle against money laundering. In June 2000, the FATF published a list of twenty-nine ‘non-cooperative’ countries. This ‘name and shame’ list is regularly updated as
the situation is monitored. The work of the FATF may be considered a relative success. It has inspired reform and led to anti-money laundering measures in many parts of the world.

But there are still many problems to be resolved. The FATF has no coercive power and is not authorised to conduct police investigations, which remain the responsibility of states. Only states have the power to define priorities and objectives in the fight against money laundering on their own territory. They also retain sole responsibility for combating the various forms of criminality such as counterfeiting, people smuggling and the trafficking of organs and animals, which have arisen in recent years.

The slowness of police and judicial mechanisms works to the advantage of money laundering operations. But the major obstacle is the explosion in the number of tax havens (offshore financial centres) over the last ten years. These were not created by the states which had benefited from the globalisation of the economy and wished to expand free trade. They were, initially, localised endeavours on the part of Monaco and small American states like New Jersey and Delaware. The big states have encouraged their proliferation and draw considerable benefit from them: “Many industrialised countries use the advantage of tax havens for international commercial transactions, especially for transactions involving ‘sensitive’ products ranging from arms to air transport,” notes Jean-François Thony, a judge who specialises in the fight against money laundering and terrorism. The initiative led by the member countries of the FATF seems somewhat derisory, given that some of their financial institutions have branches or agencies in offshore financial centres, an anomaly which never provokes the slightest reaction. When the FATF publishes its lists of ‘non-cooperative countries and territories’ (NCCTs), it is careful to avoid attacking its members, even though they are heavily implicated in the growth of tax havens. France itself is hardly blameless in this matter: its banks have many branches in offshore financial centres. Democracies frequently place the defence of sovereignty and economic interests above that of their security. Transnational actors profit this contradiction.

The fight against drugs is also indicative of governmental incoherence. States have been cooperating in a relatively efficient manner for several years now. But the continuing difficulties and paucity of results stem from the fact that many states are complicit in the trafficking of drugs. Some of them are direct participants in the trade; they shield these illegal activities because the cultivation of coca and opium is, in their view, a national economic asset. These ‘narcostates’ have nothing to fear, for no country wants to antagonise its allies. This form of compromise extends to certain international institutions. Thus the World Bank does not embarrass Colombia by asking where it gets the money it uses to repay its debt. And while the US is prepared to provide Colombia with yet more support for the war on drugs, it turns a blind eye to what goes on in Mexico, a country with which it has a more nuanced relationship.

When the fight against drugs is politically and technically feasible, it is not always so in human terms. Governments which are determined to destroy cannabis or opium harvests are aware that they will also eliminate the sole
means of subsistence for entire populations. Decisions of this kind plunge thousands of peasants into poverty if there are no accompanying measures to alleviate the damage. When the Taliban government banned the cultivation of opium in July 2000, the decree affected some 200,000 families. The question is just as urgent today, given that the income from the cultivation and trafficking of opium in 2003 exceeded the amount of international aid received by Afghanistan in that year. In its drive to eradicate coca plantations, the Colombian government was confronted with the resistance of the peasants, who refused to go back to planting crops such as coffee, the income from which would barely enable them to survive. The problem therefore calls for international action on a massive scale, but many states, despite the firm tone of official discourse, are reluctant to take such a step.

Despite the predictions made by some experts, the pre-eminent role of the state on the international stage is not under threat. New relations of power are being created; distinguished by paradox and complexity, they do not conform to the ‘two worlds’ schema. Transnationalists claim that no single state can overcome the problems posed by environmental damage, epidemics or international crime. But this has been true for such so-called ‘global’ issues throughout history. Nonetheless, the nation-state as a form of political organisation is not about to disappear. ‘The state is irreversible’, declared the British academic Barry Buzan in 1991, as if the fact were self-evident. Indeed: there is no way of going back.


Translated by Roger Leverdier

NOTES
8 ‘De la souveraineté à la capacité de l’État’ in Marie-Claude Smouts (ed.), p.50.
10 Josépha Laroche, op. cit., p. 87.
20 This third type is too general and needs some refining by distinguishing three sub-groups. First, the US, which is post-modern, unilateralist and reluctant to engage in multilateral cooperation. Second, advocates of ‘moral diplomacy’ like Sweden and Canada. Third, ‘pragmatic postmoderns’, of which France is a good example. This sub-group takes the incremental approach to cooperation (hence the extremely cautious attitude of France towards the International Criminal Court). Cf, Samy Cohen, *La Résistance des États*, ch. 1, Seuil, 2003.
24 This is the conclusion also reached by Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2000, p. 15.
25 Smouts (Marie-Claude) et al., *Dictionnaire des relations internationals*, Dalloz, 2003, p. 484.
26 Oxfam (Oxford Committee for Famine Relief) was founded in 1942 by three British citizens in order to raise awareness of the famine in Greece. Care (Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere) was founded by US citizens of European origin with the aim of helping the populations of Europe.
35 This has also been noted by Bertrand Badie and Marie-Claude Smouts. Cf. Le Retournement du monde, op. cit., p. 79.
41 Cf. the Peillon-Montebourg report.
Samy COHEN: «Les États et les "nouveaux acteurs"»
article publié initialement dans la revue *Politique internationale*, n°107, printemps 2005.

**Traducteurs:**

Anglais: Roger Leverdier
Arabe: Khalil Kalfat
Chinois: Chen Lichun
Espagnol: Arturo Vázquez Barrón
Russe: Andre Naoumov

**Droits:**

© Samy Cohen pour la version française
© Roger Leverdier/Institut Français du Royaume Uni pour la version anglaise
© Khalil Kalfat/Centre Français de Culture et de Coopération du Caire – Département de Traduction et d’Interprétation pour la version arabe
© Chen Lichun/Centre Culturel et de Coopération Linguistique de Pékin pour la version chinoise
© Arturo Vázquez Barrón/Centre Culturel et de Coopération de Mexico – Institut Français d’Amérique Latine pour la version espagnole
© Andre Naoumov/Centre Culturel Français de Moscou pour la version russe